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SUMMARY
The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and the Caribbean Basin Trade Protection
Act (CBTPA) of the USA are trade preference programmes offering reduced tariffs to African
countries. We investigate the impact of the preferences on the exports of the recipients in this
thesis. Using annual data on mirror exports, macroeconomic, social, cultural and religious variables,
we evaluate the impact of the preferences in three different ways—(1) difference-in-differences,
(2) quantile and (3) matching estimators. As part of our review of the empirical evidence, we
conduct a meta-analysis to summarise the quantitative AGOA literature. This is augmented with a
meta-regression to investigate the presence of publication bias. In chapter 3, the first of the three
empirical chapters, the question asked is, “has there been an observed increase in the exports of
AGOA and CBTPA recipients to the USA compared to their exports to the rest of the world?”
The identification of the impact consists of modelling the selection in exporting that occurs and
accounting for the zero trade occurring at the HS-6 digit level of disaggregation. One result is that,
the impact of the preference varies with the level of product aggregation.
The two remaining chapters focus on the AGOA preference and is identified due to the exogen-
ous provision of the preference. Chapter 4 adopts a matching approach while chapter 5 is based
on a quantile regression. The matching estimates providing the mean impacts are negative for
exports to the USA compared to the counter-factual. In Chapter 5, we show that, the impact of
the preference on the recipients is unequal—oil exporters are the largest gainers. We decompose
the impact by using the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition found in Machado and Mata (2005) for
quantile regressions. We find that, the gains to AGOA recipients are confined to the top half of the
export distribution—implying that the gains from AGOA are unequal and thus heterogeneous in
their impact on the recipients.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction and background
The provision of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) to Sub-Saharan African (SSA)
countries was one of the major changes in USA–Africa trade relations. This provides a unique
setting for a natural experiment in studying the impact of AGOA on beneficiary countries. Unlike
the European Union (EU) that provided a choice of preferences to African countries beyond the
Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)—the USA only has AGOA for the African countries1.
The question of whether AGOA has increased the exports of recipients is thus, an empirical question,
that is addressed in this thesis. Also of interest, is whether AGOA has succeeded in raising exports
of beneficiary countries beyond the initial years of the preference?
We contribute to the existing literature by borrowing econometric tool-kits from other fields of
economics to answer the question of whether the impact has been positive for the beneficiaries. The
econometric methods we adopt can be considered as new ways of analysing the impact of trade
preferences and these methods to the best of our knowledge have not been applied to analysing
trade preferences and AGOA in particular. We focus on both the short- and long-run effects of the
AGOA policy. We construct a counter-factual to measure the impact of AGOA on the beneficiaries2.
It is important to construct an appropriate counter-factual that provides a realistic estimate of the
impact of AGOA. The counter-factual is constructed in three ways—relying on (a) propensity
score matching methods of Rosenbaum and Rubin; (b) exact matching methods of Abadie et al.
(2001) and Abadie and Imbens (2011); and (c) the synthetic control matching approach of Abadie
et al. (2010, 2012) and Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003). There are some key differences between
these three approaches and we find that the synthetic control method provides a more appropriate
estimate of the impact in our case. One difference is that the synthetic control approach provides a
time series of the outcome of interest allowing the researcher to observe the post treatment trends in
the outcome. In addition, the synthetic control approach is more suited to case study analysis and
allows one to focus on a single case or country of interest (see Abadie et al., 2010, 2012; Abadie
and Gardeazabal, 2003). We discuss these methods including their similarities and differences in
more detail in chapter 4.
1These include the EBA, the EU-ACP (prior to 2008) and GSP+ preferences that African countries can access.
2Beneficiaries, recipients or treated countries are used throughout the thesis to refer to countries that have been
provided with the AGOA preference. In chapter 3 beneficiaries and recipients extend to other trade preferences, however,
to avoid ambiguity we make reference to the preference being discussed.
2Non-reciprocal preferences are reduced tariffs offered to developing countries (by developed and
middle income countries) to grant them market access and help them compete with more competitive
exporters in the markets of the preference providers3. In this regard, the offer is unilateral and
recipient countries are not expected to provide similar tariff reductions to the countries offering the
preferences. This began with the introduction of the GSP by developed economies in the 1970s
and continued into the 1980s and through till today with the introduction of newer non-reciprocal
preferential schemes for developing countries. The EU and USA have several of these schemes
with developing countries having membership of at least one of these schemes. The special and
differential treatment of the WTO allows developing countries to be given special treatment thereby
providing lower tariffs compared to other WTO members. The provisions include (1) allowing
longer time periods for agreements and commitments, (2) policies increasing trade opportunities
for developing countries, (3) measures to safeguard trade interests of developing member countries
(4) provision of assistance to developing countries to build their expertise in WTO activities and
the implementation of technical standards, and (5) special treatment for least developed country
(LDC) members4. The existing unilateral preferences of the USA and the EU are compatible with
the special and differential treatment provision of the WTO. However, the EU-ACP preferences of
the EU were found to be incompatible with this provision and have since 2008 been discontinued
and replaced by the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) which are WTO compatible.
There is a large empirical literature that has devoted much attention to the analysis of the
impact of trade preferences. The majority of the empirical literature has focussed on the EU’s trade
preferences (such as general system of preferences (GSP) GSP+, EU-African Caribbean Pacific
(ACP) and Everything but Arms (EBA) preferences) with quite a few studying the impact of AGOA.
The current research has focussed on the econometric approach to estimating the impact via the
gravity equation5 (see for example, Cipollina and Salvatici, 2010b; Silva and Tenreyro, 2006).
The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) of the USA is a programme offering reduced
trade tariffs to African countries6. The purpose of the Act is to grant market access to African
countries. In this thesis we contradict the current view that AGOA has increased exports to the USA.
We argue that, the increases observed are unequal and that the most benefits have been derived
by the largest exporters among the AGOA countries. Furthermore, majority of these gains have
accrued to oil exporting countries such as Nigeria, Angola, Chad, Republic of Congo, and Gabon.
Much of the literature has centred on the measurement of non-reciprocal preferences, that is
whether to use dummy variables or preference margins to represent the preferences (for example,
Cipollina and Salvatici, 2010a). Agostino et al. (2007); Aiello et al. (2010); Brenton and Hoppe
3For instance, Brazil, China, and India currently provide some preferential access to their markets.
4Available at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/devel e/dev special differential provisions e.htm
5Head and Mayer (2013) provides a survey on the right approach to estimating gravity models. Although, not
essentially a treatment of trade preferences it comments on the problems of some of the previous literature on regional
trade preferences and free trade areas in general.
6The literature considers AGOA to be a non-reciprocal preference. However, there are several requirements that
prospective African countries need to meet to qualify for the preference. For example, the USA places emphasis on
democracy, rule of law, and regular elections; economies should be market-based and not command economies; they
should eliminate barriers to trade and investment with the USA; respect American intellectual property and protect it;
enact policies to reduce corruption, poverty; eliminate child labour practices; and increase education and healthcare;
and protect the rights of its workers (See http://www.agoa.info/index.php?view=about&story=country eligibility for
further information.). Given that African countries need to fulfil these and other requirements for continual eligibility the
non-reciprocal nature of the preference can be questioned.
3(2006); Brenton and Ikezuki (2004); Collier and Venables (2007); Condon and Stern (2011); Frazer
and Van Biesebroeck (2010); Gibbon (2003); Mattoo et al. (2003) and Tadesse and Fayissa (2008)
are among the papers studying the impact of trade preferences for developing countries. Others
have focussed on the utilization of preferences (Bureau et al., 2007; Nilsson, 2005, 2011; UNCTAD,
2003), there is also a subgroup focussing on preference erosion due to the multilateral liberalization
of tariffs (Alexandraki and Lankes, 2004; Francois et al., 2006; Hoekman et al., 2006, 2009; Liapis,
2007; UNCTAD, 2007). Rules of origin that limit the use of preferences are also studied in the
literature (Augier et al., 2004; Brenton and Manchin, 2003; Brenton and O¨zden, 2005; Cadot et al.,
2006; Cadot and de Melo, 2007; Edwards and Lawrence, 2010).
The dominant tool used by many of the articles listed earlier in analysing the impact is the
gravity model7. In using the gravity model, Silva and Tenreyro (2006) have advocated the use
of the poisson pseudo maximum likelihood estimator to account for the numerous zeros found
in trade data. On the contrary, Cipollina and Salvatici (2010b) find the poisson estimator to be
biased and suggest that the Heckman two step estimator is less biased under appropriate identifying
restrictions. These methods have been extended to firm level and tariff line data in recent papers
(for example, Aiello et al., 2010).
The United States of America (USA) has provided several preferential trade agreements to
developing countries. These include the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) offered
to selected Sub-Saharan African countries (SSA) and the Caribbean Basin Trade Protection Act
(CBTPA) which were provided to Caribbean Basin countries8. The CBTPA is part of the earlier
Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) which was launched as the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery
Act (CBERA) provided to the Caribbean Basin countries in the early 1980s. Although, we focus on
the CBTPA preferences which were provided in 2000 we do make references to the earlier CBI
and CBERA preferences. There has been much debate in the literature about the impact of these
preferences for developing countries. These studies include the impact of AGOA (for example,
Brenton and Hoppe, 2006; Brenton and Ikezuki, 2004; Collier and Venables, 2007; Frazer and Van
Biesebroeck, 2010; Gibbon, 2003; Mattoo et al., 2003; Pa´ez et al., 2010; Tadesse and Fayissa, 2008)
and studies on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Caribbean Basin Initiative
(CBI) and Dominican Republic–Central America Free Trade Area (CAFTA-DR) (Ames, 1993; Haar,
1990; Hornbeck, 2010; Hutchinson and Schumacher, 1994; Ozden and Sharma, 2006; Yeboah et al.,
2009).
These studies are mixed in terms of the impact of the preferences on developing countries. We
believe that the mixed results can be attributed to the construction of the counter-factual by which
the impact of the preferences are measured. In other words, the comparison of the exports of the
beneficiaries to the non-beneficiaries need to be more carefully laid out and estimated. Much of the
estimation of the impact is based on regression analysis that pools all countries together and returns
a mean impact of the programme based on a dummy variable indicating treatment. Collier and
Venables (2007); Di Rubbo and Canali (2008) and Nilsson (2005) tend to carry out their analysis
by providing a means of measuring the performance of the preferential beneficiaries by comparing
7Collier and Venables (2007) is an exception and a few others.
8Caribbean and Central American Countries: Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas The, Barbados,
Belize, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada,
Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, Panama, St. Kitts and
Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, and Turks and Caicos Islands
4their exports to the USA to that of the European Union (EU). This is important in isolating the
impact of AGOA given that these countries also export to other regions and also receive preferential
treatment from these regions. In chapter 3, we instead control for the exports of the developing
countries to the rest of the world. This way, we can account for the various preference programmes
and trade agreements existing between the AGOA beneficiaries and their remaining trade partners.
Frazer and Van Biesebroeck (2010) argue that the non-uniform preferences provided by AGOA
and its selective choice of countries from within the continent satisfy the requirement for analysing
the policy impact of AGOA. The implication of Frazer and Van Biesebroeck (2010) is that, the
AGOA preference is exogenous and provides us with a policy experiment to assess the impact of
AGOA on the beneficiaries. This in addition makes AGOA exogenous and thus endogeneity of
the preferences is not a problem for our analysis. The CBTPA preference was also unilaterally
applied to selected Caribbean and Latin American Countries9. The variation in countries selected
and products covered is employed in the analysis to study the impact of the AGOA and CBTPA
preferences on selected products at the HS-6 digit level of trade. Besides, Agostino et al. (2007)
also notes that in the absence of these preference agreements, the average level of trade becomes
the counterfactual hence, adopting this idea—the introduction of the CBTPA and AGOA would
lead to a departure from the normal level of trade. This departure from the normal level of trade
can thus be interpreted as the effect of the policy. As discussed in chapter 3 an attempt is made at
controlling for any potential endogenous relationships that might exist and be an issue of concern
in the analysis.
1.2 Significance and contribution of the thesis
The novel aspects of the thesis lies in the methodological approach undertaken in the empirical
chapters. For instance, the meta-analysis of the AGOA literature in chapter 2, the matching analysis
in chapter 4 and the quantile regression analysis to show the heterogeneous impact of AGOA in
chapter 5 are all new ways of analysing the impact of AGOA. These are the main contributions of
the thesis. Although, this is applied to the AGOA preferences of the USA, they can be extended to
study other trade preferences on offer.
In particular, chapter 5 provides key insight to the analysis of AGOA, these can be summarised
as: (a) the distribution of benefits to recipients of AGOA is unequal with larger exporters and
crude oil exporting countries reaping the majority of these benefits; (b) the composition of AGOA
countries (in terms of whether these countries consistently maintain the preference throughout
the sample or are removed from the preference a number of times) does not change the impact of
AGOA in major ways. In other words, excluding countries that do not enjoy the AGOA preference
consistently or maintaining them in the analysis does not change the impact of AGOA neither does it
remove the unequal distribution of the impact towards oil exporting countries. The differences in the
impact are marginal at best—indicating that compositional effects of the choice of AGOA countries
does not affect the quantile results; (c) the comparator countries (in this case the counter-factual
countries) do not change the result that the impact is heterogeneous; (d) the choice of products
included in the analysis are key to the gains observed for the AGOA countries. The gains are
9The introduction of preferences in textiles and apparel within the CBTPA preference is used to model this variation
in preferences for Caribbean Basin countries
5concentrated in a few products. Inclusion of crude oil products widen the unequal benefits—thereby
leading to large inequalities in exports of the AGOA recipients. Generally, countries exporting the
products offering the gains are the exporters that tend to enjoy the most benefits of their AGOA
status.
The lessons therefore in analysing AGOA is that, the choice of countries for AGOA (as well as
in this analysis) is not a major deciding factor on the impact of AGOA in the case of a quantile
analysis. However, the composition of countries can be important when using other methods based
on the mean impact of the preference. It may lead to a reduction of the AGOA impact but does
not entirely eliminate it when the comparison is with other developing countries. In terms of
methodology, OLS estimates are likely to have heteroscedastic standard errors leading to wrong
test statistics. In this regard the recent econometric literature has offered solutions—for instance,
the clustering of the standard errors might be useful in reducing heteroscedasticity within the
difference-in-differences context. For example, Brewer et al. (2013) and Donald and Lang (2007)
provide conditions whereby the problem can be resolved by the use of generalised least squares,
cluster-robust standard errors and bootstrapping of the standard errors. While Conley and Taber
(2011) and Donald and Lang (2007) provide conditions for identification of the treatment effects in
the case where the countries (or groups) are small. Athey and Imbens (2006) provide the case where
average benefits can vary across the treated and control countries (or groups). Heteroscedasticity
per se does not lead to biased coefficient estimates but can lead to wrong inference (see for example,
Greene, 2003; Wooldridge, 2002)—in that we might wrongly reject the null hypothesis of “no
impact of AGOA” (or fail to reject the null hypothesis as the standard errors have been erroneously
computed).
The main issue that might affect the size of the estimated impact is the outlying countries
and any endogeneity that might be present. These are likely to overstate the average impact of
any least squares estimation performed. The quantile regression which tends to be more robust
to heteroscedasticity and outliers compared to OLS would be a more appropriate approach in
estimating the impact10. A caveat to the quantile regression is that, there have not been applications
of this to gravity models and the presence of incidental parameters makes it difficult to incorporate
country-year fixed effects in the estimated gravity model. Thus, the application of the quantile
regression to gravity equations in chapter 4 provides another contribution to the literature. The
median estimate in the results section of the chapter were smaller in magnitude compared to the
OLS estimate. We therefore suggest that in studying the impact of trade preferences in general (not
only AGOA preferences) the median regression results should be reported together with the least
squares or alternative non-linear approaches to provide a more realistic or conservative measure of
the impact of the preference. This is mainly because some developing countries are more able to
take advantage of the preferences and thus find themselves among exporting nations at the upper
tails of the export distribution. The majority of the remaining countries can be found at the lower
tail of the distribution.
The summary of the remaining contributions include (a) the generalised least squares (GLS)
10Following Athey and Imbens (2006); Brewer et al. (2013); Conley and Taber (2011); Donald and Lang (2007) it
is still reasonable to estimate reasonable impacts of AGOA and perform appropriate inference. However, it would be
important to take into account outliers during the estimation process. One solution to outliers is the use of an impulse
dummy—here a dummy is defined taking the value of one for the outlier and zero for all remaining observations and this
becomes an additional variable in the regression analysis.
6random effects model is biased and its use in studying preferences leads to highly irregular estimates.
On the contrary, using the Mundlak/Chamberlain random effects models reduces this bias in large
samples. The Mundlak/Chamberlain device is a good way of controlling for the correlation between
the random effects on one hand and the covariates on the other; and (b) we provide a quantitative
summary of the literature as well as make inferences about publication bias.
1.3 AGOA and CBI preferences
Source: Author’s elaboration using map coordinate data from www.mappinghacks.com/data and trade
preference data from USITC website
Figure 1.1: AGOA, ATPA and CBERA countries
The AGOA and CBI preferences have undergone several amendments since their inception in
2000 (started in 2001) and 1983 respectively. We provide a summary of these important revisions
in the AGOA and CBI preferences below. For the AGOA preferences the following revisions are
noteworthy11:
• AGOA I - extended GSP product eligibility (4650 products); certain limitations (eg. compet-
itive needs legislation) removed; inclusion of 1835 products not covered in the GSP as duty
free products.
• AGOA II - (2002) further relaxation of rules of origin in apparel and selected textile articles
(eg. towels & blankets, etc); knit-to-shape apparel included; rules of origin relaxed to include
yarn; Botswana and Namibia given LDC status; volume cap limit doubled
• AGOA III - extended AGOA to 2015 and apparel provisions to 2007, ethnic printed fabrics
added; use of foreign collars and cuffs in domestic garments allowed
11www.agoa.info and AGOA reports to congress
7Source: Author’s elaboration using map coordinate data from www.mappinghacks.com/data and trade
preference data from USITC website
Figure 1.2: The various preferences offered by the USA
• AGOA IV - (2006) Access given to LDC AGOA countries for HS 50 - 63; new rules of origin
allowing inputs to be sourced from the AGOA LDC group. Third country fabric extended to
2012; increase in volume cap on garments.
• AGOA V - (Nov. 2009) single implementation of rules of origin; harmonisation and expansion
of USA preferences and extension of trade benefits currently available.
The CBI has also undergone several phases and these include12 :
• Launched in 1983 as the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA)
• 1984 - 20 countries received benefits (Includes El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras and
Nicaragua in 1990).
• 1990 - CBERA made permanent and amended.
– 20% tariff reduction on certain leather products
– Duty free treatment for products using 100% inputs from the US
• 1991 - 94 tariff categories added or expanded
• 1992 - 28 tariff categories added or expanded.
• 2000 - US Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act enacted.
– Added apparel exports
12www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/preference-programs and USTR (2009)
8– This expires in 2010 (or if an FTA of the Americas comes into force)
• 2002 - CBERA amended
• 2006 - CAFTA-DR benefits begin for Dominican Republic, Honduras,
Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua. Costa Rica joins in 2009.
• The CBTPA has however, been extended for the remaining countries beyond 2010.
Figure (1.3) shows that, the Sub-Saharan African (SSA), Latin America and Caribbean (LAC)
and East Asia and Pacific (EAP) countries have less than a 5% share of world exports on average.
The South Asian (S. Asia) and Middle East and North African (ME & NA) countries have shares
of world exports larger than 5% on average between 1995 and 2011. In spite of the low share of
world exports, the SSA and LAC countries export on average at least 40% of their exports to the
combined EU and USA markets. This share varies for individual countries and ranges between 40%
and 99% of their exports. Countries such as Aruba, Cayman Islands, Chad, Dominican Republic,
Haiti, and Lesotho among others export over 70% of their total exports to the EU and USA markets.
Majority of the LAC countries export less than 20% to the EU market with majority of exports
going to the USA market. Haiti for example exports less than 6.5% of its exports to the EU. For
SSA, majority of the countries export more products to the EU compared to the USA. Although,
some exceptions exist for the major oil exporters such as Nigeria and Angola that export higher
shares of total exports to the USA than to the EU.
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Figure 1.3: Share of world exports by region
91.4 Summary of the thesis chapters
In chapter 2, we review some of the empirical literature on trade preferences. We more specifically
carry out a meta-analysis of the impact of a specific preference — AGOA, which is the main
preference studied in this thesis. The use of the meta-analysis and meta-regression techniques allow
us to explain the differences in coefficients reported as well as test for publication bias. We do not
find conclusive evidence on the existence of publication bias. However, there is some indication of
the existence of publication bias and a genuine empirical effect of AGOA.
Chapter 3 is an empirical exercise on 981 disaggregated HS six digit level products. In addition
to studying AGOA, we also look at the impact of similar preferences offered to the Caribbean
Basin countries. This allows us to identify the impact of AGOA while controlling for competing
preferences that offer similar agreements. The impact of the preferences varies according to the
level of disaggregation as well as the group of commodities studied.
Chapter 4 is the second of our three empirical chapters. The analysis focuses on aggregate
export data (that is, total rather than product level exports). The approach also differs, as we borrow
from the evaluation literature by using the propensity score matching, covariate matching and
synthetic control approaches to uncover the impact of AGOA on recipients. The counter-factual
is defined using a group of countries very similar to the AGOA recipients. The results are mixed
and show that compared to the counter-factual countries, the AGOA beneficiaries exported less to
the USA. In using the synthetic control approach we are able to explore the trends in exports of a
particular AGOA country with its synthetic counterpart (counter-factual). We find that oil exporting
countries show a higher trend in post-AGOA exports compared to the counter-factual. Excluding
oil products eliminates most of the positive gap and in most cases reverses the impact—thereby
showing the counter-factual trends to be higher than the oil exporting countries in this case. A
key result in the chapter and which is supported in the literature is that much of the gains are
driven by oil exports. In spite of the gains in AGOA preferential exports, we find that, the GSP
and the most favoured nation (MFN) exports of the AGOA beneficiaries were less than that of the
counter-factual countries. Moreover, a comparison of the trends in exports by selected countries
and their synthetic (counter-factual) counterparts show that Angola, Chad, and Republic of Congo
obtain higher exports than their counter-factual countries. The gains are driven by oil exports and
are no longer present after excluding oil exports (except in the case of Angola).
Finally, chapter 5 disentangles the effects of the impact on AGOA countries. The matching
estimates show that, when comparing total exports of recipients to the counter-factual, there are
no significant increases in exports. We try to see whether the impact is heterogeneous. Thus,
we compare the impact at the various quantiles of the distribution of exports, to rule out the
influence of any outlying countries in the export distribution. Secondly, we also carry out a
quantile decomposition to see where the sources of the differences in the impact are obtained
from. The decomposition allows us to see whether the impact is due mainly to differences in the
characteristics of the AGOA and non-AGOA countries or mainly due to differences in coefficients.
The results obtained show that a few countries enjoy the gains of AGOA at the top of the distribution.
The majority of countries at the 75th percentile and below show lower exports compared to the
non-AGOA countries. Table (1.1) summarises the chapters, methods and results presented in the
thesis.
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Table 1.1: Summary of thesis chapters and main research questions
Chapter Research Question Methodology Results
1: Introduction - - -
2: Literature & Meth-
odological Review
Is there publication
bias in the AGOA lit-
erature?
Literature search &
review including a
meta-analysis and
meta-regression
analysis.
Significant differences
in the estimated AGOA
impact can be found in
the literature
3: The impact of
trade preferences on
exports of develop-
ing countries: The
case of the AGOA
and CBTPA prefer-
ences of the USA
Has there been an ob-
served increase in the
exports of AGOA and
CBTPA recipients to
the USA compared to
their exports to the rest
of the world?
Regression ana-
lysis: PPMLE,
Mundlak RE, ran-
dom effects & fixed
effects
Mixed results: CB-
TPA preferences on one
hand have increased the
exports of the recipients
while AGOA is mixed
4: Impact of AGOA:
A matching approach
a. Can we find
a positive impact of
AGOA through match-
ing AGOA countries
with non-AGOA coun-
tries?
1. Propensity score
matching 2. Exact
mahalanobis match-
ing 3. Synthetic
control matching
No significant impact
of AGOA is present in
approaches (1) and (2).
Approach (3) provides
mixed results for each
country and depending
on whether oil products
are included in total ex-
ports.
5: Is there a hetero-
geneous impact on
exports to the USA
Do we observe an het-
erogeneous impact on
recipients of AGOA
preferences?
Quantile regression
and decomposition
analysis
The effect of the prefer-
ence is unequal and we
find that, the impact is
concentrated at the up-
per tail of the export dis-
tribution.
6: Conclusion - - -
1.5 Data
Data for chapter 2 is entirely constructed from the various econometric studies of the AGOA impact.
A search for articles was carried out at various periods between January and June 2011 and again
in September 2012. The search strategy involved querying the Google search engine, Munich
Personal REPEC Archive (MPRA), Google Scholar, ECONLIT, SCOPUS, Wiley Journals, World
Bank’s JOLIS, Web of Knowledge and JSTOR databases. The following key words “AGOA trade
agreement”, “economic impact of AGOA trade preferences ”, “African growth and opportunity
act” and “AGOA trade preferences” were used in finding the studies for the meta analysis. A
couple of studies were also obtained from the references of the selected studies. The search led to
over 30 studies, however these were reduced to fourteen studies because some of the studies had no
econometric content or were analysing other aspects of AGOA.
Data for the analysis is obtained from the World Integrated Trade System13 (WITS) which
queries data from UN Comtrade for export (and import) data and UN TRAINS for the tariff data.
13http://wits.worldbank.org/wits/
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Gross domestic product data is obtained from The World Bank’s World Development Indicators14
(WDI) and gravity type variables (viz., landlocked, area, latitude, number of cities, official language,
etc) are obtained from the CEPII distances database15. In addition, our political variables (military
and religion) are obtained from the Database of Political Institutions16 (DPI) and democracy
time series dataset 17. Finally, the preferential dummies are constructed based on information
sourced from the WITS preferential database and the United States International Trade Commission
(USITC)18 The remaining variables constructed (viz., RCA and market size) are based on the
variables obtained from the sources above. Table (3.1) provides further information on the variables
used as well as summary statistics.
Data for chapters 4 – 5 are obtained from the same sources. Data for the outcomes are
obtained from the UN-Comtrade and USITC databases. The World Development Indicators and
IMFs International Financial Statistics databases provide macroeconomic indicators (such as,
gross domestic product, inflation, population, value-added (in industry, manufacturing, agriculture,
construction, services, etc), interest rates, exchange rates among others) for the purposes of
matching similar countries. Additionally, Kaufmann’s Global Governance19, Database of Political
Institutions20, Polity IV and Bates et al (2005)21 databases provide political, cultural and religious
data to augment the vector of control variables needed to perform a realistic match. Finally, gravity
type variables are obtained from the CEPII gravity database 22.
1.6 Outlook
The thesis is composed of six chapters. The next chapter, chapter 2 although contains the theoretical
and empirical discussion of the existing literature has a section devoted to the empirical analysis
of the estimated impacts of the econometric literature on AGOA. Chapters 3 – 5 are empirical in
nature and analyse various aspects of the impact of AGOA preferences on the recipients. Finally,
chapter 6 provides a summary of the results presented and concludes the thesis.
14http://data.worldbank.org/
15Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales: http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/
bdd/distances.htm
16Thorsten Beck, George Clarke, Alberto Groff, Philip Keefer, and Patrick Walsh, 2001. ”New tools in comparative
political economy: The Database of Political Institutions.” 15:1, 165-176 (September), World Bank Economic Review.
17Norris, 2009, http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Data/Democracy%20TimeSeries%
20Data/
18http://dataweb.usitc.gov/
19www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/
20Thorsten Beck, George Clarke, Alberto Groff, Philip Keefer, and Patrick Walsh, 2001. “New tools in comparative
political economy: The Database of Political Institutions.” 15:1, 165-176 (September), World Bank Economic Review.
21Robert Bates ; Karen Feree; James Habyarimana; Macartan Humphreys ; Smita Singh, “Other Political Data
(updated 2005)”, http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/14977 UNF:5:XzsUmjt4AZzpm9JB3hO6pA== Murray Research Archive
[Distributor] V1 [Version]
22http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/gravity.asp
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Chapter 2
Literature and Methodological Review
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter a brief review of the literature on trade preferences is provided. In the first part,
we review the existing theoretical literature on trade preferences. We trace the theory from the
earlier works of Adam Smith to the modern discussion of preferential trade agreements (PTA).
An empirical and methodological review is also conducted in the second part reviewing various
works on the impact of trade preferences with a specific focus on the USA. The final part presents
a quantitative summary of the AGOA impact studies. The quantitative summary is conducted
using a meta-analysis and meta-regression framework. The chapter is organised as follows, section
(2.2) introduces the theoretical literature and framework for the next three chapters. Section (2.3)
provides a methodological review of the gravity model. Section (2.4) provides the empirical
literature. The next section (2.5), provides a meta-analysis to summarise the quantitative literature
as well as a meta-regression to explain the differences in the reported study effects found in the
literature. Section (2.6) concludes the chapter. We now turn to a discussion of the theoretical
literature and provide a theoretical framework for the remaining chapters.
2.2 Theoretical literature and framework
2.2.1 Preferential trade agreements
Much of the theoretical work on preferential trade agreements (PTA) have largely centred on
reciprocal PTAs or what is known as Regional Trade Agreements (RTA)1. The majority of the
theoretical discussion on non reciprocal PTAs draw upon the earlier work on Customs Union theory.
This has led Baldwin (2011, 69) to acknowledge that, there are “conflicting, overlapping, and
competing terminologies.” Pomfret (2001) and Baldwin (2011) trace the contributions to PTAs
to the early writings of Adam Smith, Robert Torrens, Frank Taussig and Gottried Harbeler2. In
this section, we draw on some of the earlier work and highlight the key areas within this body of
literature that helps in thinking through non reciprocal PTAs.
1Parts of this section have been included in a chapter in the Handbook of Trade and Development. Cirera, Xavier
and Edgar F.A. Cooke (forthcoming), “Trade Preferences”in Oliver Morissey, Ricardo Lopez and Kishor Sharma (eds.),
Handbook of Trade and Development. Edward Elgar.
2Pomfret (1986, 2001) has a more detailed discussion of these works to which the reader is referred to and it includes
the references to the much earlier studies.
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Pomfret (2001) notes that, the early contributions dwelled on the impact of the preferences on
the giver and not on the recipient. The example offered by Pomfret, is highlighted in his quotation
of Adam Smith.
When a nation binds itself by treaty to exempt goods of one country from duties
to which it subjects those of all others, the country or at least the merchants and
manufacturers of the country, whose commerce is so favoured, must necessarily derive
great advantage from the treaty (Pomfret, 2001, : 177 citing Smith, 1776, bk IV Ch.
6).
On the other hand, Tausig (1892) placed emphasis on the market share of the recipient in the
provider’s market (Pomfret, 2001). Pomfret (2001) notes that, welfare in Tausig’s world largely
depended upon the impact on prices. Much of the modern analysis of preferences are largely
based on the recipients and how these preferences can improve and enhance market access. The
key issues in recent work on non-reciprocal preferences focus on the utilisation of preferences by
recipients, preference margins, preference erosion, rules of origin as well as preference rents among
others. There have been key developments in the measurement of preference erosion, margins
and utilisation (see for instance, Carre`re, 2011; Carre`re et al., 2010; Fugazza and Nicita, 2013;
Hoekman and Nicita, 2011; Low et al., 2009)
Baldwin (2011) incorporates imperfect competition and discusses how industrial location of
production can be affected by PTAs. Unilateral tariff reduction by developed countries should make
it more attractive for industries to locate in developing countries (Baldwin, 2011). This is expected
to occur due to a reduction in “demand-linked causality” which provides locational advantages
to locating in the North (Baldwin, 2011). The lower tariffs can then be attractive for firms to
situate in the South—near raw material supplies and get access to cheaper labour (Baldwin, 2011).
Baldwin (2011) concedes that, most GSP programs have not done much in promoting industrial
relocation of production to the South. Pa´ez et al. (2010) provides evidence of the location of firms
in Lesotho and a few other countries due to generous textile preferences offered by the USA under
the AGOA program. Should unilateral preferences invoke changes in location of production it may
thus provide further gains for developing country beneficiaries.
Conconi and Perroni (2011) on the contrary develop a theoretical model to explain whether
unilateral trade or reciprocal trade preferences are more useful in promoting policy credibility and
liberalization in developing countries. Based on an analysis of a small open developing economy
and a large partner where the small country has problems committing to the trade policies it
formulates. They examine three scenarios and the possible implications of the scenarios on the
small country’s ability to maintain consistent trade policy or sustain free trade. The scenarios are
(1) the small country maintains its trade policy on its own, (2) unilateral concessions by the large
country, (3) reciprocal trade agreement whereby both countries provide each other concessions.
Based on their analysis, scenario (3) makes it much easier for the small country to pursue free
trade and pursue credible trade policy. The other two scenarios do not help in overcoming the
policy credibility of the small country. Its policy credibility depends on how it interacts with the
private sector (Conconi and Perroni, 2011)3. Scenario (2) resembles the non-reciprocal preference
3Conconi and Perroni (2011) provide the EPA arrangements of the EU with ACP countries and AGOA as examples
of scenario (3) as these have some elements of reciprocity.
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situation and (3) offers the reciprocal PTA scenario. By their submission, the non-reciprocal case
does not provide the needed incentives to promote free trade and increase the policy credibility
of the recipients. This might explain the over-reliance of developing countries on the largess of
developed countries when it comes to trade. Nevertheless, the proliferation of FTAs between the
USA and several countries as well as the EU and other countries should lead to more credible
policies and a move to free trade—as suggested by scenario (3).
2.2.2 Theoretical framework
The diagram below (figure 2.1) represents the gains that can be obtained by developing countries
offered tariff preferences by the North (in panel A) and the losses as a result of preference erosion
due to multilateral tariff liberalisation (panel B). In the absence of preferential tariffs in (A) the
export supply curve is t+ S. The distance ab is the height of the tariff applied in the developed
country market. The introduction of a non preferential tariff for a subset of countries—created by
removing the tariffs on these countries leads to an increase in the supply curve to S. The preference
recipients supply more exports to the market and their exports increase from Q1 to Q2. As a result
Area A+ C becomes a transfer of income from the preference giver to the preference recipients.
Pomfret (1986, 2001) refers to area A+ C as a transfer of tariff revenue from the preference
giver to the developing country. The additional export provides extra producer surplus for the
beneficiaries (Pomfret, 1986, 2001). The lower price allows demand to shift away from other higher
cost suppliers to the recipient countries (Hoekman et al., 2009). The other suppliers faced with the
tariffs thus lose some of their export surplus and this is gained as area A by the recipient countries
(Hoekman et al., 2009). However, Hoekman et al. (2009) note that, the impact depends to a great
extent on the export supply and import demand elasticities of the exporting and importing countries
and the substitutability of the products between the countries among others. Thus, the key gains to
be received by beneficiaries largely depends on the elasticities. Larger gains may be experienced
by recipients in products that are quite similar and have large elasticities. In addition, where the
preference provider has low import elasticities the gains may be much larger. This explains the
reason for the large gains in the energy and extractive sectors by AGOA recipients (essentially, the
similarity in the product and the elasticities involved).
Panel (B) in figure (2.1) represents the impact of preference erosion on the countries provided
with preferential access to the developed country market. The liberalization of MFN tariffs or
removal of tariffs for non preference receiving countries leads to the losses shown as area B in
the figure. The recipients lose part of area A+ C they gained as a result of the preferential tariffs
in panel (A)—this loss is shown as area B in panel (B) of the diagram. The impact of preference
erosion is thus, a decrease in demand from D1 to D2 leading to a decrease in exports by the
preference recipients to Q3. The loss in surplus by the recipient countries is then gained by other
non recipient countries. In the presence of more efficient and lower cost suppliers this loss can
become larger and create market access problems for the preference recipients. One example is,
the reduced gains in the apparel and textile sectors after the removal of the textile quotas (the
cancellation of the multi-fibre arrangement). Not only in the textiles sector but also, in other
sectors such as agriculture, there has been a gradual multilateral reduction in tariffs due to various
WTO rounds and this has contributed to the erosion in preferences of developing countries. Low
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Figure 2.1: Preference gains and erosion
et al. (2009) for instance provide the estimates for non-agricultural market access. They find that,
developing countries suffer from preference erosion as a result of the reduction in MFN tariffs.
For instance, they report that, the total preference loss by Namibia is US$ 19.7 million as a result
of MFN tariff reductions by the QUAD4 countries and Australia based on the 2003 MFN tariffs.
However, after adjusting for competition from non-MFN trade—the loss declines to $ 10.7 million.
Similarly, total preference losses for Botswana, Cameroon, Congo, Coˆte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya
and Nigeria are estimated to be 1.7, 2.8, 0.4, 25.3, 19.9, 26.4 and 6.6 million dollars respectively.
Incorporating the non-MFN trade adjustments leads to a decline in the estimated preference losses.
A second figure below is used to show the export supply response of the developing countries
and to show what happens when they export to other destinations. Given the world net import
demand, a typical preference recipient would supply the USA, EU and the rest of the world with
their exports. Given various destinations, a typical developing country would make the choice of
how much to supply to each destination based on several factors. Chief among these factors, is
the proportion of the world price they would receive from exporting to a particular destination.
In addition, other factors such as transportation and trade costs as well as the trade policy of the
destination would influence their decision5. One would expect more exports to be supplied to
destinations offering more favourable trade policy in the form of very low tariffs holding transport
costs and other costs constant. In the diagram, assuming that the USA provided lower tariffs relative
to the EU and ROW, we would expect a larger share of the exports to be delivered to the USA
market. Thus, preferential access should lead to a shift in exports from other destinations to the
preference giving market in the short-run as preference recipients prepare to increase their export
capacity in products receiving preferential access.
Generally, it is expected that, there would be a larger increase in existing exports (intensive
margin) than in new product exports (extensive margin)—the preferential tariff encourages more
exports in existing exports (the intensive margin) which are easier to increase rather than creating
4The four countries Canada, EU, Japan and USA are usually referred to as the QUAD countries in WTO.
5Tastes are important also but ignored here to simplify the discussion that follows.
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Figure 2.2: Net Import demand and tariff preferences of three destinations
new exports (the extensive margin). However, Cardamone (2011) and Cipollina and Salvatici
(2010b) find the contradicting result of a smaller effect at the intensive margin of exports compared
to the extensive margin. In this vein, we would expect a larger impact on the extensive margin
of exports to the USA. This is mainly due to the additional products that were included in the
AGOA agreement. For example, beneficiaries were offered special market access in textile and
apparel products and provided duty and quota free access in specific apparel products. Countries
such as Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Lesotho, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, South Africa, Swaziland
and Tanzania have taken advantage of the apparel provision. This would show as an increase in
the extensive margin for the countries that were not exporting apparel and textile products due to
existing restrictions imposed by the USA and the multi-fibre arrangement (MFA).
Figure (2.2) shows these probable effects of trade preferences offered by developed economies
for a typical developing country. In the diagram, there are three regions, the USA, EU and ROW.
Developing countries (and for that matter AGOA recipients) would tend to supply more exports
to countries that offer the right price incentives. Here the lower price incentives are offered by
providing preferential tariffs that reduce the wedge between the world price and the actual price
received by exporters. The higher price received by exporters due to the lower tariff would yield
higher exports as exemplified by the export supply to the USA.
2.3 Methodological review: the gravity model
The gravity model is reviewed in this section given its popularity in empirical applications. A
number of the studies discussed in the next section are based on a gravity model. The importance
of the gravity model in empirical trade has been emphasised by Cipollina and Salvatici (2010a)
and Head and Mayer (2013) among other authors. In view of this and given that the gravity model
forms the basis of the quantile regressions estimated in chapter (5) we conduct a review in this
section. Nevertheless, the approach adopted in chapter (3) has a lot of similarities to the gravity
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model and this is explored further below.
Cipollina and Salvatici (2010a) conduct a meta-analysis of several studies that have employed
gravity models in studying reciprocal trade agreements. This is a small subset of the larger literature
using gravity models. The literature has used gravity models for several areas, such as studies
on preferential trade, foreign direct investment, transport costs, migration, free trade agreements,
regional trade agreements and the impact of disasters on trade among several other areas in the
trade literature. Cardamone (2007) is another survey of gravity models in the area of preferential
trade agreements. Head and Mayer (2013) is a survey of the estimation and interpretation of gravity
models for the analysis of trade flows. Anderson (1979); Anderson and van Wincoop (2003);
Anderson and Yotov (2012); Baier and Bergstrand (2007, 2009a); Baldwin and Taglioni (2006);
Chaney (2008); French (2013); Helpman et al. (2007); Silva and Tenreyro (2006); Westerlund and
Wilhelmsson (2011) and a few others are studies that discuss the methodological and theoretical
issues in estimating gravity regressions.
Head and Mayer (2013) distinguishes general, structural and naive gravity models as the three
main definitions of gravity discussed in the theoretical and empirical studies of bilateral trade. The
general gravity equation in the trade literature according to Head and Mayer (2013) is expressed as:
Xij = GEiMjφij .
Where Xij is exports from country i to j, G is a gravitational constant, Ei represents exporter
country characteristics (or as referred to by Head and Mayer (2013)—“capabilities”),Mj represents
importer characteristics and φij captures trade costs. The variables Ei and Mj are defined here to
be consistent with the model presented in chapter 3. The model can be estimated after imposing
a few conditions and expressing E and M as a function of observable characteristics (Head and
Mayer, 2013).
The structural gravity is based on the following equation:
Xij =
Yi
Ωi︸︷︷︸
Ei
Xj
Φj︸︷︷︸
Mj
φij .
where, Yi is the total value of production, Xj is the total value of the importer’s expenditure on
all exporters, and Ωi and Φj are what Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) refer to as “multilateral
price resistance” and these are defined as:
Φj =
∑
l
φljYl
Ωl
and Ωi =
∑
l
φilXl
Φl
.
Head and Mayer (2013) note that structural gravity can be estimated at either the aggregate or
industry level of trade and that empirically, GDP is taken as the proxy for Yi and Xj .
The final equation for the gravity model is the naive form expressed below.
Xij = GY
a
i Y
b
j φij
Where Yi and Yj are exporter and importer GDP respectively and a and b are the GDP elasticities
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which are theoretically predicted to be one (Head and Mayer, 2013). The naive gravity equation
suggests that trade is proportionally related to the product of the country sizes. A number of studies
include the population of the exporter and importer countries as additional variables to account for
the size of the countries (cf Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006; Foster et al., 2011).
There are similarities between the approach adopted in chapter 3 and the gravity equations
discussed above. In chapter 3, since the dependent variable is defined by dividing exports of country
i to j by exports of i to the rest of the world—the exporter country characteristics get cancelled out
in the model. Thus, equation (3.3) in chapter 3 is:
Xi = Mjdijµi. (2.1)
Where the product and time subscripts have been suppressed. µi is an error term, dij is
the between country characteristics and the remaining variables are as defined above. The key
difference is the absence of the gravitational constant and the exporter characteristics. However if
we incorporated the exporter characteristics and allow dij × µi to capture the trade costs and how
easily country i can access market j—we can approximate the gravity model above. The remaining
difference is that exports are considered to one country and the direction of trade is from i to j
excluding flows from j to i. In this thesis, this is the focus of chapter 3. The model can be extended
to include additional destination countries as well as look at flows in the opposite direction in which
case we can return to a gravity model that resembles the structural or general gravity equation
above and thus include a gravitational constant in the equation. This would lead to equation (2.2)
which links our approach to the gravity equation.
Xi = GEiMj dijµi︸ ︷︷ ︸
φij
. (2.2)
In implementing our proposed model in chapter 3 we include country-product-time fixed effects
to capture the constant aspects of the trade relationship such as distance and the time varying aspects
of the preferences. In a gravity framework this would capture the multilateral price resistance terms
thereby reducing any omitted variable bias. The rest of the discussion of the empirical model and
its implementation is discussed in section (3.3.2) of chapter 3.
The empirical estimation of the gravity model is done by taking logs of the particular definition
chosen. Taking the logs of the structural gravity equation then gives us:
lnXij = lnG+ lnEi + lnMj + lnφij . (2.3)
The naive estimation which Head and Mayer (2013) finds to be inconsistent with theory, adopts
the log of GDP (in some cases, log of population), distance, adjacency, whether the country
pair have a common language, historical tie, or are landlocked. This estimation form omits the
multilateral price resistance terms and Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) have called this the “gold
medal mistake” in gravity estimation. They also suggest a “bronze medal mistake” which involves
deflating the dependent variable (trade flows) by the USA price index—this according to them is
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not as serious as the gold medal mistake. The other mistake is the “silver medal mistake” where the
dependent variable is considered as the average of two way exports rather than the uni-directional
flow of exports6. It is has become common for the problem of the omitted multilateral resistance
term to be solved by incorporating country dummies in cross section estimates while country and
year fixed effects are used for panel data (see for example, Baier and Bergstrand, 2007; Baldwin
and Taglioni, 2006; Head and Mayer, 2013).
In the analysis of free trade agreements (FTAs) Baier and Bergstrand (2007) suggest that
that FTAs are endogenous. On the contrary, we think the AGOA preference is exogenous and
thus endogeneity is less of an issue in our case. The difficulty in finding potential instruments to
suitably handle the right hand side endogenous variables is also highlighted by Baier and Bergstrand
(2007). The sources of bias are omitted variables, simultaneity and measurement error which lead
to inconsistent estimates (cf, Baier and Bergstrand, 2007; Wooldridge, 2002). These are the
potential sources of endogeneity for FTAs and can be likely sources in the analysis presented in the
thesis. Baier and Bergstrand (2007) discounts the endogeneity of GDP explaining that, GDP as
a function of net exports is a small share of GDP—hence it does not create serious problems to
the unbiasedness of the coefficient estimated. The share of net exports as a percentage of GDP is
potentially less than 5% and its connection to exports is not direct. The remaining gravity variables,
distance, adjacency and common language are potentially exogenous (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007).
Issues of selectivity can be handled within the Heckman selection approach while omitted variables,
that is the multilateral price resistance terms can be handled within the fixed effects approach using
country and time fixed effects as mentioned above7.
Generally, the exclusion of the country-year fixed effects leads to inconsistent estimates as the
multilateral resistance terms have not been accounted for in the gravity regression. An alternative
approach to solve the problem of the multilateral resistance terms has been suggested by Head
et al. (2010) (and also in Head and Mayer, 2013) which requires the dependent variable of the
gravity regression to have a reference exporter and importer country. The method known as Tetrads
requires defining a new dependent variable—a “tetradic” term of the ratio of exports from country
i to n and l to n. The reference exporter is thus applied to the numerator and the reference importer
to the denominator—this is the case for bilateral two-way trade gravity regressions. Thus the
dependent variable becomes,
Xin/Xik
Xln/Xlk
.
Where the subscript “in” indicates exports from country i to n and the reference exporter is l and
the importer is k. Head et al. (2010) and Head and Mayer (2013) suggest that this attenuates the
bias of omitting the country-year fixed effects. Essentially, the procedure can lead to the multilateral
terms cancelling out and thus not requiring the terms to be estimated. In our application here, we
only consider exports in one-direction, that is exports to the USA. Thus, our ratio of exports to the
6Other forms of this error is the averaging of imports and exports for each bilateral pair or sum of these. For instance,
the right form of the dependent variable should consider Ghanaian exports to the USA as one bilateral pair and USA
exports to Ghana as another bilateral pair—not the average of these two flows. The flaw from estimating gravity this way
is that it is not theoretically consistent with the gravity equation and can lead to biased coefficient estimates. Baldwin
and Taglioni (2006) have an extended discussion in their article. Cipollina and Salvatici (2010a) also discuss these medal
mistakes in their paper.
7Baier and Bergstrand (2007) also suggest that first differencing is useful in cases where T is large and the errors are
serially correlated.
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USA divided by exports to the EU or ROW in chapter 5 and the model described above for chapter
3 is useful in approximating the Tetrads approach.
2.4 Empirical literature
2.4.1 EU and USA trade policy
Tadesse and Fayissa (2008) use HS-2 digit data to analyse the impact of AGOA on exports of
eligible countries to the USA. In doing this they adopt a gravity model and they also separate the
AGOA impact into intensive and extensive margins8. In addition to the standard gravity variables
they include the stock of immigrant population (per country) in the USA, dummies for landlocked,
AGOA eligibility, English language, an index of economic openness, years elapsed under AGOA,
lagged imports and time and country effects. Using a tobit estimation technique they carry out
regressions for each HS-2 digit product (that is chapters 00 – 99) and decompose the coefficient of
the AGOA dummy into extensive and intensive margin effects.
Generally, the gravity coefficients had the expected signs—distance (-0.5) and economic size
(0.495) for HS 03 products (that is fish and crustaceans). Moreover, USA population and income
levels had no significant impact on AGOA imports in several of the HS-2 categories. As reported
by Tadesse and Fayissa (2008), coffee, tea and spices; knit; and non-knit apparel articles increased
exports of SSA countries by 5.2%, 43.5% and 16% on average respectively. Furthermore, AGOA
had approximately a 64% increase in HS-03 exports although it was insignificant. Of the 32
estimated coefficients for the AGOA dummy reported in the article 17 were significant—namely,
HS-04, HS-05, HS-07, HS-09,HS-15, HS-21, HS-22, HS-33, HS-39, HS-40, HS-44, HS-57, HS-60,
HS-61, HS-62, HS-85 and HS86 had significant coefficients. The lag of the dependent variable
(0.65) was significant in most of their regressions. They reported both positive and negative
immigrant stocks in several cases. The extensive and intensive margin effects reported by them for
HS 01 products were 0.09 and 0.5 respectively and significant. In relation to the decomposition,
only a few products recorded significant values for both effects—much less than the 24 significant
extensive margin effects across products.
Collier and Venables (2007) estimate the impact of trade preferences on exports of developing
countries to the USA relative to the EU using total apparel exports. Their total sample was 110
developing and middle income countries resulting from selecting countries with mean apparel
exports of US$ 100,000 and above. They capture the AGOA impact through a dummy variable
indicating when the country was given AGOA preferences. The main regressions are also estimated
for a sub sample of 86 countries whose apparel exports were US$ 1 million and above during
1991 – 2005. The coefficients for AGOAA (AGOA apparel dummy) in their first three regressions
were significant and varied from 2 to 2.21. The coefficients signify the strong impact of AGOA in
increasing exports to the USA relative to the EU in apparel products. The actual impact on exports
to the USA compared to the EU is given by the exponents of 2 and 2.2 which are 7.4 and 9.1 times
the exports to the EU respectively. The result signifies an increase in AGOA country exports to the
USA relative to the EU by a multiple of 7.4 and 9.1 respectively.
8They use the terms import initiation - creating new imports (extensive margin) and import intensification - the
volume effect on USA imports (intensive margin).
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They had another dummy capturing the effect of the EU’s Everything but Arms (EBA) prefer-
ence on these countries. In order to identify the effect of the EBA they restricted their dummy to
countries that were ineligible for the European Union–African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) prefer-
ences (this they call EBANC). This variable was not significant and in most cases had the wrong
sign. Similarly, using the EBA dummy in its place—it was also not significant and showed the
wrong sign. Three subsequent regressions with 110 countries correct the sign for the EBA dummies
and produces a marginal increase in the AGOAA coefficient. A quadruple difference in difference
method to sort out the effects of having between country characteristics vary over time is also used.
In the two regressions carried out with this method, the AGOAA effect recorded significant values
(2.65 and 1.98 respectively). The first regression excluded the AGOA and EBANC terms. They
therefore confirm that, AGOA had a large impact on its beneficiaries. We depart from Collier and
Venables (2007) by expanding our product coverage9 as well as working with HS-6 digit trade
data in chapter (3). Chapters (4 & 5) use a different methodological approach. Secondly, we also
consider preferences offered to the Caribbean Basin countries (CBTPA). And finally, we control
not only for exports to the EU but also exports to the rest of the world.
Nilsson (2005) and Di Rubbo and Canali (2008) who instead employ a gravity model do not
find such strong results for AGOA in their sample. It must, however, be noted that these studies did
not use the same product groups and level of aggregation. Nilsson (2005) explored the effects on
total exports while Di Rubbo and Canali focussed on agri-products. Collier and Venables on the
other hand, limited their analysis to apparel. In summary, Nilsson (2005) and Di Rubbo and Canali
(2008) did not find significant trade creating effects for AGOA. EU trade policy was found to be
more trade creating compared to AGOA.
Nilsson (2005) in a study of EU and USA trade policy for 158 developing countries apply a
standard gravity model in estimating the trade effects of the trade policies. Their results confirm
a stronger trade creating effect of EU policy compared to the USA trade policy. However, one
drawback is that, the study did not account for the zero exports in the model estimated10. This is
presented as a censoring problem in the econometrics literature and can create significant biases
in coefficient estimates thus making them unreliable for inference (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005;
Greene, 2003; Jensen et al., 2002; Wooldridge, 2002).
However, Nilsson’s (2005) cross section estimation using the 2001 – 2003 annual average
exports lessens the impact of the censoring problem. Essentially, by taking the average exports
for the period they are able to fill in the missing observations for particular years by using the
average exports for the period available (in other words reducing the missing or zero exports). The
coefficients of both sets of regressions (that is, the 2001–2003 average and the 2001–2003 panel
analysis) are similar; however, the t-statistics estimated in the 2001 – 2003 panel are twice the
cross-section estimates indicating the potential bias of ignoring the censoring of the dependent
variable in his model. The reported trade creation values for the cross-section regression11 include
9We go beyond apparel products to include all six–digit products within the following categories: live animals; meat
and edible meat offal; salt, sulphur, earth and stone, plastering; ores, slag and ash; and textile products.
10Nilsson (2005) in Section 4, the last paragraph of the gravity model sub-section makes reference to the zero
exports—“No particular attempt is made to deal with the zero-or missing value observations in the trade data” The
countries with zero or missing trade data can be found in footnote 32.
11It is converted from actual EU imports from developing countries normalized by the transformed dummy coefficient
of the relevant dummy for EU imports, and various income groupings.
22
EU imports: 35.6%; low income countries: 50.3%; lower middle income countries: 22.9% and
upper middle income countries: 46.2%. The percentage indicates the amount of trade generated
by EU trade policy (in terms of preferential programmes provided to least developed countries)
compared to USA policy. Thus the 50.3% reported for low income countries imply that EU policy
is associated with 50.3% more exports compared to USA policy for low income countries. All but
lower middle income countries had significant coefficients in the cross-section regression. The
coefficients for the panel regression are not discussed in this section due to the potential bias in
the coefficients identified above. Finally, the average estimate of gross creation by EU policy for
the period 2001 – 2003 was 70.2%, 59.3% and 54.2% of total imports by the EU from developing
countries for lower income, lower middle and upper middle income countries respectively (Nilsson,
2005). This is an indication of the size of the gross trade creation by the EU trade policy.
Di Rubbo and Canali (2008) in a study of 102 developing countries for the period 1996 – 2005
for agricultural products (food and fibre products) use a similar methodology to that of Nilsson
(2005). They find EU trade policy to be more effective at creating trade than USA policy. They
report gross trade creation coefficients of 75.9%, 62.2%, 90.4% and 69.1% for low income, lower-
middle income, upper-middle income countries and EU imports respectively for the period 1996 –
2000. Higher percentages are recorded for the period 2000 – 2005 of 80.8%, 63.1%, 91.4% and 73%
for low income, lower-middle income, upper-middle income countries and EU imports respectively.
A similar interpretation to Nilsson’s can be given to Di Rubbo and Canali—however, EU policy
generates more exports of agri-products compared to the USA. They find the trade variation to be
significant for the lower income group. Compared to Nilsson (2005) the trade creation effects are
stronger for the upper-middle income countries rather than the low-income countries. We note that,
these effects are confined to the agri-food sector not total exports as was the case in Nilsson. Also,
the reported coefficients of Nilsson above, are for his cross-section regression and therefore exclude
the time variation provided by Di Rubbo and Canali (2008).
Focussing on the USA, Frazer and Van Biesebroeck (2010) estimate the impact of AGOA at
the HS 6 – digit level using standard difference-in-differences and triple difference-in-differences—
controlling for baseline levels of imports, country and product specific import trends after the
adoption of AGOA. They find an increase of 42% of imports on average as a result of the AGOA
preference. However, they estimate the causal impact of AGOA to be lower at 28%—they argue
that this controls for both the pre- and post-import differences for both AGOA and non AGOA
countries—as well as control for product-specific trends common for both groups of countries. On
the contrary, concentrating on only non-oil imports they find that AGOA raises exports by a lower
amount of 6.6% for the AGOA beneficiaries.
In summarising, Collier and Venables (2007); Frazer and Van Biesebroeck (2010); Gibbon
(2003); Pa´ez et al. (2010) generally find apparel and textiles as well as oil and energy products to be
the main drivers of the gains by AGOA beneficiaries. We do not observe this for apparel and textiles
but do observe this of the extractive industry in chapters (4 & 5) and it is further discussed in the
results section of each chapter12. Gibbon (2003) and Pa´ez et al. (2010) discuss the proliferation of
12In chapter (3) we do notice some positive impact of apparel and textiles for the AGOA countries. This is done
at a finely disaggregated level and hence we are able to pick up the increases in particular products within this sector.
Chapters (4 & 5) perform the analysis at a more aggregated level and makes the comparison with respect to a particular
group of countries. The results show that AGOA exported less of these products relative to the group of countries they
are compared with.
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firms in the textile industry and the enormous impact on employment in that sector for Lesotho
and other African countries. This according to them is not limited to apparel but also to oil and
energy related exports where the example provided is the increase in investments in Nigeria’s
energy sector. Nonetheless, for Lesotho in spite of the record investments an impediment in having
further investments was the constraints on land available (Gibbon, 2003). Had these constraints not
existed a much stronger impact of AGOA might have ensued.
In an extended survey of previous empirical studies, Mold (2005) links the mild impact of
AGOA to (1) the limited benefits and exclusion of sensitive products from the AGOA list, (2) the
initial 8-year life span of AGOA with the subsequent extension in 2004 (of AGOA) to 2015 has not
encouraged long-term investments for investors who have been given a short horizon to work with,
(3) the fear that preferential access and new trade agreements under discussion if offered to the
Middle East and Central America would dampen any benefits offered by AGOA and (4) Arbitrary
use of AGOA ROOs in certain products. An example offered by Mold is the near-exclusion of
Kenya due to its inability to meet ROOs in textiles. Mold (2005) brings to the fore the impact of
the AGOA conditions on freedom of policy making and the uncertainty created by the periodic
(annual) review of AGOA beneficiaries.
2.4.2 Impact of AGOA on SSA countries
We now focus briefly on the empirical literature that estimate the impact of AGOA on its beneficiar-
ies. The results presented in the literature are mixed and vary in terms of the size of the AGOA
impact. Studies such as Collier and Venables (2007); Frazer and Van Biesebroeck (2010) and
Nouve (2005) do find all their impacts to be positive. On the contrary, studies such as Giovannetti
and Sanfilippo (2009); Lederman and O¨zden (2007); McKay (2012); Mueller (2008); Nouve and
Staatz (2003); Seyoum (2007); Tadesse and Fayissa (2008); Tadesse et al. (2008) and Zappile
(2011) do report mixed coefficients. The direction of the impacts and size vary with the level of
disaggregation of exports, the products chosen, the period covered by the study, the definition of
the dependent variable and the estimation method used. In this section, we review the evidence
presented in a few of the papers. Table (2.1) below provides a summary of existing studies on
AGOA. We recap briefly some of these papers below.
24
Ta
bl
e
2.
1:
Su
m
m
ar
y
of
th
e
em
pi
ri
ca
ll
ite
ra
tu
re
E
st
im
at
ed
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
s
A
ut
ho
rs
Y
ea
rs
C
ou
nt
ri
es
D
at
a
M
et
ho
do
lo
gy
M
ea
n
M
in
M
ax
N
um
be
r
C
ol
lie
ra
nd
V
en
ab
le
s
(2
00
7)
15
W
or
ld
A
pp
ar
el
&
Te
xt
ile
s
O
L
S
2.
08
6
0.
90
0
2.
65
0
9
Fr
az
er
an
d
V
an
B
ie
se
br
oe
ck
(2
01
0)
9
A
G
O
A
/W
or
ld
A
ll
H
S8
di
gi
t
O
L
S
0.
30
8
0.
03
0
0.
45
2
4
G
io
va
nn
et
ti
an
d
Sa
nfi
lip
po
(2
00
9)
11
A
fr
ic
a
IS
IC
3
-6
di
gi
t
2S
L
S/
G
M
M
/O
L
S
0.
03
0
-0
.1
35
0.
14
3
22
L
ed
er
m
an
an
d
O¨
zd
en
(2
00
7)
1
W
or
ld
To
ta
lt
ra
de
To
bi
t/H
ec
km
an
1.
13
8
-0
.8
11
2.
02
7
5
M
cK
ay
(2
01
2)
21
A
G
O
A
&
de
v
A
pp
ar
el
&
Te
xt
ile
s
O
L
S
0.
12
9
-0
.1
40
0.
36
5
4
M
ue
lle
r(
20
08
)
11
A
G
O
A
To
ta
ln
on
oi
l
O
L
S
-0
.1
63
-0
.1
63
-0
.1
63
1
N
ou
ve
(2
00
5)
9
A
fr
ic
a
To
ta
le
xp
or
ts
Sy
s.
/d
iff
.G
M
M
0.
17
4
0.
04
0
0.
22
0
16
N
ou
ve
an
d
St
aa
tz
(2
00
3)
4
A
G
O
A
A
gr
ic
ul
tu
ra
le
xp
or
ts
O
L
S
15
9.
54
6
-0
.1
45
76
9.
50
0
18
Se
yo
um
(2
00
7)
8
A
G
O
A
To
ta
li
m
po
rt
s
A
R
IM
A
-0
.9
29
-1
1.
92
1
0.
54
0
14
Ta
de
ss
e
an
d
Fa
yi
ss
a
(2
00
8)
16
A
G
O
A
A
ll
H
S
2
di
gi
t
To
bi
t
1.
01
0
-2
.1
20
3.
45
7
32
Ta
de
ss
e
et
al
.(
20
08
)
16
A
G
O
A
To
ta
li
m
p.
/S
IT
C
1
di
g.
To
bi
t
0.
48
6
-1
.2
24
2.
91
2
13
Z
ap
pi
le
(2
01
1)
11
A
G
O
A
N
on
O
il
O
L
S
-0
.1
41
-0
.1
41
-0
.1
41
1
T
he
su
m
m
ar
y
ab
ov
e
sh
ow
s
th
e
di
st
ri
bu
tio
n
of
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
s
in
ea
ch
st
ud
y
as
w
el
la
s
th
e
nu
m
be
ro
fc
oe
ffi
ci
en
ts
es
tim
at
in
g
th
e
im
pa
ct
of
A
G
O
A
.T
he
ab
ov
e
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
fo
rm
s
th
e
ba
si
s
of
th
e
da
ta
se
tu
se
d
in
th
e
m
et
a-
an
al
ys
is
an
d
re
gr
es
si
on
in
se
ct
io
n
(2
.5
).
Ev
en
th
ou
gh
th
e
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
s
ar
e
no
ts
ho
w
n,
th
es
e
ca
n
be
se
en
in
fig
ur
e
(2
.7
)i
n
se
ct
io
n
(2
.5
).
So
ur
ce
:A
ut
ho
r’
s
el
ab
or
at
io
n
of
th
e
em
pi
ri
ca
ll
ite
ra
tu
re
di
sc
us
se
d
ab
ov
e
25
Lederman and O¨zden (2007) focus on geographical and political determinants to identify the
impact of USA’s trade preferences. The estimations are based on the gravity model. Unlike the
literature focussing on the AGOA impact, they reviewed additional preferences offered by the USA
to other regions of the world. They find that most preference beneficiaries increase their exports up
to three-fold relative to countries excluded from receiving the preferences.
Nouve (2005) uses various dynamic panel estimators to estimate the impact of AGOA. Forty-six
African countries are selected for the study covering the period 1996 – 2004. His approach is a
departure from existing approaches—since the literature avoids using lagged values of the export
variable to identify the impact of AGOA. The gravity model is the main specification adopted for
the estimations. Nouve (2005) concludes that the contribution of an increase in AGOA is 16 – 20
cents for every dollar increase in exports to the USA. A contrary result found by Nouve (2005) to
the earlier literature, is that, apparel and textiles did not yield significant increases in total exports13.
Nouve and Staatz (2003) using quarterly data for a sample of 46 African countries find
inconclusive evidence on the impact of AGOA14. Their analysis focusses on the agricultural
sector and there is limited evidence of a strong impact in this sector within the existing literature.
One might attribute this effect to the strong subsidies the EU and USA have on their domestic
agricultural sector.
Giovannetti and Sanfilippo (2009) is the second paper presented that departs from the traditional
impact studies. They measure the impact of Chinese exports on AGOA exporters. They analyse
whether the Chinese exports have crowded-out African exports to the American market. Based
on disaggregated data on 48 African countries for the period 1995 to 2005, they find evidence of
Chinese exports displacing African exports to the USA. This tends to support the lower impact
observed for certain sectors such as textiles in recent studies.
Mueller (2008); Seyoum (2007) and Zappile (2011) do not find any significantly positive
impacts of AGOA15. Finally, the remaining studies, Collier and Venables (2007); Frazer and Van
Biesebroeck (2010) and Tadesse and Fayissa (2008) have been discussed in the previous section
and hence only mentioned here and included in table (2.1).
2.4.3 Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) and Caribbean Basin countries
The Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) was less effective than the Caribbean Basin
Trade Protection Act (CBTPA) (Hornbeck, 2010). However, this is explained by Hutchinson and
Schumacher (1994) to be a result of (a) over-reliance on the market mechanism, (b) the exclusion of
important Caribbean Basin products such as textile and apparel as well as tourism products hindered
13Recent work by Rotunno et al. (2012) also note that that China accounted for a large majority of apparel exports of
Botswana, Kenya, Lesotho, and Madagascar. The apparel exports of these countries and a few others were mainly due to
Chinese ’transshipments’ to take advantage of the favourable rules of origin of AGOA at the time. The ’transshipments’
have declined markedly since the removal of quotas by the USA on Chinese apparel exports. Similarly, McKay (2012)
finds that the end of the multi-fibre arrangement (MFA) has reduced the advantage AGOA recipients had in apparel and
textiles. Moreover, he questions whether AGOA played any role in the success of apparel—rather, he attributes the
success partly to the existing multifibre arrangement at the time.
14The maximum estimate of 759.5 which seems out of place in table (2.1) is due to having the dependent variables in
levels rather than logs. However, for the regressions based on a log definition of the dependent variable the coefficients
reported on the AGOA dummy are less than 2. Again, this points to how the definition of the dependent variable can
influence the estimated impact of AGOA.
15Both Mueller (2008) and Zappile (2011) use a Prais-Winsten transformed least square regression while Seyoum
(2007) adopts an ARIMA time series estimation method.
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the reaping of its potential benefits, (c) the re-imposition and tightening of USA sugar quotas and
(d) the falling world prices of petroleum and petroleum products. This has led some authors to
conclude that CBERA failed to achieve their mandate of increasing economic growth in the region
(for example, Ames, 1993; Hornbeck, 2010; Hutchinson and Schumacher, 1994). Nonetheless,
the CBTPA which had a large impact on the recipients also met with a decline as a result of the
introduction of the Dominican Republic–Central America Free Trade Area (CAFTA-DR).
Hornbeck (2010) argues that CBI beneficiaries have suffered from erosion of their preferences
as a result of the increasing move towards the adoption of free trade agreements (FTA) by the USA.
The North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) after its adoption, curtailed the trade advantage
of the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) countries over Mexico—thereby giving Mexico some
advantages in apparel and other products Mexico was more competitive at producing than the
Caribbean Basin countries (Hornbeck, 2010; Hutchinson and Schumacher, 1994). Hutchinson
and Schumacher (1994) in calculating the revealed comparative advantage (RCA) of Mexico and
the Caribbean countries in their top 30 export products did find the Caribbean countries to be
competitive in 20 out of their top 30 industries and expected this to provide some buffer against
NAFTA. The adoption of the CAFTA-DR has in particular, adversely affected the remaining
Caribbean countries within the CBI and again reduced their trade advantage in apparel and textiles
and non-primary commodities (Hornbeck, 2010). The main reason provided by Hornbeck (2010) is
due to the cummulation rules in apparel production among NAFTA, CAFTA-DR and Haiti which
leave the remaining countries under the CBI with limited ability to adapt to the new competition
from these regions. The percent of apparel imports in total USA imports of apparel is even lower—
this fell from 13.6% in 2005 to 1% in 2008 (Hornbeck, 2010). Hornbeck (2010) attributes this
to the CAFTA-DR. The CAFTA-DR countries excluding Costa Rica accounted for 90% of total
apparel imports of all the Caribbean Basin countries (Hornbeck, 2010) and this accounts for the
vast shortfall.
Hornbeck (2010) shows that only 7.5% of total imports from CBI recipient countries were
eligible for preferential tariffs after excluding CAFTA-DR and energy exporting countries. This
is what might be driving our negative coefficients discussed in chapter (3) of this chapter. In
addition, Hornbeck (2010) finds that the following additional factors contributed to the diminishing
preferences (a) CAFTA-DR countries produced most of the apparel and textile products (b) the
remaining CBI countries are not competitive in the apparel sector and have been unable to take
advantage of the preferences and (c) The removal of the multifibre agreement (MFA) on textiles
has furthered heightened their situation. It must however, be added that some of this might also be
due to AGOA countries such as Lesotho and Kenya (and other smaller AGOA recipients) gaining a
foothold in the USA market in the apparel and textile sector.
2.5 Meta-analysis
There have been several studies on the impact of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)
of the USA on Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries. The estimates reported in these studies vary
widely and differ in terms of econometric methodology applied as well as the level of aggregation of
the dependent variable (exports and/or imports). A convenient way of summarising the coefficients
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reported in selected studies is by pursuing a meta-analysis. This is pursued in this section of the
chapter using some of the recent advances in meta-analysis and meta-regression analysis (MRA).
A recent systematic review by Condon and Stern (2011) summarising the findings of twenty-one
econometric and non-econometric AGOA studies show that (1) exports from SSA have increased
since the inception of AGOA and (2) Apparel is significantly correlated with higher exports. This
section of the chapter seeks to go beyond Condon and Stern’s systematic review by performing a
meta regression analysis (MRA) on studies that estimate the impact of AGOA on SSA countries.
The main contribution is extending the work of Condon and Stern (2011) to incorporate a
quantitative summary of the AGOA literature. To the best of the knowledge of the author, this is
the first attempt to investigate the AGOA literature (and to some extent, trade preference literature)
using a MRA approach. Hence a novel approach to the study of AGOA is presented in this
chapter. Meta-analysis (MA) has now become a popular way of summarising quantitative analysis
(Borenstein et al., 2009; Stanley, 2005). There has been a growing number of meta-analytic studies
in several areas of economics (for example, Cipollina and Salvatici, 2010a; Doucouliagos, 2005;
Doucouliagos and Stanley, 2009; Feld and Heckemeyer, 2011; Rose and Stanley, 2005, among
others). In this chapter, our focus is on the application of MRA towards assessing publication bias
in the AGOA literature. The closest study to analysing trade preferences is Cipollina and Salvatici
(2010a). They apply MRA to the study of several reciprocal trade agreements that have been ratified
by the World Trade Organisation (WTO).
Several studies exist analysing the AGOA preferences of the USA towards SSA countries.
In spite of these studies there are only a few that make use of econometric methods to estimate
the effects of AGOA and this limits the number of studies we can include in our meta-analysis
and MRA. However, the individual studies do report several coefficients, thereby increasing our
sample size. The results of the AGOA studies have been mixed—reporting varying estimates
of the impact of the preference as discussed in section (2.4). In terms of methodology, several
econometric approaches have been undertaken. In the EU preference literature, gravity models
applying Heckman selection and Poisson models tend to be very popular. However, in the AGOA
literature gravity modelling is less popular. Much of the analysis are based on estimating import
demand equations with one study (Seyoum, 2007) applying arima time series models. We do
investigate whether these various specifications do affect the impact measured.
The choice of studies is based on whether the AGOA impact is estimated and whether they
employ econometric techniques in measuring the impact of AGOA. A large number of AGOA
studies employ non econometric techniques in studying AGOA. Thus, after dropping the non-
econometric studies we are left with 14 studies that form the dataset used in the meta-analysis
presented in this section16. These studies report multiple coefficients varying from 1 to as many
as 32 estimates and the reported impacts also vary widely. The multiple estimates reported by the
studies creates problems for estimation. One way around this problem is estimating random effects
16Fourteen studies are adequate for a meta-analysis. Borenstein et al. (2009) points out that at least two studies are
adequate for a fixed effect meta-analysis—for random effect meta-analysis two studies would be inadequate given its
assumptions. Essentially, two studies in the fixed effects case can provide a more precise estimate of the true effect rather
than a single study (Borenstein et al., 2009)—the main reason being that, the fixed effect model ignores dispersion in the
study effects while the random effects model incorporates the dispersion in estimation (Borenstein et al., 2009). However,
for the meta-regression analysis, fourteen studies seem to be fewer than most of the applications in the economics
literature. The number of studies available depends on the topic and how many researchers are engaged in discussing
that particular topic of interest.
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and fixed effect models17 to control for the within and between variation (Cipollina and Salvatici,
2010a). The fixed effects model uses the within variation while the random effects model uses a
combination of the between and within study variation. This is useful in reducing the impact of
the resulting heterogeneity as a result of pooling various estimates. There are other approaches to
get around this problem, such as multilevel modelling—estimated study effects are assumed to be
hierarchically ordered and nested within individual studies (for example, Konstantopoulos, 2011).
These are explored in the analysis presented here.
One of the objectives of this section, is to summarise the AGOA impact reported in the selected
studies. We investigate publication bias to see if the effect is as large as reported in a couple of
studies (for instance, Collier and Venables, 2007; Nouve and Staatz, 2003). Moreover, we are
also interested in whether there is a genuine or authentic effect based on the studies selected.
Additionally, does the impact depend on the composition of countries? That is, are the studies
that focus on only AGOA beneficiaries, the ones reporting larger coefficients compared to studies
incorporating other non AGOA countries. Finally, a number of studies on AGOA have underscored
the importance of apparel and textiles and reported strong impacts for AGOA beneficiaries. Using
study specific variables we test whether the impact varies across product groups.
The rest of this section of the chapter, is organised as follows. Section (2.5.1) introduces the
data, methodology and estimation framework used in the meta-analysis. Section (2.5.2) presents
a visual guide to identifying publication bias as well as some stylised facts of the data. The next
section (section 2.5.3) discusses the results while the final section (section 2.5.4), concludes the
meta analysis section of this chapter.
2.5.1 Data and methodology
Search strategy
To build the database for the meta-analysis, a search was carried out at various periods between
January and June 2011 and again in September 2012. The search strategy involved querying the
Google search engine, Munich Personal REPEC Archive (MPRA), Google Scholar, ECONLIT,
SCOPUS, Wiley Journals, World Bank’s JOLIS, Web of Knowledge and JSTOR databases. The
following key words “AGOA trade agreement”, “economic impact of agoa trade preferences ”,
“African growth and opportunity act” and “AGOA trade preferences” were used in finding the
studies for the meta analysis. A couple of studies were also obtained from the references of the
selected studies. The search led to 30 studies, however these were reduced to fourteen studies.
Three reasons for this include: (a) some studies were working paper versions of the published
studies (all eight published papers for example), (b) some studies had been published under two or
more titles but contained the same results (examples include, Collier and Venables, 2007; Frazer
and Van Biesebroeck, 2010; Nouve and Staatz, 2003; Tadesse and Fayissa, 2008), and (c) some
studies even though were an analysis of AGOA either did not include regression analysis or looked
at other aspects of AGOA. For example, Olarreaga and O¨zden (2005) focussed on estimating the
17The use of the term random effects and fixed effects in this section is not similar to its usage in panel data analysis.
The random and fixed effects here refers to the distribution of the population effect sizes. The random effects takes these
as normally distributed while the fixed effects assumes them to be fixed. See the meta-analysis studies cited in section
(2.5.1) for more examples of its usage in meta-analysis.
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tariff rents in AGOA apparel and textile exports and Edwards and Lawrence (2010) were interested
in the impact on prices. On the contrary, Brenton and Hoppe (2006); Lall (2005); Mattoo et al.
(2003) and Pa´ez et al. (2010) were not econometric studies. This leaves us with a sample of fourteen
studies consisting of 179 study effects. Of the fourteen, eight were published in journals with the
remaining six existing as working papers.
Funnel and Galbraith plots
In investigating publication bias several authors have suggested the inspection of funnel graphs
which plot the inverse of the standard error against the effect size (partial correlation or coefficient)
(Borenstein et al., 2009; Stanley et al., 2008; Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2010; Stanley, 2005, 2008;
Sterne et al., 2001). There have been modifications and some studies show other types of funnel
graphs. There is also the Galbraith plot which shows the relationship between the t-statistic and
the inverse of the standard error. When these graphs show symmetry then it implies the absence
of publication bias. However, when there are more points to one side of the mean effect (or zero)
then it is an indication of publication bias (Borenstein et al., 2009; Sterne et al., 2001). Borenstein
et al. (2009); Stanley et al. (2008); Stanley (2005, 2008); Sterne et al. (2001) have emphasised the
need to carry out formal testing of publication bias since the visual inspection of the graphs can be
subjective. The formal testing is discussed in the MRA models below.
Meta-Analysis: Fixed effect vs. random effects models
Two major approaches exist for summarising the study effects reported in each study to obtain a
pooled estimate. The random effect models (REM) and fixed effect models (FEM) are the main
approaches18. The FEM assumes all studies have the same effect size (µ) and that any departure
from the observed effect are purely due to random errors (ei) (Borenstein et al., 2009). On the
contrary, the REM assumes that the effect size varies across studies and are randomly distributed
within each study (Borenstein et al., 2009). The pooled estimates provided by these models are
simply the weighted means of the observed study effects (in our case, the weighted means of the
reported coefficients) (Borenstein et al., 2009). In the FEM model, the summary effect is given by
a weighted average of the study effect sizes and the weights are the inverse of the variance of the
coefficients reported in each study (Equations (2.4) – (2.6)).
The weights calculated in the FEM model penalises smaller studies while giving more weight
to larger studies (Borenstein et al., 2009). The REM on the other hand, does not penalise smaller
studies and incorporates all studies without having any particular study strongly influencing the
summary estimate (Borenstein et al., 2009). Equations (2.6) – (2.10) represent the REM. The
REM uses a moments based estimator in calculating the weights for θREM this is known as the
DerSimonian and Laird method (Borenstein et al., 2009). The Q statistic calculated in equation
(2.9) can also be taken as a test for the presence of homogeneity between studies. The test statistic is
distributed as χ2 with k− 1 degrees of freedom (df) (Borenstein et al., 2009; Feld and Heckemeyer,
2011).
18See footnote (17) for a distinction between the REM and FEM models from their usual usage in panel data
econometrics.
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θFEM = µ+ ei (2.4)
θFEM =
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(2.5)
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V REMbi
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2
i∑k
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Where, Vbi is the variance of bi, Wi are the weights assigned to each study, bi are the observed
effect size in the studies selected, and θFEM , θREM are the FEM and REM pooled estimates of
the various effect sizes respectively, df = k − 1 and k is the number of studies. The variances of
the pooled estimates are V FEMθ = 1/
∑k
i=1Wi and V
REM
θ = 1/
∑k
i=1W
REM
i respectively. C is a
scaling factor and T 2 is the between studies variance. The standard error is then the square root of
the variance. The confidence intervals for both models are then given by CI = θ + 1.96×√Vθ .
The weights for the REM are differentiated by the superscript REM.
There is consensus in the literature that the REM is a preferred estimator when coefficient
estimates are heterogeneous. The FEM performs poorly in the presence of heterogeneity. However,
in the absence of heterogeneity the FEM can be used to obtain unbiased estimates of the summary
study effect (Borenstein et al., 2009). Furthermore, Borenstein et al. (2009) points out that the
FEM can be performed on two or more studies unlike the REM which requires a decent sample
size. In the presence of heterogeneity, it is useful to investigate the sources of the heterogeneity.
In this paper, we pursue this by estimating our REM model by study as well as using an MRA to
investigate the sources of heterogeneity. We are able to carry out tests of heterogeneity using the
I2 statistic (I2 = (Q− df/Q)× 100). This allows us to decide on the type of modelling to carry
out. Borenstein et al. (2009) citing Higgins et al (2003) suggest that values of 25%, 50% and 75%
can be considered as low, medium and high heterogeneity respectively. An I2 value of 0% implies
that there is no real variation in the studies while a value of 100% indicates high heterogeneity and
real variation among coefficients reported by the individual studies.
Borenstein et al. (2009) note that one of the aims of a meta-analysis is to include several studies
that are not necessarily similar—thus, allowing one to study the observed patterns in the selected
studies. They also point out that in a meta-analysis it is possible to combine different study designs
(in our case an example can be found in the differences in the regression models, that is, time series
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or cross-section or panel data regressions among others) and studies reporting results in different
ways. From our summary of the studies in table (2.1) above we find differences in study designs and
sample sizes of the studies. Following Borenstein et al.’s (2009) advice it is possible to combine
all these studies—since our interest is on the reported impact of AGOA. A summary of this view
found in Borenstein et al. (2009) is quoted below.
In most meta-analyses, however, the inclusion criteria will be broader than this. It is
an important feature of a meta-analysis that it may (usually must) address a broader
question than those addressed by the primary studies it includes. Thus a certain amount
of diversity among the studies is not only inevitable but also desirable. A good meta-
analysis will anticipate this diversity and will interpret the findings with attention to
the dispersion of results across studies (Borenstein et al., 2009, 358).
Meta-regression model
In carrying out the MRA, we need to emphasise that, in the presence of several coefficients a careful
choice of MRA to apply is required. Questions of which coefficient to choose to represent each
study becomes difficult to answer. Secondly, the presence of more than one coefficient per study
also poses problems. Some authors get around this problem by selecting particular estimates or
using the mean, mode or other moments of the study effects. In this paper, we choose to include all
estimates and thus, pursue a multi-level MRA to account for the multiple coefficients per study to
check the accuracy of the pooled MRAs. The MRA takes the following form
bij
Seij
≡ tij = β0 + β1
(
1
Seij
)
+ ν (2.11)
tij = β0 + β1
(
1
Seij
)
+
K∑
k=1
γkZijk
Seij
+ ν (2.12)
tij = α0 + α1
(
1
Seij
)
+
K∑
k=1
ζkZjk
Seij
+ µ0j + eij (2.13)
var(eij) = σ
2
e ; var(µ0j) = σ
2
µ0 ; eij ∼ iid(0, σ2e); µ0j ∼ iid(0, σ2µ0)
Where bij is the ith coefficient from the jth study, tij is the reported t-statistic of the ith
estimate in the jth study, Seij is the reported standard error, Zijk measures characteristics in
each study—those that explain the differences between studies as well as certain features of each
particular study, ν is the disturbance term, µ0j is a study level random intercept and eij is the error
term.
Equations (2.11) and (2.12) will be estimated by WLS while Equation (2.13) is a multi-level
equation with studies at level 2 and coefficient estimates at level 1. For Equation (2.13), α0 is
assumed to be the same for each study. The study level component (µ0j) represents the departure
of the jth study’s intercept from the overall population intercept (α0). The first two coefficients are
the fixed part of the model and the last two terms provide us with the random variation (Goldstein,
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1998). The variance partition component (VPC) can be calculated as
V PC =
ˆσ2µ0
σˆ2e +
ˆσ2µ0
This indicates the percentage of the variance that can be attributed to differences between studies.
Meta-significance testing
Stanley (2005, 2008) note that a logarithmic relationship exists between the t-statistic and the
degress of freedom. A positive relationship between the two provides a confirmation of the
empirical effect (Stanley, 2005, 2008). A variation of Equation (2.11) is to use the natural log of
the reported degrees of freedom in each study, that is
ln |tij | = δ0 + δ1 ln(dfij)
Other versions also employ either the square root of the degrees of freedom (
√
df ) or the natural
log of the sample size (lnN ) in place of ln(df) (examples of empirical work in this area include,
Doucouliagos, 2005; Doucouliagos and Stanley, 2009; Rose and Stanley, 2005; Stanley et al.,
2008; Stanley, 2005, 2008). This is the meta-significance testing (MST) approach and is explored
in the present analysis to ensure the robustness of our results. In the MST, δ1 6= 0 indicates the
presence of a genuine effect. Stanley (2005, 2008) note that an effect exists when δ1 = 1/2. In
the log-linearised model shown above rejecting δ1 ≤ 0 indicates the existence of an empirical
effect (Stanley et al., 2008; Stanley, 2005). According to Stanley (2005) the estimates in the MST
regression can be affected by publication selection. However, publication bias is proportional to the
inverse of the square root of the sample size (
√
n) in the presence of publication selection (Stanley,
2005). Publication selection therefore reduces the positive coefficient on the log of degrees of
freedom thereby resulting in a coefficient that is less than half (Stanley, 2005).
Yet another way of testing for a genuine empirical effect is to shrink the coefficients to zero by
correcting for publication bias (Stanley, 2005). Then a regression of the corrected t-statistics on
precision should yield an answer to whether there is any genuine empirical effect.
|tij | = ϕ0 + ϕ1
(
1
Seij
)
+ ξ
corrected− tij = φ
(
1
Seij
)
+ ε
In MST, the alternate hypothesis (H1) δ1 > 0 implies a genuine empirical effect. Similarly, ϕ > 0
and φ 6= 0 indicates publication bias and a genuine empirical effect respectively. In the joint
PET/MST β1 6= 0 (in Equation [2.11] – [2.12] and α1 6= 0 in Equation [2.13]) and δ1 > 0 indicates
a genuine empirical effect (Stanley, 2005).
Finally, following Stanley (2005) and Stanley et al. (2008) we carry out a t-test of β0 in Equation
(2.11) and (2.12) to test for publication bias (funnel asymetry test (FAT)) and a test of β1 = 0 which
provides the precision-effect test (PET). This is similarly done for α0 and α1 to test for FAT and
PET respectively. Stanley (2005) also notes that a useful strategy is to carry out joint PET/MST
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testing to identify genuine effects in the presence of publication bias. This is also carried out in
the results section. Controls included in Equation (2.12) and (2.13) allow us to check whether the
reported estimates in the studies are strongly influenced by study characteristics.
2.5.2 Stylised facts about the AGOA studies included
In the meta-analysis literature, the distribution of points on the funnel plot must be symmetric for a
researcher to have confidence that there is no publication bias. A non-symmetric diagram indicates
that publication bias is present in the sample of studies being analysed. The symmetry indicates
that the plausible range of values for the coefficients are present within the body of studies on the
subject. In other words, one expects to find estimates that vary randomly around the true effect
(Stanley, 2005). Thus as noted by Stanley (2005), publication bias or selection leads to statistically
significant results being published thereby skewing the distribution of coefficient estimates.
Figures (2.3) – (2.5) show various features of the underlying data for the meta analysis. Figure
(2.3) and (2.4) show various funnel plots to provide a visual aid in identifying any publication
bias present in the meta analysis. Panel (2.3(a)) plots the precision of the estimated AGOA effect
against a partial correlation of the AGOA coefficient (all studies are included). However, the
remaining three panels exclude six large estimated coefficients reported in one of the studies. These
coefficients are larger than 300 while the remaining coefficients used in the plots are less than four,
hence their exclusion in this case. Panel (2.3(b)) shows a funnel plot with the missing estimates
to the left of the mean included. Figure (2.3) and (2.4) indicate that publication bias is plausible.
There are more positive effects than negative effects as shown by the vertical line at the mean of
zero. Borenstein et al. (2009) note that the interpretation of the funnel plot can be subjective and
there is the need for other tests to be carried out (also, Stanley et al., 2008; Stanley, 2005, 2008).
Following Stanley (2005, 2008) and Stanley et al. (2008) we carry out formal tests of publication
bias in addition to the funnel plots shown in this section. Figure (2.5) plots the coefficients (and
T-stats) reported against the number of post-AGOA years of data available as well as the period of
time post AGOA when the paper was written. A quadratic fit is added in each panel. The figures
indicate a slight U-shaped relationship. In the initial years after AGOA, large coefficients and
highly significant results were reported. However, this tended to reduce till six years after AGOA
when larger and more significant coefficients were reported again. Thus, with the passage of time
smaller coefficients and larger t-statistics are reported. This is similar to the findings of Stanley
et al. (2008) for the relationship between t-statistics and unemployment. Although, they show an
inverted-U shaped quadratic fit19 they also find larger absolute t-statistics reported with the passage
of time.
In summary, the funnel plots indicate that there is some publication selection occurring. Studies
are more likely to report positive coefficients rather than negative coefficients. These coefficients
are also more likely to be further from zero. This selection of positive coefficients therefore raises
the impact of AGOA beyond its true value. Hypothetically, if we were to have a true impact of
zero, then the funnel plots should show the points being random around the zero impact. Having
more coefficients on the positive side of the true impact of zero (in this case) then leads to an
19Their t-statistics are all negative compared to ours that are mostly positive. Thus considering absolute values we
both display a similar trend. To establish this result further, we would require more annual data on published studies
post-AGOA
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overstatement of the impact. Similarly, it is possible to have a lot more studies reporting a negative
impact in which case it would still be publication selection. This overstatement of the empirical
results generally biases the magnitude of reported coefficients upward (Stanley, 2005). This
makes the funnel plot a priori point publication bias towards one direction—thereby assuming that
publication selection is unidirectional (Stanley, 2005).
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Figure 2.4: Standard error vs. coefficient based on Egger et al. (1997) methodology
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Figure 2.5: Relationship between years after agoa and coefficient/T-stat
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2.5.3 Results
The results of the meta-analysis and meta-regression are presented in the following sections. Three
main estimations are carried out in the text. Table (2.2) reports the results of the meta significance
tests in five columns. Tables (2.3 & 2.4) present the random effects and fixed effects meta regression
results. However, the results of the weighted least squares (ie. the fixed effects meta regression)
is likely to be biased given the presence of the high level of heterogeneity in the study effects.
We include the results here, in comparison to the other results shown. The final table (table 2.5)
provides the estimates for the multilevel meta regression. In two studies (Nouve and Staatz, 2003;
Seyoum, 2007) probability values were reported instead of t-statistics or standard errors. Hence, the
inverse of the t-distribution was used to recover the t-statistics—the distribution of these imputed
statistics are presented with the summary statistics reported in Table (A.1) in appendix (A).
Random effects meta-analysis
The summary statistics and the studies used in the meta analysis are presented in appendix (A)
(Tables A.1 – A.2). The results of the random effects meta analysis are presented below. Figure
(2.6) shows the meta-analysis by whether the studies were published or not. Figure (2.7) presents
a visual representation of the summary meta analysis by study. The length of the diamonds in
the graph represent the confidence intervals of the pooled study effects of each study. Three
studies have a negative pooled estimate (Cooke, 2009; Nouve and Staatz, 2003; Seyoum, 2007).
Of the three studies only Nouve and Staatz (2003) reports a significant pooled estimate. The
remaining pooled coefficients are positive and three of these are significant. The graphs present
the tests of heterogeneity (I2) after each estimated effect. Five of the studies display high levels of
heterogeneity reporting I2 values of 69.7% – 99.9%. Five out of the remaining six studies have
an I2 value of zero indicating that there is no real variation among their coefficients. The pooled
estimate of all studies of 0.12 is significant and also displays high heterogeneity (I2 = 99.9%).
Thus, the pooled AGOA impact is 12.8% ([exp(0.12) − 1] × 100). This estimate provides us
information about how large the impact should be and also whether it is positive or negative. The
reported estimate is thus, the combined estimate calculated based on pooling the study effects
obtained from the selected studies.
In terms of figure (2.6), the published studies report a pooled effect of 0.01 which is relatively
smaller than the 0.16 pooled study effect reported for unpublished studies. Again, a large amount
of heterogeneity is present justifying our use of the random effect meta-analysis model. The I2
is significant at 1% and reports values of 99.9% for unpublished studies and 72.9% for published
studies. Due to the heterogeneity present in the studies (Figures [2.6–2.7]), pooled estimates from
the FEM would be biased and hence its results are not reported in the appendix. However, for
comparative purposes the estimate of the FEM was 0.007 (0.7%) which is much less than the 12.8%
estimate reported by the REM20.
20The exclusion of studies with coefficients above 50 and also excluding studies with only one coefficient did not
change the pooled estimate. The pooled estimate stays at 0.12. On the other hand excluding studies with a single
coefficient does reduce the confidence interval by a unit.
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NOTE: Weights are from random effects analysis
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Figure 2.6: Random effects meta-analysis by publication status
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NOTE: Weights are from random effects analysis
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Figure 2.7: Random effects meta-analysis by study
Meta-significance tests
We present the MST results (tests of genuine empirical effect) in Table (2.2). Results in columns
(1), (3) and (4) point to the presence of a genuine empirical effect. The regressors—the log of
degrees of freedom, sample size and square root of degrees of freedom are all significant at the
1% level of significance in each of the three columns respectively. However, columns (2) and (5)
find no effects. The square root of degrees of freedom and precision are insignificant also in the
remaining columns. In column (5) we followed Stanley (2008) by shrinking the t-statistic value to
zero and using it as the dependent variable. All three estimates of the genuine effect are greater
than zero and less than half in columns (1) and (3) of the table. A t-test of α1 = 1/2 is rejected in
all three cases (with t values of 12.41, 12.40 and 23.02 respectively) with the result—α1 < 1/2.
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The significant coefficients exhibited in columns (1, 3 & 4) indicate the presence of a genuine
empirical effect in the studies of AGOA. This is the effect after controlling for publication selection.
Thus, our sample does show a positive impact of AGOA for the African beneficiaries. The rest of
this chapter continues by testing other variants of the MRA model to reach a robust conclusion
on publication bias and genuine empirical effects. Last but not the least, the remaining models
estimated allow us to incorporate moderator variables to control for any heterogeneity that might
be present among the studies. This way, we control for any characteristics that might be explaining
the differences in the study effects.
Table 2.2: MST—Test of Authentic effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log of T-stat T-stat log of T-stat log of T-stat Corrected T-stat
log of degrees of freedom 0.242∗
(0.109)
degrees of freedom (square root) 0.015 0.001∗∗
(0.011) (0.000)
N (in logs) 0.241∗
(0.108)
precision -0.010
(0.013)
Constant -1.578 -21.505 -1.596 0.481 -0.000
(1.609) (22.151) (1.605) (0.681) (0.441)
Study dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 178 179 178 178 179
R2 0.425 0.113 0.424 0.433 0.100
Robust standard errors in parentheses, dependent variable is absolute value of T-statistics
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Meta-regression analysis: random and fixed effects weighted least squares
In Table (2.3), our initial FAT/PET results are presented using a random effects model. Precision
is insignificant in the first two columns of the table, indicating the absence of a genuine effect.
However, in the third column, a significant and negative coefficient is reported. The constant (β0)
in Equation (2.11) is not significant in any of the columns indicating the absence of publication bias.
This result contradicts the evidence presented in the funnel plots of the previous section that shows
a large publication bias. The inconsistency of the funnel plots and the MST results above might
be due to the nesting of several coefficients per study. This multiplicity of study effects might be
driving the results indicating the absence of publication bias. Further analysis to investigate the
publication bias and the evidence of a genuine effect are presented in the remaining sections to
enable us reach a more definitive conclusion on the presence (or absence) of publication bias and
genuine effects.
The presence of product effects, single country studies, logged dependent variables, OLS/time
series analysis, number of explanatory variables and the use of annual data exerts a positive effect
on the reported t-statistics (study effects) in table (2.3). Given that the studies vary largely on these
dimensions, we find that they provide a plausible explanation for the wide variation in the estimated
coefficients reported in the sample of studies. Additionally, these contribute to the variation in
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the reported t-statistics. Apart from raising the significance level of the estimates, the remaining
significant regressors in our model tend to reduce the reported t-statistics in the study sample. The
number of years, country effects, cross-section data and gravity regressions are the main study
characteristics having a negative effect on the reported t-statistics. Similarly, the results in this
section are showing the absence of publication bias. The constant in all three columns remain
statistically insignificant. The coefficient on precision (1/SEi) is not significant in the first two
columns but significant in the last column. In the last column of the table, the coefficient of -0.393
indicates that there is a genuine empirical effect that is negative. The inclusion of moderator
variables in columns (2 & 3) are to explain away any heterogeneity that is present in the studies.
Thus, the results provide no conclusive evidence on a genuine empirical effect. It is difficult but not
impossible to explain the sign on the precision coefficient which is inconsistent with the earlier
empirical effects reported in the previous section. One explanation we offer here, might be the use
of the random effects21 meta-regression which has allowed the underlying study effects to vary.
Table 2.3: Random effects metaregression results
(1) (2) (3)
T-stat T-stat T-stat
precision (1/SEi) 0.00596 0.515 -0.393∗
(0.009) (11.266) (0.184)
no. of explanatory variables 0.0424∗∗∗ 0.0422∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
N (in logs) 0.000881 -0.00687
(0.042) (0.008)
no. of years (logs) -0.341 -0.360∗∗∗
(1.019) (0.103)
no. of countries (logs) -0.0195 -0.00540
(0.053) (0.022)
published = 1 -0.0256 0.0115
(0.045) (0.014)
country effects = 1 0.223 -0.250∗∗
(1.131) (0.091)
time effects = 1 -0.00332 0.00488
(0.141) (0.071)
cross section = 1 -5.135 -3.320∗∗∗
(16.813) (0.296)
other preferences included = 1 0.864 0.0547
(5.826) (0.078)
gravity regression = 1 0.646 -0.351∗∗
(5.477) (0.107)
robust s.e. = 1 0.00754 0.0491
(0.064) (0.033)
product effects = 1 0.533 0.438∗∗∗
(0.598) (0.103)
single country analysis -0.666 1.153∗∗∗
(5.734) (0.162)
logged dep. var. = 1 0.526 0.367∗∗∗
(1.029) (0.093)
Agriculture -0.00756
(0.026)
All/Total 0.599
(1.217)
Apparel/Textiles/Leather 0.0409
(0.190)
21See footnote 17
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Energy/Electricity/Chemicals 0.0369
(0.037)
Region = AGOA countries -0.312
(0.587)
Dependent var. = Exports -1.827
(10.780)
Dependent var. = Imports 0.103
(5.421)
time frequency = Annual -0.607
(5.735)
GMM/IV 1.103
(0.775)
OLS/Time series 0.501∗
(0.252)
Level of disaggregation = 6 digit and above -0.953
(5.802)
Level of disaggregation = below 6 digits -0.711
(5.427)
Level of disaggregation = Sector totals 0.554
(1.209)
annual = 1 1.055∗∗∗
(0.173)
Constant 0.130 -0.0283 -0.125
(13.141) (3.409) (1.295)
Study dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 179 179 179
τ2 = 0 —constant only model 705.4 6543.3 705.4
τ2 estimate 683.6 8.381 2.384
LR test of τ2 = 0 1.25387e+09 232187.1
degrees of freedom 164 139 149
Standard errors in parentheses. All explanatory variables are divided by the standard error of the reported
coefficients in the studies. The hypothesis τ2 tests whether a fixed effects model is appropriate for the
analysis. The constant only test uses a version of the heterogeneity test (Q–test) while the LR test is based
on a residual maximum likelihood model. In all three models the fixed effects model is rejected due to the
presence of heterogeneity. Estimates based on the metareg command of Roger Harbord.
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The previous table (table 2.2) is based on the fixed effects meta-regression model and hence,
assumes the study effects to be constant. Table (2.4) which incorporates the fixed effects assumption
is consistent with the earlier table. It provides positive but larger genuine effects with the exception
of two negative genuine effects in columns (5 & 6). We can however, rule out column (5) at the 5%
level of significance. On the contrary the effect reported in column (5) is probably driven by the
heterogeneity in the study effects. Let us not forget that, the square of the standard error is now
used as weights. These two features, that is the heterogeneity present and different weights are
probably contributing to the negative estimate of the genuine empirical effect. The next column
which also uses the square of the standard error as weights reports a positive coefficient. This leads
us to believe that, the heterogeneity of the effects rather strongly influenced the sign of the estimate
in column (5).
Furthermore, table (2.4) indicates strongly the presence of publication bias in addition to the
genuine empirical effects mentioned in the previous paragraph. Column (1 & 6) report the basic
MRA of Equation (2.11). The remaining columns include moderator variables. The final two
columns, however, use the variance (σ2) of the reported coefficients as the weights. Apart from
column (1 & 5) all the remaining columns indicate varying levels of publication bias. While
columns (2, 3, & 7) are negative, columns (4 & 6) are positive. In all cases there is some positive
42
publication selection occurring. In other words, large effects (negative or positive) are reported
and published. Another implication is that, insignificant and smaller effects are not reported by
authors or do not get published. But then again, these findings would hold if the assumptions of the
fixed effects are upheld. A probable reason for the changes in the publication bias coefficient is
the choice of moderator variables. Nonetheless, we are wary of the small number of studies that
the analysis is based upon. These, can have an effect on the estimated coefficients. However, we
are constrained by the number of AGOA impact studies that have been published or released as
working papers. An increase in the number of studies would be useful in improving the estimates
as well as providing more stable estimates of publication bias.
The number of covariates in a study is positive and significant at the 1% level in all four
columns it appears in. The magnitude of the coefficient remains at 0.04 in all the four columns.
The preference dummy (columns 3, 5 & 7), selection correction (3, 5 & 7), AGOA countries
relative to all countries (4 & 5), gravity estimation relative to other methods (3 & 7), country fixed
effects (3 & 7), number of observations (7) and cross-section data (7) are all significant at the 5%
level and contribute to a decrease in the reported t-statistics, on average and all things equal. On
the contrary, product fixed effects (7), other preferences (7), logged dependent variable (5 & 7),
energy/electricity/chemical products (5 & 7), aggregated data (5), single country analyses (5 &
7), and published studies (7) are also significant at the 5% level but have a positive association
with the reported t-statistics. All things equal, these variables lead to larger t-statistics reported
by authors. Of the remaining coefficients, annual data relative to monthly data is positive and
significant in column (5). A few of the significant coefficients are observed to reverse their signs as
more moderator variables are included in the regression. An example is the coefficient of robust
standard errors (this is negative in column 3 but positive in column 7). Finally, all regressors in
column (7) are strongly significant. The following variables are shown to raise the study effect
on average and ceteris paribus: logged dependent variables, robust standard errors, product fixed
effects, single country analysis, agricultural products, inclusion of other preferences (or PTAs),
published articles, annual data and the number of covariates. On the contrary, the number of years,
the number of countries, accounting for selection, incorporating country effects, time effects, using
cross-section data, gravity models and using a dummy to capture the AGOA preference reduces
the study effect on average and ceteris paribus. Given the flaky nature of the results for the fixed
effects and the inconclusive evidence from the random effect meta-regression earlier, we estimate a
multilevel meta-regression in the next section as a further robustness check.
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Table 2.4: Weighted Least Squares meta analysis results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat
Constant -0.0716 -0.507∗∗∗ -0.319∗∗ 0.302∗∗ 0.155 1.513∗∗∗ -0.358∗∗∗
(0.092) (0.094) (0.104) (0.111) (0.116) (0.003) (0.006)
no. of covariates 0.0416∗∗∗ 0.0416∗∗∗ 0.0418∗∗∗ 0.0419∗∗∗ 0.0425∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
No. of obs (log) 0.00362 -0.00160 0.00803 0.0104 -0.0161∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.014) (0.014) (0.000)
No. of years used (log) -0.147 -0.344 0.0870 -0.188 -0.231∗∗∗
(0.349) (0.359) (0.366) (0.374) (0.002)
No. of countries (log) -0.0613∗∗∗ -0.0525∗∗∗ -0.0519∗∗∗ -0.0570∗∗∗ -0.0280∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.000)
annual = 1 0.0287 0.881∗∗∗
(0.191) (0.004)
selection = 1 -0.185∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ -0.252∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.054) (0.004)
published = 1 -0.741 -1.543 0.0117∗∗∗
(0.525) (1.100) (0.000)
country effects = 1 0.456∗ 0.498 -0.289∗∗∗
(0.201) (0.499) (0.004)
time effects = 1 0.0135 0.00465 -0.0314∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.048) (0.004)
cross section = 1 0 0 -2.274∗∗∗
(.) (.) (0.012)
other preferences included =1 -0.488 -0.0523 0.206∗∗∗
(0.415) (0.747) (0.001)
gravity regression = 1 -1.097∗ -1.563 -0.287∗∗∗
(0.482) (1.011) (0.003)
preference dummy = 1 -2.340∗∗∗ -2.028∗∗∗ -2.706∗∗∗
(0.286) (0.422) (0.102)
robust s.e. =1 -0.144∗∗∗ 0.0232 0.00619∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.019) (0.001)
product effects =1 -0.247 -0.201 0.446∗∗∗
(0.182) (0.499) (0.003)
single country = 1 0 2.203∗ 0.928∗∗∗
(.) (1.026) (0.006)
logged dep. var. = 1 -0.118 2.181∗∗ 0.386∗∗∗
(0.182) (0.697) (0.003)
Agriculture -0.00957 -0.0117
(0.008) (0.008)
All/Total 0.128 2.140∗∗
(0.192) (0.666)
Apparel/Textiles/Leather 0.00559 0.0239
(0.060) (0.060)
Energy/Electricity/Chemicals 0.0262∗ 0.0247∗
(0.012) (0.012)
Region = AGOA countries -0.300∗ -0.538∗∗
(0.151) (0.166)
Dependent var. = Exports 0.133 1.280
(2.201) (0.888)
Dependent var. = Imports -0.178 -1.825
(1.579) (1.747)
time frequency = Annual -0.0566 2.347∗
(0.193) (1.015)
GMM/IV -0.430∗ -0.899+
(0.191) (0.538)
OLS/Time series -0.587∗∗∗ -0.669∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.035)
Level of disaggregation = 6 digit and above 0.278 2.415∗
(2.132) (1.052)
Level of disaggregation = below 6 digits -0.281 1.438
(1.483) (1.630)
Level of disaggregation = Sector totals 0.132 2.138∗∗
(0.203) (0.668)
Precision (1/SEi) 0.0553 0.677 4.073
∗∗ 0.0758 -2.524+ -0.298∗∗∗ 2.262∗∗∗
(0.216) (0.804) (1.340) (2.377) (1.340) (0.047) (0.102)
Study dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Observations 179 179 179 179 179 179 179
goodness of fit–χ2 17061.2 1091.6 858.3 565.2 431.6 1.01861e+09 319587.7
model χ2 104676.7 120646.2 120879.6 121172.6 121306.3 8.28448e+09 1.37106e+10
Standard errors in parentheses. All explanatory variables divided by standard error. The last two columns use the square of the standard error as weights. + p < 0.1,
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Multi-level meta-regression
The final table, Table (2.5) below presents the multi-level MRA estimates. We include these results
to check the robustness of our earlier random effects MRA results—given that that our coefficients
are nested in the individual studies. The intercept is the only random component included in the
2-level multi-level MRA below. In columns (2 & 3) in the table, precision is negative and significant
at the 1% level of significance. The number of covariates and the presence of product effects are
robust to the inclusion of additional moderator variables. Nonetheless, the number of covariates
is robust across all three tables—the coefficients are also quite similar (approximately 0.04). The
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number of covariates, presence of products effects, use of a logged dependent variable, annual
data, single country analysis, energy/electricity/chemical products, GMM/IV and OLS/time series
estimators (relative to other estimation methods) tend to significantly increase the study effects, on
average and ceteris paribus. On the contrary, gravity models, cross section data and the number of
years significantly reduce the reported study effect, on average and ceteris paribus. The significance
of these variables indicate that much of the variation in reported study effects is explained by the
differences in these study characteristics. Thus, these variables are the main characteristics behind
the differences in reported study effects. Nonetheless, a number of these variables are significant
across all three tables with similar signs and impact on the t-statistics reported in the studies.
All the variables in the preceding are significant at 1% with the exception of the published
study coefficient that is significant at the 10% level of significance. The random component of the
model (lnσu) and the residual standard error (lnσe) are significant in all three columns. These
indicate that the studies are largely different from each other. The variance partition component
(VPC) corroborates this evidence together with the I2 tests discussed earlier which all point to the
heterogeneity of the studies. The VPC calculated are 5.7%, 17.8%, 80.8% and 17.8% for columns
(1) – (4) respectively. They indicate the level of variance in study level t-statistics that can be
attributed to differences between the various studies in the sample. In column (3), the VPC is large
and implies that, 80.8% of the variance is due to differences between the studies. On the other
hand, the basic MRA in column (1) attributes only 5.7% of the variance to differences between
the studies. Thus one observation from the table, is that increasing the moderator variables and
controlling for some of the variation between studies tends to account for the larger values of the
VPC observed in columns (2) – (4)22
Table (2.4) provided the weighted least squares results for comparative purposes. The tests
of publication bias were significant in five out of the seven columns. The results presented so
far are at best mixed. This makes it difficult to provide a definitive conclusion on the direction
of the bias. Nonetheless, the same can be said of the empirical effect. The implication is that
more work needs to be done in accumulating further studies as well as rethinking the design of
the MRA. On the whole, the negative empirical effects do not outnumber the positive effects. We
cannot clearly provide the direction of the empirical effect. This is evident in tables (2.2) that
shows a positive effect and columns (3 & 7) of table (2.4) which shows a negative impact of AGOA
beyond any publication bias. To the contrary, the evidence from the random effects MRA and
the multilevel MRA point towards a negative true effect beyond any existing publication bias. As
mentioned earlier, more work needs to be done in pinning down these effects. One way to do this is
by broadening the scope of the present MRA.
22Table (A.3) in appendix (A) presents results for the case where coefficients larger than fifty have been excluded
(columns 1 – 4). This results in the exclusion of Nouve and Staatz (2003) from the table. Column (5) further excludes
Mueller (2008); Zappile (2011) since both report a single coefficient. The decision to exclude these studies is to check if
their inclusion above is driving the results presented in this section. The results in the appendix shows that this is not
the case and remain largely consistent with the earlier result. Precision is negative and significant in columns (2 & 3).
Similar to table (2.5) above, the constant which allows for us to test publication bias remains insignificant implying the
absence of publication bias.
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Table 2.5: Multilevel meta analysis results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat
precision (1/SEi) 0.00505 -1.177∗∗∗ -0.341∗ -1.072
(0.009) (0.104) (0.156) (1.058)
no. of covariates 0.0267∗∗∗ 0.0422∗∗∗ 0.0423∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
product effects = 1 0.809∗∗∗ 0.414∗∗∗ 0.545∗
(0.059) (0.089) (0.227)
logged dep. var. = 1 0.765∗∗∗ 0.356∗∗∗ 0.365
(0.103) (0.080) (0.369)
country effects = 1 0.0432 -0.251∗∗ 0.0517
(0.057) (0.082) (0.372)
published = 1 0.102+ 0.0118 -0.0233
(0.056) (0.013) (0.020)
N (in logs) -0.00548 0.00383
(0.008) (0.019)
no. of years (logs) -0.362∗∗∗ -0.379
(0.089) (0.430)
no. of countries (logs) -0.0174 -0.0303
(0.017) (0.021)
annual = 1 1.083∗∗∗ 0.610
(0.147) (0.740)
time effects = 1 0.00476 -0.00493
(0.065) (0.065)
cross section = 1 -3.141∗∗∗ -2.090
(0.264) (1.556)
other preferences included = 1 0.0579 -0.205
(0.070) (0.553)
gravity regression = 1 -0.378∗∗∗ -0.539
(0.091) (0.349)
robust s.e. = 1 0.0401 0.00855
(0.030) (0.029)
single country analysis 1.149∗∗∗ 0.471
(0.137) (0.708)
Agriculture -0.00923
(0.012)
All/Total 0.409
(0.398)
Apparel/Textiles/Leather 0.0384
(0.087)
Energy/Electricity/Chemicals 0.0360∗
(0.017)
region = AGOA countries -0.391
(0.241)
Dependent var. = Exports 0.364
(0.886)
Dependent var. = Imports 1.016
(0.631)
GMM/IV 1.007∗∗
(0.339)
OLS/Time series 0.414∗∗∗
(0.112)
level of disaggregation = 6 digit and above 0.00775
(0.534)
level of disaggregation = below 6 digits 0.471
(0.501)
level of disaggregation = Sector totals 0.357
(0.388)
Constant 2.386 0.630 -0.261 -0.486
(2.718) (1.053) (0.816) (1.212)
lnσu: Random
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Constant 1.830∗∗∗ 1.132∗∗∗ 1.078∗∗∗ 1.394∗∗∗
(0.411) (0.275) (0.214) (0.230)
lnσe: Residual
Constant 3.233∗∗∗ 1.898∗∗∗ 0.360∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.056) (0.058) (0.060)
Observations 179 179 179 179
LR test vs. linear regression 3.639 17.81 142.4 68.90
Variance partition component (%) 5.7 17.8 80.8 17.8
Standard errors in parentheses. All variables divided by the standard error of the reported AGOA coefficient. +
p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
2.5.4 Summary
A meta-analysis of the AGOA trade preference literature was conducted in this section of the
chapter. The findings indicate the presence of a genuine empirical effect in the literature. There are
some concerns though, of the changing signs of the precision coefficient and its non-significance
in some columns (that is, β0/α0 and β1/α1). An explanation of the inconclusive evidence, might
be due to the conservative number of studies included in the MRA. In addition, the presence of
several coefficients in each study which requires appropriate modelling of the MRA might also
be an issue. In resolving the issue of multiple coefficients in a study, we used a multi-level model
as a robustness check of our estimates. However, with multi-level modelling a good number of
studies need to be used since the estimator has asymptotic properties. Possibly, in the near future
there would be more econometric studies on AGOA to help resolve any issues with our sample by
providing a larger sample of studies.
The sign of the precision coefficient informs us of the direction of bias in the estimated
coefficients provided in the AGOA literature. In the random effects meta-regression and the
multilevel regression models the precision coefficient is negative pointing towards a smaller
impact of AGOA than reported in the literature. On the contrary, the fixed effects WLS provides
coefficients of the opposite sign in majority of the columns. This can be explained by the presence
of heterogeneity which makes assumptions of the error term inappropriate. The random effects
meta-regression and the multilevel models allow the errors to be more flexible and include an
additional term to account for the variation in coefficients within the same study. We believe that
the differences in coefficients and signs between the random effects based methods and the fixed
effects weighted least squares is largely due to the heterogeneity present in the studies.
While the meta-regression provides an explanation of the variation in reported coefficients in
the literature, the meta-analysis shown earlier provides a convenient way of pooling all coefficients
reported. The pooled coefficient thus, provides information about the magnitude of the impact. The
value of 12.8% provided in figure (2.6) and (2.7) therefore provides information about the likely
impact of AGOA. Based on the studies used in the analysis a pooled estimate of 12.8% is a more
reasonable estimate of the impact of AGOA and thus estimates that are much larger (or smaller)
than 12.8% must be due to the study design adopted. The meta-regression then provides a way of
exploring how these differences in the study designs affect the estimated AGOA study effects.
In concluding, we find inconclusive evidence on publication bias. In terms of a genuine
empirical effect our conclusions are at best inconclusive, although there is some evidence that this
effect is negative. We are unable to clearly present the direction of this effect. However, if we are to
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stand by the results from our multilevel model the effect seems to be negative. There is the need to
accumulate more studies to further investigate the issue of publication bias and whether correcting
for publication bias provides any empirical effect. We do not find strong evidence, that textiles &
apparel significantly increase the reported t-statistics. On the contrary, there is some evidence on
agriculture and energy, electrical and chemical products increasing the t-statistic values relative to
other products, all things equal. Last but not the least, we do find some evidence that the number of
countries and composition of countries matter when estimating the impact of AGOA. However, the
direction of the effect and significance is mixed for the number of countries.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter has provided a discussion of the theoretical and empirical literature. A quantitative
review of the literature has also been carried out. The quantitative review tried to establish the
presence of publication bias in existing studies. The analysis sought to provide evidence of the
existence of any genuine empirical effect after controlling for publication bias and heterogeneity
of the selected studies. Our results on publication bias is inconclusive. On the one hand, the
funnel plots suggest the presence of publication bias as they show asymmetry in the estimated
study coefficients found in the literature. On the other hand, the formal tests of publication bias
are not significant in most cases. Even though table (2.5) did not have a significant constant, the
level two variation in the study effects is significant which is consistent with the high test value of
heterogeneity reported. Thus, the estimated coefficients vary widely within each study and across
studies. Finally, the meta-analysis summarising the study effect, reports an AGOA study effect of
around 12.8%. The pooled coefficient should serve as a reference point for studies on the AGOA
impact. We now turn to a more detailed analysis of the AGOA impact on disaggregated trade data
in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3
The Impact of Trade Preferences on
Exports of Developing Countries: The
Case of the AGOA and CBTPA
Preferences of the USA
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter the main question we ask is that, “has there been an observed increase in the exports
of AGOA and CBTPA recipients to the USA compared to their exports to the rest of the world?” In
answering the main question of the chapter we, (1) estimate the impact of the USA’s preferences on
exports of developing countries given their exports to the rest of the world (focussing on the AGOA,
CBTPA and GSP preferences), (2) compare the impact at various levels of disaggregated trade (3)
compare AGOA to the CBTPA preferences noting any significant differences (4) determine which
products have been the export drivers while comparing the importance of apparel in the exports of
the preference beneficiaries and (5) show that the results are robust to the choice of econometric
technique and not sensitive to controls included in the regressions. In doing this, we contribute to
the existing empirical literature on USA preferences by controlling for the exports of developing
countries to the rest of the world. Secondly, we add to the few existing empirical work on the
CBTPA preferences. We also find support for the importance of apparel and textiles in AGOA
(and CBTPA) exports as has been underscored by for example Collier and Venables (2007) and
Frazer and Van Biesebroeck (2010). Finally, we show that with large N panels the random effects
estimator is inconsistent and inefficient. However, the Heckman two step procedure, fixed and
Mundlak corrected random effects estimators provide similar estimates.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section (3.2) shows the trends in imports
and the competitiveness of recipients of American preferences. Section (3.3) presents the data,
econometric framework and modelling problems requiring our attention. We show how we address
these problems in our analysis. Section (3.4) is a discussion of the results. The conclusion is then,
provided in the final Section (3.5).
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3.2 Competitiveness and trends in USA imports from selected AGOA
and CBI beneficiaries
Figure (3.1) below provides the level of imports observed under each preference. Additionally, the
GSP and other regional preferences are included to show the overall trends in American preferences
over the period 1997–2011. As indicated by the graph, the volume of AGOA exports are quite close
to that of the GSP and has exceeded the GSP in some periods. This massive jump from zero imports
to the level of the GSP imports is what much of the studies on AGOA are capturing. However,
the financial crisis has had its effect on all preferences as shown by the dip in imports around
2006–2007 for majority of the preferences. The crisis appears not to have affected CAFTA-DR
exports which maintains its gradual increase.
In drawing conclusions on the preceding comments, one must not lose sight of the fact that,
majority of the AGOA beneficiaries export a significant portion of their previous GSP products
under AGOA. Thus, the growth of AGOA exports is in a way matched by a decline in GSP exports
(as well as MFN exports) making the impact and increase in AGOA shown larger. The GSP
products have a limited number of zero and low tariff lines compared to the other preferences.
Nonetheless, when countries become more competitive in certain products their GSP preferences
in those products are withdrawn. The withdrawal of the GSP or removal of the preferences for
specific products is one of the built-in mechanisms of the GSP to ensure that countries that have
exceeded the income and competitiveness criteria for selection into the GSP are removed (GAO,
2008). This way, the USA is able to maintain the tariff preferences for countries that continue to
fall below the income and competitiveness criteria set. This process of withdrawing or limiting the
preferences is referred to as “graduating” the countries or products involved. Similarly countries
previously “graduated” can be “de-graduated”—that is returned to the GSP if they fall below the
income and competitiveness thresholds. These, thus serve to limit the potential for much higher
growth in GSP products.
Finally, figure (3.2) provides information on EU and USA tariff lines. Figure (C.1) provides
further information on the competitiveness of the various regional preferences in the American
market. Additional tables (tables B.1–B.2) and graphs (figures B.1–B.5) are presented in the
appendix to this chapter (appendix B). Figure (3.2) shows the mean and maximum applied tariffs
as well as the number of tariff lines of the EU and USA (3.2(a)), (3.2(b)), and (3.2(c)). These are
shown for the agricultural and industrial sectors as well as total exports. Both importing countries
do have higher tariffs in agriculture compared to industrial products. While the simple and weighted
average tariffs have declined from their 1997–2000 average for the EU, the simple average tariff for
the USA has increased marginally. The average tariffs for all imports is generally lower for the USA
compared to the EU in both periods. Additionally, the USA’s average for industrial imports is lower
than that of the EU. Panel (3.2(b)) shows that the maximum tariff rate was 716% for agricultural
products for the 1997–2000 period1. In 2001–2010, the maximum tariff in this sector fell to 350%2.
1This was the tariff for HS 040390–buttermilk, curdled milk and cream, kephir, other fermented milk, cream products.
This was the maximum tariff observed in 1997.
2HS 040390 was no longer the highest tariff. The highest tariff now applied to a number of products in the HS 24
category—namely, six digit product codes 240110, 240120, 240130, 240310, 240391 and 240399. These products are
various categories of tobacco and include tobacco and tobacco substitutes, tobacco waste, tobacco extracts essences and
other manufactured tobacco.
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The EU on the contrary, had much lower peak tariffs than the USA. The highest tariffs are still in
the agricultural sector in the 1997–2000 period. Smoking tobacco (HS 240310) had the highest
tariffs for the 2001–2010 period for the EU. The final panel (3.2(c)) shows that the EU has more
products receiving a tariff at the tariff line level. In the period 2001–2010, the USA has been able
to increase the number of free lines beyond what the EU was offering in the earlier period.
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3.3 Data, econometric framework and modelling issues
3.3.1 Data
Data for the analysis is obtained from the World Integrated Trade System3 (WITS) which queries
data from UN Comtrade for export (and import) data and UN TRAINS for the tariff data. Gross
domestic product is obtained from The World Bank’s World Development Indicators4 (WDI) and
gravity type variables (viz., landlocked, area, latitude, number of cities, official language, etc) are
obtained from the CEPII distances database5. In addition, our political variables (military and
religion) are obtained from the Database of Political Institutions6 (DPI) and democracy time series
dataset 7. Finally, the preferential dummies are constructed based on information sourced from
the WITS preferential database and USITC8 The remaining variables constructed (viz., RCA and
market size) are based on the variables obtained from the sources above. Table (3.1) provides
further information on the variables used as well as summary statistics.
We selected all HS 6-digit categories within the following products, 01:- Live Animals, 02:-
Meat and edible meat offal; 25:- Salt, sulphur, earth & stone, plastering, etc; 26:- Ores, slag and ash;
and 50–63:- Apparel and clothing. The products were selected based on whether some of the 6-digit
products were captured in the preference. Also, of interest were products that form a significant
component of developing country exports. Apparel and Textiles are an important component of
both AGOA and CBTPA preferences hence their inclusion. GAO (2008) notes that, approximately
94% and 70% of all imports under AGOA and ATPA/ATPDEA comprised fuel imports respectively.
Apparel imports were 30%, 10% and 3% of total imports under CBI, ATPA and AGOA respectively
(GAO, 2008).
We use annual data covering the period 1996 – 2009. There are 166 countries and 981 different
products at the 6 digit level in the dataset. The products comprise of 808 apparel and textile and
173 non apparel products at the 6-digit level. Fewer products are however, exported by several
of the countries. The non apparel products consist of the 6 digit products falling within the live
animals, meat and offal and salt and ores sector as indicated above. For example, for the African
countries fewer than 400 products are exported in any given year. Of these products there are some
products that are not exported in all years. In Table (3.1), the probability of exporting a particular
6-digit product in our sample is 0.3, the average number of free tariff lines (indicating zero tariff
rates) is 0.4, the average weighted MFN tariff is 9.03% and the average applied tariff is 8.09%. The
probability of exporting under the GSP, AGOA, CAFTA-DR and CBTPA are 0.008, 0.004, 0.01
and 0.007 respectively.
The tariff margins are constructed based on information provided at the 6-digit level on the
MFN and applied tariff provided by WITS. In cases where missing values of the MFN and applied
tariffs are encountered we checked the preferential status of the country and replaced the missing
3http://wits.worldbank.org/wits/
4http://data.worldbank.org/
5Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales: http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/
bdd/distances.htm
6Thorsten Beck, George Clarke, Alberto Groff, Philip Keefer, and Patrick Walsh, 2001. ”New tools in comparative
political economy: The Database of Political Institutions.” 15:1, 165-176 (September), World Bank Economic Review.
7Norris, 2009, http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Data/Democracy%20TimeSeries%
20Data/
8http://dataweb.usitc.gov/
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values with the average estimate based on the region, preference group and product. Trade flow
data not provided by UN Comtrade were assumed to be zero. We instead used the imports reported
by the partner country of the exporter rather than the exports provided by the exporters. The use of
the imports by the partner country rather than the exports of the exporter is referred to as “mirror
exports”—since this is supposed to be equal to the reported exports with any difference in value
attributable to costs, freight and insurance. Piermartini and Teh (2005) notes that, mirror exports
are more accurately recorded than the exports reported by the developing countries. The reason
for this, is that, imports entering a country are inspected at the port by custom authorities and the
relevant tariffs are applied—this leads to more accurate recording of imports compared to exports
that may not be taxed as they are shipped out of the exporting country.
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3.3.2 Methodology
The econometric formulation for investigating trade preferences at the macro level is adopted
from Collier and Venables (2007). They estimate the impact of the USA’s AGOA and EU trade
preferences (given by dummies) on the log of exports from developing countries to the USA relative
to the EU-15 countries. They control for market size and market demand shocks. We depart from
Collier and Venables (2007) by looking at disaggregated 6 digit HS chapters 1, 2, 25, 26 and 50-639
and instead use the ratio of imports by the USA relative to imports by rest of the world for each
country (see equation 4). Additional controls included here are each country’s RCA, lagged values
of applied preferential and MFN tariffs (or preference margins) at the six-digit product level and
lagged political controls such as democracy and political stability. We include these variables
to control for (a) the competitiveness of the exporting countries, (b) the political climate of the
country and (c) the preference margin. We expect countries with a governing democracy, rule
of law, competitive industry in the sectors chosen and high preference margins to raise exports
to the USA. Conversely, countries with a poor democratic record, lack of rule of law and facing
low preference margins to have lower exports to the USA. In addition, imports under the GSP is
controlled for by interacting our GSP dummy with the CBTPA and AGOA dummies.
At the six digit level of disaggregation, zero exports would be observed for some countries
hence the Heckman two-stage panel estimator is more appropriate in modelling Equation (5). This
is needed to correct for selectivity bias in the decision to export a particular HS 6 digit product in the
case of the Heckman selection. Essentially, there is self-selection in the exports of products at highly
disaggregated levels, whereby countries do not randomly choose to export a particular product.
Our panel approach to estimation allows us to include fixed effects (exporter and product fixed
effects) and time effects to control for some of the unobserved characteristics and market shocks
respectively. The principal model is the Heckman selection10 — the Poisson pseudo maximum
likelihood estimator (PPMLE), panel fixed effect, and Mundlak corrected random effects estimators
are included for comparative purposes.
Equation (3.1) and (3.2) below model exports from country i (partner) to j (USA) and rest
of the world as a function of exporter nation characteristics (E), USA and World characteristics
— captured by market size (M ), between country characteristics (d) and an error term (µ). The
total imports by the USA relative to the World of product p from all countries is the proxy for
market size—which additionally controls for market demand shocks in these importing regions.
The between country characteristics (d) includes fixed elements—for example distance and constant
trade preferences over time as well as time varying country-pair specific trade preferences (Collier
and Venables, 2007, 1338-9). We proxy these using country-product-year fixed effects for the
constant parts and dummies for trade preferences for the time varying parts. Equation (3) is then
the ratio of the first two equations—this substitutes out the exporter characteristics leaving us with
91–Live animals; 2–Meat and edible meat offal; 25–Salt, sulphur; earth & stone; plastering, etc; 26–Ores, slag and
ash; 50-60–Textiles; and 61-63–Textile articles (apparel and clothing).
10Selection is primarily based on exports to the USA. If a country does not export to the USA then in the first stage the
dependent variable is zero. If exports to the USA are observed the dependent variable takes the value of one. Thus, the
first stage is the probability of exporting to the USA. The second stage the outcome equation then models all non-missing
flows. In the case whereby either exports to the USA or ROW is missing we experimented with two models, (1) we
excluded these in the second stage and (2) replaced the missing value with 1 and took the ratio of both destinations. Both
methods yielded qualitatively similar results in terms of the coefficient and the significance.
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an estimable equation in the form of Equation (3.5). Equation (3.4) is our selection equation and
the Inverse Mills Ratio calculated from (3.4) is incorporated into (3.5) to complete the Heckman
two-step procedure. In chapter 2, we provided a link between the model presented in this chapter
and the gravity model. The key difference was the absence of the gravity constant and the exporter
country characteristics which is dropped from the model due to the dependent variable being defined
as the ratio of exports to two destinations. In other words, the exporter country characteristics
cancel out making it easier to estimate our model. In our actual implementation of the model we
rely on the usual gravity type variables and incorporate additional variables as discussed below.
The PPMLE is estimated using Equation (3.3) in its multiplicative form. The Poisson regression
log linearises this equation and thus our results would be similar to the log linearised model in
Equation (3.5) (for example, Herrera, 2010; Silva and Tenreyro, 2003). Our argument is that a
country given a preference would then decide which products to produce. In this decision, rules
of origin, cummulation rules, preference margins, competitiveness and other factors determine
whether the country exports to the USA. Our exclusion restriction includes the preference margin
and this is discussed further in the next section.
Xip,j = Ei(t) ∗Mj(t) ∗ dip,j(t) ∗ µip,j(t) (3.1)
Xip,w = Ei(t) ∗Mw(t) ∗ dip,w(t) ∗ µip,w(t) (3.2)
xipt = Mt ∗ dipt ∗ µipt (3.3)
exportsipt = α+ β
′TPit + γ1lat+ γ2RCA
i,w
ipt + γ3Milipt−1
γ4tariff marginipt−1 + Γ
′Za + ηip + ηt + µipt (3.4)
exportsipt =
{
1 if positive exports
0 otherwise
lnxipt = a+ α
′TPipt + γ1MSizept + γ2RCA
i,w
ipt−1 +
+λˆipt + δ
′Zb + ηip + ηt + ipt. (3.5)
Where: xipt = Xip,j/Xip,w,Mt = Mj/Mw, dipt = dip,j/dip,w, i, p, and t subscripts refer to
country, product and time respectively, j refers to the USA while w refers to rest of the world, “a”
in Equation (3.5) is the constant of the regression. The log of the dependent variable is taken as
ln(1 +X). Tariffs and political variables are lagged in order to avoid introducing any simultaneity
or endogeneity into our model.
Xij is Imports from partner i
Ei is exporter nation characteristics
Mj is importer characteristics
dij is between country characteristics - given by trade preferences offered by j
to i
µipt; ipt is an error term
TPit is trade preferences offered by the USA. It takes the value 1 from the year in
which a country first receives the preference and 0 before11. Includes, GSP,
AGOA and CBI beneficiaries
TPipt is trade preferences offered by the USA. It takes the value 1 for a product
exported under a preference and 0 otherwise12. Includes, GSP, AGOA and
CBTPA beneficiaries for each product
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MSizept is market size the ratio of total imports of our selected commodities into j
excluding country i.
tariff marginipt calculated as
MFN tariff - Applied HS tariff
MFN tariff for each country, year and product.
Mil is Military - 1 if chief executive is a serving military officer
λˆipt Is the inverse Mills ratio from the first stage regression, calculated as:
φ(·)
Φ(·) ,
where φ(·) is the standard normal probability density function and Φ(·) is
the standard normal density function of the Equation (4) whenE(exports =
1| covariates).
ηt Time effects
ηip exporter and product fixed effects in the fixed effects regression. Is the
random effects in the panel random effects estimator
Za vector of control variables – latitude, natural log of area, number of cities,
Number of Free lines, dummies for Africa, Latin America & Caribbean,
landlocked Christians, Muslims, English and Spanish speaking countries
Zb vector of control variables – latitude, natural log of area, number of cities,
dummies for landlocked, Africa, Latin America & Caribbean, NAFTA,
CAFTA, English and Spanish speaking countries
RCA Based on Balassa (1967)13the revealed comparative advantage (RCA) is
calculated as:
RCAi,wipt =
(
Xwp,i∑
pX
w
p,i
)
÷
(
Xwp,w∑
pX
w
p,w
)
where: Xwp,i is exports of product p from country i to the World and
∑
pX
w
p,i
is total exports from country i to World, Xwp,w and
∑
pX
w
p,w are the world
exports of product p and total exports respectively
3.3.3 Econometric modelling issues
We attempt various econometric techniques viz., the Heckman selection and the Poisson estimators.
These are then compared to traditional estimates from the fixed effects and random effects estimators
based on positive imports. We employ the fixed effects regressions in most of our estimations as
this approach allows for the existence of a correlation between the fixed effects and the regressors
(Baltagi, 2001; Greene, 2003; Wooldridge, 2002). Secondly, the fixed effects approach minimises
the omitted variable problem as the fixed effects capture variables omitted from the model leaving
the coefficients unbiased to a large extent. A problem with the fixed effects is the inability to
estimate time invariant variables. However, the time invariant variables can be recovered from a
regression of the variables on the extracted fixed effects. The time invariant variables are not pivotal
to our analysis so this is pursued only in a few regressions for comparative purposes—that is to
compare the coefficients to those of the random effects, which allows for time invariant variables.
Unlike the fixed effects, the random effects approach does not allow for a correlation between
the random effects and the explanatory variables. The estimator assumes this correlation to be zero.
Hence, in the presence of a correlation, the random effects estimator becomes inconsistent and
11Definition allows preferences to overlap for each country. Thus a country can be an AGOA and a GSP beneficiary.
To control for these overlaps we include interaction terms for those cases where countries have two or more preferences
12Previous footnote applies here also
13Balassa, Bela 1967, Studies in Trade Liberalization, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore: Maryland
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inefficient. Mundlak (1978) argues that the random effects estimator is biased due to misspecific-
ation when there is a correlation between the random effects and the explanatory variables. To
overcome this, Mundlak (1978) suggests adding the mean of the explanatory variables as additional
regressors in the random effects estimator. Thus in our case the ηip in Equation (3.4) and (3.5)
(when estimated by the random effects estimator captures the random effect parameter) can be
specified as:
ηip = ϕ
′X¯ip + ϑip (3.6)
where:
ϑip ∼ N(0, σ2ϑ), X¯ip =
∑T
t=1 Xipt
T and X is the vector of time varying explanatory variables
in Equation (3.4) or (3.5)
This is pursued for all the random effects estimators presented in the results section. The
Hausman test allows a choice to be made between the fixed effects and the random effects estimators.
In addition, the Breusch and Pagan test provides an avenue for testing for the presence of random
effects in our model. In Table (3.3) we report the Breusch and Pagan test and these are significant
for all random effects estimated (with and without Mundlak’s correction). The Hausman test is not
pursued since we employ the fixed effects model to capture country and product specific effects
that are not captured by the variables included in our model. The fixed effects are significantly
different from zero in all estimations as provided in the table’s footnotes.
We now turn to specific econometric modelling issues found in the trade literature that requires
our attention in this chapter—as well as revisit some of the issues raised in the preceding paragraphs.
The Heckman selection and Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood (PPMLE) have become dominant
techniques in empirical trade studies (for example, Helpman et al., 2007; Herrera, 2010; Silva
and Tenreyro, 2003, 2006, 2009; Silva et al., 2010). Given the presence of zeros in the trade data
and the large literature on selection into exporting we pursue the Heckman selection as one of our
models. In light of the zeros we also pursue the PPMLE. The Heckman selection is motivated
by the desire to model the self-selection into export markets (for example, Agostino et al., 2007;
Cardamone, 2007).
It was earlier mentioned that, mirror exports are used to help reduce the missing or unrecorded
exports of developing countries. The missing data problem is not entirely resolved as this is
symptomatic of highly disaggregated trade data. However, we are reassured of the reliability of
the import data since imports tend to be more accurately recorded compared to export data (for
example, Piermartini and Teh, 2005). The reason being that, tariffs are applied at the border, hence
more reliable data on imports are collected. Thus, in our case, imports by the USA would be more
reliable since the USA has to decide which imports are allowed in duty free, under the various
preferences, MFN or at normal tariff rates—this makes them more reliable. One can safely conclude
that, most of the remaining missing or unrecorded values in the dataset represent countries not
exporting that particular product. This essentially motivates Heckman’s two stage panel estimator
to control for self-selection into export markets and thus reduce the problem of selection bias that
arises.
An issue prevalent in pursuing Heckman’s selection estimator is finding appropriate exclusion
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restrictions. The use of appropriate exclusion restrictions reduces the bias in standard errors
calculated at the second stage and allows the model to be identified (Bushway et al., 2007).
Nonetheless, the use of a probit in the first stage without the necessary exclusion restriction
holds, as the non linear nature of the probit estimator provides identification (Zabel, 1992). In
circumstances where both the first stage and the second stage are non linear14 then the exclusion
restrictions are important in identifying the second stage (Zabel, 1992). More importantly, failure
to find adequate exclusion restrictions implies that the second stage cannot be identified in this
case and estimates of the second stage would be inconsistent and inefficient (Zabel, 1992). To
overcome these issues we adopt Jensen et al.’s (2002) approach of estimating a Mundlak corrected
random effects probit in the first stage and a fixed effects estimation in the second stage. This
reduces the problem of having omitted variables in the first stage as well as mis-specifying the
model. The challenge in carrying out the first stage probit in our case is getting the model to
converge—especially for the disaggregated product regressions. If faced with this problem we can
safely adopt a linear fixed effects or a Mundlak corrected linear random effects estimator for the first
stage. This, then requires us to include valid restrictions in our first stage to aid the identification of
our second stage regressions.
In previous work, Helpman et al. (2007) adopted religion as their exclusion restriction in
modelling firm heterogeneity within the gravity framework. However, this has been criticised by
some authors (for example, Silva and Tenreyro, 2009) who do not find a link between religion and
the probability of exporting. We instead use the preference margin, military and preference dummies
created at the country level15. Our argument is that, a country given a preference would then decide
which products to export. This decision would be influenced by rules of origin, cumulation rules,
preference margins and competitiveness at the product level as well as other factors that determine
whether the country exports to the USA (viz., autocracy, number of free lines, landlocked among
others). In the second stage, the preference margin serves as an exclusion restriction. Arguably, it
would be more preferable to have the preference margin in the second stage as a determinant of
the level of exports. Mainly because the preference margin may also affect the levels of exports.
The decision to include it here was to have an exclusion restriction and provide more focus on
the product dummies in providing the AGOA impact. Further, the data confirms our choice of the
preference margin as an exclusion restriction although theoretically, we might have included it as
an exclusion restriction.
Aiello et al. (2010); Cardamone (2007); Cipollina and Pietrovito (2011); Cipollina et al. (2013)
provide a discussion of the drawbacks of using dummies. Aiello et al. (2010) rather use the dummy
approach in their analysis. Given, that this is within the difference-in-differences approach the
AGOA product dummy would provide the average treatment effect and we do not want the impact
to be affected by any correlation between the preference and the preference margin. Admittedly,
this is an area that deserves more thought and that future analysis should attempt at addressing
this issue. After a country has decided on exporting, emphasis now lies on factors such as the
competitiveness and capacity of the country to export more products. In our analysis, the preference
14It could also be that both stages are linear if the first stage is based on a linear probability model. There are very few
applications of this and it is a departure from Heckman’s presentation of the selection estimator
15The product level is not used in this case and it is irrespective of whether the country uses the preference or not.
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margin would be captured by the product dummies16 at the second stage and in the other regressions
captured by the country-product fixed effects. The dummy-time interactions in later regressions
capture annual variations and modifications occurring within the preference programmes.
Similarly, the PPMLE has been shown to provide consistent results for gravity models and in our
case it would also yield consistent estimates. The zero inflated poisson (ZIP) can be an alternative
to the PPMLE since it models excess zeros through a logit and hence solves any headaches with
selection17. However, this is not pursued due to estimation problems encountered. The problems
are related to the large number of parameters. The large number of fixed effects prevents the model
from converging and potentially introduces an incidental parameters problem. Another estimator
within the pseudo maximum likelihood family, the negative binomial regression (NBREG) is also
a useful alternative in the presence of over-dispersion in the dependent variable. However, the
NBREG is sensitive to the scaling of the dependent variable and is restrictive. It does not do well
in the presence of excess zeros, thus it is not pursued here. Bosquet and Boulhol (2010) show
that the NBREG PMLE is not consistent and is sensitive to the scale of the dependent variable.
Thus, it is not good for modelling trade flows. On the contrary, the PPMLE is consistent as long as
the conditional mean function is correctly specified (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998). As a result the
PPMLE can be applied to data generating processes for the dependent variable in cases where it is
not even poisson distributed (ibid.).
Finally, Piermartini and Teh (2005) argue that GDP is unreliable in estimations using disag-
gregated data and that the right controls in such cases is output data for the exporting industry or
sectoral-country specific effects. In this paper, product-country effects are included in all fixed
effects estimations and an additional variable, the revealed comparative advantage for each country
is included to capture each country’s competitiveness at the product level. The revealed comparative
advantage is potentially endogenous in the regression—the more competitive an exporter is in a
particular product, the more of this product is exported. Finding instruments in this case, would
prove difficult—thus we use the lagged values of the regressor to reduce the endogeneity problem
that might exist. This hopefully, solves the problem and reduces any omitted variables problem
resulting from not controlling explicitly for sectoral output.
3.4 Results and discussion
The results in this section focus on the HS-6 digit level of disaggregation. All regressions apart
from the regression of time invariant characteristics on the fixed effects in Table (3.5), include
country-product and time fixed effects. Furthermore, with the exception of the random effects probit
and the Poisson PMLE fixed effects, all other regression estimators report robust standard errors
clustered around the country-product categories. Table (3.3) reports three different estimators—the
fixed, Mundlak corrected random effects and the ordinary panel random effects estimators. Table
(3.4) reports the Heckman two-step estimator and the Poisson PMLE. This allows a comparison
of the various estimators and also shows any indication of bias in our chosen Heckman estimator.
16The dummies are defined at the product level and indicate products that are processed under the preference and
exported as such. The interaction of the preference product dummies with the year provides additional changes in the
preferences occurring each year. This possibly captures variations in the preference margin for each product exported
under the preference.
17Thanks to Barry Reilly for pointing this out
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Table (3.5) presents the time invariant variables regressed on the extracted fixed effects reported in
the first four columns of Table (3.3) as well as the Heckman second stage estimations in Table (3.4).
Finally, Table (3.6) allows us to check the sensitivity of our estimates to the exclusion of OECD
and European countries as well as China and Hong Kong from our regressions. In Appendix II,
further results are presented showing estimates of other levels of disaggregation (HS2 and HS4).
This is to show whether our estimates are sensitive to the level of disaggregation. Additionally, the
tables in the appendix also compare estimates of non apparel and textiles to those of apparel and
textiles to confirm whether the USA preferences are being driven by apparel and textiles.
We next discuss the results in the main paper. Columns (1) - (4) of Table (3.3) reports estimates
from the fixed effects regression. The difference between columns (1) and (2) is the inclusion of
the military variable in column (2). Columns (3) and (4) augment Columns (1) and (2) respectively
with the interaction of AGOA and CBTPA preferences with year dummies respectively. The base
year for the AGOA-year interaction is 2001 and that for the CBTPA-year interaction is 2000. Thus
these two interaction terms are dropped from the regression and become the reference categories
in interpreting the remaining preference-year interactions in the regression. Columns (5) - (8)
reports the Mundlak corrected random effects—these follow the same pattern as columns (1) - (4).
The main difference is the incorporation of time invariant variables. Thus in column (6) and (8)
dummies for Christians and Muslims (base category is other religions) are included in addition
to military. The inclusion of military and the religious dummies in these models allows us to
test whether they can be omitted from the model and used as valid exclusion restrictions for the
Heckman two-step estimator. We can reject the alternate hypothesis that the military coefficient
is different from zero at the 5% level of significance in columns (2), (4), (6) and (8)—thereby
indicating that it is not correlated with the dependent variable in the second stage. We cannot do
the same for the religious dummies which are significantly different from zero at the 0.1% level
and thus correlated with our dependent variable. Hence, if used in the Heckman first stage as an
exclusion restriction, the residuals might be correlated with the second stage error. The Muslim
dummy is however, not significant at conventional levels in columns (4) and (8) of Table (3.5) when
regressed on the fixed effects. The final two columns of Table (3.3) reports the ordinary random
effects estimator.
The AGOA, CBTPA and GSP preferences are significant in all eight columns of Table (3.3).
Our controls CAFTA-DR, the lag of each country’s RCA and market size of the USA are also
significant in all columns. The interaction of GSP and AGOA is not significant in any of the columns
of the table. The interaction of CBTPA and GSP is however, significant in our random effects type
estimators. With the exception of the English speaking dummy all other time invariant controls
included in the random effects type models are significantly different from zero. NAFTA has a
coefficient of 1.7 in the Mundlak corrected random effects estimator an indication that, NAFTA is
associated with higher exports to the USA relative to the world. Holding all else constant, NAFTA
is estimated to be 447.39% higher compared to non-NAFTA countries. Similarly, Latin American
and Caribbean countries on average and holding all things constant significantly raise exports to the
USA relative to the world. These are expected given the close proximity of NAFTA countries and to
a large extent the Latin American and Caribbean countries to the USA. On the contrary, on average
and holding all else constant, African exports to the USA are significantly lower relative to the
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rest of the world in the Mundlak regressions but positive in columns (9) and (10). In summarising,
Table (3.3) indicates that AGOA and GSP preferences increase exports to the USA relative to the
rest of the world holding all else constant. While CAFTA-DR decreases exports to the USA relative
to the world.
For the CBTPA preferences, a positive coefficient is achieved only after controlling for annual
variations in preferences through the inclusion of preferences and time interactions. In the case
of AGOA, controlling for the annual variation in the preferences makes no difference to the sign
or significance of the estimated coefficient. Also, the interaction of time and the preferences is
significantly lower in 2008 and 2009 compared to the base years of AGOA (2001) and CBTPA
(2000). An indication of the harm caused to exports of developing countries and the inability of the
USA to absorb additional imports from the world as a result of the financial crisis of that period. In
spite of this, the AGOA and CBTPA preferences on average and holding all things constant have
been able to increase exports of developing countries to the USA relative to their exports to the rest
of the world.
Turning our attention to the next table (Table (3.4)) we find qualitatively similar results. AGOA
is positive and significant in both the Heckman and the Poisson PMLE. Similarly, the CBTPA
preferences are only positive when the annual variation to the preference is controlled for. On the
contrary, the GSP coefficient becomes negative in the Poisson model. They are however, significant
in all models in which they appear within the table. In both tables the annual variation of the AGOA
preferences indicates that the first few years of AGOA saw a rapid rise in exports to the USA
relative to the rest of the world compared to the base year of 2001. Columns (1) and (4) report the
first stage results for our Heckman estimator. All variables with the exception of the number of free
lines, have a significant impact on the probability of exporting to the USA. Apart from countries
that qualify for the CBI, all the remaining preferences, that is, GSP and AGOA eligible countries
significantly lower the probability of exporting to the USA. A country’s competitiveness (RCA)
in a product and the preference margin significantly increases their probability of exporting to the
USA. This is in line with our earlier assertion in the preceding section that, the larger the margin
between the MFN tariff and the applied tariff (in this case the preferential tariff) the more likely a
country would try to exploit the gains from exporting that particular product. Nonetheless to exploit
these advantages, a country with a competitive advantage in production of product p is more likely
to benefit from the higher preference margins by increasing its exports.
In column (4), latitude, English and Spanish speaking as well as land area significantly increase
the probability of exporting to the USA holding all else constant. The remaining variables, number
of cities, landlocked, Christianity and Muslim dummies (compared to the other religions) reduce
the probability of exporting to the USA. The negative coefficients for the Muslim and Christian
dummies might largely be due to the Chinese effect. However, for the Muslim dummy the
composition of the exports of Muslim countries is also playing a role here. The military coefficient
significantly lowers the probability of exporting to the USA. This is evidenced by the fact that,
the USA normally imposes trade sanctions on countries it believes to be undemocratic or ruled by
military leaders. The significance of military and the religious dummies indicate that they must
be included in the first stage regression. They are thus highly correlated with the probability of
exporting to the USA. In addition, all exclusion restrictions are jointly significant and different
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from zero. The case for military is however, much stronger than the religious dummies. The main
difference between the two first stage regressions is that column (1) is based on a fixed effects
regression, while column (4) is a Mundlak corrected random effects estimator—modified from that
proposed by Jensen et al. (2002). Column (4) allows additional exclusion restrictions in the form of
the religious dummies as well as additional controls provided by the time invariant variables.
In the second stage, we include the time and preference interactions in the immediate column
after each first stage regression. The second column after the first stage estimates (columns (3)
and (6)) exclude these interactions. The time-preference interactions only make a difference for
the CBTPA in this table as previously shown in Table (3.3). The last two columns report the
coefficients for the Poisson PMLE. The coefficients for the Poisson, in most cases are larger than
the previous models discussed. However, the Poisson estimator’s standard errors are lowest among
all the models reported above. In most cases it is less than half the standard error of the other
models—thus indicating that it provides the lowest variance among the estimators presented in this
section. The standard errors of the Heckman are quite similar to those of the fixed effects in Table
(3.3). This in turn indicates that our exclusion restrictions are reasonable. The Heckman second
stage standard errors reported in Table (3.4) have not been corrected as has been suggested by for
example Wooldridge (2002). The similar standard errors reported by both model types reduces
the pressure of correcting the second stage errors reported and also leads us to believe that the
standard errors are unbiased. This result can be attributed to the large sample dimension of our
data and given that our estimators have large N and small T sample properties we can overlook the
correction at this stage.
Given these comparisons, all models presented with the exception of the ordinary random effects
estimator are consistent to a large extent. The ordinary random effects, however, has presented us
with relatively larger coefficients—at times twice the estimated coefficients in the other models.
This points to its inconsistency and inefficiency, hence the remaining models perform better in
reducing this bias—in most cases the estimated coefficients and standard errors are the largest
indicating an upward bias of the ordinary random effect estimates. An argument which we do not
find tenable here is whether the model is misspecified and that the random effects is inappropriate.
It does not seem so, since the Mundlak corrected random effects attenuates the bias of the ordinary
random effects. The explanation could be the presence of a correlation between the random effects
and some explanatory variables. Thus the inclusion of the averages of the explanatory variables as
suggested by Mundlak (1978) has greatly reduced the misspecification and problems created by the
assumption of no correlation. Nevertheless, the ρ reported by the random effects type estimators is
significantly different from zero indicating that the random effects is preferred to a pooled OLS
regression. In addition, the Breusch and Pagan LM tests of random effects indicate the presence
of the random effects and these are significantly different from zero. Finally, the goodness of fit
measures of the Mundlak corrected random effects are larger than those of the ordinary random
and fixed effect estimators. As a result, the Mundlak random effects provides a better fit and is the
more appropriate model to present in this section.
Table (3.5) shows the median and OLS regression of the time invariant variables on the
fixed effects. Apart from the NAFTA coefficient the median regressions report lower coefficients
compared to the OLS regression. In almost all cases there are no sign reversals. Comparing the
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coefficients to that of the Mundlak corrected random effects, it is observed that Spanish speaking,
English speaking and African dummies are now positive in the fixed effect estimator. The NAFTA
coefficient is smaller than that reported in Table (3.3). The first eight columns of Table (3.5)
correspond to the first four columns of Table (3.3). The remaining four columns correspond to the
Heckman second stage regression in Table (3.4). To sum up, the remaining coefficients have the
same sign as the random effects but are marginally larger in most cases.
The final table reports results for a sub-sample of countries. In columns (1), (3) and (4) we
exclude OECD and European countries from our sample leaving us with 119 countries. In columns
(2), (5) and (6) China and Hong Kong are also excluded in addition to the countries excluded
earlier. One reason for excluding these countries is that, they have large trade flows with the USA.
China for one, has a trade surplus with the USA and supplies a significant volume of USA imports.
Excluding these developed OECD and European countries, China and Hong Kong allows us to
lessen their impact on our results. These provide us with further sensitivity and robustness checks.
In addition, we want to show whether in the absence of China (which is competitive in similar
products) the AGOA and CBTPA preferences show larger and more significant coefficients. The
results are qualitatively similar to the ones reported earlier. The only difference is in the first stage
regression, the GSP eligible country dummy is now positive. Indicating that in the absence of the
more competitive OECD countries and China, there is a marginally higher probability of exporting
under the GSP.
In the trade literature the inclusion of the zero export values provides the estimate for the
extensive margin of exports (for example, Felbermayr and Kohler, 2006). By focussing on non-
zero exports, we obtain the intensive margin estimates. Thus, our Poisson PMLE below can
be considered as representing the extensive margin estimates. The Heckman second stage and
the Mundlak corrected random effects provide the intensive margin estimates of the impact of
the AGOA and CBTPA preferences. Notably, the extensive margin estimates are larger than the
intensive margin estimates (cf. Cardamone, 2011; Cipollina and Salvatici, 2010b; Felbermayr
and Kohler, 2006). Our result is in line with the literature mentioned above. Besides, Felbermayr
and Kohler (2006) note that excluding the extensive margin can lead to biased estimates of the
coefficient of interest18.
18In Felbermayr and Kohler (2006) the coefficient of interest was a WTO dummy. In our case this would be the
preference dummy.
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Table 3.4: Heckman two step estimator
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
XUSA = 1 log (USA/ ROW) XUSA = 1 log (USA/ ROW)
1st-stage 2nd-Stage A 2nd-Stage B 1st-stage 2nd-Stage A 2nd-Stage B Poisson Poisson
AGOA product dummy 0.407∗∗ 0.335∗∗∗ 0.405∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗ 0.508∗∗∗ 1.230∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.075) (0.134) (0.075) (0.004) (0.008)
agoa×gsp product dummy 0.395 0.365 0.392 0.362 1.196∗∗∗ 2.139∗∗∗
(0.464) (0.414) (0.462) (0.412) (0.142) (0.142)
CBTPA product dummy 0.353∗∗ -0.644∗∗∗ 0.358∗∗ -0.638∗∗∗ -0.587∗∗∗ 0.247∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.074) (0.112) (0.074) (0.002) (0.003)
cbtpa×gsp product dummy -1.083 -1.066 -1.088 -1.071 -5.252∗∗∗ -5.500∗∗∗
(0.888) (0.887) (0.886) (0.885) (0.415) (0.415)
GSP product dummy 0.111∗∗ 0.110∗∗ 0.109∗∗ 0.109∗∗ -0.943∗∗∗ -0.873∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.039) (0.040) (0.039) (0.011) (0.011)
CAFTA-DR -0.265∗∗∗ -0.514∗∗∗ -0.266∗∗∗ -0.516∗∗∗ -1.598∗∗∗ -1.147∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.036) (0.038) (0.036) (0.004) (0.004)
Country’s RCA, lagged (log) 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.303∗∗∗ 0.298∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000)
Market size, USA.World (logs) 0.009∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.260∗∗∗ 0.260∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
1st stage Residuals -5.545∗∗∗ -5.696∗∗∗ -5.966∗∗∗ -6.121∗∗∗
(0.152) (0.154) (0.162) (0.165)
GSP LDC country dummy -0.013∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
GSP country dummy -0.008∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
CBI 0.039∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008)
AGOA country dummy -0.006∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Country’s RCA (log) 0.070∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Military -0.009∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Number of free lines 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Margin (MFN and applied tariff) 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Area (log) 0.031∗∗∗
(0.000)
Number of cities -0.002∗∗∗
(0.000)
latitude 0.001∗∗∗
(0.000)
landlocked -0.075∗∗∗
(0.001)
English Speaking 0.059∗∗∗
(0.002)
Spanish speaking 0.064∗∗∗
(0.003)
Majority Christian -0.039∗∗∗
(0.002)
Majority Muslim -0.101∗∗∗
(0.002)
Constant 0.141∗∗∗ 4.078∗∗∗ 4.178∗∗∗ -0.090∗∗∗ 4.064∗∗∗ 4.157∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.105) (0.106) (0.003) (0.104) (0.105)
agoa×yeari Yes Yes Yes
cbtpa×yearj Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mundlak average terms No No No Yes No No No No
Observations 2279844 1047124 1047124 2279844 1047124 1047124 1704878 1704878
R2 0.020 0.022 0.017 0.022 0.018
AdjustedR2 0.020 0.022 0.017 0.022 0.018
Clusters 1.63e+05 1.22e+05 1.22e+05 1.63e+05 1.22e+05 1.22e+05
rho 0.678 0.549 0.549 0.588 0.605 0.608
F-Test 483.580 84.726 139.692 85.054 140.306
R-squared overall 0.139 0.006 0.004 0.266 0.003 0.002
Standard errors in parentheses, + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. (a) Dependent variable is the log of (imports into the US/into rest of world)
(b) Estimation is done at 6 digits on positive flows (c) F-test of exclusion restrictions: F(3,162845)=45.34 and Chi-squared test χ2(5) = 3150.25 for columns (1) and (4)
respectively. Column 1 uses fixed effects and the exclusion restriction does not include religion. Column 4 has religion (christian and muslim) as additional exclusion restrictions.
The F-test (Chi-squared test) is a joint significance test of military, number of free lines, preference margin and religion dummies (where applicable) (d) robust standard errors
used (except the Poisson case). i = 2002, ... , 2009; j = 2001, ... , 2009
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Table 3.6: Random effects without selection correction and Heckman two step estimates for
sub-sample of countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log (USA/ ROW) XUSA = 1 log (USA/ ROW) XUSA = 1 log (USA/ ROW)
Mundlak-RE1 Mundlak-RE2 LPM1 2nd Stage1 LPM2 2nd Stage2
AGOA product dummy 0.409∗∗ 0.410∗∗ 0.395∗∗ 0.391∗∗
(0.136) (0.136) (0.133) (0.133)
agoa×gsp product dummy -0.079 -0.096 0.354 0.351
(0.578) (0.581) (0.450) (0.450)
CBTPA product dummy 0.397∗∗∗ 0.400∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗ 0.350∗∗
(0.113) (0.113) (0.111) (0.111)
cbtpa×gsp product dummy -1.616∗∗ -1.623∗∗ -1.046 -1.044
(0.552) (0.539) (0.872) (0.871)
GSP product dummy 0.147∗∗ 0.149∗∗ 0.122∗ 0.122∗
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
CAFTA-DR -0.167∗∗∗ -0.159∗∗∗ -0.191∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Country’s RCA, lagged (log) 0.156∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Market size, USA.World (logs) 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Military -0.009∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
landlocked 0.142∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ -0.085∗∗∗ -0.078∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.001) (0.001)
Area (log) -0.040∗∗∗ -0.038∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of cities 0.007∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
latitude 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ -0.000+ -0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
English Speaking -0.022+ 0.005 0.030∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.012) (0.002) (0.001)
Spanish speaking -0.098∗∗∗ -0.068∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.023) (0.003) (0.003)
Africa -0.094∗∗∗ -0.103∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009)
Latin America & Caribbean 0.227∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020)
GSP LDC country dummy -0.011∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
GSP country dummy 0.003∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
CBI 0.032∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008)
AGOA country dummy -0.007∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Country’s RCA (log) 0.074∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Number of free lines 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Margin (MFN and applied tariff) 0.018∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
1st stage residuals -7.542∗∗∗ -7.596∗∗∗
(0.209) (0.212)
Constant 0.398∗∗∗ 0.413∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗∗ 5.383∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗ 5.505∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.028) (0.003) (0.140) (0.003) (0.144)
agoa×yeari Yes Yes Yes Yes
cbtpa×yearj Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mundlak terms (averages) Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
Observations 565077 538946 1634346 565077 1606878 538946
R2 0.032 0.032
AdjustedR2 0.032 0.032
Clusters 78716 76762 1.17e+05 78716 1.15e+05 76762
rho 0.338 0.326 0.544 0.560 0.536 0.544
F-Test 74.980 74.123
R-squared overall 0.143 0.143 0.260 0.010 0.241 0.013
Standard errors in parentheses, + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 (a) Dependent variable is the log of (imports into the US/into rest of
world) and for the 1st Stage it is the probability of exporting to the USA (b) Estimation is done at 6 digits on positive flows, (c) 1 Excludes 33 OECD countries and
remaining European countries, 2 China and Hong Kong are also excluded in addition to the OECD and European countries. (d) Test of random effects is 226101.89
and 217337.84 for the first two columns respectively (e) Chi-squared test of exclusion restrictions are χ2(3) = 227.92 and χ2(3) = 204.48 for columns (3)
and (5) respectively. i = 2002, ... , 2009; j = 2001, ... , 2009
In order to make the comparison across the models we summarise the coefficients and the
exponentiated coefficients of the dummies of the models in Figure (3.3). The minimum and
maximum coefficients are reported for each model and for the AGOA, GSP, CBTPA and CAFTA-DR
preferences. The noticeable difference is the ordinary random effects and the Poisson coefficients.
The remaining models have quite similar coefficients. The graph on the right side (panel b) reports
the exponentiated coefficients of the non Poisson estimators. We do this since our dependent
variable is in logs and the explanatory variable is a dummy. We thus report the percentage impact
of the preferences. The analysis above points towards the tendency of the USA preferences in
increasing the exports of its preference beneficiaries relative to their exports to the rest of the world.
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The minimum and maximum coefficient estimates in the tables in the main text are shown in the graph. The graph on the left shows the coefficient estimates while the
graph on the right is based on the exponentiated coefficient values.
Figure 3.3: Summary of coefficients and impact of preference dummies in tables 3.3, 3.4 & 3.6
Various attempts at testing the robustness and sensitivity of the estimates also lend support to
the conclusion above. Thus, the maximum impact of AGOA, GSP and CBTPA is 57.8%, 13.4%,
and 48.4% respectively ignoring the results from the ordinary random effects. Similarly, the
minimum impact is 38.3%, 11.5% and -48.8% respectively. The CAFTA-DR impact is negative
in all models—the magnitude of the impact is 40.3% in absolute terms. The negative estimate
is probably due to the choice of products and the exclusion of fuel products. Further, we might
be capturing the adjustment phase for these countries as they move from the CBTPA preferences
to fully take advantage of the new free trade arrangement. On the whole, the AGOA estimates
are much smaller than Collier and Venables (2007) but quite close to Frazer and Van Biesebroeck
(2010). A comparison in this case is quite difficult since Collier and Venables (2007) uses more
aggregated data while Frazer and Van Biesebroeck (2010) uses all HS 6 digit products.
Figure (3.4) below summarises the results of the HS-2 and 4 digit products in tables (B.4)–(B.7)
in appendix (B)19. The Heckman, fixed effects and Mundlak coefficients are qualitatively similar
19All HS-6 digit products are included in the aggregated regressions. Two approaches were used, (1) the proportion of
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across the tables. Panels (a), (c) and (e) provide a summary of the coefficient estimates while
panels (b), (d) and (f) provide the percentage impact. Of the four preferences, the GSP preferences
are not significant in any of the six panels. The AGOA product dummy is significant in the HS-2
digit estimations. The CAFTA-DR preferences are significant in all cases except for the 4 digit
non-apparel products. In particular, the AGOA product coefficients switch signs across the 2
and 4 digit aggregation levels. The coefficient estimate of 3.2–3.6 in panels (a) and (b) become
-0.02–(-)0.13 at the HS-4 digit level (although the HS-4 digit coefficients are not significant). This
switching of signs, probably reveals that, there are compositional effects within each product
category due to the preferences offered—and these are driving the results shown in the figure.
Aiello et al. (2010, 18) for instance, note that at the HS-2 digit level, “... the margin of trade
preferences widely varies across sectors and donors.” We would probably add that, this also varies
across the type of preferences offered in the case of a single preference giving country. From the
results, this variation across the HS-2, 4, and 6 digit products are different in the case of the AGOA
products. The preferences at the 6-digit level combine fewer HS-8 digit products for each HS-6
product compared to the HS-2 and 4 digit products—since tariffs are set at the 8-digit level or
higher. Thus, the number of products within a level of aggregation offered preferences increase as
we choose HS-4 and 2 digit products.
The large positive impact at the 2-digit level picks up the increase in exports for a larger number
of aggregated 8-digit products that have been provided the AGOA preferences. This accumulation
of preferences at the 2-digit level drives up the gains we observe for the AGOA countries. The
4-digit level surprisingly does not pick up the accumulated gains from summing up the 8-digit
products at the 4-digit level. The key differences could therefore be the composition of the products
and the concentration of the preferences and possibly the gains within each particular HS-2 and
4-digit cluster. The composition and concentration of preferences and the gains could therefore be
quite different across the two levels of aggregation. However, by combining or amalgamating these
products into one HS-2 category—the potential increase in exports becomes larger and translates
into the large positive coefficients observed in the graph. These compositional efffects are more
apparent in the AGOA products compared to the remaining products and tend to be driven by
the preferences offered under the apparel and textile products. Given the choice of non-apparel
products, this compositional effect does not reverse the signs across the HS-2 and HS-4 digit
products—possibly due to the absence of any compositional effect. The similarity and strength of
the results in panels (a)–(d), lends support to the contention that, the presence of apparel and textile
products in our sample is driving the observed gains for AGOA.
The HS-6 digit products probably have fewer or no compositional effects due to all 8-digit
products having been provided preferential tariffs (or at least half the number of HS-8 products
for a particular HS-6 digit product). Further, most HS-6 digit products can be broken down into
a handful of products at the HS-8 digit level. Thus, selecting these products at the HS-8 (or even
10 digit) level leaves us with little or no compositional effects of the preferential tariff. This is a
likely explanation for the similar signs the HS-6 and HS-2 digit products have. In other words,
the compositional effects at the lower level of aggregation increases the magnitude of the impact
HS-6 digit products having AGOA tariffs and (2) the proportion was converted to a dummy—=1 if proportion is 0.4
and higher, = 0 otherwise. Both results were similar. The results reported are based on the approach (2)—the dummy
variable.
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while the absence of the effect at the HS-6 digit level provides marginal to reasonable gains in
exports. The remaining preferences however, do not show sign reversals thereby indicating that
the compositional effects do not play any role in the impact of these preferences. On the contrary,
the CBTPA preference also show evidence of the compositional effect for apparel and textiles. We
must note that, the apparel and textile preferences offered to the Caribbean Basin countries are
similar to the AGOA preferences. However, the impact is positive and significant at the HS-4 digit
level while it is negative and insignificant at the HS-2 digit level of aggregation. Two conclusions
obtained from the foregoing are that, (1) the choice of products and (2) the level of aggregation of
the products matter for the framework used in analysing the impact of AGOA in this chapter. The
result is further indication that the benefits of AGOA are concentrated in particular broad categories
of products—namely, fuels and apparel and textile products. The exclusion of fuel products only
serves to place more emphasis on the apparel and textile gains. Thus, the gains observed in figure
(3.4) are largely driven by the apparel and textile products and the compositional effects within the
apparel and textile products.
We have presented results of various models to show the impact of USA’s preferences on
developing countries. In doing this, we have controlled for the exports of these countries to the
rest of the world to isolate the impact of the preferences. The results after various robustness and
sensitivity checks point to a positive impact of AGOA and the CBTPA preferences of the USA on
the exports of its beneficiaries to the USA. Nonetheless, the USAs GSP preference is also increasing
exports to the USA relative to the rest of the world.
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The minimum and maximum coefficient estimates in the tables in the appendix to this chapter are shown in the graph. The graphs on the left show the coefficient
estimates while the graphs on the right are based on the exponentiated coefficient values. The top row is based on the full sample of product, the graphs in the middle
region are based on the apparel and textile products and the bottom graphs are based on the non-apparel and textile products in the sample of products.
Figure 3.4: Summary of coefficients and impact of preference dummies in tables B.4 – B.7
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3.5 Summary and conclusion
In this chapter, we have estimated the impact of the USA’s AGOA and CBTPA preferences on
its beneficiary countries. Adopting Collier and Venables (2007) methodology and making the
required changes to fit their methodology within our framework. Unlike the AGOA preference
that remains positive whether the AGOA product and year interaction is included or excluded as
additional regressors—the CBTPA product dummy switches signs. The CBTPA preference is
therefore sensitive to the exclusion of the interaction of the CBTPA product and year dummies. The
inclusion of the CBTPA and year dummies controls for the annual modifications of the preference.
Therefore the exclusion of these additional regressors lead to a negative impact of the CBTPA
product dummy. However, after adjusting for the annual modifications, we find that, the impact is
positive and significant. The AGOA preference on the other hand is not sensitive and is robust to
the exclusion of the AGOA preference-time interaction as well as the exclusion of some variables.
HS-6 and HS-2 levels of disaggregation tend to provide consistent estimates with the same signs
and significance. The HS-4 disaggregation on the other hand, tends to be sensitive and the signs
switch around a lot. However, at higher levels of aggregation (HS-2) the explanatory variables
tend to be correlated with each other, especially the preference-time interactions and the CBTPA
preferences—thus, we find it difficult to obtain a coefficient estimate of the CBTPA preferences in
a few cases. Also, with the non apparel and textile regression, correlation among the variables is
higher and the concentration of exports in this cluster is relatively smaller.
Adverse weather and market demand shocks can affect the exports of the preference benefi-
ciaries. Secondly, there have been several modifications of the preferences for both CBTPA and
AGOA countries. For instance, five CBTPA members exited in 2006 to form a free trade agreement
with the USA. In terms of AGOA, Coˆte d’Ivoire (2005), Central African Republic (2004), and
Eritrea (2004) have at one time or the other been declared ineligible for AGOA. Mauritania on the
other hand has on two occasions had their membership of AGOA withdrawn (in 2006 & 2009).
These changes in the membership of the preferences and modification of the products offered
have implications on exports that must be controlled. The product dummies in the regressions are
defined for countries that maintain their preference eligibility. This provides additional variation
in the regression—the dummy captures not only the membership of the countries in a particular
preference but also whether their exports of that product received preferential tariffs. Controlling
for these using time dummies and their interaction with the preference enables the preferential
impact to be identified. On the contrary, failing to control for these events might influence and
possibly reduce the estimated coefficient. For instance, the effect of controlling for these events is
visible in the case of the CBTPA countries whereby the negative coefficient becomes positive after
including the time dummies and its interaction with the preference.
For AGOA, the coefficient remains positive and only the size of the impact varies marginally.
The marginal change in the AGOA impact implies that, these countries have not had drastic market
supply shocks aside from the initial uptake of AGOA. Besides, modifications of the preferences
have been minor and centred mainly around apparel and textile products. The CBTPA countries
on the other hand have encountered major changes in their preferences over the period and the
exclusion of five countries that were major exporters under the CBTPA must have led to significant
changes in their exports. Notwithstanding, the region has had its fair share of natural disasters (such
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as hurricanes and floods) that have hit Haiti and a few other Caribbean countries after 2000.
Using the ordinary random effects leads to inconsistent estimates which in several cases are
twice the estimates of the fixed effects, Mundlak corrected random effects and Heckman selection
estimators. The Poisson PMLE estimates are also larger but they report much smaller standard
errors affirming its popularity in the current trade literature as an applied model of choice. The
inclusion of preference-time interactions increases the impact of the preferences. The increase
is smaller in the other non Poisson estimators—but quite larger—more than twice the estimate
for the Poisson estimator. The Mundlak corrected random and fixed effects estimates are quite
similar to the Heckman indicating that these models are good alternatives to the Heckman estimator.
An implication, is that non exporting is distributed randomly in our dataset. Thus, the estimated
coefficients in the absence of controlling for selection are not as severely biased as expected.
Studies based solely on the ordinary random effects as shown by our analysis tend to over-
estimate the impact of the preferences. Increasing the sample size and allowing N to increase
infinitely does not resolve this inconsistency. However, the differences between the fixed effects,
Mundlak corrected random effects and Heckman selection estimators are not so different in very
large samples. This holds because our sample is relatively large and with fixed T—thus consistency
holds for increasing N. Thus for fixed T but large N the differences in estimates are quite small as
the benefits of the large sample tends to lead us towards the true parameter estimates. In smaller N
samples however, care needs to be taken in choosing the appropriate estimator to obtain consistent
estimates.
In concluding, we note that further work needs to be done in identifying the causal impact of
the preferences. Extensions to this chapter to overcome the present short-comings include exploring
causality issues within the regression framework and possibly extending the analysis to a structural
gravity model. Further, the use of the preference margin in the first stage of the Heckman two
step regression would need to be revisited to determine whether it would be more appropriate in
determining the outcome in the second stage. However, if the preference margin is used in the
second stage, the product level dummies and their interaction with the year dummies would have
to be excluded from the regression. This is mainly due to the correlation between the preference
dummies and the margin—they essentially capture similar policy effects. Last but not the least, we
avoided the debate on the correct measurement of the preference margin. We note that, the literature
in this area has grown and that Fugazza and Nicita (2013) for example, recommend that the relative
preference margin should be the appropriate margin used in the gravity model20. Future work in
this area would have to take this debate into account. At the moment, our argument for not pursuing
the relative preference margin is that, the preference margin is only included in the first stage of
the Heckman estimator in this chapter. All the remaining regressions use the dummy approach
instead. Again, future work in this area can be used to determine whether the measurement of the
preference margin leads to a significant difference in the results presented above. In the next two
chapters (chapters 4 & 5) we focus on AGOA and pursue a matching and quantile analysis.
20Examples of the literature in this area, include, Carre`re (2011); Carre`re et al. (2010); Fugazza and Nicita (2013);
Hoekman and Nicita (2011); Low et al. (2009).
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Chapter 4
Impact of AGOA: A matching approach
4.1 Introduction
The current chapter departs from the previous chapter (chapter 3) by adopting a matching approach
to analysing the impact of AGOA. This chapter attempts to fit within the body of literature by
analysing the impact of AGOA on exports of recipient countries to the USA by constructing a
counter-factual set of countries using a propensity score matching approach. Methodologically,
it departs from the standard linear and non linear regression framework by constructing counter-
factual outcomes to determine the impact of the preferences. This is useful since any comparison
would be on countries that are similar to the AGOA beneficiaries. Nevertheless, matching reduces
the heterogeneity of the sample of countries in the present chapter, although the sample remaining
does not become fully homogeneous. In other words, the analysis compares similar rather than
different countries hence the reduction in the heterogeneous nature of the sample of countries.
Matching provides the tools to find a similar country to each treated country based on a set of
covariates. Removing some of the heterogeneity and using the restricted sample thus allows a
cleaner estimate of the impact of the preference. This might explain the large variation in the impact
of AGOA that is reported within the literature. The large sample in addition exaggerates the impact
of AGOA–mainly due to the large number of countries within the sample that are quite different in
terms of social, economic, cultural and religious characteristics compared to the AGOA recipients.
In terms of the matching methodology two other papers Millimet and Tchernis (2009) and
Baier and Bergstrand (2009b) have used this approach in answering a different set of questions.
Baier and Bergstrand (2009b) applied the approach to study the impact of free trade agreements on
trade flows. They find an impact quite close to the estimates provided by gravity models. Millimet
and Tchernis (2009) on the other hand, provide two different applications (1) an assessment of the
environmental impact of WTO membership and (2) the impact of the euro adoption on bilateral
trade. For both applications they do find evidence to support the positive impact on the outcomes
of interest, that is, being a member of the WTO is beneficial in terms of global environmental
measures pursued by member countries. The adoption of the euro increased trade among developed
countries (Millimet and Tchernis, 2009). The novelty of the current chapter is that, the method is
adopted in answering questions related to the impact of AGOA on recipient countries which to the
knowledge of the author is the first attempt of this type of analysis.
The main question asked in this chapter is, “has AGOA increased the exports of recipients
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compared to non-recipient countries?” Our contribution in this chapter, is the careful construction
of the counter-factual outcomes for assessing the impact of AGOA. The construction of the counter-
factual is done using three methods, (1) propensity score matching (PSM), (2) exact covariate
matching, (3) synthetic control methods (SCM). The rest of the chapter is organised as follows.
Section 4.2, presents the data and econometric approach. Section 4.3, discusses the results. Finally,
Section 4.4 concludes.
4.2 Econometric approach and data
4.2.1 Matching framework
The matching approach is expected to provide a causal explanation to whatever increases in exports
of AGOA countries is observed. Since one does not observe what the exports of these countries
would be after the enactment of AGOA, countries that were not provided these preferences are
used as the counter–factual. The assumption is that, these countries provide the trend in exports
that, would have been observed for the preference beneficiaries. Thus, after matching—a positive
estimate would imply that the AGOA preference has contributed to higher exports for AGOA
countries compared to the counter-factual. One can therefore attribute this difference, to the AGOA
status of the recipients. However, if there is no difference in exports, then the preferences might not
have been the main instrument in the export performance of the beneficiaries. Matching is done
on similar economic, political, cultural and other factors in order to limit the influence of these
characteristics in driving the results.
Randomisation as noted by Lee (2005) is difficult to undertake. Observational (or secondary)
data on countries are not randomised and thus treated (AGOA countries) and control (non AGOA
countries) groups may vary significantly in terms of their characteristics. This difference can be
removed by the use of matching as argued in for example Lee (2005). Lee (2005) notes that the
outcome yi is uncorrelated with the treatment in cases of randomised experimental data. This
condition might hold if the treatment is exogenous and for reasons unrelated to yi (Lee, 2005).
Examples could be a new law or regulation or due to natural events for example the weather
or geography (Lee, 2005). Since the AGOA policy was a new law, this motivates the choice of
approach here1.
As discussed in the literature on matching—comparing groups of treated individuals and
controls where there is no randomisation leads to biases (Guo and Fraser, 2010; Lee, 2005;
Rosenbaum, 1987, 1991a, 2002, 2004, 2010; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983b). Some expected
problems from the matching procedure include dimension problems—where the treated and controls
differ in characteristics and do not fall within the region of common support—that is, where the
treated and controls fail to overlap in their propensity scores (Lee, 2005). Propensity score matching
helps solve the dimension problem while the common support problem is solved by having the
propensity score lie between zero and one (Guo and Fraser, 2010; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983b).
For our purposes, the treatment is the exogenous policy provided by the USA for selected
1The AGOA treatment for ROW and EU is strictly exogenous given that, the law was passed by the USA and not
ROW or EU. Our main argument for exogeneity in the case of exports to the USA is that it was a law passed by the
American congress and not by the African countries.
77
SSA countries. The AGOA preference thus becomes the treatment. The outcome of interest is the
exports of the beneficiaries in terms of their exports to the USA. We define this in various ways to
test the sensitivity and robustness of the outcome. The outcome of interest in this case is discussed
below.
The analysis is carried out on both the shares as well as the levels of exports to each destina-
tion. Total exports are considered for the three destinations2 as Xiworld =
∑K
k=1
∑J−2
j=1 X
ijk
ROW +∑K
k=1X
ik
USA +
∑K
k=1X
ik
EU
1. Export shares: Exports to the USA out of total exports for country i
(
XiUSA
Xiworld
)
2. Exports in levels
(a) Total exports to the USA for country i
(∑K
k=1X
ik
USA
)
(b) Difference between year n and 1997 for country i(
K∑
k=1
XikUSA,n
)
−
(
K∑
k=1
XikUSA,1997
)
,
where n = 2002, 2005, 2007, 2010
In the analysis, we use mirror exports instead of the reported exports for each outcome. The
reason for using mirror exports is that, these are recorded more accurately than the exports reported
by developing countries.
The following equations lay out the challenges of defining a counter-factual for the AGOA
countries. The four equations provide the process we undertake to match the AGOA countries—
taken as the treated and the control countries—the countries that have not been provided the AGOA
treatment.
τATE = E(τ) = E[y
1 − y0] (4.1)
τATT = E[τ |X = 1] = E[y1 − y0|X = 1] = E[y1|z,X = 1]− E[y0|z,X = 1] (4.2)
ˆP (z) = Pr(X = 1|z) (4.3)
τi,j = arg min |Pˆ 1i − Pˆ 0j | i ∈ T, j ∈ C (4.4)
superscripts, (agoa) =
{
1 if agoa beneficiary
0 otherwise
Where: X is the AGOA treatment, τ is the treatment effect coefficient, y is the outcome and z -
is a vector of variables used in estimating the propensity score for matching AGOA beneficiaries
to non-AGOA developing countries. This vector includes economic variables, political variables,
country characteristics and other variables such as landlocked, physical capital per worker, land per
worker among others. T and C are treated and control country sets respectively.
2The same exercise was carried out for exports to the USA within the various preferences offered by the USA. These
do not yield any new results and as expected AGOA countries export less under the GSP and MFN relative to the other
countries. Given that for most of the control countries their preferential exports outside the GSP was close to zero we did
not expect any surprising results.
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Equation (4.1 & 4.2) define the problem at hand, We seek to find the difference between the
outcome before and after the treatment. However, it is difficult to observe E[y0|z,X = 1] — the
counter-factual. Hence, the counter-factual is constructed by selecting countries with characteristics
similar to the treated countries — E[y0|z,X = 1] = E[y0|z,X = 0]. The countries are matched
based on the vector z—allowing one to select countries that are very similar prior to the treatment.
When matching is done properly it allows for a causal inference to be made (Yasar and Rejesus,
2005). This allows a comparison to be made and thus any difference in the outcome can be attributed
to the preference.
The vector y1 is the outcome for the treated group (AGOA beneficiaries) and y0 is that of the
control group created (that is, the counter-factual for the AGOA group of countries). Equation (4.3)
is the propensity score in general form estimated conditional on the vector of characteristics. This
is estimated via a logit regression and the predictions from this regression becomes the propensity
score used for matching AGOA recipients to non-AGOA countries. Equation (4.4) specifies that
treated countries with a propensity score ( ˆP (z)) close to a control country are matched together—as
they are similar, based on the covariates chosen.
In matching, it is often difficult obtaining a match. In order to avoid this problem, one could
match countries based on the propensity score using the nearest neighbour, caliper/radius, kernel,
and stratification matching methods. As is common in practise, a combination of the various
methods are employed to check the sensitivity and robustness of the estimated treatment effects.
In the nearest neighbour matching, preference beneficiaries and non preference beneficiaries are
randomly ordered and the non preference beneficiaries with the score closest to the beneficiary is
selected. The nearest neighbour finds the nearest control country to match with a treated country.
Matching can be one-one or one-many, that is either one control to each treated unit or more than
one control to each treated unit. In addition, a control can be matched to a treated unit more than
once—matching with replacement (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008; Guo and Fraser, 2010; Khandker
et al., 2010).
The nearest neighbour matching estimated in the next section is done without replacement and
a one-one nearest neighbour matching is performed. The nearest neighbour (NN ) is given by
NN = min |Pˆ 1i − Pˆ 0j | i ∈ T, j ∈ C,
In addition, to using the propensity score with the nearest neighbour, the mahalanobis metric
matching (NNmaha) discussed at length in Abadie et al. (2001); Abadie and Imbens (2002, 2011)
and Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) is also included as a check on the propensity score matching
estimates. This estimator is a distance estimator and it uses the covariance matrix COV of the
matching variables to match the treated and control countries.
NNmaha = (zi − zj)′COV −1(zi − zj) i ∈ T, j ∈ C,
The control country with the minimum distance NNmaha is chosen for the treated country. Again,
matching is done without replacement and both treated and control countries matched are excluded
from the data after the match. Abadie et al. (2001); Abadie and Imbens (2011) and Abadie and
Imbens (2002) point out that one problem with this approach is that in finite samples there is a
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bias of order Op(N−
1
k ) when continuous covariates are used (where k is the number of continuous
covariates). The bias results from the differences in the continuous covariate values between treated
and control groups (Abadie et al., 2001; Abadie and Imbens, 2002, 2011). The bias-corrected
estimator reduces the bias but does not entirely eliminate it thereby making it
√
N consistent
(Abadie and Imbens, 2002, 2011). A bias of order Op(N−
1
6 ) to Op(N−
1
9 ) is expected in this
analysis. The use of the bias-correction based on the matching variables used in the regression
would be useful in reducing most of this bias. Furthermore, as a robustness check, Abadie and
Imbens’s (2011) heteroscedasticity consistent matching estimator is reported in the appendix. This
is useful in cases where the treatment is heterogeneous and standard errors are heteroscedastic.
It is important to note that the NNmaha estimator is not based on the propensity score but rather
the estimator conducts the matches based on the covariates specified that enter the covariance
matrix, COV. This allows us to further ascertain the robustness of the propensity score method in
estimating the impact of AGOA.
The caliper/radius matching on the contrary, requires us to define a region of common support—
(δ) and randomly select non preference beneficiaries that have a similar propensity score within
the defined region. This improves on the quality of matches obtained (Guo and Fraser, 2010; Lee,
2005). The nearest neighbour in some cases can match treated and control countries that have very
different propensity scores (Guo and Fraser, 2010; Lee, 2005). The caliper, therefore provides
the opportunity to place a threshold on the difference in propensity scores between the treated
and controls that are matched (Guo and Fraser, 2010; Lee, 2005). We experiment with calipers
in the region of 0.2, 0.1 and 0.05 to check the sensitivity of the results to the caliper chosen. The
caliper match is given as, δ > |Pˆ 1i − Pˆ 0j | = arg min |Pˆ 1i − Pˆ 0j | i ∈ T, j ∈ C, where Pˆ 0i and Pˆ 1j
are the estimated propensity scores of the controls and treated respectively. The caliper choice is
informed by Rosenbaum and Rubin’s (1985) suggestion for choosing a caliper size that reduces a
large percentage of the bias. According to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985), the suggested caliper
size is given by 0.1× (s21/s20)×
√
[(s21 + s
2
0)/2] where s
2
1, s
2
0 are the sample variances for treated
and control countries respectively.
Bandwidth parameters of 0.2, 0.1 and 0.06 are used for the kernel estimator. Again, varying the
bandwidth allows one to check the sensitivity and robustness of the kernel matching estimates to
the size of the bandwidth. The kernel matching is given by
κ =
k
(
Pˆ 0j −Pˆ ji
an
)
∑
l∈C k
(
Pˆ 0k−Pˆ 1i
an
) j ∈ C, i ∈ T
k(·) is the kernel function. The Epanechnikov kernel is used in all kernel estimations in section
(4.3.1). The kernel matching estimator uses a weighted average of the control group of countries to
construct each treated country’s counter-factual.
Last but not the least, stratification matching allows the propensity score to be divided into
strata (or blocks/intervals). The mean difference between the treated and control countries are then
calculated within each strata (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008; Khandker et al., 2010). After which,
the overall weighted mean is calculated over all strata to obtain the ATT estimate.
To strengthen our conclusions, a difference-in-difference matching estimation is carried out.
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This is possible since observations of the outcome variable before and after the inception of AGOA
are available. It is thus possible to use the difference in outcomes to calculate the ATT estimate.
This is given by
τDIDATT = E[∆y
1|X = 1, ˆP (z)]− E[∆y0|X = 0, ˆP (z)]
where ∆y1 = y1before− y1after and ∆y0 = y0before− y0after. y1before and y0before is taken as the year
1997 for treated and control outcomes respectively. y1after and y
0
after are outcomes for the treated
and control countries for 2002, 2005 and 2010.
Differences due to individual characteristics lead to overt bias and differences in the unob-
servables () give rise to hidden (covert) biases (Lee, 2005). Overt and hidden biases can affect
the treatment effects. Guo and Fraser (2010) and Lee (2005) note that overt biases can easily be
controlled and removed by incorporating z covariates in the estimation of the propensity score. On
the other hand, hidden (covert) biases are more difficult to remove and control for (Guo and Fraser,
2010; Lee, 2005). Overt biases occur when E(y|X = 1) 6= E(y|X = 0) due to some differences
in the z covariates while differences in  leads to hidden biases (Guo and Fraser, 2010; Lee, 2005;
Rosenbaum, 1987, 1991a, 2002, 2004, 2010). The difference-in-differences matching estimator
above is helpful in reducing the hidden biases present3.
Equation (4.2) can be rewritten as
E[y1|X = 1, z]− E[y0|X = 0, z] = τATT + (E[y0|X = 1, z]− E[y0|X = 0, z])
To identify τATT within the framework the second term (in brackets) must be equal to zero, that
is E[y0|X = 1, z] − E[y0|X = 0, z] = 0. If E[y0|X = 1, z] − E[y0|X = 0, z] 6= 0, then the
ATT estimate would be biased due to differences in the treated and control group of countries
(Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008)—leading to selection bias. In order for the ATT estimate to be
identified the following two assumptions suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983b) is important
for identifying our AGOA treatment impact.
• Unconfoundedness: y0, y1∐X|z. The outcomes are assumed to be independent of the
AGOA treatment after controlling for observed covariates. This assumption is plausible since
the policy is exogenous—the preference is extended to SSA countries by the USA.
• Overlap: 0 < Pˆ (X = 1|z) < 1. The propensity score for the treated and controls must lie
between zero and one. In other words, their distributions must have a considerable overlap.
Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) argue that in estimating τATT , the weaker versions of the assumptions
above can be used. Thus, unconfoundedness of the controls (y0
∐
X|z) and the propensity score
less than one (Pˆ (X = 1|z) < 1) are enough for identification .
The presence of selection bias is a problem expected in the analysis. Controlling for the
covariates in the propensity score estimate would solve the selection bias that occurs due to
covariate differences. On the other hand, the bias arising from unobserved factors is more difficult
to resolve and can still lead to highly biased estimates. Using a difference-in-difference matching
estimator is an attempt at reducing the problem. However, the literature suggests carrying out
sensitivity tests to check for problems with unobserved factors. Two of these tests are Rosenbaum’s
3Even though this estimator is useful in removing hidden biases, it might not entirely eliminate them.
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bounds analysis (DiPrete and Gangl, 2004; Rosenbaum, 1987, 1991a, 2010, 2012; Rosenbaum and
Rubin, 1983a) and Ichino et al. (2006) and Nannicini’s (2007) sensitivity design. Ichino et al.’s
(2006) tests are carried out in the chapter (see tables 4.15 & 4.16).
Given that our data is in longitudinal form, this would create problems when matching. This
has been noted by Nielsen and Sheffield (2009) and refer to it as the, “double dimensionality of
panel data”. They also discuss some of the ways in which researchers have attempted to get around
the problem. To circumvent this problem we average our pre- and post-treatment outcomes and
perform our matching on the average pre-treatment characteristics (or covariates) as well as using
the difference between our chosen base year (1997) and selected post-AGOA periods. The choice
of 1997 as the base year is because the treated countries in 1997 had no idea that AGOA would be
implemented. It therefore provides a reasonable time period before the start of the programme and
thus, there is no unanticipated rise in exports in expectation of the AGOA programme.
4.2.2 Data
Data is obtained from several sources. Data for the outcomes are obtained from the UN-Comtrade
database and the United States International Trade Commission (USITC)4. The World Development
Indicators and IMF’s International Financial Statistics databases provide macroeconomic indicators
(such as, gross domestic product, inflation, population, value-added (in industry, manufacturing,
agriculture, construction, services, etc), interest rates, exchange rates among others) for the purposes
of matching similar countries. Additionally, Kaufmann’s Global Governance5, Database of Political
Institutions6, Polity IV and Bates et al (2005)7 databases provide political, cultural and religious
data to augment the vector of control variables needed to perform a good match. Finally, gravity
type variables are obtained from the CEPII gravity database 8.
The data consists of a cross-section of 42 treated countries from SSA and approximately 122
potential control countries (developing countries in Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean as
well as North Africa). After matching, the number of control countries included in the estimation
drops to 34 countries—giving us a total of 76 countries for the matching estimators. Table (C.5)
in the appendix shows the number of treated and control countries falling within each block of
the propensity score as well as the overall number of treated and control countries matched. The
outcomes are averaged over the period 2001–2010 while the variables used in the propensity score
and exact mahalonobis matching are averaged over the 1990–1999 period.
4.3 Results and discussion
The propensity score is based on the 1990 – 1999 averages of the social, economic, cultural and
religious control variables. The matches are then performed on the average of the post–AGOA
4dataweb.usitc.gov/
5www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/
6Thorsten Beck, George Clarke, Alberto Groff, Philip Keefer, and Patrick Walsh, 2001. “New tools in comparative
political economy: The Database of Political Institutions.” 15:1, 165-176 (September), World Bank Economic Review.
7Robert Bates ; Karen Feree; James Habyarimana; Macartan Humphreys ; Smita Singh, “Other Political Data
(updated 2005)”, http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/14977 UNF:5:XzsUmjt4AZzpm9JB3hO6pA== Murray Research Archive
[Distributor] V1 [Version]
8http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/gravity.asp
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data (2001–2010). We define our treated countries in four different ways, (i) All AGOA: all
AGOA countries irrespective of whether their participation in AGOA has been revoked at least
once; (ii) In & Out AGOA: The set of countries that have had the AGOA preferences revoked at
least once (or restored after a previous revocation), these include countries such as Mauritania,
Madagascar, Niger, Coˆte d’Ivoire among other countries; (iii) Always AGOA: The set of countries
that have never had their preferences revoked since the inception of the programme or when they
were officially assigned to the programme. This is limited to countries that were provided AGOA
preferences between 2000 and 2003; and (iv) AGOA & EBA: Countries having AGOA and EBA
preferences simultaneously and have at least consistently had AGOA preferences throughout the
study period. These various definitions allows us to study any differences that might be observed
across the various treated groups. At the same time it allows us to see whether these would result
in compositional effects that might affect how the impact is reported. Furthermore, it would
be possible to observe whether countries simultaneously exporting under the AGOA and EBA
programmes export less to the USA compared to the counter-factual (or control) countries.
The propensity score estimates and information on the performance of the propensity score
are summarised in the appendix. The overlap assumption mentioned earlier in this chapter is
satisfied—since our propensity score lies between zero and one (see figure [C.2] in appendix C). It
is also safe to assume that the unconfoundedness assumption is satisfied—given that the AGOA
preference is exogenous. Last but not the least, the tests of covariate balance after the propensity
score estimation shows that the covariate means for the treated and control are not statistically
different. In other words, the t-tests for the null hypothesis that the covariate means are the same
for the control and treated countries cannot be rejected for each covariate included in the propensity
score estimation (see table [C.6] in the appendix)—implying that the differences in the covariate
means prior to estimating the propensity score has been reduced. In the next section we focus on
presenting the results from the matching estimations performed on the data.
4.3.1 Propensity score matching
Tables (4.1)–(4.8) are the initial matching results based on the four definitions of the treatment
group above. For each odd numbered table the outcomes studied are (a) total exports to the USA;
(b) the share of USA exports in total exports of each country; and (c) the difference between exports
in a given year (2002, 2005, 2007 & 2010) and export in 1997. The even numbered tables show the
results for eight product groups. The outcome is measured in levels. The product groups are based
on Hanson’s (2010) classification of eight different product categories these are:
• Agriculture, meat and dairy, & seafood (AMDS): HS 1–10, 12–14
• Food, beverages, tobacco, wood, & paper (FBTWP): HS 11, 15–24, 44–48
• Extractive industries (EI): HS 25–27, 68–71
• Chemicals, plastics, & rubber (CPR): HS 28–36, 38–40
• Textiles, apparel, leather, & footwear (TALF): HS41–42, 50–65
• Iron, steel, and other metals (ISOM): HS 26, 72–83
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• Machinery, electronics, & transportation equipment (METE): HS 84–89
• Other industries (OI): HS 37, 43, 49, 66–67, 90–97
In all the tables in this section, the radius, kernel and stratification matching estimators are
reported. The calipers (δ) chosen for the radius matching estimator are 0.05, 0.1 and 0.2 while
the bandwidths (κ) for the kernel are 0.06, 0.1 and 0.2. The results in table (4.1) for all AGOA
recipients for the outcomes in levels and shares are not significant. Significant estimates are,
however, reported for the 2002 export difference. These are significant at the 5% level for the
radius matching with caliper sizes 0.1 and 0.2 and the kernel with bandwidth of 0.2. The remaining
radius and kernel estimates are significant at 10%. The significant results imply that, all things
equal and on average, the difference in exports between 2002 and 1997 is less relative to the control
countries. An indication that the control countries had a larger increase in exports to the USA over
the period compared to the increase over the period for the treated countries. The relative difference
is between $ 361 and $ 486.4 million9. On the contrary, widening the gap between the base year
and our chosen year of interest shows no significant differences. Much of the significant difference
is relatively close to the programme adoption year. The non-significance of the remaining outcomes
provides no information about the relative differences between the controls and the treated countries
contrary to our expectations. An implication is that for these outcomes, the treated and the control
countries have similar levels or shares of exports.
In table (4.2) we find significant coefficients for all estimated impacts for TALF products. The
estimates are negative and significant in all seven columns. The impact ranges from $ -577.2 – $
-817.5 million. The negative estimates indicate that the treated countries on average and ceteris
paribus exported lower TALF products compared to the control countries. The result provides
a causal impact of the preference on the treated countries. Comparing the TALF exports to our
constructed counter-factual yields a lower impact of the preference. We note that, the TALF
products include other products such as leather and footwear. The inclusion of these products which
are not part of the AGOA special textile preferences might be contributing to the negative estimates.
These additional products in which the AGOA countries are less competitive in, compared to the
counter-factual countries are driving the results.
The AMDS products are also significant in the first six columns. The estimates are negative
and range between $ -119.3 million – $ -1.4 billion. Thus, the AGOA countries on average and
ceteris paribus have $ 119.3 million to $ 1.4 billion less exports compared to the counter-factual
countries. The remaining products showing significant coefficients include FBTWP (column 4),
METE (column 4 & 7) and OI (column 4 & 7) exports. The AGOA countries export $ 96.5 million
FBTWP products lower than the counter-factual countries on average and ceteris paribus. The
estimate for METE and OI are approximately $ 390 and $ 109 million. Again, these products
do not seem to be major export products of the treated countries. We do not find any significant
results for the extractive industry. One possible explanation for this result, is that, the inclusion of
other extractive products that are not crude oil related products have contributed to the insignificant
estimate in this case. A closer look at the estimates indicates that they are positive despite being
insignificant. The inclusion of non-oil products in this category has therefore contributed to the
9All dollar ($) amounts referred to in this chapter and the next is based on the USA currency.
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result—that is, no statistical difference in the exports of the product cluster. The remaining product
clusters are also not significant and have negative estimates. These products are also not key exports
of the treated countries.
Focussing on only the set of countries that have had a revocation of their preferences during the
period yields a few more significant estimates (see table 4.3). We note that, the matching estimates
reported do not include the remaining AGOA countries in the set of controls but maintains the
earlier set of controls that are comparable to the new definition of treated countries (this is similar
for the remaining tables in this section). Given that for this set of countries they spend at least one
year out of the programme the negative estimates are well within our expectations. Nonetheless,
given that the matching is based on averages of the outcomes over the period, these estimates
average out the transition years. In the next chapter where a panel of the countries are analysed over
time, this issue is resolved with year dummies. The treated countries export less to the USA relative
to the controls. This ranges between $ 1.63 billion and $ 1.73 billion on average and all things
equal. The radius estimates (δ = 0.2) is significant for all four outcomes estimating the difference
in exports with our 1997 base year. The difference increases with the gap in years. The relative
difference ranges from $ 463.2 million in 2002 to $ 2.2 billion for 2010, on average and ceteris
paribus. All things equal, the treated countries have experienced a smaller increase in exports over
the period compared to the control countries. Essentially, the rise in exports during the period is
much greater for the control relative to the treated.
Table (4.4) provides the estimates for the product clusters for countries that have not consistently
maintained their AGOA status. TALF exports are significant and negative in two columns. All
remaining products are not significant. TALF exports in columns (4) and (7) indicate that this group
of AGOA countries exported $ 1 billion less exports compared to the counter-factual countries
all things equal. The results in the table can be explained by the inconsistency of the exports of
the treated countries to the USA. Furthermore, our estimates are probably not clearly identified.
The group of countries studied in the table receive the treatment multiple times and this may
contribute to our estimate not being clearly identified and estimated. However, this result provides
a comparison to the remaining tables in terms of how the various groups of treated AGOA countries
fare.
Tables (4.5) and (4.6) present the results for countries that have consistently maintained their
AGOA status. The results in table (4.5) is similar to table (4.1). The only outcome showing
significant results is the export difference in 2002. This difference ranges from $ 378.6 million to $
535.7 million, on average and all things equal. The remaining outcomes—exports (in levels and
shares) and the remaining export differences are not significant. Earlier we attributed these to the
crowding-out effects occurring at the country and product cluster levels. These effects are leading
to the insignificant estimates observed. The significant 2002 difference-in-difference estimate
implies that, the treated countries on average have not been able to increase their exports beyond
that of the counter-factual. The mix of countries having very high exports on the one hand and
the countries with very low to almost zero exports to the USA among the treated countries have
contributed to the negative short-term impact of the AGOA preference. Our quantile analysis in
the next section, attempts to disentangle these effects and to show the impact of the preference
at the various quantiles of the export distribution. This way, we should be able to overcome the
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crowding-out effect prevalent in the results presented in this section.
Table (4.6) provides estimates for the case where the treated countries always maintain their
AGOA status. AMDS, FBTWP, CPR, TALF and OI products provide a few significant results.
The estimated difference between the treated and counter-factual countries range from $ -103.9
million (OI products) to $ -776.7 million (TALF products). Again, the estimated product clusters
include several products that are not key exports of the AGOA countries and thus contribute to the
significant and negative results observed. Nonetheless, the extractive industry remains insignificant
and positive.
The final two tables (tables 4.7 & 4.8) exploring the propensity score matching estimates are
for the countries that have AGOA and EBA preferences simultaneously. The export difference in
2002 is negative and significant at 5% in the radius (δ = 0.2) and kernel (κ = 0.2) columns. The
estimates for total exports to the USA is also significant at the 10% level in these two columns. The
results for total exports to the USA indicate that, on average and all things equal total exports to
the USA are $ 1.20 billion to $ 1.28 billion less than the control countries. Similarly, the increase
in exports between 1997 and 2002 is lower than that of the controls by approximately $ 410.7
million to $ 440.8 million, ceteris paribus. Arguably, the fact that, these countries have the EBA
preferences which competes with the tariffs offered under AGOA explains why we observe these
results. Of note is that, the EBA was provided to these countries at the time AGOA was provided
for the treated countries.
The final product table, table (4.8) for the countries having both ‘AGOA & EBA’ preferences
provides some significant estimates for three products, AMDS, TALF and OI. The TALF exports
are $ 776 million less than the counter-factual countries on average and all things equal. This
estimate is similar to that of table (4.6). AMDS are $ 97 million to $ 115 million lower for the
treated countries while OI products are $ 90 million less than the counter-factual countries, all
things equal. The remaining products are not significant and have similar signs to those of the
previous tables. We note once again, that EI exports are positive despite not being significant.
In summary, the explanation we can provide for the matching estimates is that given that our
analysis is based on the mean values of exports for the period 2000 – 2010, we obtain long term
results. The long term results being negative imply that the short-run impact immediately after the
provision of AGOA are not maintained throughout the period. One conclusion of the above results
is that, there is no long run positive impact of the AGOA preference. We explore these results
further by applying a different approach to answering the question of what the causal impact has
been for the AGOA countries. The new approach provides both short- and long-run impacts of the
AGOA preference. Moreover, this approach allows us to focus on each AGOA country separately
rather than combining all countries together. This case study type of analysis provides us with
further evidence and allows us to make a more comparative and focussed analysis of the AGOA
impact. Before turning our attention to the comparative case studies we check the robustness of the
results presented here using the covariate/exact matching approach.
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Table 4.1: Matching estimates: All AGOA
Outcome Radius Radius Radius Kernel Kernel Kernel Stratification
(δ = 0.05) (δ = 0.1) (δ = 0.2) (κ = 0.06) (κ = 0.1) (κ = 0.2)
Exports -892 000 -873 800 -1 155 000 -826 300 -713 400 -1 146 000 -671 600
Std. Error 1 219 000 941 400 925 800 1 134 000 934 100 947 100 948 700
Z-statistic -0.732 -0.928 -1.248 -0.729 -0.764 -1.210 -0.708
# Control 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
# AGOA 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
Export Share 0.039 0.018 -0.003 0.029 0.023 -0.003 0.022
Std. Error 0.045 0.043 0.048 0.044 0.042 0.048 0.043
Z-statistic 0.871 0.408 -0.065 0.670 0.587 -0.051 0.507
# Control 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
# AGOA 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
Exports (2002 - 1997) -388 500 -400 000 -486 400 -375 300 -361 600 -481 900
Std. Error 236 300 196 800 196 900 220 300 195 700 198 400
Z-statistic -1.644* -2.033** -2.470** -1.704* -1.848* -2.429**
# Control 33 33 33 33 33 33
# AGOA 37 37 37 37 37 37
Exports (2005 - 1997) -48 189.7 -178 900 -376 700 -92 494.5 -86 675.8 -360 200
Std. Error 911 200 712 300 674 800 834 000 719 300 686 700
Z-statistic -0.053 -0.251 -0.558 -0.111 -0.121 -0.525
# Control 33 33 33 33 33 33
# AGOA 37 37 37 37 37 37
Exports (2007 - 1997) -21 524.9 -193 700 -459 100 -109 600 -84 129.7 -440 000
Std. Error 1 394 000 1 077 000 1 007 000 1 278 000 1 104 000 1 027 000
Z-statistic -0.015 -0.180 -0.456 -0.086 -0.076 -0.428
# Control 33 33 33 33 33 33
# AGOA 37 37 37 37 37 37
Exports (2010 - 1997) -454 500 -555 900 -846 600 -563 800 -474 200 -843 900
Std. Error 1 713 000 1 266 000 1 178 000 1 570 000 1 332 000 1 204 000
Z-statistic -0.265 -0.439 -0.719 -0.359 -0.356 -0.701
# Control 33 33 33 33 33 33
# AGOA 37 37 37 37 37 37
All standard errors are bootstrapped with 250 replications. Covariates used in matching include proxies for governance
(corruption), economic structure, gravity type variables. Critical Z-values areZ(α = 0.05) = 1.96 andZ(α = 0.1) = 1.64
for the 5% and 10% significance levels respectively for the Radius and Kernel matching estimates. The Stratification estimates
are based on the Student’s t distribution—the critical values for the 10% and 5% t0.1,70 = 1.667 and t0.05,70 = 1.994 are
respectively. Note that: ATT estimate and standard errors for levels are in thousands of US $. ** 5%, * 10%
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Table 4.2: Matching estimates—Product exports: All AGOA
Outcome Radius Radius Radius Kernel Kernel Kernel Stratification
(δ = 0.05) (δ = 0.1) (δ = 0.2) (κ = 0.06) (κ = 0.1) (κ = 0.2)
USA AMDS -125 500 -126 600 -143 100 -119 300 -111 700 -1 411 000 -127 300
Std. Error 84 239.9 71 894.2 68 743.7 78 703.7 66 072.2 70 075.5 78 374.8
Z-statistic -1.490 -1.761* -2.082** -1.516 -1.691* -2.014** -1.624
# Control 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
# AGOA 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
USA FBTWP -30 062.8 -61 628.8 -96 596.5 -26 458.3 -36 084.4 -86 739.7 -53 286.4
Std. Error 39 130.1 44 994.3 57 345.3 36 144 33 118.9 53 593.5 46 636.2
Z-statistic -0.768 -1.370 -1.684* -0.732 -1.090 -1.618 -1.143
# Control 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
# AGOA 39 39 39 39 39 39 42
USA EI 471 100 580 200 556 800 49 3400 544 700 542 500 448 700
Std. Error 833 500 659 800 618 800 747 500 670 400 627 100 722 900
Z-statistic 0.565 0.879 0.900 0.660 0.813 0.865 0.621
# Control 32 32 32 32 32 32 34
# AGOA 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
USA CPR -87 476.5 -79 539.8 -95 668.3 -82 940 -73 830.6 -97 676.5 -63 211.3
Std. Error 93 750.3 66 271 61 709.3 89 770.8 70 148.5 65 796 50 965.3
Z-statistic -0.933 -1.200 -1.550 -0.924 -1.052 -1.485 -1.240
# Control 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
# AGOA 41 41 41 41 41 41 42
USA TALF -668 000 -677 900 -811 600 -726 700 -652 600 -817 500 -577 200
Std. Error 378 300 332 300 331 300 382 000 344 100 349 200 335 000
Z-statistic -1.766* -2.040** -2.450** -1.902* -1.897* -2.341** -1.723*
# Control 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
# AGOA 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
USA ISOM -68 454 -72 318 -104 000 -64 905.7 -54 918.9 -98 839.3 -72 084.2
Std. Error 93 811.2 73 054.1 76 088.5 83 767.7 65 867.3 75 474.9 78 448.9
Z-statistic -0.730 -0.990 -1.366 -0.775 -0.834 -1.310 -0.919
# Control 33 33 33 33 33 33 34
# AGOA 40 40 40 40 40 40 42
USA METE -334 600 -371 800 -391 700 -266 700 -274 200 -386 400 -183 000
Std. Error 253 200 286 400 226 700 202 500 222 300 226 600 164 200
Z-statistic -1.321 -1.298 -1.728* -1.317 -1.233 -1.705* -1.114
# Control 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
# AGOA 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
USA OI -109 500 -99 626 -109 100 -96 356.5 -92 633.4 -107 600 -77 108
Std. Error 78 485.8 63 764.5 61 235.8 71 632.3 63 963.2 62 147.4 74 434.5
Z-statistic -1.395 -1.562 -1.782* -1.345 -1.448 -1.731* -1.036
# Control 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
# AGOA 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
All standard errors are bootstrapped with 250 replications. Covariates used in matching include proxies for gov-
ernance (corruption), economic structure, gravity type variables. Critical Z-values are Z(α = 0.05) = 1.96 and
Z(α = 0.1) = 1.64 for the 5% and 10% significance levels respectively for the Radius and Kernel matching
estimates. The Stratification estimates are based on the Student’s t distribution—the critical values for the 10% and
5% t0.1,70 = 1.667 and t0.05,70 = 1.994 are respectively. AMDS–Agriculture, meat and dairy, & seafood (HS
1–10, 12–14); FBTWP–Food, beverages, tobacco, wood, & paper(HS 11, 15–24, 44–48); EI–Extractive industries
(HS 25–27, 68–71); CPR–Chemicals, plastics, & rubber (HS 28–36, 38–40); TALF–Textiles, apparel, leather, &
footwear (HS41–42, 50–65); ISOM–Iron, steel, and other metals (HS 26, 72–83); METE–Machinery, electronics,
& transportation equipment (HS 84–89); & OI–Other industries (HS 37, 43, 49, 66–67, 90–97). Note that: ATT
estimate and standard errors are in thousands of US $. ** 5%, * 10%
88
Table 4.3: Matching estimates: In & Out AGOA
Outcome Radius Radius Radius Kernel Kernel Kernel Stratification
(δ = 0.05) (δ = 0.1) (δ = 0.2) (κ = 0.06) (κ = 0.1) (κ = 0.2)
Exports -1 084 000 -1 281 000 -1 733 000 -1 225 000 -1 144 000 -1 627 000 -1 110 000
Std. Error 1 189 000 1 070 000 954 400 1 132 000 1 083 000 1 009 000 944 800
Z-statistic -0.912 -1.197 -1.816* -1.082 -1.056 -1.612 -1.175
# Control 32 32 32 32 32 32 10
# AGOA 10 10 10 10 10 10 9
Export Share -0.013 -0.043 -0.069 -0.011 -0.027 -0.063 -0.041
Std. Error 0.067 0.059 0.059 0.066 0.058 0.058 0.061
Z-statistic -0.190 -0.725 -1.163 -0.166 -0.459 -1.082 -0.680
# Control 32 32 32 32 32 32 10
# AGOA 10 10 10 10 10 10 9
Exports (2002 - 1997) -312 000 -383 800 -463 200 -338 500 -343 800 -444 900
Std. Error 307 900 286 500 228 700 311 300 295 000 237 100
Z-statistic -1.013 -1.340 -2.025** -1.087 -1.165 -1.876*
# Control 31 31 31 31 31 31
# AGOA 10 10 10 10 10 10
Exports (2005 - 1997) -727 600 -909 600 -1 032 000 -819 200 -818 700 -1 023 000
Std. Error 983 300 875 400 656 400 994 700 909 000 700 300
Z-statistic -0.740 -1.039 -1.572 -0.824 -0.901 -1.461
# Control 31 31 31 31 31 31
# AGOA 10 10 10 10 10 10
Exports (2007 - 1997) -1 340 000 -1 601 000 -1 726 000 -1 493 000 -1 462 000 -1 733 000
Std. Error 1 530 000 14 09 000 1 031 000 1 557 000 1 461 000 1 105 000
Z-statistic -0.876 -1.136 -1.674* -0.959 -1.001 -1.568
# Control 31 31 31 31 31 31
# AGOA 10 10 10 10 10 10
Exports (2010 - 1997) -1 781 000 -209 6000 -2 200 000 -2 011 000 -1 919 000 -2 246 000
Std. Error 2 185 000 1 988 000 1 431 000 2 224 000 2 063 000 1 546 000
Z-statistic -0.815 -1.054 -1.537 -0.904 -0.930 -1.453
# Control 31 31 31 31 31 31
# AGOA 10 10 10 10 10 10
All standard errors are bootstrapped with 250 replications. Covariates used in matching include proxies for governance
(corruption), economic structure, gravity type variables. Critical Z-values areZ(α = 0.05) = 1.96 andZ(α = 0.1) = 1.64
for the 5% and 10% significance levels respectively for the Radius and Kernel matching estimates. The Stratification estimates
are based on the Student’s t distribution—the critical values for the 10% and 5% t0.1,19 = 1.729; t0.1,40 = 1.684 and
t0.05,19 = 2.093; t0.05,40 = 2.021 are respectively. Note that: ATT estimate and standard errors for levels are in thousands
of US $. ** 5%, * 10%
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Table 4.4: Matching estimates—Products: In & Out AGOA
Outcome Radius Radius Radius Kernel Kernel Kernel Stratification
(δ = 0.05) (δ = 0.1) (δ = 0.2) (κ = 0.06) (κ = 0.1) (κ = 0.2)
USA AMDS -102 800 -119 600 -123 900 -118 200 -112 400 -125 400 -96 683.2
Std. Error 137 300 126 600 99 279.3 131 600 128 400 111 000 108 100
Z-statistic -0.749 -0.945 -1.248 -0.898 -0.875 -1.130 -0.894
# Control 32 32 32 32 32 32 10
# AGOA 10 10 10 10 10 10 9
USA FBTWP 41 188.6 31 598 11 481.7 36 191.8 29 125 15 385.9 49 540.3
Std. Error 108 500 81 132.5 75 798.6 106 500 83 624.8 75 907.5 94 560.2
Z-statistic 0.380 0.389 0.151 0.340 0.348 0.203 0.524
# Control 32 32 32 32 32 32 10
# AGOA 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
USA EI -4 845.8 -19 559.3 -174 800 -13 878.1 -15 890.9 -135 500 -4 123.3
Std. Error 101 400 8 6975.9 184 200 98 937.6 86 999.3 169 800 79 973.1
Z-statistic -0.048 -0.225 -0.949 -0.140 -0.183 -0.798 -0.052
# Control 30 30 30 30 30 30 10
# AGOA 10 10 10 10 10 10 9
USA CPR -23 151.9 -27 202.5 -80 669.2 -26 591.3 -25 481.7 -67 579.9 -22 328.9
Std. Error 31 943.7 28 772.8 69 649.2 30 507.9 29 277.1 59 974.5 25 136.5
Z-statistic -0.725 -0.945 -1.158 -0.872 -0.870 -1.127 -0.888
# Control 32 32 32 32 32 32 10
# AGOA 10 10 10 10 10 10 9
USA TALF -822 800 -937 100 -1 042 000 -907 200 -824 300 -1 030 000 -857 300
Std. Error 661 800 597 800 504 300 635 100 596 200 538 900 544 000
Z-statistic -1.243 -1.568 -2.066** -1.428 -1.383 -1.911* -1.576
# Control 32 32 32 32 32 32 10
# AGOA 10 10 10 10 10 10 9
USA ISOM -4 256 -9 987.4 -47 779.9 -6 569.9 -9 023.4 -38 497.4 -7 272.9
Std. Error 21 231.3 20 697.7 47 689.4 21 130.5 20 766.7 38 073.4 17 977.1
Z-statistic -0.200 -0.483 -1.002 -0.311 -0.435 -1.011 -0.405
# Control 31 31 31 31 31 31 10
# AGOA 10 10 10 10 10 10 9
USA METE -53 096.4 -61 481.9 -170 000 -60 339.3 -58 355.3 -133 000 -49 225.9
Std. Error 73 968.3 67 870 123 000 71 285.4 68 904.3 99 303.7 58 671.7
Z-statistic -0.718 -0.906 -1.379 -0.846 -0.847 -1.335 -0.839
# Control 32 32 32 32 32 32 10
# AGOA 10 10 10 10 10 10 9
USA OI -108 700 -126 000 -118 500 -123 700 -119 400 -123 300 -101 000
Std. Error 151 100 138 600 108 600 145 600 140 800 121 300 119 700
Z-statistic -0.719 -0.909 -1.091 -0.850 -0.848 -1.016 -0.844
# Control 32 32 32 32 32 32 10
# AGOA 10 10 10 10 10 10 9
All standard errors are bootstrapped with 250 replications. Covariates used in matching include proxies for gov-
ernance (corruption), economic structure, gravity type variables. Critical Z-values are Z(α = 0.05) = 1.96 and
Z(α = 0.1) = 1.64 for the 5% and 10% significance levels respectively for the Radius and Kernel matching
estimates. The Stratification estimates are based on the Student’s t distribution—the critical values for the 10%
and 5% t0.1,19 = 1.729; t0.1,40 = 1.684 and t0.05,19 = 2.093; t0.05,40 = 2.021 are respectively. AMDS–
Agriculture, meat and dairy, & seafood (HS 1–10, 12–14); FBTWP–Food, beverages, tobacco, wood, & paper(HS
11, 15–24, 44–48); EI–Extractive industries (HS 25–27, 68–71); CPR–Chemicals, plastics, & rubber (HS 28–36,
38–40); TALF–Textiles, apparel, leather, & footwear (HS41–42, 50–65); ISOM–Iron, steel, and other metals (HS
26, 72–83); METE–Machinery, electronics, & transportation equipment (HS 84–89); & OI–Other industries (HS 37,
43, 49, 66–67, 90–97). Note that: ATT estimate and standard errors are in thousands of US $. ** 5%, * 10%
90
Table 4.5: Matching estimates: Always AGOA
Outcome Radius Radius Radius Kernel Kernel Kernel Stratification
(δ = 0.05) (δ = 0.1) (δ = 0.2) (κ = 0.06) (κ = 0.1) (κ = 0.2)
Exports -740 500 -767 500 -1 008 000 -561 100 -541 600 -1 018 000 -417 900
Std. Error 1 725 000 1 353 000 1 105 000 1 620 000 1 291 000 1 151 000 1 294 000
Z-statistic -0.429 -0.567 -0.912 -0.346 -0.420 -0.884 -0.323
# Control 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
# AGOA 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
Export Share 0.069 0.046 0.016 0.060 0.052 0.017 0.056
Std. Error 0.054 0.047 0.052 0.053 0.048 0.052 0.050
Z-statistic 1.272 0.980 0.305 1.138 1.099 0.334 1.119
# Control 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
# AGOA 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
Exports (2002 - 1997) -406 800 -439 000 -535 700 -378 600 -385 300 -530 000
Std. Error 294 500 231 700 208 800 276 000 219 800 210 000
Z-statistic -1.381 -1.895* -2.566** -1.372 -1.753* -2.524**
# Control 33 33 33 33 33 33
# AGOA 24 24 24 24 24 24
Exports (2005 - 1997) 378 900 140 900 -82 480.8 330 600 278 400 -50 735.8
Std. Error 1 273 000 1 027 000 923 400 1 181 000 1 016 000 948 700
Z-statistic 0.298 0.137 -0.089 0.280 0.274 -0.053
# Control 33 33 33 33 33 33
# AGOA 24 24 24 24 24 24
Exports (2007 - 1997) 757 100 420 300 123 300 653 900 585 400 169 800
Std. Error 1 884 000 1 494 000 1 335 000 1 761 000 1 501 000 1 375 000
Z-statistic 0.402 0.281 0.092 0.371 0.390 0.123
# Control 33 33 33 33 33 33
# AGOA 24 24 24 24 24 24
Exports (2010 - 1997) 360 400 79 372.4 -230 200 255 700 209 200 -194 000
Std. Error 2 091 000 1 517 000 1 344 000 1 969 000 1 566 000 1 390 000
Z-statistic 0.172 0.052 -0.171 0.130 0.134 -0.140
# Control 33 33 33 33 33 33
# AGOA 24 24 24 24 24 24
All standard errors are bootstrapped with 250 replications. Covariates used in matching include proxies for governance
(corruption), economic structure, gravity type variables. Critical Z-values areZ(α = 0.05) = 1.96 andZ(α = 0.1) = 1.64
for the 5% and 10% significance levels respectively for the Radius and Kernel matching estimates. The Stratification estimates
are based on the Student’s t distribution—the critical values for the 5% and 10% t0.05,50 = 2.009; t0.05,60 = 2.000 and
t0.1,50 = 1.676; t0.1,60 = 1.671 are respectively. Note that: ATT estimate and standard errors for levels are in thousands
of US $. ** 5%, * 10%
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Table 4.6: Matching estimates—Products: Always AGOA
Outcome Radius Radius Radius Kernel Kernel Kernel Stratification
(δ = 0.05) (δ = 0.1) (δ = 0.2) (κ = 0.06) (κ = 0.1) (κ = 0.2)
USA AMDS -129 600 -140 500 -156 000 -118 300 -117 300 -152 500 -136 900
Std. Error 91 855.8 80 335.3 72 367.5 86 870.8 69 854.8 70 790.1 94 796.2
Z-statistic -1.411 -1.749* -2.156** -1.362 -1.679* -2.154** -1.444
# Control 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
# AGOA 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
USA FBTWP -47 330.2 -93 399 -136 600 -41 241.1 -56 017.1 -123 900 -83 719
Std. Error 44 492.7 57 565.1 77 252 39 082.4 40 218.3 72 684.2 60 785.7
Z-statistic -1.064 -1.622 -1.768* -1.055 -1.393 -1.705* -1.377
# Control 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
# AGOA 28 28 28 28 28 28 29
USA EI 682 400 849 300 870 000 717 400 799 000 837 200 661 400
Std. Error 1 040 000 822 400 773 000 932 100 840 400 778 600 984 400
Z-statistic 0.656 1.033 1.125 0.770 0.951 1.075 0.672
# Control 32 32 32 32 32 32 34
# AGOA 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
USA CPR -117 000 -106 100 -110 200 -108 100 -97 700 -116 900 -84 197
Std. Error 136 300 85 738 66 095.1 131 100 92 604 74 460 83 952
Z-statistic -0.858 -1.237 -1.667* -0.825 -1.055 -1.570 -1.003
# Control 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
# AGOA 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
USA TALF -563 900 -607 300 -774 700 -565 400 -583 500 -776 700 -421 500
Std. Error 405 700 330 000 296 500 412 000 371 400 319 400 269 500
Z-statistic -1.390 -1.840* -2.613** -1.372 -1.571 -2.432** -1.564
# Control 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
# AGOA 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
USA ISOM -91 920.3 -99 138 -131 200 -87 158.4 -74 079.9 -126 800 -99 403.8
Std. Error 137 200 103 800 98 365.9 123 900 96 168.9 100 100 125 800
Z-statistic -0.670 -0.955 -1.334 -0.703 -0.770 -1.267 -0.790
# Control 33 33 33 33 33 33 34
# AGOA 28 28 28 28 28 28 29
USA METE -451 300 -517 000 -505 500 -356 900 -374 800 -509 700 -241 500
Std. Error 380 600 438 000 333 800 307 400 288 800 332 000 259 000
Z-statistic -1.186 -1.180 -1.514 -1.161 -1.298 -1.535 -0.932
# Control 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
# AGOA 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
USA OI -104 900 -100 300 -107 600 -87 832 -88 461.4 -103 900 -63 201.6
Std. Error 74 315.7 62 061.6 53 391.5 65 962 56 070.3 49 719.8 50 792.3
Z-statistic -1.412 -1.616 -2.015 -1.332 -1.578 -2.090** -1.244
# Control 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
# AGOA 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
All standard errors are bootstrapped with 250 replications. Covariates used in matching include proxies for gov-
ernance (corruption), economic structure, gravity type variables. Critical Z-values are Z(α = 0.05) = 1.96 and
Z(α = 0.1) = 1.64 for the 5% and 10% significance levels respectively for the Radius and Kernel matching
estimates. The Stratification estimates are based on the Student’s t distribution—the critical values for the 5% and
10% t0.05,50 = 2.009; t0.05,60 = 2.000 and t0.1,50 = 1.676; t0.1,60 = 1.671 are respectively. AMDS–
Agriculture, meat and dairy, & seafood (HS 1–10, 12–14); FBTWP–Food, beverages, tobacco, wood, & paper(HS
11, 15–24, 44–48); EI–Extractive industries (HS 25–27, 68–71); CPR–Chemicals, plastics, & rubber (HS 28–36,
38–40); TALF–Textiles, apparel, leather, & footwear (HS41–42, 50–65); ISOM–Iron, steel, and other metals (HS
26, 72–83); METE–Machinery, electronics, & transportation equipment (HS 84–89); & OI–Other industries (HS 37,
43, 49, 66–67, 90–97). Note that: ATT estimate and standard errors are in thousands of US $. ** 5%, * 10%
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Table 4.7: Matching estimates: AGOA & EBA preferences
Outcome Radius Radius Radius Kernel Kernel Kernel Stratification
(δ = 0.05) (δ = 0.1) (δ = 0.2) (κ = 0.06) (κ = 0.1) (κ = 0.2)
Exports -1 138 000 -1 042 000 -1 195 000 -915 000 -835 600 -1 278 000 -563 800
Std. Error 1 149 000 923 500 686 800 1 060 000 824 400 718 200 957 900
Z-statistic -0.990 -1.128 -1.740* -0.863 -1.014 -1.779* -0.589
# Control 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
# AGOA 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
Export Share 0.070 0.052 0.000 0.057 0.053 0.006 0.056
Std. Error 0.073 0.060 0.065 0.068 0.060 0.065 0.062
Z-statistic 0.964 0.867 0.006 0.838 0.888 0.092 0.910
# Control 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
# AGOA 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
Exports (2002 - 1997) -384 700 -372 100 -410 700 -330 600 -325 900 -440 800
Std. Error 339 200 242 000 167 300 268 400 225 900 188 300
Z-statistic -1.134 -1.538 -2.455** -1.232 -1.443 -2.341**
# Control 33 33 33 33 33 33
# AGOA 15 15 15 15 15 15
Exports (2005 - 1997) -415 900 -488 900 -528 400 -344 100 -366 900 -600 700
Std. Error 842 600 662 500 498 400 674 900 584 700 545 000
Z-statistic -0.494 -0.738 -1.060 -0.510 -0.628 -1.102
# Control 33 33 33 33 33 33
# AGOA 15 15 15 15 15 15
Exports (2007 - 1997) -449 200 -582 800 -657 300 -369 300 -421 400 -756 200
Std. Error 1 283 000 1 045 000 808 300 1 070 000 947 700 876 800
Z-statistic -0.350 -0.558 -0.813 -0.345 -0.445 -0.862
# Control 33 33 33 33 33 33
# AGOA 15 15 15 15 15 15
Exports (2010 - 1997) -755 100 -886 200 -944 600 -639 600 -708 400 -1 106 000
Std. Error 1 673 000 1 336 000 998 100 1 391 000 1 242 000 1 097 000
Z-statistic -0.451 -0.663 -0.946 -0.460 -0.570 -1.008
# Control 33 33 33 33 33 33
# AGOA 15 15 15 15 15 15
All standard errors are bootstrapped with 250 replications. Covariates used in matching include proxies for governance
(corruption), economic structure, gravity type variables. Critical Z-values areZ(α = 0.05) = 1.96 andZ(α = 0.1) = 1.64
for the 5% and 10% significance levels respectively for the Radius and Kernel matching estimates. The Stratification estimates
are based on the Student’s t distribution—the critical values for the 5% and 10% t0.05,50 = 2.009 and t0.1,50 = 1.676 are
respectively. Note that: ATT estimate and standard errors for levels are in thousands of US $. ** 5%, * 10%
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Table 4.8: Matching estimates—Products: AGOA & EBA preferences
Outcome Radius Radius Radius Kernel Kernel Kernel Stratification
(δ = 0.05) (δ = 0.1) (δ = 0.2) (κ = 0.06) (κ = 0.1) (κ = 0.2)
USA AMDS -148 300 -120 500 -97 424.8 -125 300 -113 100 -115 900 -90 637.4
Std. Error 134 600 95 480.2 53 314.9 119 600 97 092.2 65 208.6 80 159.2
Z-statistic -1.102 -1.262 -1.827* -1.048 -1.165 -1.777* -1.131
# Control 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
# AGOA 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
USA FBTWP -35 417.1 -65 330.7 -58 253.6 -30 717 -36 900.1 -61 741.8 -49 949.8
Std. Error 34 478.8 60 255.1 36 664.2 30 385.4 31 217.2 42 900.9 43 274.8
Z-statistic -1.027 -1.084 -1.589 -1.011 -1.182 -1.439 -1.154
# Control 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
# AGOA 16 16 16 16 16 16 17
USA EI 222 600 273 100 322 300 264 500 263 700 304 600 219 000
Std. Error 865 500 551 400 469 800 733 400 576 700 491 900 905 900
Z-statistic 0.257 0.495 0.686 0.361 0.457 0.619 0.242
# Control 32 32 32 32 32 32 34
# AGOA 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
USA CPR -83 050.1 -86 698.3 -78 821 -75 511.3 -73 086.3 -88 724.4 -57 838.6
Std. Error 84 536.9 79 356.1 56 484.4 82 960 74 977.8 64 020.5 83 941.2
Z-statistic -0.982 -1.093 -1.395 -0.910 -0.975 -1.386 -0.689
# Control 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
# AGOA 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
USA TALF -512 600 -489 700 -776 100 -505 600 -473 500 -797 300 -361 500
Std. Error 438 600 346 300 305 000 441 800 355 600 340 300 315 000
Z-statistic -1.169 -1.414 -2.545** -1.144 -1.332 -2.343** -1.148
# Control 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
# AGOA 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
USA ISOM -141 500 -114 400 -88 894.2 -124 000 -102 600 -104 200 -77 888.4
Std. Error 171 100 132 300 66 627.6 142 900 112 000 80 816.3 80 295
Z-statistic -0.827 -0.865 -1.334 -0.868 -0.916 -1.289 -0.970
# Control 33 33 33 33 33 33 34
# AGOA 16 16 16 16 16 16 17
USA METE -277 200 -348 000 -340 700 -207 800 -203 500 -330 900 -118 500
Std. Error 299 800 310 700 254 000 222 400 174 000 230 900 171 700
Z-statistic -0.925 -1.120 -1.341 -0.934 -1.170 -1.433 -0.690
# Control 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
# AGOA 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
USA OI -98 894.7 -94 344.4 -83 520.3 -76 240.1 -77 231.2 -90 276.8 -48 706.5
Std. Error 99 475.4 74 884.6 48 137.3 79 147.9 72 521.7 54 081.8 57 245.1
Z-statistic -0.994 -1.260 -1.735 -0.963 -1.065 -1.669* -0.851
# Control 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
# AGOA 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
All standard errors are bootstrapped with 250 replications. Covariates used in matching include proxies for gov-
ernance (corruption), economic structure, gravity type variables. Critical Z-values are Z(α = 0.05) = 1.96 and
Z(α = 0.1) = 1.64 for the 5% and 10% significance levels respectively for the Radius and Kernel matching
estimates. The Stratification estimates are based on the Student’s t distribution—the critical values for the 5% and
10% t0.05,50 = 2.009 and t0.1,50 = 1.676 are respectively. AMDS–Agriculture, meat and dairy, & seafood (HS
1–10, 12–14); FBTWP–Food, beverages, tobacco, wood, & paper(HS 11, 15–24, 44–48); EI–Extractive industries
(HS 25–27, 68–71); CPR–Chemicals, plastics, & rubber (HS 28–36, 38–40); TALF–Textiles, apparel, leather, &
footwear (HS41–42, 50–65); ISOM–Iron, steel, and other metals (HS 26, 72–83); METE–Machinery, electronics,
& transportation equipment (HS 84–89); & OI–Other industries (HS 37, 43, 49, 66–67, 90–97). Note that: ATT
estimate and standard errors are in thousands of US $. ** 5%, * 10%
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4.3.2 Robustness and sensitivity results
This section presents further results based on Abadie et al.’s (2001) and Abadie and Imbens (2011)
matching estimator. The matching estimators are based on the nearest neighbour matching approach
and provide additional bias correction to the estimated average treatment on the treated (ATT)
results. The results presented here are not based on the propensity score estimate but rather matching
is based on the covariates listed below each table. The estimators also provide a means of correcting
the estimated standard errors for any heteroscedasticity that might be present in the standard errors
due to differences in the treatment effect across the treated and the controls. Results based on the
nearest neighbour but using the mahalanobis distance estimation are also shown. Further results
testing the sensitivity of the ATT estimates to the presence of confounding or unobserved factors
are also presented. The sensitivity estimates are based on Ichino et al. (2006) and Nannicini (2007).
The approach allows one to simulate the output (Γ) and selection (Λ) effects that can drive the ATT
estimates to zero. In the appendix to this chapter (appendix C) we present additional results10
In discussing the nearest neighbour results below we focus on model B. Model B has been
augmented with additional covariates that should lead us to closer matches of our treated countries
with our controls compared to model A. Model A provides a baseline estimate that can be compared
to the propensity score matching results of the previous section—given that, the same covariates
are specified.
In table (4.9), TALF is the only significant cluster among the product exports. The treated
countries had $ -3.9 billion lower exports compared to the control countries on average and ceteris
paribus. Our previous explanation that the TALF cluster contains leather and footwear products
that are probably crowding out the apparel and textile products still holds. In addition, the treated
countries, include countries that have not consistently maintained their AGOA status—thus, they
also crowd out whatever increases in exports the consistent exporters might obtain.
The remaining non-significant products with the exception of the extractive industry are not key
exports of the AGOA countries. The export difference between the selected post-AGOA years and
1997 provide no significant estimates. Again, there may be crowding out effects occurring. We note
briefly, that the baseline estimates for the export differences and the non-GSP share are significant.
The non-GSP share is positive while the export differences are negative. The baseline estimate is 0.6
points lower than our preferred estimate in model B. Similarly, the baseline estimates for the export
differences are also relatively lower than the model B estimates. The export difference increases in
magnitude as we move from 2002 to 2010. An indication that in the short-term, the losses relative
to the counter-factual on average is smaller. However, as we look at the longer-term, the magnitude
increases. Thus, compared to the counter-factual countries, the negative impact becomes larger
implying a larger negative impact of the preference on average and ceteris paribus. We however,
note that 2007 and 2010 are linked to the financial and food crisis that occurred during the period.
The USA economy was one of the worse hit and this affected their ability to import. Additionally,
the food crisis affected exports of a number of developing countries (with African countries among
10Tables showing additional propensity score matching and nearest neighbour results are presented including the
results controlling for heteroscedasticity of the standard errors. Further tables based on Ichino et al. (2006) and Nannicini
(2007) that assume the confounding variables to be income and religion are also presented. Rosenbaum’s bounds
sensitivity analysis results for selected outcomes are presented for the interested reader of this thesis. Additional results
not shown are also available upon request.
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the severely hit due to the food crisis). We expect these events to affect the estimated difference for
these years and may probably yield results of a higher magnitude for these two years.
Table (4.10) concentrates on countries that have consistently maintained their AGOA status.
We limit the set of countries to those that received preferences until 2003 and ignore countries that
received their preferences after 2003. The results are similar to the previous table, however, a few
more significant estimates are reported. Our baseline estimates report significant estimates for a
few more product clusters. The baseline estimates in a few cases report smaller absolute estimates
compared to model B—for example, all the export differences. All remaining significant estimates
are negative implying that the treated countries had lower exports relative to the counter-factual on
average and ceteris paribus.
TALF products remain significant and are $ 3.6 billion lower for the treated countries compared
to the counter-factual on average and all things equal. AMDS exports is now significant and shows
the treated countries have $ 973 million lower exports than the counter-factual on average. The
strong support provided to agriculture by the USA means that, the treated countries need to be
competitive at producing products within this cluster to enjoy any positive impact. Few countries
among the treated are able to meet the strong standards required by the USA. Nevertheless, even
fewer countries manage processing and packaging of the AMDS cluster of products. The majority
of products are exported with limited processing. For example, the bulk of cocoa and cocoa related
exports of Ghana and Ivory Coast is dried cocoa beans. Further processing of these products into
final products results in higher tariffs, thus, these countries resort to exporting the unprocessed and
semi-processed cocoa related products to enjoy lower tariffs.
Turning our attention to table (4.11) we focus on AGOA countries that have consistently
maintained their AGOA status and that also have the EBA preferences of the EU. There are fewer
significant estimates. The results for our main model—model B, shows no significant results for
the export differences. The total exports to the USA, AMDS, CPR, TALF, ISOM, and IO product
clusters are all significant. All remaining significant coefficients are negative. The result for total
exports to the USA shows that the treated countries had $ 712.3 million lower exports compared to
the counter-factual countries on average and ceteris paribus. This has not been significant in the
previous tables but shows up significant in model B of the table. Thus, in aggregate given that most
of the products in the table report a negative estimate—our result for total exports is therefore not
surprising. The result here, means that for our treated countries analysed in the table, the impact of
AGOA has been negative, all things equal.
In terms of the product clusters, the reported estimates are $ -40.6 million, $ -7.2 million, $
-695.7 million, $ 5 million and $ -1.99 million for AMDS, CPR, TALF, ISOM and OI exports
respectively. The TALF and AMDS estimates are consistent with the previous results although the
magnitude reported here is much smaller compared to the previous results. ISOM presents a positive
coefficient which implies that the treated countries have $ 5.7 million higher exports compared to
the counter-factual on average and ceteris paribus. This result provides a positive impact of the
AGOA preference for the ISOM cluster. The composition of the treated countries is probably linked
to this result. By focussing on a smaller subset of the AGOA countries, we may have reduced the
crowding out effect seen previously. Although, we observe relatively lower estimates compared to
the previous tables in this section, we do not see a change in the sign of the remaining products that
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were previously significant. This implies that, we may have reduced the crowding out effect within
the treated countries but the crowding out effect within the product cluster still remains. Thus,
given the definition of the clusters, the average impact remains negative given that a significant
number of products within each cluster do not fall under the AGOA preferential tariff list.
Tables (4.12)–(4.14) are based on the mahalanobis distance metric. The same three definitions
of the treated countries—that is, ‘all AGOA’, ‘always AGOA’ and ‘AGOA & EBA’ are used. Model
B remains our preferred model with model A providing us with the baseline estimates consistent
with the results reported in the previous section.
Table (4.12) shows the results for the ‘all AGOA’ group of countries. The significant results in
table (4.9) are also significant here in addition to the significant AMDS and OI product clusters.
The export differences are negative supporting the results in table (4.9). The treated countries have
$ 806.9 million, $ 2.9 billion and $ 4.9 billion lower exports compared to the counter-factual on
average for AMDS, TALF and OI products.
In table (4.13) we find fewer significant results than table (4.10). For the baseline estimates,
the export differences are no longer significant while in model B, AMDS and TALF products are
no longer significant. Again, we attribute the non-significance and negative effects in some of
the outcomes to the crowding-out occurring within the group of treated countries and the product
clusters.
The change in approach and the definition of the treatment group, (that is countries that have
been consistent in maintaining their AGOA status and adopting the mahalanobis metric approach)
we have been able to improve our matching results. The averaging effects thus, either eliminates
any statistical differences we might find or returns a negative estimate for key products such as
TALF that we expect to be positive or those that show no significance—for example, the EI cluster.
Table (4.14) provides the final results of the nearest neighbour for the ‘AGOA & EBA’ treated
group of countries. We obtain fewer significant results compared to table (4.11). How can we
reconcile the results across the nearest neighbour and the nearest neighbour with the mahalanobis
distance metric? Given that the number of treated countries and control countries have not changed
across the two sets of tables (that is, tables 4.9–4.11 and the corresponding tables in 4.12–4.14)
we do find differences across the sets of results. All the export differences (models A and B) in
tables (4.11 & 4.14) are almost the same (since the results are rounded off)—the remaining results
are quite different. On the contrary tables (4.9–4.10 & 4.12–4.13) do not show such similarity. In
the computation of the matches, the algorithm introduces these subtle differences. For instance
in tables (4.11 & 4.14 our treated countries are 17, thus using the mahalanobis distance metric
to match the control countries to the treated countries in many instances might result in a similar
configuration of matches and thus similar estimates as we observe. Tables (4.9–4.10 & 4.12–4.13)
however, have more treated countries (29 & 42)—therefore when matching is performed using the
mahalanobis distance metric it is possible to have a different configuration of matches and hence
in most cases results would be different across the tables. The difference in the configuration of
matches is due to the different weighting matrices11 used in estimating the ATT estimates.
11The first three nearest neighbour matching results draw on the k × k diagonal matrix of all k covariates used in the
match (Abadie et al., 2001). The diagonal matrix is composed of the inverse sample standard errors of the matching
covariates (Abadie et al., 2001). The mahalanobis distance metric on the other hand draws on the variance-covariance
matrix of the k matching covariates (Abadie et al., 2001). Depending on how different these weighting matrices are the
results can either be very different or similar.
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Nonetheless, with respect to all the negative estimates, we believe chapter 5 throws more light
on this. Essentially, in the next chapter we find that the top ranked exporters of AGOA are driving
all the gains in exports. These few countries included with all the remaining countries contribute to
the average impacts shown. The average impacts therefore turn negative given that a number of
small exporters are included in the calculation. These countries crowd-out any positive impacts that
might have been obtained if they were not included in the estimation12.
12We do not focus on only the top five AGOA exporters to check this assertion. However, the quantile results in the
next chapter and the diagrams shown in the next section of this chapter show that the countries outside the top five have
comparatively lower exports. Thus, any average would be driven downwards by all the remaining countries.
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The remaining tables (4.15 & 4.16) in this section provide our sensitivity results. The results
shown are for the ‘all AGOA’ and ‘always AGOA’ treatment groups. The sensitivity analysis is
based on what Nannicini (2007) calls the “killer confounders”. We simulate large selection and
output effect values to see whether the ATT estimates are driven to zero. In the tables below we
assume the following values of the parameters used in simulating the confounder U : p11 = 0.8,
p10 = 0.8, p01 = 0.6, p00 = 0.1. This gives us p1. = 0.8 and p0. = [0.17, 0.46]. Our output (d)
and selection (s) effects are d = p01 − p00 = 0.6− 0.1 = 0.5 and s = p1. − p0. = 0.8− 0.17 =
0.63; 0.8 − 0.46 = 0.46. These output and selection effects are high and after conditioning on
U (the unobservable variable) and W (the observable variables) yields the selection and output
estimates shown under their respective columns in the tables. The selection effect reported in the
table is calculated as the average odds ratio of U based on Pr(T = 1|U,W ). T is the treatment,
W is the observable vector of covariates and U is the unobserved (or confounding) factor. The
selection effect is therefore
Λ =
Pr(T = 1|U = 1,W )
Pr(T = 0|U = 1,W )/
Pr(T = 1|U = 0,W )
Pr(T = 0|U = 0,W ) .
The output effect is calculated as
Γ =
Pr(I(Y > Y¯ ) = 1|T = 0, U = 1,W )
Pr(I(Y > Y¯ ) = 0|T = 0, U = 1,W )/
Pr(I(Y > Y¯ ) = 1|T = 0, U = 0,W )
Pr(I(Y > Y¯ ) = 0|T = 0, U = 0,W ) .
The output effect ranges between 16.4 and 18.2 in table (4.15) while the selection effects are
between 9.6 and 23.5. These large selection and output effects do not drive the estimated ATT close
to zero which implies that much larger selection and output effects than that reported in the table
are required to drive the ATT estimates to zero. For instance, in spite of the rather large effects, U
explains 50% ([858.4 million - 428.7 million]/858.4 million) of the 2002 difference-in-differences
baseline estimate reported in model A of table (4.9). On the contrary, the estimates reported in table
(4.1) which are between $ 361 million and $ 486.4 million are much closer to the ATT estimate
based on the potential confounders simulated.
In table (4.16) we have similar estimates and very large selection and output effects. The output
effect varies between 15.99 and 18.9 while the selection effect varies between 11 and 25.7. In terms
of the difference-in-differences estimate for 2002, the simulated confounder explains 61.6% ([948.1
million -363.6 million]/948.1 million) of the baseline estimate reported in table (4.10). Quite
contrary to the previous table the ATT estimates for 2005 and 2010 have fallen rather than risen
above the 2002 values. The confounder explains 88% and 38.9% of the 2005 and 2010 baseline
estimates in model A in table (4.10). However, these estimates in both models of the table are not
significant. The simulation exercise shows that for most of the significant estimates, much larger
values of the selection and output effects are required to have the unobserved variable explain all of
the baseline estimate. This exercise thus, supports the robustness of the matching estimates13.
13Tables (C.11 - C.16) present additional tables based on simulating the confounder based on the majority christian
country dummy, low income country dummy and also the Rosenbaum sensitivity analysis.
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Table 4.15: Sensitivity Analysis: All AGOA
Outcome ATT Output Effect (Γ) Selection Effect (Λ)
Exports -918 813 824.00 17.06 15.45
Export Share 0.01 17.40 9.64
Exports (2002 - 1997) -428 744 736.00 16.77 12.75
Exports (2005 - 1997) -342 771 680.00 16.73 12.87
Exports (2007 - 1997) -418 388 448.00 16.60 13.56
Exports (2010 - 1997) -741 396 416.00 16.75 12.58
Exports: AMDS -124 871 808.00 17.29 15.58
Exports: FBTWP -66 321 348.00 16.43 14.49
Exports: EI 539 518 400.00 16.45 15.70
Exports: CPR -83 352 768.00 16.97 15.75
Exports: TALF -742 025 152.00 17.04 15.73
Exports: ISOM -65 693 728.00 16.72 14.54
Exports: METE -325 135 456.00 18.24 23.48
Exports: OI -102 425 184.00 18.00 20.97
The methods here are described in Ichino et al. (2006) and Nannicini (2007). 1000 replications are conducted. The binary
transformation is based on the mean value of each outcome (Y). The simulation is based on the following assumptions of the
confounder, P11 = Pr(U = 1|I(Y > Y¯ ) = 1, T = 1) = 0.80; P10 = Pr(U = 1|I(Y > Y¯ ) = 1, T = 0) = 0.80;
P01 = Pr(U = 1|I(Y > Y¯ ) = 1, T = 0) = 0.60; P00 = Pr(U = 1|I(Y > Y¯ ) = 0, T = 0) = 0.10;
P1. = Pr(U = 1|T = 1) = 0.80; P0. = Pr(U = 1|T = 0) ≡ 0.17 ↔ 0.46. The output effect is the average odds
ratio of U based on a logit model of Pr(I(Y > Y¯ ) = 1|T = 0, U,W ). The selection effect is the average odds ratio
of U based on Pr(T = 1|U,W ). T is the treatment, W is the observable vector of covariates and U is the unobserved
(or confounding) factors. Output effect = Pr(I(Y >Y¯ )=1|T=0,U=1,W )
Pr(I(Y >Y¯ )=0|T=0,U=1,W )/
Pr(I(Y >Y¯ )=1|T=0,U=0,W )
Pr(I(Y >Y¯ )=0|T=0,U=0,W ) . Selection effect
=
Pr(T=1|U=1,W )
Pr(T=0|U=1,W )/
Pr(T=1|U=0,W )
Pr(T=0|U=0,W ) .
Table 4.16: Sensitivity Analysis: Always in AGOA
Outcome ATT Output Effect (Γ) Selection Effect (Λ)
Exports -748016192.00 16.63 16.80
Export Share 0.04 17.84 11.04
Exports (2002 - 1997) -457 082 944.00 15.99 14.06
Exports (2005 - 1997) -29 936 260.00 16.69 14.00
Exports (2007 - 1997) 184 289 568.00 17.00 14.97
Exports (2010 - 1997) -86 024 848.00 16.90 14.37
Exports: AMDS -130 864 808.00 16.57 16.70
Exports: FBTWP -100 010 288.00 17.37 16.14
Exports: EI 813 692 928.00 16.66 17.46
Exports: CPR -106 409 104.00 16.56 18.27
Exports: TALF -680 370 304.00 16.92 16.82
Exports: ISOM -86 093 176.00 16.64 16.50
Exports: METE -435 430 368.00 18.87 25.73
Exports: OI -97 720 536.00 17.03 23.29
The methods here are described in Ichino et al. (2006) and Nannicini (2007). 1000 replications are conducted. The binary transformation is based on the mean value
of each outcome (Y). The simulation is based on the following assumptions of the confounder, P11 = Pr(U = 1|I(Y > Y¯ ) = 1, T = 1) = 0.80;
P10 = Pr(U = 1|I(Y > Y¯ ) = 1, T = 0) = 0.80; P01 = Pr(U = 1|I(Y > Y¯ ) = 1, T = 0) = 0.60; P00 = Pr(U =
1|I(Y > Y¯ ) = 0, T = 0) = 0.10; P1. = Pr(U = 1|T = 1) = 0.80; P0. = Pr(U = 1|T = 0) ≡ 0.17 ↔ 0.46. The output
effect is the average odds ratio of U based on a logit model of Pr(I(Y > Y¯ ) = 1|T = 0, U,W ). The selection effect is the average odds ratio of U
based on Pr(T = 1|U,W ). T is the treatment, W is the observable vector of covariates and U is the unobserved (or confounding) factors. Output effect
=
Pr(I(Y>Y¯ )=1|T=0,U=1,W )
Pr(I(Y>Y¯ )=0|T=0,U=1,W ) /
Pr(I(Y>Y¯ )=1|T=0,U=0,W )
Pr(I(Y>Y¯ )=0|T=0,U=0,W ) . Selection effect =
Pr(T=1|U=1,W )
Pr(T=0|U=1,W ) /
Pr(T=1|U=0,W )
Pr(T=0|U=0,W ) .
4.3.3 An alternative approach: comparative case studies using the synthetic control
method (SCM)
The results based on the propensity score and exact nearest neighbour matching have provided a
negative impact of the AGOA preference on the beneficiaries. In the previous section, the averaging
of our outcomes in calculating the ATT estimates led to non-significant estimates and in some cases
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provided significant results that showed a negative impact of AGOA on some key AGOA exports.
We attributed these results to the crowding out occurring within the treatment groups and the
product clusters. In this section, we hope to clarify and further analyse whether a different approach
based on case study analyses can provide us with useful answers to our question posed at the
beginning of this chapter, “has AGOA increased the exports of recipients compared to non-recipient
countries?” We find that the synthetic control approach undertaken in this section does a better
job of showing the trends in exports and providing us an answer to this question on a country
by country basis. Nonetheless, unlike the previous sections, we are able to study the time trends
of exports for each AGOA recipient and observe the trends for our counter-factual countries14.
Furthermore, we focus on oil and non-oil exports to determine whether isolating oil exports from
the EI cluster would lead to significant estimates. In the appendix to this chapter (see figure C.8),
we also show results for apparel and textile products to determine if the exclusion of leather and
footwear products from the TALF cluster would yield a positive impact.
In this section, we use an alternative approach at matching the countries. The results above as
mentioned earlier, are probably driven by the crowding out effects due to averaging our outcomes
over the sample period. For instance, the outcome is averaged over the post-AGOA period, however,
not all AGOA countries received their preferential status in the same year. Secondly, averaging of
the outcomes does not provide an adequate way of comparing the outcomes over time. We hope
to overcome these drawbacks by using the synthetic control method of Abadie and Gardeazabal
(2003) and described in Abadie et al. (2010) and Abadie et al. (2012)15.
Figures (4.1)–(4.4) provide an idea of the trends in total exports and non-oil exports for the
AGOA countries and the pool of control countries. We do this to show the similarities and
differences in the trends of exports for the treated countries and the control countries. In figure
(4.1), the average non-oil and total exports of the control pool lies above the average exports for
the AGOA countries. This gives support to our earlier assertion of the crowding out occurring in
our average matching estimates. In order to show that there are a number of large exporters among
the AGOA group of countries we show selected countries based on the top five AGOA exporters
(selections made from ranking countries based on their average non-oil and total exports to the
USA for the 2000 – 2012 period). In figure (4.2), we find South Africa to have the highest non-oil
exports over the 2000–2012 period compared to the average of the pool of control countries and
remaining AGOA countries. After including oil exports, we find that, South Africa is no longer the
highest exporter. Nigeria now becomes the largest exporter to the USA—showing how oil exports
makes a difference in the ranking of the top exporters of AGOA. Also, Angola after 2004 rises
above South Africa in terms of total exports. All these three countries lie above the mean exports of
the control pool for almost the entire sample period. Mauritius and Kenya ranked among the top
five (see figure [4.4] for the ranking of the top five and bottom five exporters within our sample)
total non-oil exporters lie below the control pool in both panels while Nigeria and Angola lie below
the control pool in only panel A.
14In this section, we refer to the constructed counter-factual as the synthetic country. Thus, if Angola is our treated
country our counter-factual comparison is done with what Abadie et al. (2010, 2012, 2014) refers to as synthetic Angola
in our case. Also following the authors we refer to our control countries as the pool. These terms are however, used
interchangeably with our previous terms that is, counter-factual, control and reference countries.
15Estimations are carried out in Stata using the Synth package provided by the authors—Abadie et al. (2010) and
Abadie et al. (2014).
107
In figure (4.3), we provide further evidence of the trend in total exports. We show the trends
in four of the major AGOA oil exporters and compare these countries to selected countries from
the control pool. The seven countries (Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Malaysia, Oman, Saudi Arabia,
and Venezuela) from the control pool were part of the counter-factual trends shown in the synthetic
control application for Angola, Republic of Congo, Gabon, and Nigeria later in this section. The
aim of this figure is to convince the reader that the choice of countries for our treated cases have
similar export trends to the four AGOA countries mentioned above. Another reason is also to justify
the positive impact of the preference we report below.
Figure (4.4) provides information on the largest and smallest AGOA exporters. As can be seen
from the graph, the mean exports in panel A for non-oil exports show South Africa to be the largest
exporter in this category. South Africa’s exports are 22.1, 28.3, 44.2, and 70.8 times the mean
exports of the next ranked countries—that is, Kenya, Mauritius, Ghana and Nigeria. Given the very
low exports of the bottom five which are less than $ 4 million, we can see the large disparity in
exports by AGOA countries. We note that, this provides further motivation for undertaking the
quantile analysis in the next chapter. Taking the mean exports across the AGOA countries would
lead to a significantly lower mean export value for all the AGOA countries as visible in figure (4.4)
in this section.
Including oil exports changes the ranking of the top five countries. Kenya, Mauritius and Ghana
no longer appear in the top five ranked countries. Nigeria on the contrary becomes the top ranked
exporter. We also observe new members, namely, Angola, Gabon and Republic of Congo. We
note that, the bottom five does not change significantly. Benin is the only country that moves up
one rank (but two from its position in panel A) above the bottom five while Burundi drops down
by one rank to become a member of the bottom five. Nigeria’s exports are 2.3, 3.2, 10.1 and
10.6 times the exports of Angola, South Africa, Gabon and Republic of Congo. This compared to
panel A where we had South Africa exporting 22.1–70.8 times the exports of the remaining top
five countries—shows a tighter distribution of exports among the top five in the case of panel B.
These countries are the largest AGOA exporters and their exports dominates the exports of all the
remaining countries. We particularly view this as problematic for analyses that are based on mean
estimators. This disparity in exports would either raise or lower the mean impact. In our case, the
mean impact is more likely to be understated given that majority of the AGOA countries are found
at the lower end of the export distribution. This provides further support for our earlier assertion
about the crowding out effects. We next outline the synthetic control method (SCM).
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Figure 4.1: Trends in Exports: AGOA and Control country averages
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Pool is based on an average of 38 developing and middle income countries.
Figure 4.2: Trends in exports: Selected top AGOA exporters and average of pool of control countries,
1975 – 2012
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Arabia & Venezuela. The 7 counter-factual countries chosen have contributed to the synthetic counter-parts of
these countries in a few cases. See appendix tables (C.22 & C.23).
Figure 4.3: Trends in Exports: Selected treated and control countries
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Even though the diagrams are based on the mean exports for 2000 - 2012 calculating the mean exports based on
the particular years each country has been provided with AGOA still leaves the bottom and top 5 unchanged.
Although a slight re-ordering of countries in the middle of the distribution occurs. Exports less than $ 4 million
appear in the graph above as 0.00
Figure 4.4: Top & bottom Five countries: 2000 – 2012 Average
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Methods
Abadie et al. (2010) in motivating the choice of synthetic control studies in comparative case studies
analysis provide the following insights.
Social scientists are often interested in the effects of events or policy interventions that
take place at an aggregate level and affect aggregate entities, such as firms, schools,
or geographic or administrative areas (countries, regions, cities, etc.). To estimate the
effects of these events or interventions, researchers often use comparative case studies
(Abadie et al., 2010, 493).
With synthetic control methods we compare the time series of aggregate exports for the treated
and control country cases. Abadie et al. (2010) suggests that synthetic control methods are data
driven thereby removing the influence of the researchers choice in selecting control countries16.
Much of the analysis is based on data available for the control and treated unit to reduce the
discretion and subjectivity of the researcher (Abadie et al., 2010). The SCM allows control units to
be combined in comparison to the treated unit—rather than a comparison with a single control unit
(Abadie et al., 2010). Examples of studies using a combination of control units include Abadie
et al. (2012); Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003); Card (1990) and Cavallo et al. (2013). There has
been an increase in the use of SCM since the initial publication by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003).
Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) combine regions of Spain in comparison to the Basque region—to
determine whether economic growth in the Basque region would have obtained in the absence
of terrorism. Abadie et al. (2010) use 38 USA states to study the effect of a tobacco control
programme initiated in California in 1998. Abadie et al. (2012) analyse the economic effects of
German reunification on West Germany using 16 OECD member countries as the control countries.
Also, Cavallo et al. (2013) is a recent application of the SCM method to natural disasters. They
estimate the causal impact of natural disasters on economic growth—where the cases selected are
based on the 75th, 90th and 99th percentile of the distribution of people killed in the world due to
natural disasters. Given the increased interest in the SCM for aggregate analysis we have adopted it
here as a further check on our results and to aid us in providing more definitive results of the impact
of AGOA.
An advantage of the SCM is that, it can be applied to both micro and macro data as well as be
performed on a few control units (Abadie et al., 2010). The SCM is a case study approach thus, we
need only one treated country to perform the analysis. We use the SCM method for selected AGOA
countries to estimate the level of exports to the USA that would have occurred in the absence of
AGOA. It is possible to carry out some falsification tests or placebo tests to determine the level of
confidence we can have in our estimates (see for example, Abadie et al., 2010, 2012). This process
can be done by either changing the actual year of AGOA provision or repeatedly assigning each
control country within the control pool the AGOA treatment and comparing their exports to the
counter-factual. Evidence obtained that show AGOA impacts much higher in magnitude relative to
16The earlier matching analysis is also data driven given that the researcher’s choice of control countries are based
on either on the propensity score or exact covariate matching. Although, in the propensity score matching approach,
the bandwidth or caliper value chosen can determine which countries are included in the counter-factual. In spite of
this, the choice of the counter-factual is based on the data. The data driven nature was essentially to compare the SCM
to qualitative methods—to provide a more robust alternative to case study analysis whereby the researcher hand-picks
comparative cases to analyse.
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our cases would imply that our initial estimates may be poorly determined (for example, Abadie
et al., 2010, 2012).
We discard all Caribbean Basin, high income, and newly industrialised countries from the
control pool. This leaves us with 38 control countries in the control pool17. The Caribbean Basin
countries have the Caribbean Basin Trade Protection Act (CBTPA) preferences which are similar
to the AGOA preferences hence their exclusion. The remaining countries excluded have high
incomes and are more industrialised than the African countries. Their exports also contain more
sophisticated manufactures unlike the African countries. A question that can be answered by this
approach is, “how has exports evolved in the treated countries after their AGOA status?” We are
still able to answer the question, “whether there has been an impact of AGOA.” In the SCM, we
find among the pool of control countries those countries that are able to replicate the pre-AGOA
exports of the treated country using algorithms developed by Abadie et al. (2010, 2012); Abadie and
Gardeazabal (2003). Given that pre-AGOA trends are similar, the year of AGOA provision becomes
the point where any departure observed between the treated and counter-factual country becomes
the policy effect. The impact then becomes the difference between exports to the USA by the treated
country and its counter-factual. In the SCM terminology the counter-factual is referred to as the
synthetic country. For instance, if Nigeria is our treated country then the counter-factual is referred
to as synthetic Nigeria—hence comparison is made between Nigeria and the constructed synthetic
Nigeria. In this case, synthetic Nigeria could be obtained by a single country in the control pool or
a combination of countries within the pool. The SCM algorithm allows this possibility—allowing
one to obtain for example Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Bangladesh and probably Malaysia providing
weights of 50%, 20%, 20% and 10% to synthetic Nigeria that replicates the exports of Nigeria.
The percentages provided in the preceding are just an example, however, such combinations of
countries that reliably reproduce the exports of Nigeria can be found.
Abadie et al. (2010, 2012) in a footnote, note that where there are several treated units it is
possible to aggregate the treated units exposed to the intervention or apply the SCM to each case.
We choose the latter given our experience in the previous section and the fact that few countries
have relatively large exports to the USA compared to the remaining treated units. Our approach in
this case, allows us to focus on each selected country and provide a comparison of each treated
country’s export series to its synthetic counterpart.
In the SCM the use of longitudinal data allows us to control for time-invariant unobserved
variables which proves to be an advantage of this method (Abadie et al., 2010, 2012; Abadie
and Gardeazabal, 2003; Cavallo et al., 2013). The analysis requires that countries that are not
provided AGOA (control countries) provide the trend in exports for the AGOA countries after the
provision of AGOA—this enables us to estimate what exports would have been for the AGOA
countries (see for example, Cavallo et al., 2013, for natural disasters). This assumption is quite
strong and is not easily satisfied (Cavallo et al., 2013). Identification in this case requires finding a
country or weighted group of countries that have the same pre-AGOA export trends. This would
likely strengthen the ability of the synthetic country to replicate the trends in exports of the treated
17The control countries are: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brunei, Comoros, Egypt, Fiji,
India, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Macao, Malaysia, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, New Caledonia,
Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka,
Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Venezuela.
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country in the absence of AGOA. This group of countries become the counter-factual or in SCM
terminology the synthetic country and provide an avenue for obtaining a causal impact of AGOA.
This approach unlike the fixed effects model, allows the unobservable factors to vary with time
(Abadie et al., 2010, 2012; Cavallo et al., 2013). This is a strong point for our analysis given that
there may be unobservable factors varying with time that may be affecting our treated countries. In
predicting exports we draw on gravity type variables to replicate the treated country’s export series.
Our model includes English, Spanish and landlocked dummies; logs of weighted distance, area and
gross domestic product (gdp). Since the algorithm includes unobservable factors that are constant
and vary with time we believe this model would be able to predict exports of our selected cases.
Let J + 1 be the treated country of interest and the control countries, T be the time period18.
We consider J = 1 to be the selected treated country while the remaining J + 1 countries form
the control pool. We consider two time periods, T0 to be the pre-AGOA period (1 ≤ T0 < T )
and T0 + 1 to T indicates the post-AGOA period. We denote Y Nit to be exports observed for
country i at time t prior to AGOA—T0. Also, let Y Iit be exports observed for unit i at time t
post-AGOA—T0 + 1. One assumption made by Abadie et al. (2010); Abadie and Gardeazabal
(2003) is that the provision of treatment does not affect the outcome prior to its implementation
in time T0—implying that Y Iit = Y
N
it during this period
19. We can define αit = Y Iit − Y Nit to be
the impact of AGOA for country i at time t. Let Dit be a dummy variable taking the value one if
country i is provided AGOA at time t and zero otherwise.
Yit = Y
N
it + αitDit.
Since we consider the first country to be provided with AGOA and in period T0 +1 to T our dummy
variable is,
Dit =
{
1 if i = 1 and t > T0
0 otherwise
Our exercise requires the estimation of (α1T0+1, . . . , α1T ). With t > T0 we have
α1t = Y
I
1t − Y N1t = Y1t − Y N1t .
Since Y I1t is not observed it has to be estimated and this can be done with the factor model proposed
by Abadie et al. (2010)
Y Nit = δt + θtZi + λtµi + εit, (4.5)
where δt is not known and is a common factor with fixed factor loadings across countries, Zi
is a vector of covariates in the pre-AGOA period, θt is a vector of unknown parameters, λt is a
18Our discussion on the methods draws heavily on Abadie et al. (2010, 2012); Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and we
use notation present in Abadie et al. (2010); Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003).
19Abadie et al. (2010) note that, it is possible to observe an impact prior to the treatment being provided—the
anticipation effects. We do observe a few instances of this in our analysis below. They recommend that it is possible
to redefine period T0 to a year where the reaction to the intervention is observed. Another implicit assumption in the
analysis is that there are no feedback effects or “interference” among the units—that is receiving AGOA status does not
affect the exports of the control countries(Abadie et al., 2010)
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vector of unobserved common factors, µi is a vector of unknown factor loadings and ε is the iid
unobserved country level shocks. Suppose there is a vector of weights W = (w2, . . . , wJ+1)′
where 0 ≤ wj ≤ 1 for j = 2, . . . , J + 1 and the sum of weights is equal to one (that is,
w2 + . . .+ wJ+1 = 1). Then each positive value of our vector W can be a potential candidate of
the synthetic country—the positive values represent a weighted average of the control countries.
This then provides us with the value of the export outcome as the sum of the following quantities
described above in equation (4.5)
J+1∑
j=2
wjYjt = δt + θt
J+1∑
j=2
wjZj + λt
J+1∑
j=2
wjµj +
J+1∑
j=2
wjεjt.
We thus obtain the following equations of the export outcomes given that there exist weights w∗i
for our J + 1 controls. However, if we are unable to find such weights for the equality in equation
(4.6) to hold—an approximation of the relationship is acceptable. Abadie et al. (2010) notes that
this is often the case in practise.∑J+1
j=2 w
∗
jYj1 = Y11,
∑J+1
j=2 w
∗
jYj2 = Y12, . . . ,
∑J+1
j=2 w
∗
jYjT0 = Y1T0 , and
∑J+1
j=2 w
∗
jZj = Z1,
∑J+1
j=2 w
∗
jµj = µ1.
(4.6)
As long as equation (4.6) holds in approximate terms we would obtain an unbiased estimate of
Y N1t . As a result Abadie et al. (2010) notes that in the approximate case the factor model specified in
equation (4.5) above can find Z1 and the set of pre-AGOA export outcomes (that is, Y11, . . . , YT0)
as long as the relationships for Z1 and µ1 hold approximately in equation (4.6).
In implementing the estimator we chose the vector W ∗ that minimises the distance between the
pre-AGOA and the synthetic control covariates—X1 and X0W . This is formulated as
arg min | X1 −X0W |= (X1 −X0W )′V (X1 −X0W )
subject to w2 ≥ 0, . . . , wJ+1 ≥ 0 and w2 + . . .+ wJ+1 = 1. Where V is a diagonal matrix with
positive diagonal elements that show the importance of the various export covariates specified in
the factor model. The post-AGOA export outcomes are then obtained as the difference between the
treated and synthetic country—Y1 − Y0W ∗ at time t ≥ T0. Our synthetic control estimate of the
impact of AGOA in the post-AGOA period is then,
Y1t −
J+1∑
j=2
w∗jYjt.
Where the variables are as defined earlier. The figures shown in the results section plot these annual
estimates of the synthetic control estimates. Table (4.17) provides the short- and long-run estimates
of the synthetic control method. We consider the estimates a year after the provision of AGOA as
our short-run estimate. The long-run estimate is provided as the mean value for all periods in the
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sample after the provision of AGOA. Figures (4.5)–(4.7) provide the synthetic control estimates.
Figures (4.8)–(4.13) provide evidence of our placebo treatments to show whether our synthetic
estimates are within reasonable limits. In the appendix, we provide further figures and tables
showing evidence of the pre-AGOA mean predictors, the random mean square prediction error
(RMSPE) and the various weights for the selected countries from the pool that form the trends in
the synthetic country (that is, the counter-factual).
Top five AGOA exporters
Figure (4.5) shows the trends in exports for the treated and synthetic countries. The effect of AGOA
on exports to the USA is the difference between exports to the USA by the treated country and its
synthetic counterpart after the enactment of AGOA. The SCM finds countries that match the trend
in exports for the treated country before AGOA, thus, after the provision of AGOA any divergence
in the export series can be interpreted as an impact of the AGOA preference. As much as possible
a good approximation of exports by the treated country in the pre-AGOA period is given by the
synthetic country if the export series follow the same path. In this analysis we track these changes
in the export series after AGOA until 2012. We thus obtain annual estimates of the difference
between the treated country and its synthetic country. In the figure we provide the estimates for the
top five AGOA countries based on total exports (which includes oil exports). For each country we
show the estimated trends for both total and non-oil exports. The first column of the figure shows
total exports while the second column shows the result for non-oil exports. The vertical line in the
the panels show when the AGOA preference was provided to each country.
In the case of Angola the pre-trends of AGOA for total exports are very similar (the predictors
for the pre-AGOA period for Angola and synthetic Angola provide further support). After the
provision of AGOA we observe that, the total exports of Angola stays above synthetic Angola
for the rest of the period. This shows that AGOA had a positive impact on the total exports of
Angola to the USA. In terms of non-oil exports we do observe a positive impact of AGOA even
though both trends for Angola and synthetic Angola appear to intersect during the post-AGOA
period. From the results, it appears that, the impact of AGOA is favourable even when oil exports
are excluded—this can be seen by comparing the Angola and synthetic Angola export series. Table
(4.17) shows that for both the short- and long-term Angola had much higher exports than synthetic
Angola. For non-oil exports these are 257.2% and 110.7% for the short- and long-term respectively.
That of total exports are 64.8% and 198.7% respectively. The exclusion of oil exports provides
a rather large short-run impact for Angola. Over the entire post-AGOA period (2005–2012), the
gap between the two is less than half the short-run impact. Looking at total exports we observe
the reverse—the short-run impact is less than half the long-run impact. Indicating the long-term
benefits of oil exports in the AGOA exports of Angola. For Angola, we find strong evidence of a
positive impact of the AGOA preference.
The Republic of Congo does not immediately show a positive impact compared to synthetic
Congo however, two years after the AGOA provision, the exports of Congo rise above that of its
synthetic counterpart for the remainder of the period. At this point Congo begins to see the positive
impact of the AGOA preference. The values in table (4.17) shows that, Congo has a lower short-
and long-term export of non-oil products of -43.4% and -49.2% respectively. The long-term non-oil
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export impact is larger in magnitude. The shortfall in exports compared to synthetic Congo is
reversed after including oil exports in the case of the mean exports over the 2001–2012 period.
While the short-term impact shows Congo to be 41.2% lower than its synthetic counterpart it shows
a large increase in exports relative to synthetic Congo over the entire post-AGOA period of 534.7%.
This is the largest positive impact observed for the twelve countries analysed in this section. This
is significantly larger than the 198.7% increase shown by Angola. One could argue that Congo
has had more time under AGOA compared to Angola and this has probably helped it in raising its
exports to the USA.
Gabon does not show any clear impact as the previous two countries. The trends for both total
and non-oil exports tend to overlap in the post-AGOA period. However, table (4.17) shows that
immediately after the provision of AGOA Gabon exported 48% and 4.3% lower non-oil and total
exports. Including oil exports has reduced the negative impact of the preference. However, when
we consider the mean impact from 2001–2012 it is 7.2% and 2.4% lower than synthetic Gabon
for non-oil and total exports respectively. In this case, we find the long term impact to be smaller
in magnitude than the immediate impact of the preference. This implies that over the period the
difference between exports by Gabon and synthetic Gabon has become smaller and exports are
now quite similar. The result shows that oil exports are key in any gains Gabon might obtain from
exporting under the AGOA preference.
Nigeria the largest exporter (in terms of total exports) does not show a similar increase in its
exports. One would have expected a greater impact for Nigeria however, given that each country
obtains a different configuration of countries from the pool of control countries—we observe a
smaller impact. We find that given the countries forming synthetic Nigeria we obtain marginal
increases in exports above the synthetic country. In both non-oil and total exports we find that
exports tend to overlap during the period. To provide a more precise estimate of the impact we note
that in terms of total exports the short- and long-term impacts are 7.97% and 1.71% respectively.
The short run impact is almost six times that of the long-run impact. The impact for non-oil exports
is negative—the short- and long-run estimates are -38.2% and -10.6% respectively—indicating that
on average synthetic Nigeria has higher exports of non-oil products compared to Nigeria. Readers
must bear in mind that, in spite of Nigeria’s export status among the AGOA countries, the internal
conflicts and militancy related to oil production in the Niger Delta region has probably affected
their oil exports20.
The final country in figure (4.5) is South Africa. The plots for non-oil and total exports reveal a
negative impact of the AGOA preference for South Africa. This probably goes against our a priori
20The political science literature offers some useful insights into the politics of crude oil and its effects on Nigeria.
The key problem region is the Niger Delta, where oil vessels and foreign oil workers are sometimes hijacked and oil
lines are cut. Douglas et al. (2004); Watts et al. (2004) and related papers at http://oldweb.geog.berkeley.
edu/ProjectsResources/ND%20Website/NigerDelta/pubs.html focus on the Niger Delta region and
the conflict arising due to access to oil resources. In terms of the economic literature these conflicts arising from having
oil has been referred to as the “natural resource curse”. Finding new deposits of oil has also been linked with the “Dutch
disease”—whereby as a result of exploiting the oil resource the remaining sectors of the economy contracts. Frankel
(2010) provides a useful survey of these issues while Metcalf and Wolfram (2010) studies the link between political
institutions and erratic oil production. Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2013) provide a case study of Nigeria related to
the resource curse and “Dutch Disease”. Could this be a possible explanation for the poor export performance when oil
products are excluded? Well this could be one reason especially for Congo (Rep.), Gabon and Nigeria. However, Angola
in the results above does not show a significant downturn in non-oil exports—we rather observe a much larger short-term
impact for non-oil exports compared to total exports but the long-term case sees a reversal of this. We do not explore
these issues here in this thesis, we do note that, these are interesting areas of research that can be explored in the future.
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expectations of the result. We note that a reason for this result might be the minimal overlap we
observe in the pre-AGOA period between South Africa and its synthetic counterpart. However, the
pre-AGOA predictor balances in the appendix (tables C.24–C.25) does show quite similar predictor
averages indicating that the South African predictors match its synthetic counterpart. Furthermore
the root mean square prediction error is low and is 0.4 and 0.6 for total and non-oil exports. The
additional evidence in the appendix implies that the estimation went well. On the contrary the
graphs tell us a different story. Another reason for the lack of overlap could be the end of apartheid
which was a significant event in South African history and had implications in terms of its trade
with the rest of the world. The various events culminating in the acceptance of South Africa and
the removal of sanctions has probably affected our estimation in this case. Of note, is that the USA
was one of the countries that had an embargo on South African exports at the time. We make this
point since the trends in both countries points to some event occurring close to 1990 and creating
a drop in South African exports—the exports then maintain their new trajectory for most of the
remaining period. In table (4.17) the values for non-oil exports are -48.2% and -42.5% for the short-
and long-run respectively. For total exports we find the values to be lower in magnitude— (-)22.3%
and -30.5% for short- and long-run impacts respectively.
In the analysis above, we focused on the top five AGOA countries based on total exports.
Of these countries South Africa and Nigeria are also among the top five AGOA countries based
on non-oil exports. We decided to show the results for the three remaining countries based on
non-oil exports—these countries include Kenya, Ghana and Mauritius. For all three countries we
find considerable overlap in the pre-AGOA trends. The AGOA preference was provided to these
countries on October 2000. Kenya shows a negative impact of AGOA on total exports for the entire
post-AGOA period. In terms of total exports the initial negative impact is overturned returning the
export series of Kenya above its synthetic counterpart. Table (4.17) shows that for non-oil exports
of Kenya, the mean gap over the entire post-AGOA period is 28.3%. Thus, Kenya had 28.3% higher
exports on average compared to synthetic Kenya. A closer look at the underlying data for non-oil
and total exports shows no difference between the two categories (except for the usual rounding off
errors however, all data has been kept in double precision to reduce this effect) for Kenya. Also, the
synthetic countries are the same across the two categories and have the same weights. We however,
note the presence of Bahrain, Iran and Jordan who contribute 4%, 7.1% and 23.9% to the synthetic
Kenya country. These countries export oil and we believe that the difference across panels (a) and
(b) might be explained by the oil exports included in the synthetic Kenya series. The exclusion of
oil shows that Kenya obtains a long-term increase in non-oil exports above synthetic Kenya.
Mauritius in panels (c) and (d) show similar trends in exports. In both panels the impact is
negative for a while after AGOA before Mauritian exports rise above its synthetic counterpart
around 2010. The impact is estimated to be -39.7% and -13.5% for short- and long-run non-oil
exports respectively. We observe lower magnitudes for total exports of -18.5% and -8.3% for the
short- and long-run respectively. The higher exports towards the end of our sample period has
resulted in the lower mean impact relative to the initial impact. Thus, even though Mauritius shows
a negative impact, if it maintains the current trends in exports the long-term impact can turn positive
to provide a positive long-term impact of the AGOA preference.
The final country in the figure is Ghana. The pre-AGOA trends show some overlap although we
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observe a wide swing in exports between 1980 and 1983. This can be explained by the economic
downturn Ghana experienced in the late 1970s that reached its nadir in the early 1980s. In 1983,
the Ghanaian economy adopted a package of reforms—“Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP)”
of the Bretton Woods institutions. These two activities can be seen in the sharp decline—due
to the downturn and the sharp increase—due to the package of reforms to stimulate economic
growth—returning exports back to its initial growth trajectory21. This event occurred almost two
decades prior to the provision of AGOA and we do not expect it to create significant estimation
problems for us. In spite of this, we observe a marginal increase in exports of Ghana above synthetic
Ghana in total exports. However, non-oil exports show that Ghana had lower exports over the entire
post-AGOA period compared to synthetic Ghana. These translate into the -26.5% and -49.4% short-
and long-run impacts of non-oil exports—while total exports show 20.3% and -22.6% gaps in table
(4.17). It must be noted that Ghana’s recent oil find should provide Ghana with some extra push to
raise its exports as well as increase their benefits from oil exports. The current evidence shows that
oil exporters benefit most from AGOA and with the recent oil discovery, Ghana is not the exception
to the rule.
Having discussed the top five AGOA countries we now turn our attention to the bottom
five countries in the next section and conclude the synthetic control approach presented here by
summarising the placebo treatments carried out below.
Bottom five AGOA exporters
The inadequate data (for the predictors, especially GDP) for the entire period and lack of conver-
gence in our estimator leads us to exclude Sao Tome & Principe, Djibouti, and Benin from the
analysis below. We however, had no problems with data and convergence of the estimator for
Burkina Faso, Gambia and Burundi that are among the bottom five AGOA exporters. We include
Sierra Leone which is one of the countries ranked in the middle of the distribution of AGOA
exporters. Doing this provides a perspective of one of the countries not found in either the top or
bottom five AGOA exporters. We do provide evidence for some of the remaining AGOA exporters
in the appendix for the interested reader.
All four cases, show a negative impact of the AGOA preference. Sierra Leone which is outside
the bottom five countries does have extended periods of time where their exports match their
synthetic counterparts. In terms of non-oil exports the short- and long-run gaps for Sierra Leone
are -66.1% and -44.8% respectively. The initial impact is higher in magnitude than the long-term
impact. In terms of total exports we find lower magnitudes of the impact. The short-term impact
falls to -58.6% while the long-term impact is now -38.1%. A comparison of the impact here with
those of the top five shows that the magnitude of the impact (in the case where exports are lower
than the synthetic country) is larger.
As can be observed in the figure all the bottom five countries shown received their preferences
much later than the original date of 2000 for the majority of the AGOA countries. The three bottom
five countries, Burkina Faso, Burundi and Gambia do have their total and non-oil exports below
their synthetic counterparts throughout the post-AGOA period. The gaps shown are relatively large
21See for example Ewusi (1987); Gyimah-Boadi (1990); Killick (2000); Loxley (1988) and related chapters in
Aryeetey et al. (2000) on this issue.
120
and in table (4.17) are among the largest gaps recorded. The short-run impacts are -94.9%, -97.1%
and -87.8% for Burkina Faso, Burundi and Gambia. The long-run impacts are -97.1%, -89% and
-95.6% for the three countries. Similar gaps can be observed for total exports—(-)93%, -96.8%
and -87.8% for Burkina Faso, Burundi and Gambia in the short-run. The long-run impacts are
also -95.4%, -82.9% and -95.4% for the three countries. The three countries are least developed
countries (LDC) based on the UN LDC criteria22. Their performance is therefore not surprising.
In summary, we find that the selected bottom five countries had a high negative impact of
AGOA. Their shortfalls with respect to their synthetic counterparts is almost twice that of the
least performing top five country. Furthermore, their impact is relatively worse than Sierra Leone
(ranked in the middle). Despite providing a better performance than the bottom five countries,
Sierra Leone’s impact is larger in magnitude compared to the top five countries—although it is less
than twice the worst performing top five country. We find that the ranking of the countries pretty
much captures how well the countries have adjusted their exports to take advantage of the AGOA
preference.
Placebo Tests
Following Abadie et al. (2010, 2012) and Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) we conduct a series
of placebo studies as a check on our results. Abadie et al. (2012) note that, the use of placebo
studies can aid in evaluating the credibility of the synthetic control results. In our case, we use
placebos where the provision of AGOA is reassigned to a different time period—1988. A second
set of placebo studies reassigns the treatment to one of the countries in the control pool. We drop
all treated countries and systematically reassign the treatment to each control country until we
have covered all control countries in the pool. Each control country provided the treatment is then
compared to the remaining control countries in the pool—and these countries are the ones selected
to form its synthetic counterpart. We then plot the distribution of these plots and superimpose our
initial synthetic results on the graph (these are the graphs that appear like a tangled web below).
Abadie et al.’s (2010) discussion of the placebo studies suggests that if the placebos have
export gaps similar to the original synthetic analysis, then the analysis does not provide adequate
evidence of the impact of the AGOA preference. When the gaps in the placebo studies are smaller
in magnitude to the synthetic control studies then we can conclude that, the impact of AGOA
for those cases are significant evidence of the impact—the interpretation here relates to figures
(4.11)–(4.13). A similar interpretation in terms of our placebos designed based on changing the
year AGOA was provided holds (see figures 4.8–4.10). A large placebo estimate in this case lowers
our confidence that the estimated impact shown in figures (4.5)–(4.7) actually provides the impact
of AGOA. The estimation in this case is done in each case with treatment reassigned to 1988. The
same predictors are used in both sets of placebos. We now summarise the results of the placebo
studies next.
In figure (4.8), Angola and Gabon exhibit gaps that are smaller than the gaps shown in figure
(4.7). This implies that, the placebo treatment does not show an impact of AGOA larger than
the earlier figure. The placebo estimate thus, raises our confidence about the impact shown in
22Angola and Sierra Leone are also classified as LDCs. However, Angola’s oil resources has placed the country
among the largest AGOA exporters.
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the previous figure. Earlier we had been sceptical about the results for Nigeria and South Africa.
Our placebo estimates for these two countries are similar to the estimates in the earlier graph. In
particular, the South African trends are no different from the previous estimation, although Nigeria
shows slightly different results between 1988 and 2003 for total exports. The Republic of Congo
also shows similar trends and no larger impact for total exports. However, there is a difference in
the placebo estimate compared to the previous graph for non-oil exports. The placebo estimates
in this case do not show unusually large impacts compared to the previous graphs and this raises
our confidence in the previous estimates. In a few cases such as South Africa, Nigeria and Congo
it may be argued that a slightly different interpretation may result depending on the researcher
assessing the graphs—mainly due to the subjective interpretation of the graphs. We do not expect
this to be much of a problem given that these noticeable differences are not large enough to lead to
us changing our confidence about the earlier estimates.
In the next figure (figure [4.9]), we find similar results as above. The gaps shown are not
large enough to change our confidence about the earlier results. In particular, Kenyan non-oil
exports show a negative impact—this should not be cause for worry. We would however, be
cautious about the placebo estimate for total exports for Mauritius. Finally figure (4.10) also
shows relatively smaller magnitudes of the impact in 1988. Burkina Faso and Sierra Leone show
no evident differences in 1988 while Gambia and Burundi show differences that are smaller in
magnitude compared to the previous estimates in figure (4.7). We are therefore satisfied that in the
majority of cases our placebo treatment does not nullify our earlier SCM results. Although, we
would be cautious about total exports for Mauritius—given the magnitude of the gaps as well as
the deviation from zero observed for Mauritius. South Africa is the other case where caution in
interpreting the impact is required. As explained earlier, the end of apartheid in the 1990–1993
period has reduced the predictive power of our SCM in this case—the pre-AGOA series no longer
overlap after the event and remain apart for the rest of the sample period. This is unlike the Ghana
case where the series returns to its initial trend and the synthetic Ghana and Ghana series overlap
once more. Moreover, the earlier period of the shock in Ghana’s case occurs much earlier in the
series compared to South Africa. We are therefore not worried about reducing the predictive power
of the SCM in the case of Ghana.
Our final set of graphs showing the distribution of placebo country gaps is presented in figures
(4.11)–(4.13). In this case we do not plot the trend in exports but the difference in exports between
the treated country and its synthetic country—that is, the export gaps. Angola and Congo show a
positive gap for total exports larger than the remaining placebo countries. This raises our confidence
about the synthetic results presented above. In terms of non-oil exports these two countries lie
within the distribution of placebo gaps. The remaining countries, that is, Gabon, Nigeria and South
Africa also have their export gaps lying within the placebo distribution of export gaps. Although,
these graphs show us that the placebo gaps are larger than the resulting synthetic estimates for
Nigeria, Congo and South Africa. We note that, there is the possibility that economic conditions
and other events in the placebo countries could lead to such magnitude of gaps in the figure. The
larger magnitude of the placebo gaps compared to the treated country gaps is a cause for concern. It
may imply that our earlier synthetic results are not well determined and may have a low predictive
power. However, we note that, the gaps of the treated countries are quite small and that even though
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the placebo countries display relatively larger gaps in magnitude—this may not be a serious issue.
The gaps for the treated countries were smaller in magnitude and almost close to zero indicating
that any impact observed was small in magnitude. In such a case, we believe this magnitude of the
gap might be realistic. Compared to the case of Angola and Congo where we observe relatively
large gaps. If we had observed placebo gaps twice the magnitude of the estimated gaps—this would
have led to the conclusion that the estimated exports gaps showing the AGOA impact were not
significant.
In figure (4.12) we carry out a similar exercise. The results are qualitatively similar to those
above. We find that in all three countries (Ghana, Kenya and Mauritius) the treated export gaps
lie within the distribution of placebo export gaps. In a few cases this distinction is marginal—for
instance, panels (a) (d) and (f) have segments where the treated export gap lies almost on the
outermost placebo export gap. Again, this should lead to concerns about the impact. However,
as suggested above the difference in magnitude in a number of cases are within reasonable limits
allowing us to have some faith in our earlier synthetic control results.
The final figure (figure (4.13) provides the results for the remaining treated countries—that
is, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Gambia and Sierra Leone. With the exception of Sierra Leone the
remaining countries have export gaps larger in magnitude than the placebo countries. Although
Sierra Leone has parts lying within the distribution of placebo plots, we find that in the early years
after AGOA, the magnitude in the gaps seem to be smaller.
In interpreting the results of the placebos and the synthetic control estimates above we note
that if there is a poor fit in the years prior to the intervention then the post-intervention gap could
be a result of a poor fit and not as a result of AGOA (see, Abadie et al., 2010). There are a few
cases where the pre-intervention gaps are off the zero horizontal line shown in the figures. Some of
these cases include, Burkina Faso, Burundi and Gambia. The placebo studies are indicating that
it is likely that the intervention we observe is due to a poor fit of our data rather than the AGOA
impact. This is one likely interpretation of the results for these countries. Another issue of note is
that, we need to ignore placebo export gaps that are not close to zero in the pre-intervention period.
Thus, in all the panels shown for our three figures, a visual inspection shows that excluding those
countries with a poor pre-AGOA fit does get rid of placebo gaps with large post-AGOA gaps.
In the placebo exercises, one way we tried to exclude countries with a poor pre-AGOA fit was
by dropping all countries that had a root mean square prediction error (RMSPE) value twice as large
as the treated country RMSPE. Doing this leads to varying numbers of countries being dropped
from the figures shown. As many as 26 countries were excluded in panel (g) of figure (4.11). For
the countries in figures (4.12)–(4.13) fewer placebo countries were dropped—in some cases just
one country. In the appendix we show the cases where all 38 control placebo countries are included
in the diagram. Even though we perform this exercise to exclude poor fitting placebo countries
we are unable to exclude most of them. To do that we would need to exclude countries that have
marginally higher RMSPEs and this would result in almost all the placebo countries being excluded
from the diagram. Despite our convictions about the poor fit of the three countries, the remaining
countries do show a much better fit even though there is no perfect overlap with the zero horizontal
line in the figures for the treated countries. The improvement in the fit of these countries suggests
that the observed impact of the preference is not the result of a poor fit of our model.
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Table 4.17: Gap between treated and synthetic country: a year after AGOA and the mean over the
AGOA period
Country One year after AGOA Mean Post-AGOA
Non-oil exports
Angola 257.18 110.77
Burkina Faso -94.87 -97.14
Burundi -97.12 -89.03
Congo, Rep. -43.41 -49.16
Gabon -48.04 -7.17
Gambia, The -87.82 -95.63
Ghana -26.51 -49.41
Kenya -12.34 28.3
Mauritius -39.71 -13.53
Nigeria -38.2 -10.63
Sierra Leone -66.12 -44.78
South Africa -48.19 -42.45
Total (including oil) exports
Angola 64.76 198.65
Burkina Faso -93.06 -95.4
Burundi -96.77 -82.87
Congo, Rep. -41.2 534.66
Gabon -4.27 -2.41
Gambia, The -87.81 -95.35
Ghana 20.3 -22.6
Kenya -49.39 -43.3
Mauritius -18.45 -8.29
Nigeria 7.97 1.71
Sierra Leone -58.63 -38.1
South Africa -22.25 -30.53
The growth rates in the table are calculated as the exponential of the log difference (between
the treated and synthetic country) minus 1 (for example, in Angola’s case, this is: exp[Angola
exports (in logs) - Synthetic Angola exports (in logs)]-1)—since the export values are in logs
this transformation approximates growth rate—the rate at which the treated country is higher or
below the synthetic country. The rates calculated are then averaged over the entire post-AGOA
period for each country taking into account when they received their preferential status (see the
last column). The short-term values in the second column is the year immediately after they
received their AGOA status—this is not an average but considers values for that particular year.
Angola (December 2003, 2004 used in the analysis), Sierra Leone (October 2002), Gambia
(December 2002, 2003 used in analysis), Burkina Faso (December 2004, 2005 used in analysis)
and Burundi (January 2006). All remaining countries received their AGOA status on October
2000.
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The top five countries shown above are based on mean exports of total exports (including oil) for the period 2000 – 2012
Figure 4.5: Trends in exports: treated versus synthetic, for top five exporters (based on total exports)
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The top five countries shown above are based on mean exports of total exports (including oil) for the period 2000 – 2012
Figure 4.8: Trends in exports: treated versus synthetic, 1988 placebo treatment
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Placebo countries are chosen based on RMSPEs less than twice the RMSPE of the treated country. RMSPE is the
root mean squared prediction error. The thick blue line should be the outermost line plot for us to have confidence in
the SCM estimate.
Figure 4.11: Export gaps between treated and placebos countries
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4.4 General observations and Conclusion
The matching estimators of sections (4.3.1 & 4.3.2) have provided us with a counter-factual to
measure the impact of AGOA on the exports of the beneficiary countries. The results of the
matching analysis shows a negative impact of AGOA. Further analysis reveals that product clusters
such as TALF, AMDS, OI and CPR are negative and significant in a number of tables. We would
have expected a positive estimate for our TALF exports. Our explanation of the negative estimate is
that, the product cluster includes products outside the apparel and textile cluster—these include
leather and footwear exports. These additional products included in this cluster are not key exports
of the AGOA countries and they contribute to the negative estimate observed in the table. For a
summary of the tariffs based on the clusters and the key products see tables (C.17)–(C.19) in the
appendix. The simple average MFN tariff for the TALF cluster is 8.5% with a maximum tariff at
the tariff line level of 37.5%. The simple average MFN tariffs for apparel and textiles is 10.4%
and 8.0% (with a maximum tariff at the tariff line of 28.6% and 20.8%) respectively. We believe
the inclusion of leather and footwear products with higher average (and maximum) tariffs have
reduced the exports for the TALF cluster. In terms of the AGOA preferential tariffs, apparel and
textile products have more generous rules of origin and with key tariff line products having zero or
very low tariffs. This is an added advantage for AGOA countries exporting under the special textile
regime of AGOA. A similar observation can be made for the EI cluster—the simple average AGOA
tariff is 1.3% but 0.3% for fuel products. The simple average MFN tariff is also 2.1% for the EI
cluster and lower at 0.5% for fuel products.
For the remaining significant product clusters a similar observation can be made. AMDS,
OI and CPR clusters again are not key sectors of the AGOA countries. Besides, the countries
exporting these products are seen to export relatively low values compared to the control countries
in the sample. This is then translated into the negative estimates observed. The extractive industry
cluster includes other non-oil products such as salts, ores, ceramic products, stone, plaster, cement,
glass, glassware, metals and precious stones which have crowded-out the effects of oil exports
within the cluster. This crowding-out effect might be responsible for the non-significance of the
cluster. We however, note that, this cluster remains positive even though it is statistically not
significant. One product cluster, ISOM returned a positive estimate in table (4.11)—in this table,
our treated countries are fewer and include only the consistent AGOA countries that have been
provided with the EBA preference by the EU. This may be one reason we can attribute to the
positive coefficient—in this case, given the composition of the treated countries we observe a lower
crowding-out effect for this product cluster23.
Returning to total exports to the USA on a few occasions we obtain a negative coefficient
indicating that the impact of AGOA for our treated countries has been negative. In other words,
AGOA has been unable to raise their exports compared to the counter-factual. This effect is present
in a few tables. Again, the crowding-out effect is working at the country level to reduce the impact of
AGOA. Similarly, the results for the difference-in-difference estimator yields a significant estimate
for the difference in exports between 2002 and 1997 in almost all tables. The result signifies that,
there has been a lower increase in exports over the period relative to the counter-factual. In spite of
the signs of our estimates, we note that there is a good level of consistency in the estimates across
23Table (C.7) in the appendix provides the descriptions of the HS product list mentioned in this chapter and the next.
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the various matching estimators and the exact matching estimates in the robustness section. The
consistency across the various configurations of our algorithms and choice of covariates in the
exact matching section increases our confidence in the ability of our estimates to provide the causal
impact of AGOA. As in any economic analysis we are cautious in referring to our estimates as
causal but intend to use them to show the direction and significance of the impact. Furthermore,
they provide us with an initial estimate that can serve as a benchmark in future studies analysing
the causal impact of AGOA.
Our caution about our matching estimates is due to minor pitfalls in the analysis. We acknow-
ledge that the matching framework passed many of the tests of covariate balance and overlap of
our treated and control countries. Other tests conducted also support the quality of the matches.
However, we consider the definition of our treated countries to be part of the problem. For instance,
our matching estimator is based on averaging post-AGOA outcomes over the 2001–2010 period
and across countries. This averaging of the outcomes has yielded the crowding out effects we find
in our estimator at the aggregate level. A similar problem is introduced at the product cluster level
where our product clusters include sectors that are not key exports of the AGOA countries thereby
watering down any strong impacts at the product level. We note that this is essentially not a serious
problem for the analysis. In fact it is possible to try various configurations of our product categories
to see whether the results would change. Our attempt at this is the exclusion of oil exports from
total exports to the USA which is performed in the previous section. Excluding oil exports we find
that the majority of AGOA countries do not show a positive impact of AGOA.
However, the inclusion of oil in exports shows up in a positive impact of AGOA for majority of
the oil exporting AGOA countries. Another minor pitfall, is that, within the 2001–2010 period we
have a number of countries such as Angola, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Burkina Faso and Togo who
received their AGOA status between 2002 and 2008. We did not make this distinction explicitly in
the calculation of the average post-AGOA outcomes. Our definition of the various sets of treated
countries, was an attempt at making this distinction and incorporating the subtle differences in the
year AGOA was granted. The results largely show very little differences across the treated groups
and this leads us to believe that any errors introduced as a result has had a very limited effect on our
estimates. In this manner given the above definitions, one could think of our estimates as intention
to treat estimates rather than an average treatment effect. This way we can rationalise including the
other periods in the analysis. Thus, what we have shown is that, SSA countries that were initially
pencilled down for the AGOA preference (including those that did not immediately take up
the preference or satisfy the criteria to attain AGOA status) have exported less to the USA
compared to the counter-factual countries. In the evaluation literature this can be considered the
impact of the preference given that AGOA is exogenous. Thus, the exports of the AGOA countries
have not increased above that of the counter-factual countries as a result of the AGOA policy.
As a result of the pitfalls mentioned in the previous paragraph, we adopted a synthetic control
method (SCM) to address any shortcomings of the matching exercise. The advantage of the SCM
is that it allows us to observe the time series of exports compared to the counter-factual country.
Moreover, the SCM is a comparative case study approach which allows us to compare each treated
country to a counter-factual country that is constructed such that its exports before AGOA are
similar if not the same as the treated country chosen. This provides a convenient way of observing
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how well the treated and counter-factual countries are similar prior to the provision of AGOA. We
draw upon graphical tools to show the gap between the series of the treated and synthetic country
at the time of the AGOA provision. The gap observed between the treated and synthetic country,
then becomes the impact of the preference. One is able to observe the immediate and the long-term
impact of the preference. In our SCM exercise on our selected top and bottom five countries we
find that Angola, Nigeria and Congo show positive impacts of AGOA on their total exports. While
Angola and Kenya are seen to have a positive impact on non-oil exports. All the remaining countries
show negative impacts of the preference.
In conclusion, this chapter has provided empirical estimates of the impact of AGOA. Our
results show that few exporters tend to benefit from the preference—these tend to be the oil
exporting AGOA countries. Nonetheless, the top five largest exporters export more than 10 times
the remaining countries. This large disparity among the AGOA countries leads us to pursue a
quantile regression analysis in the next chapter to tease out the differences in the impact at the
various percentiles of the distribution of exports to the USA.
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Chapter 5
Is there a heterogeneous impact on
exports to the USA?
5.1 Introduction
The current chapter attempts to fit within the body of literature discussed in chapter (2) by analysing
the impact of AGOA on exports of recipient countries to the USA. We depart from the previous
two empirical chapters, by defining a counter-factual set of countries for the preference recipients
and applying a quantile regression analysis to the matched set of countries. This chapter is not
based on obtaining matching estimates of the treatment effect, but an estimation of the treatment
effect given a set of matched countries. We carry out the analysis by first, matching countries
receiving the AGOA preferences to a set of countries having similar characteristics but are not
AGOA beneficiaries1. Quantile regressions are then applied to the matched sample of countries.
For comparison, the analysis is also performed using the non-matched sample.
The quantile framework allows us to study whether the impact of AGOA has had a heterogen-
eous impact on the recipients. In other words, when we consider the export distribution of the
recipients and compare this distribution to that of the control countries, do we observe the impact
at the tails of the distribution rather than having a considerable difference in the middle of the
distribution. The quantile regression enables us resolve questions concerning the entire distribution
of exports for our sample of countries. Matching the countries reduces the heterogeneity of the
sample of countries although the sample remaining does not become fully homogeneous. Removing
some of the heterogeneity and using the restricted sample, thus allows a cleaner estimate of the
impact of the preference at the various quantiles. This might explain the large variation in the
impact of AGOA that is reported within the literature.
The chapter seeks to answer the following questions, (a) have the exports of AGOA recipients
to destinations other than the USA suffered as a result of the AGOA preference? (b) Are there any
differences in the impact across the various percentiles (or quantiles) of the export distribution? (c)
1These characteristics include area of country, gross domestic product, population, whether landlocked, English or
Spanish speaking, distance to the USA, religion, per capita gross domestic product, savings per gross national income,
corruption, regulatory quality, voice & accountability, agricultural land area (% of total land area) and World Bank
income classification (low/lower middle/upper middle income classification). Thus, based on the same set of covariates
in chapter (4). See section (4.2.1) in chapter 4 for more details on the propensity score matching framework. The idea in
this chapter, is to have similar countries in the regression. We therefore use the matched countries constructed based on
the propensity score in chapter 4. In the appendix and in the robustness section below we no longer use the matched
countries from chapter 4.
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what factors explain the “raw” gap between exports of AGOA and non-AGOA recipients? and (d)
is the quantile impact affected by the choice of countries used as the counter-factual? and (e) is the
AGOA impact present only in apparel/textile and crude oil (and oil product) exporting countries.
The first of these questions is answered by considering the ratio of exports to the USA to exports
to the EU and rest of the world (ROW) respectively. A positive estimate would imply an increase
in exports relative to the other destination when compared to the control group of countries. The
second question is answered by statistically testing whether there are any significant differences
among the parameters estimated for each quantile. A quantile decomposition analysis would
through further light on the gap between the exports of the treated and the control countries—thus
providing an answer to the third question. The fourth question is answered by comparing the
magnitude and significance of the quantile estimates across the two samples—that is, the matched
sample and the larger sample having all countries in our dataset. The final question is based on
estimating separate quantile regressions for each product group and checking which products have
positive coefficient estimates. In addition, to answering the questions above, the chapter would
provide additional robustness analysis to show whether excluding certain products (such as the
extractive industry and agricultural products among others) affect the impact of AGOA on the
treated countries.
The contribution of this chapter is therefore the adoption of a quantile analysis to show the
heterogeneity in the impact of AGOA on exports of recipients compared to other non-recipient
countries across the export distribution. Secondly, a decomposition of the impact is done to show
the price and output effects of the preference. These two analyses are the main contributions and
novel aspects of the current chapter. A final contribution is the notion that, having all countries
included in the regression as comparator countries overstates the impact. On the other hand, using
a subset of countries that are more similar to the AGOA recipients reduces the impact of AGOA on
the exports of recipients to the various destinations.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows Section 5.2, provides descriptive and graphical
evidence provided by the data on both recipients and non-recipients. Section 5.3, presents the
econometric approach adopted in this chapter. Section 5.4, discusses the results. Finally, Section
5.5 concludes.
5.2 Data and descriptive evidence
5.2.1 Data
Data is obtained from several sources. Data for the outcomes are obtained from the UN-Comtrade
database and the United States International Trade Commission (USITC)2. The World Development
Indicators and IMF’s International Financial Statistics databases provide macroeconomic indicators
(such as, gross domestic product, inflation, population, value-added (in industry, manufacturing,
agriculture, construction, services, etc), interest rates, exchange rates among others) for the purposes
of matching similar countries. Additionally, Kaufmann’s Global Governance3, Database of Political
2dataweb.usitc.gov/
3www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/
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Institutions4, Polity IV and Bates et al (2005)5 databases provide political, cultural and religious
data to augment the vector of control variables needed to perform a realistic match. Finally, gravity
type variables are obtained from the CEPII gravity database 6.
The cross-section dataset consists of 42 treated and 122 control countries. The number of
control countries available in the panel of 10 (2001–2010) years reduces to 68 countries due to
missing data on our covariates for the quantile regressions. The full set of control countries include
developing countries in Asia, Central and South America, the Caribbean and North Africa. After
matching, the number of control countries remaining declines to 34 countries—giving us a total of
76 countries for the matched sample. The full sample including matched countries is 164 and 106
countries for the cross-section and panel data analysis respectively. This set of countries is largely
based on the countries for which a full set of data on all variables used in the analysis exists. Table
(C.5) in appendix (C) shows the number of treated and control countries falling within each block
of the propensity score as well as the overall number of treated and control countries matched.
To motivate the choice of the quantile regression discussed in section (5.3.1), we show the
distribution of exports to the USA, EU and ROW. The kernel density estimates in figure (5.1) shows
the differences in the distribution of exports for AGOA, non-AGOA and Caribbean Basin Trade
Protection (CBTPA)7 exporters. The CBTPA exporters are shown separately since they have similar
tariff preferences as the AGOA recipients. Thus, in the analysis of the impact of AGOA on the
treated countries, they are excluded from the control group of countries to allow the impact of the
AGOA preference on the African countries to be identified at the estimated quantiles of interest.
Figure (5.2) provides the quantile plots for the outcome variables for AGOA and non-AGOA
countries. The diagonal solid line is a reference line indicating points of symmetry for a distribution.
Given that, in all the graphs, the points of the outcome variable lie off the reference line, it can be
concluded that the distributions are heavily skewed. The non-AGOA outcomes are skewed to the
left. It is the non-symmetrical nature and skew present in the export data that motivates the quantile
regression adopted in this chapter as the average impact is likely to be driven by the countries in the
top quantile.
5.3 Econometric approach
5.3.1 Quantile regression framework
In applying our regression analysis, we use the quantile regression estimator of Koenker and Bassett
(1978). The decision to incorporate the quantile framework is to capture any differences that might
occur at the various percentiles8 of the export distribution. Secondly, ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression is sensitive to outliers and these can influence the results. The median regression on the
4Thorsten Beck, George Clarke, Alberto Groff, Philip Keefer, and Patrick Walsh, 2001. “New tools in comparative
political economy: The Database of Political Institutions.” 15:1, 165-176 (September), World Bank Economic Review.
5Robert Bates ; Karen Feree; James Habyarimana; Macartan Humphreys ; Smita Singh, “Other Political Data
(updated 2005)”, http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/14977 UNF:5:XzsUmjt4AZzpm9JB3hO6pA== Murray Research Archive
[Distributor] V1 [Version]
6http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/gravity.asp
7These are mainly countries in the Caribbean Basin region. We also exclude Central American countries, Dominican
Republic and Mexico since they have a free trade agreement with the USA.
8we use quantiles and percentiles interchangeably in this chapter to refer to various points on the distribution of
export values.
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Figure 5.1: Kernel Density estimates of exports, by preference
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Figure 5.2: Quantiles plots of exports: AGOA and Non-AGOA countries
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other hand is less sensitive to outliers (see for instance Cameron and Trivedi, 2005; Wooldridge,
2002). Thus, using the quantile regression is useful in the presence of outliers. For instance,
Nigeria, Angola, South Africa, Congo (Rep) and Chad during the period 2001 – 2010 had exports
above the mean level of exports in each year. Chad (in 2008), Congo (Rep) (2006–2010) and
Gabon (2001–2005) have also had exports greater than the mean level of exports for the periods
specified in brackets. To provide an idea of how large these are, we note that, Nigeria, Angola and
South Africa were 3.32, 1.12 and 0.79 standard deviation units above the mean on average for the
ten year period. More specifically, the values are 4.40, 1.47, 0.86, and 0.11 for Nigeria, Angola,
South Africa and Congo (Rep) in 2010 respectively. All remaining countries for that year were
0.06–0.41 standard deviation units below the mean. This seems to be the pattern in all years with
two exceptions. In 2001–2005, Gabon was the fourth highest overall exporter with their exports
above the mean level of exports. They are replaced by Congo (Rep) from 2006 as the fourth highest
AGOA exporter. Secondly, in 2008, Chad becomes the fifth highest exporter with exports larger
than the mean level of exports of all AGOA beneficiaries. In these two cases, the standard deviation
units are positive but less than one. Nigeria and Angola in particular are outliers and thus in a mean
regression (OLS) they might influence the estimated impact. This requires us to use methods that
are less sensitive to influencing the estimated impact—hence, the choice of a quantile regression
approach. Estimating the impacts at the median and other quantiles reduces the influence of outliers
in driving our estimated results. Besides, if treatment is heterogeneous then estimating the effect for
various percentiles of the distribution is helpful in sorting out these issues. Thus, one can estimate
the effects at the 25th percentile and also at the 75th percentile to show if there are any significant
differences in the tails of the distribution. For the purposes of this paper, the 25th, 50th, 75th and
95th percentiles are estimated.
We have cross-sectional and panel data available for the quantile regression analysis. The
cross-section data poses no serious challenges for estimation and it is based on Koenker and
Bassett (1978) and Koenker and Hallock (2001). However, our panel data poses some challenges
for estimation and is discussed next. Several issues have been raised and researched into with
regards to quantile regressions for panel data (some of these studies include but are not limited to,
Abrevaya and Dahl, 2008; Canay, 2011; Firpo et al., 2009; Geraci and Bottai, 2007; Koenker, 2005;
Powell, 2011; Rosen, 2012; Wooldridge, 2002). Given the following panel specification, there is
the problem of how to treat ci which is the unobserved country effect.
Qτ (yit|xit) = xitθ0 + ci + uit.
Where Qτ (uit|xit) = 0, i and t subscripts represent country and time, ci is the unobserved country
effect, xit is the explanatory variable, Qτ is the specific quantile estimated and uit is an error term.
The problem of incidental parameters appears if the fixed effects are estimated (Koenker, 2005;
Wooldridge, 2002). This is particularly serious when there are a large number of fixed effects
due to a large number of countries or units—leading to parameters being inconsistently estimated
(Koenker, 2005; Wooldridge, 2002). The literature suggests the following approaches around the
problem. One way, is by using the Chamberlain/Mundlak correlated random effects approach.
This helps in reducing the problem of estimating several fixed effects. The unobserved effects are
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estimated in terms of the averages of the time varying explanatory variables.
ci = ψ0 + x¯iξ0 + ai; yit = ψ0 + xitθ + x¯iξ0 + υit
where υit = ai + uit is the composite error term. A variation of this approach is presented by
Abrevaya and Dahl (2008) for two time periods.
In the Chamberlain/Mundlak approach, we need to impose an independence assumption that
is, vit is independent of the x’s. This requires strong independence assumptions to identify the
parameters of interest (Wooldridge, 2002). Which Wooldridge (2002) notes that, it implies parallel
quantile functions. Two other approaches discussed by Wooldridge (2002) include estimations
using time demeaned data y¨it = x¨itθ0 + u¨it. A pooled quantile regression can also be estimated
on differenced data, that is ∆yit = ∆xitθ0 + ∆uit. The differenced data removes the unobserved
component ci just as the time-demeaned regression does. Doing this allows the regression to be
estimated without having to worry about the fixed effects and the problems of incidental parameters
that it gives rise to (Wooldridge, 2002).
A fourth approach, is the penalized fixed effects estimator9 of Koenker (2004, 2005) which
attempts at resolving the issue with panel data by adding an additional parameter in the regression
that serves as a penalty by reducing the parameter estimates. In the Koenker approach the fixed
effects are estimated, however, the inconsistency they add to the parameter estimates are offset by
the penalty parameter incorporated in the regression. We however, adopt the Chamberlain/Mundlak
correlated RE framework advocated in Wooldridge (2002) for our analysis (in the appendix, table
[D.41]), we show the penalized fixed effect, Mundlak and ordinary fixed effect estimates for
comparative purposes). The main reason for adopting the Mundlak approach is that, the coefficients
lie within the parameter estimates of the penalized and ordinary fixed effect models. Nonetheless,
we feel confident in Geraci and Bottai’s (2007) assertion that the random effects quantile regression
provides a lower bias than the penalized estimator hence the choice of the Mundlak random effects
model.
The following two equations are estimated for the cross-section and panel data respectively.
Qτ (yi|xi) = αcsτ + βcsτ AGOAi + xiγcsτ + ξcsτ + it (5.1)
Qτ (yit|xit) = αpτ + βpτAGOAit + xitγpτ + x¯itξpτ + ηt + υit (5.2)
Where υit = ai + εit, Qτ (i|xi) = 0, Qτ (υit|xit) = 0, τ ∈ (0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 0.95) and is
to show that the estimated coefficients are for different quantiles. p and cs are for pooled and
cross-section respectively.
The regressors included in the quantile regression are chosen based on the empirical gravity
regression. Given our inability to incorporate the country-year fixed effects as suggested by Baier
and Bergstrand (2007), we instead include the weighted distance variable which has been used in the
9Lamarche (2010) & Geraci and Bottai (2007) have some monte-carlo evidence on the various estimators (includes,
the penalised quantile regression, feasible quantile regression, fixed effect quantile regression, pooled quantile regression
and quantile random effects). According to Lamarche (2010) penalized methods can be applied to a broader range
of models. Secondly, it does not introduce a bias and reduces the “variability of the fixed effects estimator”. Geraci
and Bottai (2007) on the contrary find that there is a range of penalty values that leads to zero bias in the fixed effects
estimator. Values outside this feasible range do lead to a large bias in the estimated parameters. However, the random
effects quantile regression provides a lower bias than the penalised estimator when the errors are normal.
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gravity literature as a crude way of controlling for the multilateral resistance terms of Anderson and
van Wincoop (2003). Generally, the exclusion of the country-year fixed effects leads to inconsistent
estimates as the multilateral resistance terms have not been accounted for in the gravity regression.
An alternative approach to solve the problem of the multilateral resistance terms has been
suggested by Head et al. (2010) (and also in Head and Mayer (2013)) which requires the dependent
variable of the gravity regression to have a reference exporter and importer country. The method
known as Tetrads requires defining a new dependent variable—a “tetradic” term of the ratio of
exports from country i to n and l to n. The reference exporter is thus applied to the numerator
and the reference importer to the denominator—this is the case for bilateral two-way trade gravity
regressions. Thus the dependent variable becomes,
Xin/Xik
Xln/Xlk
.
Where the subscript “in” indicates exports from country i to n and the reference exporter is l and the
importer is k. Head et al. (2010) and Head and Mayer (2013) suggest that this attenuates the bias of
omitting the country-year fixed effects. Essentially, the procedure can lead to the multilateral terms
cancelling out and thus not requiring the terms to be estimated. In our application here, we only
consider exports in one-direction, that is exports to the USA. Thus, our ratio of exports to the USA
divided by exports to the EU or ROW is useful in approximating the Tetrads approach. Besides,
we note that in all the quantile regressions estimated, year dummies are included which proxy
part of the country-year fixed effects. Nonetheless, we argue that, the inclusion of the Mundlak
terms incorporates elements of the country fixed effects in our regressions and this is helpful in
adjusting for the multilateral resistance terms in the gravity equation. The approach undertaken
here, therefore attenuates the bias of not having fixed effects in our quantile regression due to
the inconsistency that might be introduced as a result of incidental parameters (the fixed effect
estimates are presented in the appendix for comparative purposes).
Equation (5.1) is the first of our structural quantile estimating equations for the cross-section.
The controls include gravity type variables namely, dummies for english, spanish and landlocked,
the logs of distance, area and GDP. Equation (5.2) on the other hand, represents our estimating
equation for the panel data. The same covariates used in equation (5.1) are used in the panel case.
These are then augmented with the means of the time varying covariates for each country i as
well as time effects (ηt) to account for changes in preferences offered and market demand shocks.
Additionally, using the structural quantile estimation allows for a simple test of the equality of the
coefficients across the various quantiles. That is, the null hypothesis βcs0.25 = β
cs
0.50 = β
cs
0.75 = β
cs
0.95
and βp0.25 = β
p
0.50 = β
p
0.75 = β
p
0.95 are tested for the cross-section and panel respectively. A
rejection of the null hypothesis implies that the effects of the preference vary across the various
quantiles estimated and implies that the impact is heterogeneous.
5.4 Results and discussion
The quantile estimation results are presented in this section. There are two sets of results based
on a (a) cross-section and (b) panel dataset of countries. The cross-section result is based on the
means of the variables over the post-AGOA period. The panel results on the other hand, are based
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on each year of data post AGOA. The panel results allow us to control for time as well as the
annual revisions for AGOA. Similar to the previous chapter (chapter 4), the treated groups are
compared (a) All AGOA: all countries that have been provided with the preference over the period
(b) Always AGOA: countries that have remained in the programme since it started (c) In & Out
AGOA: countries that have at least had their preference revoked once (some of these countries have
been accepted back into the programme) and (d) AGOA & EBA: countries having both the AGOA
and EBA preferences. Further tables testing the robustness and sensitivity of the results presented
here are in the appendix (appendix D). The cross-section results are discussed next.
5.4.1 Cross-section results
All tables in this section include the following set of covariates—dummies for English speaking,
Spanish speaking and landlocked countries, natural logs of weighted distance, area and gross
domestic product (GDP). Table (5.1) provides results for total exports to the USA (columns 1 – 4),
the USA to EU export ratio (columns 5 – 8) and the USA to ROW export ratio (last four columns).
The only significant estimate reported in the table is at the 95th quantile for the countries that
have at least had their AGOA status revoked based on the USA to EU export ratio10. The estimate
indicates that at the 95th quantile, the export ratio is 2.2 points lower for the treated countries
relative to the control countries. One explanation for the negative coefficient is that, the in & out
group due to the revocation of their preferences face more uncertainty in terms of their AGOA
preferences. The uncertainty surrounding their AGOA status can have a dampening effect on their
exports to the USA. Majority of these countries for example, Ivory Coast, Congo (DR), Guinea,
Niger, Mali, Guinea Bissau and Eritrea have more consistent exports to the EU. Thus they end up
having a smaller export ratio when compared to the control countries.
The graphs of the quantile estimates can provide useful information on the location and shape
of the quantile distribution thereby providing us with additional information about the differences
between the AGOA and non-AGOA recipients (see for example Hao and Naiman, 2007). Hao and
Naiman (2007) note that a pure location shift is represented by a horizontal line of the quantile
coefficients. They further note that, the scale shifts are indicated by the slope of the quantile
coefficient plot—a positively sloped curve indicates an increase in the scale while a decrease in the
scale is represented by a negatively sloped curve. Identifying the location and shape of the quantile
plot allows inference to be made as to whether the quantile coefficients estimated remain the same
at all quantiles or increase (or decrease) in scale across the estimated quantiles. This is useful in
determining where the impact is largest. The graphs shown in this section, show a combination of
scale and location shifts. We are unable to say anything about the skewness—as the plots provide
very limited information concerning the skewness of the coefficients (Hao and Naiman, 2007). In
most applications, this has to be calculated and formally tested to determine the changes in the skew
10In this chapter non-treated, counter-factual and control countries are used interchangeably. These all refer to the
non-AGOA countries maintained in the analysis. The use of the word average is not referring to the OLS mean estimate
but the reference here is because the data is an average over a 10 year period. The interpretation of the coefficients are
thus at the points of the distribution for which they are estimated. The coefficients are transformed using the exponent of
the coefficient (that is, expβ). In some cases, we express this as a percentage and the calculation is (expβ −1)× 100.
These two definitions are used interchangeably through the text. We indicate percentage changes when the percentage is
negative or if the positive change is not very large. We reserve the first definition for those large changes as shown in this
section and the rest of the chapter.
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of the quantile coefficients. This is however, not important to our analysis and the location and shift
in scale shown are sufficient to provide us the required information to discuss the estimated quantile
coefficients. We therefore focus on the location and scale (or spread) shifts that are observable from
the graphs. The estimated quantile coefficient is shown on the vertical axis while the value of the
specific quantile estimated is shown on the horizontal axis.
Figure (5.3) summarises our quantile estimates for selected estimates in table (5.1). The thick
black solid horizontal line between the two dotted horizontal lines represents the OLS coefficient
estimate. The area between the two horizontal dotted lines represent the OLS 95% confidence
interval. The second solid line represents the quantile estimates. The shaded grey area encompassing
this line is the 95% confidence interval for the quantiles shown on the horizontal axis. As long as
the quantile estimates lie between the lower and upper confidence intervals of the OLS estimate we
can reasonably conclude that, the estimated quantiles are not significantly different from each other.
In the figure, the quantile estimates do not not go beyond the OLS confidence limits and thus at the
95% interval, we are unable to reject any differences in the quantile estimates. This can also be
seen in the two tables below, as most of the estimated coefficients are not significantly different
from zero.
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5.4.2 Product analysis
Tables (5.2) – (5.9) show the results for the eight products introduced in chapter (4). To recap,
these products are: (1) Agriculture, meat and dairy, & seafood (AMDS): HS 1–10, 12–14; (2) Food,
beverages, tobacco, wood, & paper (FBTWP): HS 11, 15–24, 44–48; (3) Extractive industries
(EI): HS 25–27, 68–71 (4) Chemicals, plastics, & rubber (CPR): HS 28–36, 38–40; (5) Textiles,
apparel, leather, & footwear (TALF): HS41–42, 50–65; (6) Iron, steel, and other metals (ISOM):
HS 26, 72–83; (7) Machinery, electronics, & transportation equipment (METE): HS 84–89; (8)
Other industries (OI): HS 37, 43, 49, 66–67, 90–97.
The first four tables present results for the exports to the USA for each treated category while the
final four tables show the results for the USA to EU export ratio. Table (5.2) shows a significant and
negative estimate for textiles, apparel, leather and footwear (TALF) products at the 75th quantile
for the countries in and out of AGOA. The estimate, significant at the 5% level implies that, the
treated countries export 99.7% less exports to the USA relative to the non-AGOA countries in the
sample, on average and ceteris paribus at the 75th quantile. In table (5.3) the reported estimate
for EI is positive and significant at the 1% level for all AGOA countries. The reported estimate is
3.6 which implies that, the treated countries export 37 times what the non treated countries export,
on average and all things equal at the 95th quantile. The EI result is driven by the large AGOA
oil exporters (that is, Nigeria, Angola, Congo Republic and Gabon). Nigeria, Angola and Congo
Republic are among the top five largest AGOA exporters and hence the positive impact observed at
the 95th quantile is largely driven by the oil exports.
Table (5.4) produces a few more significant estimates than the earlier two tables. The chemical,
plastics and rubber (CPR) cluster has three significant estimates at the 1% and 5% levels for the
25th, 50th and 75th quantiles. Other industry (OI) products has one significant estimate at the 5%
level at the 95th quantile. All the four estimates are negative implying that the treated countries
on average export less than the non treated countries. These results are for countries that have
both EBA and AGOA preferences. The competing nature of these two preferences does imply that,
the treated countries export more of the two products to the EU relative to the USA compared to
the non-AGOA countries. All things equal, for CPR products the treated countries export 81.8%,
94.4% and 89.7% less than the non treated countries export to the USA. Also, the treated countries
all things equal, export 89.1% less OI products than the non treated countries export to the USA.
In table (5.5) the always AGOA treated group report significant estimates for CPR products at
the 50th quantile and EI exports at the 95th quantile. The coefficient for CPR products is negative
while for EI products it is positive. The negative estimate of -1.63 at the median implies that
the treated countries have 80.3% less CPR product exports relative to the control countries at the
median. On the contrary, the positive estimate of 3.61 implies that the treated countries export 35.9
times the EI products the control countries export to the USA on average and ceteris paribus at the
95th quantile. This estimate is quite similar to the estimate obtained at the 95th quantile for all the
AGOA countries. An indication that the countries that are unable to consistently maintain their
AGOA status have had a relatively marginal effect on the impact at the top of the distribution.
The next four tables (tables 5.6–5.9) are based on the USA to EU export ratio. Compared
to the previous four tables, they report a few more significant estimates. The definition of the
dependent variable allows a comparison of exports by each country to the USA and to the EU at
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each point of the export distribution. One reason for maintaining the USA to EU export ratio is
because it approximates the Tetrads approach of Head and Mayer (2013); Head et al. (2010). The
interpretation of the coefficients can be similar to the interpretation and inference above. However,
given that the dependent variable is defined as a log ratio we can interpret the resulting parameter
estimate as a triple difference-in-difference estimate. In this case, not only are we comparing
estimates across treated and control categories but also across the EU and USA markets. We use
this latter form in interpreting our results in this section. In effect, the large exporters to the USA
if they are not major exporters to the EU would remain at the top of the distribution while the
small exporters who export a lot more to the EU would remain at the bottom of the distribution.
The distributional quantiles are thus determined by the new dependent variable. In table (5.6),
agriculture, meat, dairy and seafood (AMDS) and CPR products are significant at the 5% level and
negative at the 75th and 95th quantiles for both products for the countries in and out of AGOA. Table
(5.7) indicates significant and negative coefficients for AMDS, FBTWP at the 50th, 75th and 95th
quantiles while CPR is significant at the 75th quantile. Machinery, electronics and transportation
equipment products are also significant and negative at the 50th and 75th quantiles for all AGOA
countries. Table (5.8) reports two negative and significant estimates for AMDS and FBTWP for
countries simultaneously receiving EBA and AGOA preferences.
The final table for the cross-section data shows that countries that always have their AGOA
status, have a negative and significant coefficient for AMDS (50th, 75th and 95th quantiles),
FBTWP (50th and 95th quantiles) and CPR (50th quantile). Based on tables (5.6) to (5.9), we find
AMDS to be significant in all four tables while FBTWP and CPR are significant in three of the
four tables. The negative estimates indicate that the export ratio is lower for the treated countries
relative to the control countries, all things equal. An implication of this negative estimate is that the
treated countries export more of these products to the EU relative to the USA when compared to the
control countries. Another implication of the result is that, the treated countries not having the EBA
preference contribute more exports to the EU relative to the USA compared to the control countries.
In this case, the countries outside the EBA group are beneficiaries of the EU-ACP preferences11.
As expected the AMDS estimates indicate relatively higher exports of agricultural produce to the
EU relative to the USA in comparison to the control countries. A result partly due to the favourable
banana tariff regime under the EU-ACP agreement.
Figures (5.4)–(5.9) provide a graphical summary of the tables below (excluding tables 5.2
& 5.6). Extractive industry export estimates in figures (5.4–5.6) noticeably rise above the upper
confidence limit of the OLS estimator. Additionally, AMDS and FBTWP estimates at the 95th
quantiles lie below the lower confidence limit in figure (5.7). Thus apart from these estimates all
remaining estimates show no statistical difference across the estimated quantiles and lie within the
confidence bounds of the OLS estimate in each case.
11The EU-ACP preferences ended in 2008. Within the EU; Germany, Netherlands, Denmark, Luxembourg and
Belgium were opposed to the banana preferences (Bessko, 1996, 282). Costa Rica, Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua,
Guatemala and Venezuela brought the banana case before the dispute settlement body (DSB) (see www.wto.org). The
USA also joined the complainants to challenge the banana import regime of the EU. As a result of the cases brought before
the WTO, the EU had to end the banana import regime. For a history of the banana dispute during the GATT regime
and under the WTO see http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds27_e.htm.
Bessko (1996); Pelzman (1999); Simi and Kaushik (2008) provide a discussion of the banana dispute.
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Table 5.2: Quantile regression estimates for exports to the USA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
AMDS FBTWP EI CPR TALF ISOM METE OI
q25
In & Out AGOA -0.476 1.099 0.183 1.334 3.251 0.899 1.215 1.150
(1.949) (2.654) (2.134) (2.321) (2.587) (1.649) (1.445) (1.740)
Constant -68.23∗ -44.43 33.88 -43.81 -124.5∗ 11.41 2.252 -22.76
(32.648) (35.607) (28.862) (31.574) (50.830) (36.161) (28.435) (33.457)
q50
In & Out AGOA -0.159 0.853 0.928 -1.282 0.444 0.917 0.494 0.0403
(1.627) (2.316) (1.513) (2.155) (2.980) (2.067) (1.226) (1.155)
Constant -45.11 -30.30 11.83 -39.57 -97.28 -5.761 6.822 -27.66
(27.744) (28.908) (17.946) (24.585) (49.478) (32.370) (27.615) (23.207)
q75
In & Out AGOA -1.404 0.504 -0.111 -1.490 -5.892∗ 0.828 0.630 0.678
(1.380) (2.095) (1.107) (1.403) (2.860) (3.018) (1.338) (0.918)
Constant -39.23 -47.48 15.68 -26.99 -66.75 -30.92 -20.39 -42.69∗
(25.490) (26.782) (15.851) (21.878) (37.897) (36.462) (30.358) (20.721)
q95
In & Out AGOA -1.531 3.482 0.382 -0.257 -4.947 4.764 0.628 1.133
(1.325) (2.146) (1.150) (1.252) (2.567) (4.341) (1.560) (1.731)
Constant -35.91 -35.86 10.42 -31.80 -52.22 -55.07 -48.29 -73.62∗
(25.411) (25.211) (14.387) (23.363) (38.083) (50.858) (30.849) (30.330)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 41 40 39 41 41 40 41 41
Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications in parenthesis. Dependent variables is exports. Quantiles selected are .25, .50 .75 & .95. Controls
include: English, Spanish & landlocked dummies, logs of distance (weighted), area & GDP. ’All’ indicates that all AGOA beneficiaries are included
irrespective of whether they are removed from the programme. ’In & Out’ are countries that are removed from the programme at least once. ’Always’ are
countries that have consistently been recipients from the beginning of the programme (i.e. from 2001/2003). ’EBA & AGOA’ are countries that are both
members of AGOA and EBA and have continuously been beneficiaries. AMDS–Agriculture, meat and dairy, seafood; FBTWP–Food, beverages, tobacco,
wood, paper; EI–Extractive industries; CPR–Chemicals, plastics, rubber; ATLF–Textiles, apparel, leather, footwear; ISOM–Iron, steel, and other metals;
METE–Machinery, electronics, transportation equipment; OI–Other industries. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 5.3: Quantile regression estimates for exports to the USA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
AMDS FBTWP EI CPR TALF ISOM METE OI
q25
All AGOA 0.0421 1.008 -0.172 -0.928 -1.361 -0.649 -0.141 -0.672
(0.760) (1.033) (1.158) (0.860) (1.564) (0.778) (0.698) (0.773)
Constant -36.88∗ -19.48 -24.81 -18.43 -86.26∗ 8.083 19.81 -7.456
(17.233) (17.020) (25.964) (16.940) (41.229) (17.817) (12.643) (16.910)
q50
All AGOA -0.327 -0.302 0.421 -1.491 -0.832 -0.262 -0.892 -0.749
(0.782) (0.720) (1.034) (0.799) (1.494) (0.981) (0.646) (0.603)
Constant -31.96∗ -19.02 2.977 -32.98∗ -47.92∗ -5.042 11.18 -24.27∗
(13.170) (11.264) (20.583) (15.382) (23.806) (24.757) (12.734) (11.652)
q75
All AGOA 0.319 -0.305 1.114 -1.157 -2.843 0.965 -0.811 -0.341
(0.734) (0.863) (1.029) (0.677) (1.785) (1.228) (0.839) (0.630)
Constant -34.71∗ -35.30∗ -2.522 -34.54∗ -64.41∗ -56.10 1.566 -20.63
(13.772) (13.795) (19.207) (16.708) (25.469) (32.156) (14.771) (12.318)
q95
All AGOA -0.954 1.646 3.639∗∗∗ -0.896 -2.170 0.445 -0.182 -0.260
(0.904) (1.191) (0.959) (1.182) (1.848) (1.507) (1.070) (1.094)
Constant -36.54∗ -42.57 -3.798 -38.73 -71.03∗∗ 2.774 -29.99 -27.23
(14.621) (24.204) (22.258) (31.540) (26.698) (35.206) (22.329) (19.083)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 75 72 73 74 75 72 75 75
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Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications in parenthesis. Dependent variables is exports. Quantiles selected are .25, .50 .75 & .95. Controls include:
English, Spanish & landlocked dummies, logs of distance (weighted), area & GDP. ’All’ indicates that all AGOA beneficiaries are included irrespective of
whether they are removed from the programme. ’In & Out’ are countries that are removed from the programme at least once. ’Always’ are countries that have
consistently been recipients from the beginning of the programme (i.e. from 2001/2003). ’EBA & AGOA’ are countries that are both members of AGOA and
EBA and have continuously been beneficiaries. AMDS–Agriculture, meat and dairy, seafood; FBTWP–Food, beverages, tobacco, wood, paper; EI–Extractive
industries; CPR–Chemicals, plastics, rubber; ATLF–Textiles, apparel, leather, footwear; ISOM–Iron, steel, and other metals; METE–Machinery, electronics,
transportation equipment; OI–Other industries. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 5.4: Quantile regression estimates for exports to the USA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
AMDS FBTWP EI CPR TALF ISOM METE OI
q25
EBA & AGOA 0.675 0.347 -1.512 -1.703∗ -0.831 -1.408 -0.997 -0.871
(1.428) (1.151) (1.271) (0.839) (1.977) (1.134) (0.830) (0.947)
Constant -59.41 -26.45 11.20 1.627 -137.7∗ 5.700 1.914 0.119
(29.593) (29.090) (24.445) (20.802) (65.631) (30.637) (27.571) (29.511)
q50
EBA & AGOA 0.158 -0.0459 -1.273 -2.883∗∗ -0.576 -0.252 -1.155 -1.269
(1.025) (0.829) (1.521) (0.914) (1.563) (1.256) (0.819) (0.775)
Constant -33.67 -12.13 2.685 -0.687 -53.22 -29.02 18.73 -7.581
(18.375) (23.119) (25.318) (23.314) (41.843) (32.632) (20.598) (18.045)
q75
EBA & AGOA 0.145 -0.677 0.146 -2.273∗ -1.789 1.835 -0.955 -1.245
(1.017) (0.981) (2.045) (0.979) (2.107) (1.621) (1.103) (0.777)
Constant -34.99 -37.76 7.099 -27.10 -46.96 -54.82 -2.911 -18.85
(17.711) (19.975) (24.779) (20.801) (37.147) (32.945) (25.481) (16.993)
q95
EBA & AGOA -0.870 0.145 2.108 -1.715 -2.111 0.889 -1.285 -2.214∗
(1.472) (1.259) (1.955) (0.943) (2.547) (1.791) (1.454) (1.064)
Constant -41.14 -33.87 -3.669 -40.88 -73.55 -31.52 -24.67 -27.95
(27.174) (19.850) (22.574) (21.782) (45.780) (33.332) (28.851) (23.544)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 50 49 48 50 50 48 50 50
Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications in parenthesis. Dependent variables is exports. Quantiles selected are .25, .50 .75 & .95. Controls
include: English, Spanish & landlocked dummies, logs of distance (weighted), area & GDP. ’All’ indicates that all AGOA beneficiaries are included
irrespective of whether they are removed from the programme. ’In & Out’ are countries that are removed from the programme at least once. ’Always’ are
countries that have consistently been recipients from the beginning of the programme (i.e. from 2001/2003). ’EBA & AGOA’ are countries that are both
members of AGOA and EBA and have continuously been beneficiaries. AMDS–Agriculture, meat and dairy, seafood; FBTWP–Food, beverages, tobacco,
wood, paper; EI–Extractive industries; CPR–Chemicals, plastics, rubber; ATLF–Textiles, apparel, leather, footwear; ISOM–Iron, steel, and other metals;
METE–Machinery, electronics, transportation equipment; OI–Other industries. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 5.5: Quantile regression estimates for exports to the USA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
AMDS FBTWP EI CPR TALF ISOM METE OI
q25
Always in AGOA -0.499 0.483 -0.975 -1.015 -0.820 -1.505 -0.488 -0.786
(0.877) (1.087) (1.480) (0.809) (1.493) (1.089) (0.744) (0.910)
Constant -46.72 -15.97 -11.30 -12.10 -133.0∗ 15.51 1.112 -8.358
(25.572) (22.995) (29.809) (17.306) (56.781) (26.081) (20.704) (23.834)
q50
Always in AGOA -0.794 0.402 0.773 -1.626∗ -0.667 -0.227 -1.238 -0.966
(0.817) (0.776) (1.320) (0.789) (1.246) (1.190) (0.718) (0.738)
Constant -29.11 -25.33 2.934 -31.49 -47.62 -12.00 -6.534 -21.80
(15.834) (16.161) (26.366) (17.781) (39.359) (30.934) (17.820) (13.779)
q75
Always in AGOA -0.328 -0.525 2.144 -1.255 -2.201 0.990 -0.803 -1.050
(0.755) (0.919) (1.361) (0.698) (1.743) (1.346) (0.901) (0.663)
Constant -27.94∗ -33.66 -5.733 -41.14∗ -36.95 -52.19 -3.089 -27.40∗
(13.120) (17.085) (24.476) (15.759) (26.524) (31.104) (21.483) (12.353)
q95
Always in AGOA -0.915 0.191 3.608∗∗∗ -1.272 -3.838 1.741 -1.220 -0.494
(0.975) (0.696) (0.884) (0.711) (2.030) (1.330) (1.179) (0.818)
Constant -36.68∗ -32.27∗ 3.554 -46.69∗∗ -30.26 -40.76 13.08 -27.55
(17.922) (15.035) (19.985) (15.373) (31.674) (29.042) (24.148) (19.743)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 62 61 60 62 62 60 62 62
Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications in parenthesis. Dependent variables is exports. Quantiles selected are .25, .50 .75 & .95. Controls
include: English, Spanish & landlocked dummies, logs of distance (weighted), area & GDP. ’All’ indicates that all AGOA beneficiaries are included
irrespective of whether they are removed from the programme. ’In & Out’ are countries that are removed from the programme at least once. ’Always’ are
countries that have consistently been recipients from the beginning of the programme (i.e. from 2001/2003). ’EBA & AGOA’ are countries that are both
members of AGOA and EBA and have continuously been beneficiaries. AMDS–Agriculture, meat and dairy, seafood; FBTWP–Food, beverages, tobacco,
wood, paper; EI–Extractive industries; CPR–Chemicals, plastics, rubber; ATLF–Textiles, apparel, leather, footwear; ISOM–Iron, steel, and other metals;
METE–Machinery, electronics, transportation equipment; OI–Other industries. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 5.6: Quantile regression: USA/EU export ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
AMDS FBTWP EI CPR TALF ISOM METE OI
q25
In & Out AGOA -1.067 0.387 0.818 1.028 0.571 4.213 -0.296 1.476
(1.348) (1.519) (1.610) (2.058) (1.945) (2.354) (1.275) (1.436)
Constant -39.10 -8.467 -16.93 -54.91 -77.57∗ -51.96 14.06 8.846
(27.789) (20.647) (27.497) (28.279) (32.352) (33.925) (24.845) (27.870)
q50
In & Out AGOA -0.565 -0.428 -1.282 -2.030 -1.828 1.230 0.151 0.134
(1.076) (1.158) (1.405) (1.576) (2.096) (1.759) (0.800) (1.079)
Constant -48.35 2.653 -0.479 -32.43 -39.06 -37.89 12.72 9.083
(25.283) (15.642) (27.529) (18.854) (36.076) (28.763) (20.327) (23.843)
q75
In & Out AGOA -2.385∗ 0.0750 0.281 -2.387∗ -3.491 1.113 0.283 0.244
(1.039) (1.041) (1.541) (1.171) (2.222) (2.017) (0.825) (0.953)
Constant -18.38 -20.78 21.49 -6.377 -4.322 -9.393 -0.597 0.780
(21.181) (17.218) (30.696) (17.405) (40.944) (30.234) (19.270) (20.016)
q95
In & Out AGOA -2.551∗ -0.904 0.562 -3.459∗ -2.907 -1.999 -0.383 1.151
(1.047) (0.997) (1.706) (1.289) (2.362) (2.044) (0.886) (0.993)
Constant -17.81 -35.56 26.27 -9.761 49.73 10.61 -7.887 5.611
(18.553) (20.877) (33.516) (18.922) (49.258) (30.027) (18.086) (19.587)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 41 40 39 41 41 40 41 41
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Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications in parenthesis. Dependent variable is the ratio of exports by country i to the USA to their exports to
the EU. Quantiles selected are .25, .50 .75 & .95. Controls include: English, Spanish & landlocked dummies, logs of distance (weighted), area & GDP.
’All’ indicates that all AGOA beneficiaries are included irrespective of whether they are removed from the programme. ’In & Out’ are countries that are
removed from the programme at least once. ’Always’ are countries that have consistently been recipients from the beginning of the programme (i.e. from
2001/2003). ’EBA & AGOA’ are countries that are both members of AGOA and EBA and have continuously been beneficiaries. AMDS–Agriculture, meat
and dairy, seafood; FBTWP–Food, beverages, tobacco, wood, paper; EI–Extractive industries; CPR–Chemicals, plastics, rubber; ATLF–Textiles, apparel,
leather, footwear; ISOM–Iron, steel, and other metals; METE–Machinery, electronics, transportation equipment; OI–Other industries. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗
p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 5.7: Quantile regression: USA/EU export ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
AMDS FBTWP EI CPR TALF ISOM METE OI
q25
All AGOA -0.721 -0.907 0.205 0.420 -0.534 -0.616 -0.644 -0.853
(0.794) (0.588) (0.601) (1.011) (1.082) (1.106) (0.554) (0.604)
Constant -20.87 -12.10 -22.57 -24.21 -77.62∗∗ -9.642 13.16 4.750
(14.833) (10.571) (12.752) (13.539) (25.414) (24.298) (17.616) (11.214)
q50
All AGOA -1.517∗ -1.422∗∗ -0.780 -0.588 -1.494 -0.497 -1.080∗ -0.824
(0.627) (0.520) (0.686) (0.767) (1.258) (0.690) (0.422) (0.588)
Constant -18.89 -7.266 -11.18 -16.64 -36.12 -11.42 9.363 0.348
(10.338) (8.982) (13.871) (11.594) (19.500) (15.522) (9.269) (10.225)
q75
All AGOA -2.222∗∗∗ -1.362∗∗ -0.299 -1.467∗ -1.682 -0.543 -0.954∗ -0.249
(0.569) (0.484) (0.624) (0.654) (1.601) (0.815) (0.461) (0.485)
Constant -24.46∗ -7.350 38.77 -8.200 -22.06 -14.24 -3.301 0.748
(10.900) (9.612) (25.387) (10.368) (21.384) (19.205) (10.031) (11.763)
q95
All AGOA -2.582∗∗ -2.258∗∗ -0.309 0.421 -1.842 0.147 -0.176 -0.734
(0.821) (0.694) (0.834) (1.099) (1.748) (0.864) (0.548) (0.612)
Constant -8.319 -7.154 48.24 -12.30 -38.37 -4.300 10.82 -5.428
(13.606) (14.809) (30.193) (20.927) (27.284) (19.665) (14.722) (13.599)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 75 72 73 74 75 72 75 75
Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications in parenthesis. Dependent variable is the ratio of exports by country i to the USA to their exports to
the EU. Quantiles selected are .25, .50 .75 & .95. Controls include: English, Spanish & landlocked dummies, logs of distance (weighted), area & GDP.
’All’ indicates that all AGOA beneficiaries are included irrespective of whether they are removed from the programme. ’In & Out’ are countries that are
removed from the programme at least once. ’Always’ are countries that have consistently been recipients from the beginning of the programme (i.e. from
2001/2003). ’EBA & AGOA’ are countries that are both members of AGOA and EBA and have continuously been beneficiaries. AMDS–Agriculture, meat
and dairy, seafood; FBTWP–Food, beverages, tobacco, wood, paper; EI–Extractive industries; CPR–Chemicals, plastics, rubber; ATLF–Textiles, apparel,
leather, footwear; ISOM–Iron, steel, and other metals; METE–Machinery, electronics, transportation equipment; OI–Other industries. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗
p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 5.8: Quantile regression: USA/EU export ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
AMDS FBTWP EI CPR TALF ISOM METE OI
q25
EBA & AGOA -0.263 -1.175 -1.089 -0.355 -0.273 1.045 -0.983 -0.215
(1.257) (0.779) (0.710) (1.082) (1.169) (1.334) (0.912) (0.687)
Constant -26.50 -20.71 -24.64 -13.50 -96.82∗∗ -30.34 5.057 -6.856
(24.647) (18.121) (15.693) (23.170) (34.608) (34.969) (22.222) (18.840)
q50
EBA & AGOA -1.343 -1.541∗ -1.205 -0.754 -0.982 -0.525 -0.859 -0.889
(0.819) (0.741) (0.988) (1.156) (1.326) (0.819) (0.656) (0.527)
Constant -27.89 -12.55 -24.18 -14.09 -27.55 -24.38 3.398 -5.524
(17.960) (13.901) (17.499) (16.235) (31.083) (19.600) (15.297) (13.466)
q75
EBA & AGOA -2.107∗ -0.890 -0.791 -1.593 -1.755 -0.813 -1.193 -0.902
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(0.829) (0.873) (1.032) (1.332) (1.833) (1.130) (0.593) (0.640)
Constant -18.54 -19.81 -24.85 -8.662 -18.78 -8.692 -4.155 2.021
(17.134) (15.125) (18.840) (18.526) (33.217) (22.328) (14.555) (13.106)
q95
EBA & AGOA -2.312 -0.624 1.088 0.572 -0.650 -0.669 -0.695 -0.407
(1.420) (1.733) (1.246) (1.470) (2.378) (1.332) (0.859) (1.167)
Constant -3.841 -27.22 -48.86 -9.601 3.823 -11.41 23.20 5.611
(24.683) (23.311) (30.764) (23.537) (52.120) (23.407) (18.707) (18.435)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 50 49 48 50 50 48 50 50
Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications in parenthesis. Dependent variable is the ratio of exports by country i to the USA to their exports to
the EU. Quantiles selected are .25, .50 .75 & .95. Controls include: English, Spanish & landlocked dummies, logs of distance (weighted), area & GDP.
’All’ indicates that all AGOA beneficiaries are included irrespective of whether they are removed from the programme. ’In & Out’ are countries that are
removed from the programme at least once. ’Always’ are countries that have consistently been recipients from the beginning of the programme (i.e. from
2001/2003). ’EBA & AGOA’ are countries that are both members of AGOA and EBA and have continuously been beneficiaries. AMDS–Agriculture, meat
and dairy, seafood; FBTWP–Food, beverages, tobacco, wood, paper; EI–Extractive industries; CPR–Chemicals, plastics, rubber; ATLF–Textiles, apparel,
leather, footwear; ISOM–Iron, steel, and other metals; METE–Machinery, electronics, transportation equipment; OI–Other industries. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗
p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 5.9: Quantile regression: USA/EU export ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
AMDS FBTWP EI CPR TALF ISOM METE OI
q25
Always in AGOA -1.013 -1.182 -0.835 0.400 -1.216 -0.913 -0.420 -0.505
(0.853) (0.595) (0.504) (0.928) (1.072) (1.228) (0.554) (0.724)
Constant -10.55 -14.73 -13.83 -10.51 -85.93∗ -8.862 -1.018 -6.392
(16.953) (14.344) (14.008) (16.126) (34.115) (30.560) (18.449) (15.183)
q50
Always in AGOA -1.682∗ -1.236∗ -1.071 -0.841 -1.145 -0.624 -0.826 -0.825
(0.663) (0.530) (0.756) (0.852) (1.221) (0.813) (0.522) (0.576)
Constant -18.82 -18.25 -19.77 -10.29 -38.54 -14.95 2.333 -5.757
(12.049) (10.960) (15.427) (12.377) (27.435) (19.708) (13.610) (12.198)
q75
Always in AGOA -2.112∗∗ -1.018 -0.550 -1.543∗ -1.936 -0.585 -0.997 -0.281
(0.671) (0.568) (0.773) (0.757) (1.611) (0.901) (0.613) (0.497)
Constant -13.12 -16.05 -2.442 -6.608 -19.03 -9.388 -10.55 4.567
(11.092) (11.122) (24.535) (11.917) (30.084) (22.422) (14.669) (13.099)
q95
Always in AGOA -2.466∗∗ -2.258∗ 0.473 0.366 -1.582 0.498 -0.176 -0.628
(0.852) (0.888) (0.939) (1.236) (1.805) (0.886) (0.647) (0.613)
Constant -4.413 -7.154 -3.099 -6.355 -28.98 9.993 10.82 2.936
(16.421) (17.649) (28.096) (19.402) (50.427) (24.546) (16.622) (16.326)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 62 61 60 62 62 60 62 62
Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications in parenthesis. Dependent variable is the ratio of exports by country i to the USA to their exports to
the EU. Quantiles selected are .25, .50 .75 & .95. Controls include: English, Spanish & landlocked dummies, logs of distance (weighted), area & GDP.
’All’ indicates that all AGOA beneficiaries are included irrespective of whether they are removed from the programme. ’In & Out’ are countries that are
removed from the programme at least once. ’Always’ are countries that have consistently been recipients from the beginning of the programme (i.e. from
2001/2003). ’EBA & AGOA’ are countries that are both members of AGOA and EBA and have continuously been beneficiaries. AMDS–Agriculture, meat
and dairy, seafood; FBTWP–Food, beverages, tobacco, wood, paper; EI–Extractive industries; CPR–Chemicals, plastics, rubber; ATLF–Textiles, apparel,
leather, footwear; ISOM–Iron, steel, and other metals; METE–Machinery, electronics, transportation equipment; OI–Other industries. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗
p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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5.4.3 Decomposition of the quantile impact
Figures (5.10) and (5.11) show the decompositions carried out according to Machado and Mata
(2005) and Melly (2005). Machado and Mata (2005) have extended the Oaxaca-Blinder decom-
position to quantile regressions12. Machado and Mata (2005) decompose the wage density into
changes due to coefficients, covariates and the residual. These three terms explain the differences in
the wage densities of the two groups identified13. Melly’s (2006) decomposition of the difference
between a treated and untreated group at the θth quantile of the unconditional distribution is given
by:
qˆ1(θ)− qˆ0(θ) = [qˆ1(θ)− qˆc(θ)] + [qˆc(θ)− qˆ0(θ)],
where the qˆ0, qˆ1 are the quantiles estimated for the control and treated groups respectively and
qˆc is the counter-factual quantile distribution. One could think of the counter-factual distribution
of exports as the distribution of exports for the non-AGOA countries had they obtained the same
characteristics (or the same level of covariates) as the AGOA countries given their return to exporting
to the USA. The initial term in brackets provide the effect of coefficients on the gap between the
treated and counter-factual countries. The second term is due to the effect of differences in their
covariates14,15.
To provide a clearer picture of the decomposition method, we note that, the covariates are the
explanatory (or independent or characteristics) variables in the relationship. The coefficient is the
coefficient reported on the AGOA dummy—this tells us the how different exports are between the
two groups. The decomposition then makes a comparison between the two groups (AGOA versus
non-AGOA) to determine where the differences originate from. In other words, are the differences
we observe between the AGOA and non-AGOA countries a result of the differences in the coefficient
on the dummy variable or a result of the differences in their characteristics? For example, both
countries could have the same GDP, distance, area or language values—then, the differences
we observe are because the estimated coefficients are different. Alternatively, the explanatory
variables could be different hence, the differences observed are mainly due to these differences in
characteristics. However, in practice the differences tend to be a combination of the two—that is,
covariate and coefficient differences. The early applications of this methodology was to labour force
surveys to explain differences in wages paid to men and women. The differences were decomposed
into differences arising from the coefficients on the gender dummy and differences arising in the
characteristics (for example, education, married, and urban variables) between men and women.
In figure (5.10) the total, covariate and coefficient effects on the export gap between the AGOA
and non-AGOA countries are shown. A comparison of the counter-factual export distribution for
non-AGOA countries with the distribution of exports for the AGOA countries shows that, the
coefficient effects are higher for the top quantiles in almost all six cases shown in the diagram.
The coefficient effect is also noticeably positive at the top of the distribution for most of the cases.
12A variant of this decomposition is described in Melly (2005) and Melly (2006). Melly provides the rqdeco stata
command to implement the decomposition. For more technical details and a complete description of the decomposition,
see Machado and Mata (2005); Melly (2005, 2006).
13In this case, the decomposition was for the raw wage gap between men and women.
14Melly (2006) shows that the first term gives the quantile treatment effect on the treated. Fortin et al. (2010) is another
paper showing the similarity of the decomposition to the effects in the treatment literature.
15The decomposition by Melly (2006) and Melly (2005) is numerically identical to Machado and Mata’s (2005)
estimator. As Machado and Mata’s (2005) simulations approach infinity identical results are obtained (Melly, 2006).
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On the contrary, the covariate difference declines for most parts of the distribution. Although,
there is evidence that the covariate effect starts to rise beyond the median it mostly stays below
zero. Furthermore, the magnitude of the covariate effect tends to be larger and in some cases its
effect at the top of the distribution is twice that of the lower end of the distribution. Nonetheless,
the negative covariate effect which exists for almost all quantiles tends to produce the negative
total effect observed in the diagram as well as in the results presented in table (5.1). The positive
coefficient effects beyond the 70th quantile does not reverse the effect of the covariates on the total
effect.
Figure (5.11) presents the coefficient effects together with its 95% confidence interval. The
difference in the impact of the coefficients on the export gap between the AGOA and non-AGOA
countries is now more evident. The effects of the coefficients tend to vary across the distribution
and is positive mostly at the upper tail of the distribution of the export gap.
Based on the graphs below, the observed impacts at the various quantiles are driven by a differing
combination of coefficient and covariate effects. The effects are generally not homogeneous and
differ depending on which part of the export distribution is analysed. In the decomposition literature
cited above, the coefficient effect is normally interpreted as a price effect. However, in our case,
we do need to control for quota restrictions, rules of origin, transport costs and other unobserved
factors that influence the amount of exports by these groups. Clearly, delineating these would
help in identifying the price effect more clearly and to attribute the coefficient gap to the price
differential resulting from clearly higher prices received by AGOA exporters due to the lower tariffs
relative to the control countries. In other words, the difference between the AGOA and non-AGOA
countries can be shown as a difference in the return to exports as well as the difference in the
country characteristics.
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5.4.4 Panel data analysis
The estimates reported in this section are for our panel quantile regressions. In this section, we do
not carry out a decomposition analysis mainly because the methods discussed in section (5.4.3) are
based on cross-section data. It is not entirely impossible to perform the decomposition exercise
on the panel data, however it is more complex and might not yield stable values of the effects.
We find more significant results in this section compared to the previous section. The additional
variation obtained by having a time dimension has significantly improved the results. Furthermore,
we include dummies for each year to capture changes in demand and also changes in the AGOA
preferences over time in all columns. The time averages of the time varying variables are also
included to capture elements of the fixed effects regression in all columns.
Table (5.10) reports estimates for the level of total exports to the USA, the USA/EU and
USA/ROW export ratios. The first four columns of estimates are for total exports to the USA,
the next four are the USA/EU export ratio and the last four are the USA/ROW export ratio. The
countries simultaneously enjoying EBA and AGOA preferences report no significant coefficients.
Countries always in AGOA report significant and positive estimates at the 75th and 95th quantiles
but a negative and significant estimate at the median. While a positive and significant coefficient is
observed for all AGOA beneficiaries at the 95th quantile. The significant estimates for countries in
and out of AGOA is negative and significant at the 95th quantile. Exploring these estimates points
to the fact that, the gains in total exports to the USA is mainly found at the top half of the export
distribution. For instance in column (1) the estimate of 0.554 translates into 74% higher exports
for the treated relative to the control countries at the 95th quantile. On the contrary, the countries
moving in and out of AGOA experience a 65% decline relative to the control countries at the 95th
quantile, all things equal. In terms of the countries always in AGOA, the impact turns out to be
85.7% higher exports relative to the control countries at the 95th quantile. For this same group of
treated countries, they have 84.2% higher exports relative to the controls at the 75th quantile but at
the median—the median exporters have 33.4% less exports than the control countries, all things
equal.
Moving on to the USA/EU export ratio we observe more significant coefficients although there
is only one significant and negative coefficient estimate at the 95th quantile for countries that have
moved in and out of AGOA. All the significant coefficients are negative indicating that all things
equal, the treated countries have a relatively smaller export ratio compared to the control countries.
One interpretation of this result is that at the 75th and lower quantiles, the treated countries export
less to the USA relative to the exports to the EU when this is compared with that of the control
countries. The coefficient indicates that the relative difference in the ratio is 0.533 to 1.662 points
less exports for the treated compared to the control countries at the significant quantiles, all things
equal. In other words, the treated countries have relatively higher exports to the EU compared to
the control countries at each quantile of the export distribution. This result tends to point towards
the relative ease with which AGOA countries have had access to the EU market compared to other
countries. One must bear in mind also that, the African countries are much closer to the EU in
terms of distance, compared to some of the Asian and Southern American countries that are part
of the control group of countries. Nevertheless, for most of the AGOA countries there have been
historical ties with either France or Great Britain and they have English or French as their national
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language—making it easier to trade with the EU16.
The results for the USA/ROW export ratio shows that, there are positive and significant
coefficients at the 25th quantile (column 10), median (columns 9–11) and the 75th quantile
(columns 9, 11–12). The positive coefficients indicate that the treated countries have a higher USA
to ROW ratio of exports relative to the control countries, all things equal. The mean share in the
dataset of USA exports in total exports of all AGOA countries is 13.0% for the 10 years. This
increases to 15.3% for countries that have maintained their preferential status over the period. The
range of the shares however, vary from almost zero percent in some years to approximately 96%
in other years. This can be compared to the mean shares for the EU of 40.4% and 41.2% over
the period for all AGOA and always AGOA countries respectively. It is therefore not surprising
that compared to the EU the ratio of export coefficients indicate a lower volume of exports to the
USA relative to the EU. To the contrary, this is reversed when exports to the USA is compared to
exports to the rest of the world. Returning to the table, the coefficients estimated imply that, the
USA/ROW export ratio is 0.69 to 0.93 points higher compared to the control countries, all things
equal. Again, the largest estimates as was in the previous two cases is centred around the median
and the 75th quantiles. The results so far indicate that much of the difference in the distribution of
exports between the treated and control countries can be consistently found at the median and 75th
quantiles. Although, in a few cases this has been at the 25th quantile and the 95th quantile.
Figure (5.12) provides selected graphs of the quantile estimates for table (5.10). The diagrams
showing the quantile estimates beyond the OLS limits are figures 5.12(b), 5.12(c), 5.12(e) and
5.12(f). Additionally, the quantile estimates for the figures mentioned do show some variation
across the quantiles. We can safely conclude that, at least one of these quantile coefficients is
significantly different from the other quantiles—thus for example, in a number of cases the 95th
quantile estimate is statistically different from the remaining coefficients. The same can be said of
the median and 75th quantile coefficients which in some cases are below the lower limit of the OLS
confidence interval while the 95th quantile coefficient is above the upper confidence limit. However,
figure 5.12(a) is a borderline case—the 95th quantile estimates are beyond the OLS confidence
limits but the remaining quantiles are well within the OLS confidence interval. We carry out a
similar analysis with the eight product groups defined earlier and this is discussed next.
16There are exceptions to this, a few Portuguese and Spanish speaking countries in Africa have had historical ties with
Portugal and Spain. These include countries such as Angola, Cape Verde and Mozambique
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5.4.5 Result for product analysis
In this section we analyse the results for eight product categories: (a) TALF (b) AMDS (c) FBWTP
(d) EI (e) CPR (f) ISOM (g) METE and (h) OI export clusters. The four treated categories are
maintained in the analysis below. These continue to be the following treatment groups: (a) In
& Out (b) All AGOA (c) EBA & AGOA and (d) Always AGOA. The analysis here focusses on
total exports of these products to the USA and the USA/EU export ratios for each product. In
the appendix (appendix D) additional results for all countries and further product analyses are
shown. At the end of this section we also present graphs of the quantile coefficients for three of the
treated groups, namely, all AGOA, EBA & AGOA and always AGOA thereby providing us with
six separate figures exploring the quantile estimates in detail. The remaining figures for the in and
out of AGOA group can be found in the appendix.
Tables (5.11)–(5.14) present the results for total exports of each product group to the USA. The
countries that move in and out of AGOA (in table 5.11) tend to export more FBTWP (25th, 50th and
95th quantiles), CPR (25th quantile), ISOM (95th quantile), METE (25th quantile) and OI (75th
quantile) than the control countries, all things equal. On the contrary, they export less TALF (75th
and 95th quantiles), AMDS (95th quantile) and CPR (95th quantile) than the control countries, all
things equal. The positive coefficients are a bit puzzling at first, however, the composition of these
countries include, Mauritania and Coˆte d’Ivoire whose exports were quite high in the years they
had their AGOA status. A number of the countries have only been out of the programme during the
sample for about a year or two. This makes the coefficients less puzzling and probably indicates
the importance of the preference for some of these countries. The reinstatement of a number of
the countries points to how quickly they resolve their internal conflicts and political stalemates
in order to be accepted back into the AGOA programme. Nonetheless, this group of countries
are not major exporters of textile products hence they have approximately 98.8% and 98.6% less
TALF exports compared to the control countries at the 75th and 95th quantiles, all things equal.
For agricultural products this gap is -87.97%, while it is -62.95% for CPR products, all at the
95th quantile, all things equal. There are no significant estimates for extractive industry exports
indicating no significant difference between the control countries and the treated countries. The
FBTWP exports is 15.4, 6.3 and 16.98 times higher than the exports of the control countries at the
25th, 50th and 95th quantiles, all things equal. For CPR, ISOM, METE and OI products these are
16, 27.6, 4.4 and 1.9 times the exports of the control countries, all things equal.
The next table, table (5.12) provides the results for all countries having the AGOA preference.
This time, TALF and OI exports are significant and negative at all four quantiles estimated. Exports
of AMDS and CPR products are significant and negative at the 95th quantile while ISOM products
are significant and negative at the 25th quantile. Meanwhile, METE exports are significant and
negative at the 50th, 75th and 95th quantiles. A few significant and positive coefficients are recorded
for FBWTP at the 25th and 95th quantiles as well as EI products at the 75th and 95th quantiles.
The EI (extractive industry) products are mainly concentrated at the top of the distribution. This
bodes well with the composition of countries exporting EI products which includes crude oil. The
major crude oil players such as Nigeria, Angola and Gabon tend to be among the top African oil
exporting nations. The EI sector also includes South Africa and Congo (Republic of) that are also
among the top five exporting nations to the USA. The positive coefficients at these two quantiles
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are therefore more in line with our expectations. The results indicate that, the countries at the
75th and 95th quantiles export 3.4 and 14.3 times the exports of the control countries holding
all regressors constant. In terms of FBTWP exports, these are 2.3 and 3.4 times the exports of
the control countries at the 25th and 95th quantiles. This impact is much smaller than that of the
EI products indicating the importance of the extractive industry products in the exports of the
AGOA countries. The OI product exports for the treated are 49.4% to 58.4% less than that of the
control countries, all things equal. Furthermore, the TALF product exports for the treated are 77.1%
to 96.4% less than the control countries—the lowest and highest quantile coefficient estimates.
This is an indication that, the AGOA countries in spite of the very favourable textile and apparel
preferences are less competitive than the control countries. The remaining products show a relative
lower exports of 55.9% to 85.4% compared to the control countries, all things equal.
All coefficients estimated for OI and CPR products are negative and significant at all four
quantiles in table (5.13). AMDS products are significant and positive at the 25th and 50th quantiles
while EI and ISOM exports are significant at the 95th quantile. The remaining products, TALF
and METE yield significant and negative coefficient estimates for three out of the four quantiles
estimated while EI has negative and significant coefficient estimates at the 25th and 50th quantiles
as well as ISOM at the 25th quantile. The negative coefficient estimates indicate that the exports of
the products by the treated countries were less than that of the control countries. We might attribute
the competing EBA preferences to these results. For instance, the countries at the 25th and 50th
quantiles are probably more competitive in exporting extractive industry products to the EU rather
than the USA. On the contrary, the treated countries at the 95th quantile exporting EI products are
relatively more competitive compared to the control countries in the USA market. The coefficient
indicates that, the treated countries at the 95th quantile export 9.5 times the EI exports of the control
countries all things equal. However, the EI exports at the 25th and 50th quantiles indicate exports
are 96.5% and 89.9% less than the control countries. The countries at the 25th and 50th quantiles
are relatively more competitive at exporting AMDS products to the USA. The coefficients imply
relatively higher exports of 248% to 250% compared to the control countries for AMDS products,
all things equal. The TALF exports are 83.8%, 86.4% and 90.3% less than the control countries at
the 25th, 50th and 75th quantiles respectively holding all variables constant. Similarly, the relative
decline of ISOM products is 79.4% at the 25th quantile while METE exports indicate a relative
gap of -70.3% (50th quantile) to -80.8% (95th quantile). The range of the relative gap is -71.3% –
(-)85.4% and -71.8% – (-)86.5% for CPR and ISOM exports respectively for the lowest and highest
coefficients estimated.
In table (5.14) results are shown for countries that have maintained their AGOA status through-
out the period of analysis. There are a few differences in the results presented in this table and table
(5.12). The exclusion of countries that move in and out of AGOA, has probably led to changes in
the composition of treated and control countries in the tails of the distribution of the various product
exports. These changes are clearer in certain products such as AMDS, FBTWP, CPR and ISOM.
On the contrary, TALF, EI, METE and OI exports report coefficients that have similar signs and
significance to table (5.12). The differences observed for these products are marginal and mostly
in terms of the magnitude of the coefficients. In terms of the products, we notice changes in the
significance of the coefficients. For instance, AMDS is additionally significant at the 25th quantile
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while FBTWP is no longer significant at the 25th quantile and 95th quantile in our comparator table
but is now significant at the 25th quantile. Similarly, CPR is now significant at the 25th and 50th
quantiles as well as ISOM which reports a significant coefficient at the 75th quantile. Even with
these changes, the signs of the coefficients of the significant estimates in the comparator table are
maintained—a reason why we attribute these changes to the tails of the new distribution of product
exports. In terms of the relative gaps between the treated and control country product exports, the
gap at the 75th and 95th quantiles for EI exports roughly indicate that, exports of the treated are 19
and 13 times the exports of the control countries respectively, holding all else constant. This again
consistently supports the fact that the extractive industry and particularly crude oil and petroleum
product exports significantly drive the gains in the top AGOA countries. Given that these gains are
driven at the top by these countries leads us to believe that, the gains from AGOA are not fairly
distributed across the recipient countries. The gains are much higher for countries at the top of
the distribution compared to countries at the median and 25th quantiles. The impact at the median
for FBTWP exports is much smaller and indicates that approximately 1.8 times the exports of the
control countries are exported by the treated countries due to the AGOA preference, all things equal.
In percentage terms this is equivalent to 87.4% higher exports for the treated countries relative to
the control countries at the median.
The TALF coefficients are equivalent to relative gaps of -85.5%, -83%, -93.3% and -97.6% at
the 25th, 50th, 75th and 95th quantiles respectively, all things equal. Other industry (OI) products
are also equivalent to the following relative gaps of -71.97%, -59.4%, -75.8% and -71.6% at the
25th, 50th, 75th and 95th quantiles respectively and all things equal. While the effects at the
upper end of the TALF distribution is greater in magnitude implying larger losses at the top of the
distribution, the biggest losses are at the 75th quantile for OI products. The remaining negative and
significant coefficient estimates imply (a) a 55.3% and 62.2% lower export value for the treated
relative to the controls for AMDS exports at the 25th and 95th quantiles; (b) 57.5% and 55.5% less
exports relative to the control countries for CPR exports at the 25th and 50th quantiles; and (c)
62.2%, 68.8% and 78.4% less exports relative to the control at the 50th, 75th and 95th quantiles
and holding all variables constant. These remaining products show that the treated countries are
less competitive at the tails of the distribution. For AMDS exports this is found at both ends of the
distribution, CPR exports are at the left tail while METE exports are at the median and right half of
the product export distribution. Our assertion in the previous paragraph that EI exports tend to be
driving the gains in AGOA finds support in the results presented here. Thus, apart from AMDS
(in table 5.13), FBWTP (in tables 5.11, 5.12 and 5.14) and EI (in tables 5.12–5.14) exports, the
remaining products point to lower exports relative to the controls at some of the specific quantiles
of interest. Thus, we can attribute the increases in these product exports compared to the control
countries to the AGOA status of the African countries.
Figures (5.13) – (5.15) provide the supporting diagrams17 of the estimated quantiles in tables
(5.11)–(5.14). In figure (5.13) the only figure showing no potential differences among the estimated
quantiles is panel (h) for OI exports—the plot of quantile coefficients all lie well within the OLS
confidence limits. The next graph (figure 5.14) shows that panels (d), (e) and (g) all lie within
the OLS confidence limits. On the contrary, the remaining panels show portions of the quantile
17The two remaining diagrams for the In & Out treatment group is provided in the appendix.
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distribution lying beyond the OLS confidence limits. Thereby indicating that these coefficients are
not necessarily equal. Thus, the effects at the various quantiles (mostly the tails) of the distribution
differ greatly. In figure (5.15), panel (d) and to some extent (b) lie within the OLS confidence
limits. The remaining figures show parts of the distribution of quantile coefficients lying beyond
the OLS confidence limits. This summary of the coefficients described above (and shown in the
figures below) goes a long way to provide support to our assertion that, the impact of AGOA is
heterogeneous for the recipient countries. In all almost all cases, the magnitude of the impact at the
95th quantile is the largest and this is more pronounced for EI exports where the largest gains are
observed at the topmost quantile estimated.
Table 5.11: Quantile regression estimates for exports to the USA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TALF AMDS FBTWP EI CPR ISOM METE OI
q25
In & Out -0.130 0.192 2.737∗∗∗ 0.875 2.775∗∗ -0.490 1.484∗ 0.561
(1.450) (0.565) (0.655) (0.804) (0.932) (0.880) (0.646) (0.622)
Constant -81.60∗∗ -57.82∗∗∗ -58.44∗∗∗ -9.430 -54.44∗∗∗ -18.10 -8.478 -29.98∗∗
(29.524) (9.678) (11.173) (11.389) (7.488) (16.707) (10.522) (9.911)
q50
In & Out -1.649 -0.203 1.989∗∗ 0.526 0.753 -1.500 0.169 0.116
(0.981) (0.596) (0.607) (0.640) (0.700) (0.765) (0.380) (0.266)
Constant -70.18∗∗ -39.96∗∗∗ -29.63∗∗∗ 3.751 -53.57∗∗∗ -8.004 -1.530 -32.65∗∗∗
(22.275) (11.395) (7.494) (7.300) (5.281) (12.540) (8.606) (5.414)
q75
In & Out -4.428∗∗∗ -0.857 0.956 -0.511 -0.699 -0.109 0.375 0.662∗∗
(1.032) (0.531) (0.904) (0.413) (0.509) (1.366) (0.396) (0.249)
Constant -67.21∗∗∗ -36.59∗∗ -38.87∗∗∗ 6.559 -47.18∗∗∗ -19.52 -29.52∗∗ -48.10∗∗∗
(14.480) (11.142) (7.429) (4.787) (6.162) (15.322) (9.932) (4.150)
q95
In & Out -4.280∗∗∗ -2.118∗∗∗ 2.832∗∗∗ -0.425 -0.993∗∗ 3.316∗∗∗ 0.575 0.155
(0.394) (0.480) (0.367) (0.419) (0.359) (0.854) (0.423) (0.446)
Constant -44.22∗∗∗ -29.79∗∗∗ -25.39∗∗∗ 14.12∗ -20.46∗∗ -32.28∗∗∗ -53.52∗∗∗ -50.42∗∗∗
(7.929) (4.945) (5.444) (7.006) (7.738) (8.372) (8.527) (6.195)
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mundlak Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 366 385 346 342 342 296 383 380
Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications in parenthesis. Dependent variables is exports. Quantiles selected are .25, .50 .75 & .95. Controls include:
English, Spanish & landlocked dummies, logs of distance (weighted), area & GDP. ’All’ indicates that all AGOA beneficiaries are included irrespective of
whether they are removed from the programme. ’In & Out’ are countries that are removed from the programme at least once. ’Always’ are countries that have
consistently been recipients from the beginning of the programme (i.e. from 2001/2003). ’EBA & AGOA’ are countries that are both members of AGOA and
EBA and have continuously been beneficiaries. AMDS–Agriculture, meat and dairy, seafood; FBTWP–Food, beverages, tobacco, wood, paper; EI–Extractive
industries; CPR–Chemicals, plastics, rubber; TALF–Textiles, apparel, leather, footwear; ISOM–Iron, steel, and other metals; METE–Machinery, electronics,
transportation equipment; OI–Other industries. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 5.12: Quantile regression estimates for exports to the USA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TALF AMDS FBTWP EI CPR ISOM METE OI
q25
All AGOA -1.476∗∗∗ 0.0471 0.851∗ -0.233 -0.542 -1.005∗∗ -0.420 -0.853∗∗
(0.438) (0.324) (0.355) (0.661) (0.391) (0.370) (0.314) (0.260)
Constant -30.61∗ -51.04∗∗∗ -32.16∗∗∗ -5.137 -27.74∗∗∗ -1.699 -1.058 -9.420
(13.256) (4.859) (7.438) (10.904) (7.410) (8.769) (6.121) (6.120)
q50
All AGOA -1.959∗∗∗ -0.148 0.411 0.189 -0.574 -0.596 -0.818∗∗ -0.686∗∗∗
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(0.403) (0.307) (0.235) (0.479) (0.371) (0.426) (0.267) (0.186)
Constant -42.88∗∗∗ -42.61∗∗∗ -24.59∗∗∗ 1.948 -40.99∗∗∗ -18.32 3.596 -22.14∗∗∗
(6.928) (5.735) (4.045) (7.295) (6.404) (10.078) (5.638) (3.053)
q75
All AGOA -3.318∗∗∗ -0.0299 -0.575 1.227∗ -0.537 0.910 -0.833∗∗ -0.682∗∗
(0.601) (0.206) (0.433) (0.485) (0.276) (0.547) (0.298) (0.228)
Constant -61.10∗∗∗ -43.19∗∗∗ -31.09∗∗∗ -8.672 -38.87∗∗∗ -26.93∗ 3.424 -25.67∗∗∗
(9.239) (5.385) (3.707) (6.284) (5.003) (11.565) (5.645) (3.776)
q95
All AGOA -2.343∗∗∗ -0.922∗∗∗ 1.229∗ 2.659∗∗∗ -1.927∗ 0.518 -1.413∗∗∗ -0.878∗
(0.399) (0.244) (0.612) (0.233) (0.751) (0.369) (0.290) (0.415)
Constant -55.96∗∗∗ -34.23∗∗∗ -28.57∗∗∗ 7.641 2.210 -7.999 -3.154 -34.42∗∗∗
(7.812) (4.169) (5.091) (9.168) (20.452) (5.708) (8.321) (6.237)
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mundlak Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 675 675 623 613 611 521 694 692
Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications in parenthesis. Dependent variables is exports. Quantiles selected are .25, .50 .75 & .95. Controls include: English,
Spanish & landlocked dummies, logs of distance (weighted), area & GDP. ’All’ indicates that all AGOA beneficiaries are included irrespective of whether they are
removed from the programme. ’In & Out’ are countries that are removed from the programme at least once. ’Always’ are countries that have consistently been
recipients from the beginning of the programme (i.e. from 2001/2003). ’EBA & AGOA’ are countries that are both members of AGOA and EBA and have continuously
been beneficiaries. AMDS–Agriculture, meat and dairy, seafood; FBTWP–Food, beverages, tobacco, wood, paper; EI–Extractive industries; CPR–Chemicals, plastics,
rubber; TALF–Textiles, apparel, leather, footwear; ISOM–Iron, steel, and other metals; METE–Machinery, electronics, transportation equipment; OI–Other industries.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 5.13: Quantile regression estimates for exports to the USA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TALF AMDS FBTWP EI CPR ISOM METE OI
q25
EBA & AGOA -1.817∗∗ 0.918∗ -0.393 -3.341∗∗∗ -1.513∗∗∗ -1.578∗∗ -0.666 -1.927∗∗∗
(0.623) (0.386) (0.420) (0.600) (0.443) (0.554) (0.398) (0.274)
Constant -32.43 -69.60∗∗∗ -28.40∗∗∗ 14.80 -18.14 23.87 0.742 -5.857
(22.746) (5.136) (7.843) (10.249) (10.420) (15.931) (8.528) (7.542)
q50
EBA & AGOA -1.998∗∗∗ 0.911∗∗ -0.209 -2.292∗∗ -1.877∗∗∗ -0.270 -1.214∗∗∗ -1.999∗∗∗
(0.544) (0.348) (0.321) (0.765) (0.396) (0.675) (0.268) (0.258)
Constant -38.40∗∗∗ -47.05∗∗∗ -17.75∗ 7.485 -17.86 -8.094 8.107 -11.60∗
(10.491) (6.436) (7.339) (9.803) (9.815) (10.386) (9.195) (4.901)
q75
EBA & AGOA -2.328∗ 0.0240 -0.905 0.0403 -1.247∗ 0.752 -1.581∗∗∗ -1.927∗∗∗
(1.041) (0.385) (0.476) (1.095) (0.527) (0.754) (0.283) (0.413)
Constant -32.11∗∗ -28.44∗∗∗ -30.71∗∗∗ 6.853 -39.13∗∗∗ -23.52∗ 7.137 -15.37∗
(11.343) (8.232) (5.847) (7.080) (6.872) (11.163) (7.299) (6.359)
q95
EBA & AGOA -2.103 0.472 0.412 2.248∗∗∗ -1.924∗∗∗ 1.051∗ -1.650∗ -1.256∗
(1.269) (0.867) (0.287) (0.339) (0.534) (0.465) (0.725) (0.543)
Constant -51.14∗∗∗ -35.75∗∗∗ -30.70∗∗∗ 3.377 -22.21∗ -24.65∗∗∗ -37.27∗ -29.04∗∗∗
(11.570) (7.196) (3.868) (5.261) (8.928) (7.386) (14.619) (7.693)
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mundlak Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 447 440 413 394 397 338 465 463
Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications in parenthesis. Dependent variables is exports. Quantiles selected are .25, .50 .75 & .95. Controls include: English,
Spanish & landlocked dummies, logs of distance (weighted), area & GDP. ’All’ indicates that all AGOA beneficiaries are included irrespective of whether they are
removed from the programme. ’In & Out’ are countries that are removed from the programme at least once. ’Always’ are countries that have consistently been
recipients from the beginning of the programme (i.e. from 2001/2003). ’EBA & AGOA’ are countries that are both members of AGOA and EBA and have continuously
been beneficiaries. AMDS–Agriculture, meat and dairy, seafood; FBTWP–Food, beverages, tobacco, wood, paper; EI–Extractive industries; CPR–Chemicals, plastics,
rubber; TALF–Textiles, apparel, leather, footwear; ISOM–Iron, steel, and other metals; METE–Machinery, electronics, transportation equipment; OI–Other industries.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 5.14: Quantile regression estimates for exports to the USA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TALF AMDS FBTWP EI CPR ISOM METE OI
q25
Always in AGOA -1.928∗∗∗ -0.804∗ -0.0105 -0.828 -0.856∗ -0.926 -0.321 -1.272∗∗∗
(0.437) (0.407) (0.364) (0.690) (0.391) (0.498) (0.302) (0.278)
Constant -75.42∗∗ -57.99∗∗∗ -27.48∗∗∗ -0.944 -27.66∗∗∗ 3.836 -14.46∗ -23.43∗∗
(24.617) (5.578) (7.292) (14.700) (8.046) (10.461) (7.117) (8.790)
q50
Always in AGOA -1.774∗∗∗ -0.597 0.628∗ 0.972 -0.810∗ -0.241 -0.974∗∗∗ -0.901∗∗∗
(0.350) (0.328) (0.252) (0.547) (0.371) (0.494) (0.267) (0.242)
Constant -43.59∗∗∗ -40.58∗∗∗ -25.75∗∗∗ 5.678 -41.04∗∗∗ -13.73 -17.43∗ -24.28∗∗∗
(7.393) (5.596) (5.681) (7.507) (7.991) (9.467) (6.918) (3.612)
q75
Always in AGOA -2.706∗∗∗ -0.480 -0.346 2.947∗∗∗ -0.357 1.407∗ -1.163∗∗∗ -1.418∗∗∗
(0.666) (0.258) (0.486) (0.449) (0.272) (0.551) (0.312) (0.278)
Constant -37.42∗∗∗ -29.47∗∗∗ -31.50∗∗∗ 2.012 -49.54∗∗∗ -27.92∗ -4.612 -24.30∗∗∗
(10.007) (6.104) (4.837) (6.159) (4.814) (12.477) (7.793) (4.261)
q95
Always in AGOA -3.740∗∗∗ -0.974∗∗∗ 0.205 2.571∗∗∗ -0.550 0.833 -1.530∗∗∗ -1.257∗∗∗
(0.555) (0.265) (0.183) (0.207) (0.347) (0.513) (0.365) (0.363)
Constant -32.80∗∗∗ -33.64∗∗∗ -29.44∗∗∗ 18.33∗∗ -47.83∗∗∗ -12.59 -10.26 -28.62∗∗∗
(7.240) (7.217) (4.121) (6.753) (4.292) (6.420) (10.104) (6.386)
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mundlak Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 564 550 526 510 510 445 584 583
Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications in parenthesis. Dependent variables is exports. Quantiles selected are .25, .50 .75 & .95. Controls include: English,
Spanish & landlocked dummies, logs of distance (weighted), area & GDP. ’All’ indicates that all AGOA beneficiaries are included irrespective of whether they are
removed from the programme. ’In & Out’ are countries that are removed from the programme at least once. ’Always’ are countries that have consistently been
recipients from the beginning of the programme (i.e. from 2001/2003). ’EBA & AGOA’ are countries that are both members of AGOA and EBA and have continuously
been beneficiaries. AMDS–Agriculture, meat and dairy, seafood; FBTWP–Food, beverages, tobacco, wood, paper; EI–Extractive industries; CPR–Chemicals, plastics,
rubber; TALF–Textiles, apparel, leather, footwear; ISOM–Iron, steel, and other metals; METE–Machinery, electronics, transportation equipment; OI–Other industries.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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We now turn our attention to the final four tables (tables 5.15–5.18) presented in this section.
The dependent variable is now the USA to EU export ratio for each of the product groups analysed.
In table (5.15) none of the quantile coefficients are significant for OI products. The only product
having all quantile coefficients significant is AMDS exports. Apart from the 25th quantile estimate
for METE products all the remaining significant coefficients are negative. The METE coefficient
indicates that the USA/EU ratio of exports is higher for the treated countries relative to the control
countries at the 25th quantile, all things equal. The implication of the positive impact is that
this group of countries export more of the METE products to the USA relative to the EU when
compared to the control countries. The estimate is consistent with the positive coefficient reported
in table (5.11) where we considered the level of total exports to the USA. The negative coefficients
for AMDS indicates that for the treated countries their USA/EU ratio of AMDS exports is lower
relative to the control countries. The implication is that the treated countries export less of the
product to the USA relative to the EU when compared to the control countries. This falls in line
with our expectations given that, the countries in our treatment group are countries that have not
consistently maintained their AGOA status. The magnitude of the impact is smaller at the 25th and
50th quantiles (-0.93 & -0.94) compared to the 75th and 95th quantiles (-2.1 & -2.8). Similarly,
the coefficient at the 95th quantiles for FBTWP, CPR, TALF and ISOM are also negative. At the
75th quantile there are negative coefficient estimates reported for EI, CPR and TALF, while at
the median the EI and ISOM coefficients are negative. On the whole, these countries are more
consistent and competitive in the EU relative to the USA market.
In table (5.7) all significant estimates are negative indicating that, at the respective quantiles
the treated countries have a lower export ratio relative to the control countries all things equal. In
addition, AMDS, FBTWP and METE products have all four estimated quantiles significant at the
5% level of significance. For AMDS and FBTWP the magnitude of the impact increases as higher
quantiles are estimated indicating that the relative difference is larger for the countries at the top
half of the distribution. The coefficients at the 50th, 75th and 95th quantiles are significant for
EI exports while CPR exports show significant estimates at the 75th quantile. Of the remaining
products, TALF coefficients are significant at the 25th, 50th and 95th quantiles; ISOM and OI
products record significance at the 25th and 50th quantiles. The AMDS coefficients are 1.1 to 3.2
points lower than the control countries. In summary, the remaining significant coefficients indicate
that the export ratio is between 0.61 to 2.2 points lower than the control countries. The results here
still point to the treated countries—in this case all AGOA countries being more competitive in the
EU compared to the USA market. We note that majority of the countries within the treatment group
enjoy at least one major preference of the EU. Thus, the coefficients indicating the higher exports
to the EU relative to the USA market is probably capturing the effects of the competing preferences
the EU has on offer for the AGOA beneficiaries. In the next table, we focus on those countries that
receive the EBA preferences of the EU to see whether these differences are still observed.
As a matter of fact, we continue to have all significant coefficients remaining negative in table
(5.17). However, fewer significant coefficients are observed compared to the previous table. The
only product with all quantile coefficients significant is the METE product exports. The 25th
quantile coefficient for AMDS and the 75th and 95th quantile estimates for FBTWP are no longer
significant. The EI products are significant at the 50th and 75th quantiles while TALF products are
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significant at the 25th and 75th quantiles. The 25th, 50th and 75th quantile coefficient estimates
for OI products are significant. The coefficient estimates do not vary widely across the two tables.
Again, supporting our view that the competing preferences of the EU are playing a key role in
making the EU more attractive for the AGOA countries. Nonetheless, we note as mentioned
earlier in the chapter, that other forces such as distance to the EU market, common language and
historical ties are playing an additional role here. More importantly one key aspect of the European
preferences is that, the changes in the preferences as well as the countries are less frequent than the
USA thereby providing more security for the African countries. It must be noted though, that one
major competing preference which was enjoyed by the African countries—the EU-ACP preference
was discontinued in 2008 although the EU safeguarded the entitlements of the African countries
during a transition period towards the EU signing Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with
the respective African countries. We must also note that given that our data ends in 2010, the full
effect of the EU-ACP withdrawal and transition to the EPAs is not fully captured. Hence, our
results capture both the EU-ACP and EBA pro-competitive forces on the exporting capacity of the
treated countries to the EU.
Finally, table (table 5.18) provides results for the countries that have had AGOA consistently
over the sample period. Similar to table (5.16) all the quantile coefficients estimated at the four
quantiles for AMDS and FBTWP are significant. The largest magnitude is observed at the 95th
quantile for these two products. None of the remaining products report any significant estimates at
the 95th quantile. Furthermore, none of the coefficients estimated for the CPR and ISOM products
are significant. If it would be recalled, these two products were also not significant in the previous
table. Again all significant estimates are negative and significant at the 5% level. The coefficients
estimated at the 25th and 50th quantiles are significant for EI and OI products. The estimated
coefficient at the 25th quantile is significant for TALF products while for METE products the
significant coefficients are observed at the 25th, 50th and 75th quantiles. The AMDS coefficients
indicate that, the export ratio is lower by 1.7, 1.9, 2.1 and 3.1 points relative to the control countries
at the 25th, 50th, 75th and 95th quantiles respectively, all things equal. The magnitude for the
FBWTP and remaining products are smaller compared to the AMDS products. The FBTWP
products are 1.2, 1.1, 1.1 and 1.9 points less than the control countries at the 25th, 50th, 75th and
95th quantiles respectively, holding all other variables constant. Our remaining coefficients vary
between 0.6 and 1.3 points less than the control countries, all things equal. Thus, confirming again
that, the product exports to the EU are relatively higher than the USA compared to the control
countries.
Figures (5.16)–(5.18) summarise the coefficients discussed above and shown in the tables below.
In figure (5.16) apart from panels (f) and (g) (and to some extent panel [c]) all the remaining figures
show significant departures from the OLS coefficient and the quantile estimates lie beyond the
OLS confidence limits. Thereby indicating that for these coefficients, the quantile estimates are
likely to be different. The next figure (5.17) shows fewer significant panels. The panels showing
significant differences across the quantiles include (a), (d) and (g) (marginally moving beyond
the lower confidence limit). Thus for the countries having both EBA and AGOA simultaneously,
the difference in exports across the distribution is not statistically significant for most of the
products. The final figure (5.18), also shows panels (c), (d), (e), (f) and (g) to lie within the OLS
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confidence limits. Panels (a) and (b) on the contrary show clearly that the quantile estimates are
statistically significant given that the 95th quantile estimates are beyond the OLS confidence limits.
Therefore in terms of the export ratio of the products the heterogeneity in the coefficient estimates
are concentrated in a few products. This could imply that the exports of the treated countries to the
EU may not necessarily be concentrated among a few countries and that all countries tend to enjoy
almost equal access to the European market. Nonetheless, the ratio of exports tends to compress
the distribution and reduces the outliers that were present in the respective exports in levels to the
three destinations.
In concluding this section, we note that, a comparison of total exports to the USA provides a
story of unequal benefits for the beneficiary countries. A comparison of their exports to the control
countries, indicates that, much of the gains are centred at the top half of the export distribution.
We also observe that, the AGOA countries tend to have more exports to the EU relative to the
USA compared to the control countries. A number of reasons cited for this include the competing
preferences of the EU, the distance, common language and the historical ties the African countries
have with the EU. The product exports also provide some interesting heterogeneous impacts. The
heterogeneous impacts are particularly more visible for extractive industry exports (EI). Nonetheless,
some heterogeneity is visible in the remaining product exports. The products performing creditably
well in the USA market are two groups, namely, the extractive industry and food, beverages,
tobacco, wood and paper products. These two products seem to be behind much of the gains
observed in the total exports to the USA. In one table agriculture, meat, dairy and seafood products
does show some gains at the 25th and 50th quantiles. However, its significance is not maintained
across the various tables of results as the previous two products mentioned. Comparatively, the EU
has a wider spread of products that the African countries export to that market. This is observed
in the negative estimates in the regressions involving the USA to EU product export ratio as the
dependent variable.
Table 5.15: Quantile regression: USA/EU export ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
AMDS FBTWP EI CPR TALF ISOM METE OI
q25
In & Out -0.930∗∗ 0.797 -0.193 0.515 0.785 0.379 1.017∗ 0.298
(0.356) (0.437) (0.587) (0.758) (0.697) (0.859) (0.502) (0.518)
Constant -50.87∗∗∗ -15.53∗∗ -19.52∗∗ -55.96∗∗∗ -80.16∗∗∗ -68.34∗∗∗ -5.967 -6.930
(5.979) (5.241) (6.736) (8.663) (8.725) (13.990) (10.708) (11.923)
q50
In & Out -0.938∗∗ 0.0412 -2.148∗∗∗ -0.847 -1.229 -1.813∗∗ 0.249 0.366
(0.359) (0.318) (0.456) (0.493) (0.711) (0.671) (0.372) (0.341)
Constant -42.42∗∗∗ -8.349 -6.215 -39.39∗∗∗ -44.80∗∗ -19.10 -1.019 -4.869
(7.785) (5.388) (6.820) (7.016) (15.156) (12.449) (8.087) (6.854)
q75
In & Out -2.091∗∗∗ -0.504 -2.164∗∗ -2.633∗∗∗ -2.564∗∗∗ -1.229 -0.214 0.537
(0.475) (0.361) (0.654) (0.677) (0.724) (0.726) (0.398) (0.371)
Constant -17.09∗ 1.391 10.20 -9.764 16.04 -1.757 10.26 -6.018
(7.244) (5.442) (8.631) (6.583) (14.374) (12.935) (7.763) (5.593)
q95
In & Out -2.752∗∗∗ -2.491∗∗∗ -1.715 -4.417∗∗∗ -3.429∗∗∗ -2.372∗∗∗ -0.202 0.350
(0.466) (0.744) (1.209) (0.454) (0.966) (0.678) (0.444) (0.456)
Constant -1.949 1.599 55.60∗∗∗ 25.42∗ 49.76∗∗∗ 8.894 -0.299 2.514
(6.469) (10.243) (15.564) (9.850) (10.720) (12.683) (7.206) (8.426)
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Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mundlak Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 383 344 341 339 366 292 383 377
Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications in parenthesis. Dependent variable is USA/EU export ratio. Quantiles selected are .25, .50 .75 &
.95. Controls include: English, Spanish & landlocked dummies, logs of distance (weighted), area & GDP. ’All’ indicates that all AGOA beneficiaries
are included irrespective of whether they are removed from the programme. ’In & Out’ are countries that are removed from the programme at least once.
’Always’ are countries that have consistently been recipients from the beginning of the programme (i.e. from 2001/2003). ’EBA & AGOA’ are countries that
are both members of AGOA and EBA and have continuously been beneficiaries. AMDS–Agriculture, meat and dairy, seafood; FBTWP–Food, beverages,
tobacco, wood, paper; EI–Extractive industries; CPR–Chemicals, plastics, rubber; TALF–Textiles, apparel, leather, footwear; ISOM–Iron, steel, and other
metals; METE–Machinery, electronics, transportation equipment; OI–Other industries. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 5.16: Quantile regression: USA/EU export ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
AMDS FBTWP EI CPR TALF ISOM METE OI
q25
All AGOA -1.085∗∗ -0.796∗∗∗ -0.450 0.350 -1.053∗∗∗ -0.839∗ -0.735∗ -0.536∗∗
(0.348) (0.233) (0.266) (0.275) (0.287) (0.370) (0.291) (0.203)
Constant -37.74∗∗∗ -20.70∗∗∗ -15.85∗∗ -34.11∗∗∗ -47.39∗∗∗ -24.81∗ -2.523 -4.370
(5.271) (4.246) (5.294) (6.473) (9.247) (10.190) (6.606) (4.819)
q50
All AGOA -1.572∗∗∗ -0.955∗∗∗ -1.068∗∗∗ -0.471 -1.144∗ -0.734∗ -0.691∗∗ -0.620∗∗∗
(0.185) (0.172) (0.258) (0.309) (0.481) (0.352) (0.214) (0.177)
Constant -28.08∗∗∗ -13.76∗∗∗ -7.280 -25.07∗∗∗ -41.96∗∗∗ -19.02∗ -1.043 -4.587
(5.069) (3.244) (4.544) (4.130) (8.112) (8.543) (5.106) (3.526)
q75
All AGOA -2.027∗∗∗ -0.980∗∗∗ -0.611∗ -0.989∗∗ -1.102 -0.668 -0.739∗∗∗ -0.191
(0.284) (0.253) (0.252) (0.338) (0.632) (0.347) (0.196) (0.181)
Constant -18.76∗∗∗ -6.186 10.08 -7.272 -34.39∗∗∗ -6.890 1.853 -6.325
(4.384) (4.099) (6.270) (5.726) (9.490) (5.405) (4.697) (3.925)
q95
All AGOA -3.243∗∗∗ -1.936∗∗∗ -1.366∗ -0.845 -2.170∗∗ -1.113 -0.490∗ -0.103
(0.280) (0.286) (0.629) (0.498) (0.769) (0.607) (0.240) (0.301)
Constant 3.779 -9.740 42.59∗∗ 0.214 -15.18 -0.643 7.997 3.240
(4.883) (7.016) (14.070) (7.416) (9.108) (8.032) (4.561) (7.135)
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mundlak Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 673 621 612 608 675 517 694 689
Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications in parenthesis. Dependent variable is USA/EU export ratio. Quantiles selected are .25, .50 .75 & .95. Controls include:
English, Spanish & landlocked dummies, logs of distance (weighted), area & GDP. ’All’ indicates that all AGOA beneficiaries are included irrespective of whether they are
removed from the programme. ’In & Out’ are countries that are removed from the programme at least once. ’Always’ are countries that have consistently been recipients from
the beginning of the programme (i.e. from 2001/2003). ’EBA & AGOA’ are countries that are both members of AGOA and EBA and have continuously been beneficiaries.
AMDS–Agriculture, meat and dairy, seafood; FBTWP–Food, beverages, tobacco, wood, paper; EI–Extractive industries; CPR–Chemicals, plastics, rubber; TALF–Textiles,
apparel, leather, footwear; ISOM–Iron, steel, and other metals; METE–Machinery, electronics, transportation equipment; OI–Other industries. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01,
∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 5.17: Quantile regression: USA/EU export ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
AMDS FBTWP EI CPR TALF ISOM METE OI
q25
EBA & AGOA -0.759 -1.092∗ -0.839 -0.0403 -1.136∗ -0.261 -0.918∗∗ -0.897∗∗
(0.492) (0.451) (0.446) (0.529) (0.494) (0.426) (0.344) (0.282)
Constant -46.76∗∗∗ -30.18∗∗∗ -16.09∗ -27.63∗∗ -61.38∗∗∗ -47.33∗∗∗ -3.157 -22.14∗∗
(7.024) (6.904) (7.444) (10.105) (12.922) (12.800) (7.704) (8.292)
q50
EBA & AGOA -1.091∗∗∗ -0.955∗ -1.237∗∗ -0.138 -0.695 -0.489 -1.176∗∗∗ -0.932∗∗∗
(0.282) (0.386) (0.401) (0.525) (0.543) (0.466) (0.270) (0.213)
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Constant -29.04∗∗∗ -17.50∗∗ -20.35∗∗ -16.75∗∗ -25.13 -15.06 -1.289 -7.002
(7.811) (6.100) (6.761) (6.353) (13.372) (10.069) (6.572) (4.772)
q75
EBA & AGOA -1.584∗∗∗ -0.470 -1.226∗∗ 0.151 -1.785∗ -0.109 -1.278∗∗∗ -0.783∗∗
(0.273) (0.348) (0.388) (0.689) (0.719) (0.613) (0.270) (0.241)
Constant -13.87∗∗ -16.91∗∗ -5.294 -11.53 -2.655 -12.03 5.667 -4.175
(5.032) (5.597) (5.542) (8.856) (9.992) (7.402) (6.371) (3.588)
q95
EBA & AGOA -3.378∗∗∗ -1.031 -1.385 1.098 -1.101 -0.758 -1.492∗∗∗ -0.345
(0.805) (0.877) (1.011) (0.833) (0.731) (0.927) (0.365) (0.556)
Constant 4.296 -16.28 13.12 -16.65 39.34∗ 5.986 15.07∗ 1.202
(6.235) (10.935) (11.458) (10.872) (16.664) (11.902) (6.083) (6.521)
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mundlak Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 438 411 393 394 447 334 465 460
Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications in parenthesis. Dependent variable is USA/EU export ratio. Quantiles selected are .25, .50 .75 & .95. Controls
include: English, Spanish & landlocked dummies, logs of distance (weighted), area & GDP. ’All’ indicates that all AGOA beneficiaries are included irrespective
of whether they are removed from the programme. ’In & Out’ are countries that are removed from the programme at least once. ’Always’ are countries that have
consistently been recipients from the beginning of the programme (i.e. from 2001/2003). ’EBA & AGOA’ are countries that are both members of AGOA and
EBA and have continuously been beneficiaries. AMDS–Agriculture, meat and dairy, seafood; FBTWP–Food, beverages, tobacco, wood, paper; EI–Extractive
industries; CPR–Chemicals, plastics, rubber; TALF–Textiles, apparel, leather, footwear; ISOM–Iron, steel, and other metals; METE–Machinery, electronics,
transportation equipment; OI–Other industries. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 5.18: Quantile regression: USA/EU export ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
AMDS FBTWP EI CPR TALF ISOM METE OI
q25
Always in AGOA -1.687∗∗∗ -1.158∗∗∗ -0.554∗ 0.488 -1.276∗∗∗ -0.633 -0.605∗ -0.699∗∗
(0.337) (0.281) (0.259) (0.403) (0.360) (0.413) (0.247) (0.216)
Constant -35.14∗∗∗ -25.61∗∗∗ -12.20∗ -25.18∗∗ -54.55∗∗∗ -40.56∗∗ -7.769 -9.082
(6.267) (6.463) (5.959) (7.831) (11.748) (13.086) (6.068) (6.795)
q50
Always in AGOA -1.879∗∗∗ -1.047∗∗∗ -0.972∗∗∗ -0.000511 -0.553 -0.475 -0.836∗∗∗ -0.702∗∗∗
(0.203) (0.183) (0.292) (0.301) (0.451) (0.358) (0.219) (0.178)
Constant -21.11∗∗∗ -15.97∗∗∗ -8.337 -22.54∗∗∗ -20.72 -15.62 -6.812 -8.720∗
(5.572) (3.966) (6.057) (5.041) (10.688) (9.077) (5.039) (3.792)
q75
Always in AGOA -2.049∗∗∗ -1.103∗∗∗ -0.427 -0.424 -0.605 -0.580 -0.884∗∗∗ -0.309
(0.243) (0.256) (0.257) (0.313) (0.652) (0.415) (0.214) (0.190)
Constant -9.708∗ -14.53∗∗ 6.623 -9.094 -16.75 -9.938 0.828 -4.355
(4.189) (5.004) (6.382) (5.849) (10.346) (5.766) (5.272) (3.397)
q95
Always in AGOA -3.112∗∗∗ -1.926∗∗∗ -0.356 -0.462 -0.784 -0.956 -0.410 -0.221
(0.230) (0.306) (0.605) (0.515) (0.670) (0.615) (0.234) (0.245)
Constant 5.978 -11.92 16.22 -7.437 34.45 2.907 9.143∗ -0.735
(5.944) (8.759) (12.094) (8.206) (18.466) (7.776) (4.632) (6.211)
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mundlak Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 548 524 509 507 564 441 584 580
Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications in parenthesis. Dependent variable is USA/EU export ratio. Quantiles selected are .25, .50 .75 & .95. Controls include:
English, Spanish & landlocked dummies, logs of distance (weighted), area & GDP. ’All’ indicates that all AGOA beneficiaries are included irrespective of whether they
are removed from the programme. ’In & Out’ are countries that are removed from the programme at least once. ’Always’ are countries that have consistently been
recipients from the beginning of the programme (i.e. from 2001/2003). ’EBA & AGOA’ are countries that are both members of AGOA and EBA and have continuously
been beneficiaries. AMDS–Agriculture, meat and dairy, seafood; FBTWP–Food, beverages, tobacco, wood, paper; EI–Extractive industries; CPR–Chemicals, plastics,
rubber; TALF–Textiles, apparel, leather, footwear; ISOM–Iron, steel, and other metals; METE–Machinery, electronics, transportation equipment; OI–Other industries.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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5.4.6 Robustness
Our earlier results in the previous section did not take into account the time AGOA was provided to
beneficiary countries. Thus, we defined four treatment variables to account for pooling all AGOA
countries together. In this section, we resort to the SITC revision 1 data on (mirror) exports to
the USA to provide a longer time dimension to study the impact of the preferences. Secondly, we
categorise exports into “total (including crude oil and products)” and “non-oil” exports. This way
we can show the importance of oil exports in the performance of the AGOA preference. Table
(5.19) provides the results for the robustness analysis18. The first two columns use the full sample
period, 1975 – 2012. Columns three and four are based on data for the period 2000 – 2012 (to be
consistent with the previous sections) while the last two columns use data for the period 1990 –
2012. One key issue, is to check whether the choice of the time period is sensitive to observing
the heterogeneity among the AGOA exporters found in the earlier sections. In this section, the full
difference-in-difference design is adopted—given that, we provide data prior to the provision of
AGOA unlike the earlier sections. The earlier sections were mainly concerned with post AGOA
outcomes by comparing countries that had been matched with the control countries based on a
propensity score from the previous chapter. In this section, the countries used in the analysis are
based on the pool of countries used in the synthetic control analysis of the previous chapter. Data
constraints led to the final number of countries being 65—made up of 38 control and 27 treated
countries.
The results in terms of the heterogeneity are no different from the earlier results. In summary
we find the impact to be different across the estimated quantiles and figure (5.19) supports this
assertion. All six panels in the figure show that at least one of the estimated quantile coefficients
is significantly different from the other quantile coefficients. This can be verified in the graph by
observing how the quantile coefficient plot extends beyond the OLS confidence bands at both the
upper and lower limits. In fact, for the total exports—which includes oil exports, several of the
estimated quantile coefficients in the plot fall outside the OLS confidence bands compared to the
plots that exclude oil exports. This is visible at both ends of the distribution as well as at the middle
of the distribution. Given that our control countries include large oil exporters such as Venezuela,
Saudi Arabia and other smaller oil exporting countries it may not be surprising to find these results
at the lower quantiles. However, given the composition of control countries the large impact at
the top of the distribution does inform us of how competitive the AGOA oil exporters are in the
American market. Besides, these countries have enough capacity to match some of the largest oil
producers in the world and others who are much closer (in distance) to the USA. The exclusion of
oil, therefore eliminates the positive impact even though we do observe that the quantile coefficient
estimates are dissimilar over the distribution of exports.
Figure (5.19) provides evidence to support the difference in the impact at the various quantiles
estimated. Although table (5.19) shows only five estimated quantiles, figure (5.19) provides
18The treated countries in the table include: Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Republic
of Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda,
Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Zambia. The
control countries are: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brunei, Comoros, Egypt, Fiji, India,
Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Macao, Malaysia, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, New Caledonia,
Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka,
Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Venezuela.
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additional estimates at the other quantiles of interest. The quantile plots do show that, there are
large scale shifts—essentially, there is an observed increase (and in other cases decrease) in the size
of the quantile coefficients. Similarly, we find location shifts in a few plots such as panels (a), (b),
(c) and (f) between the 30th and 60th quantiles. The other graphs do not show obvious location
shifts although over a small range of quantile coefficients we observe short horizontal sections of
the quantile coefficient plot. We now describe the results from the table.
The results in table (5.19) points to the robustness of our earlier results. For both non-oil and
total (including oil) exports, the impact of AGOA on beneficiary countries varies according to the
position of the beneficiary on the export distribution. For non-oil exports we observe a significant
and negative coefficient at all quantiles of the export distribution. An implication of this result is
that non-oil exports to the USA of the treated countries are lower compared to the control countries
at the quantiles estimated holding all else constant. This finds support in the literature and in our
previous tables. On the contrary, total exports (including oil) shows a different picture at the upper
tail of the distribution. Including oil in the export values, changes the impact at the 90th and 95th
percentiles to become positive. Thereby indicating that, countries at the 90th and 95th percentiles
compared to the control countries have higher exports to the USA all things equal. In spite of this
difference across the non-oil and total export outcomes the coefficients are significantly different
across the estimated quantiles in both cases.
The result shows the importance of oil in the exports of the recipients and further supports our
results in the previous chapter. Thus, oil exporting countries are driving the positive coefficients
observed at the top end of the distribution. The same cannot be said of non-oil exports—the
composition of the exporters at the top end are exporting comparatively lower values to the USA
and hence unable to push up the gains at the top part of the distribution. Comparing the composition
of these countries we find that Nigeria, Angola, Chad, Gabon, and Republic of Congo in the
previous chapter showed higher exports than their synthetic counterparts. However, for these same
group of countries the exclusion of oil exports left them out of the top five and also had lower
exports than their synthetic counterparts. Nigeria is the only member of this group that remains in
the top five for the mean non-oil exports over the post agoa period. Of note is that, the magnitude
of the impact for non-oil is larger at the top of the distribution—indicating that the losses are larger
for the top 5% – 10% of AGOA exporters. Similarly, the magnitude is larger at the top end for total
exports—indicating that the gains obtained by the top AGOA exporters are larger in absolute value
when compared to the losses by the beneficiaries at the other quantiles estimated.
In table (5.19), the coefficient estimates at the 95th quantile are 2, 0.9, 2.9, 1.3, 2.5, and 1.7
times the 25th quantile coefficient estimates in columns (1) – (6). Apart from column (2) having
a smaller coefficient in absolute value than the 25th quantile coefficient, all remaining columns
show quite larger coefficient values compared to the 25th quantile as the numbers above show.
In terms of non-oil exports, the 95th quantile estimates are negative and significant in all three
columns. In columns (1), (3) and (5) the AGOA countries show 84.3%, 82.7% and 78.6% lower
exports to the USA compared to the control countries, and all things equal. Using sub-periods
of our 1975–2012 sample in this section, does not change the signs of the estimated coefficients
neither does it eliminate the unequal impact at the various quantiles estimated. One exception is
the 75th quantile coefficient in column (4)—we observe a positive but insignificant coefficient.
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The implication of this is that, our results of an unequal impact is robust to time as well as to the
composition of the control countries included in the regressions. Extending the time period to
2012—two years beyond the analysis in the previous section has not affected the conclusions of the
previous section. The unequal impact at the various quantiles of exports remain. The impacts are
similar across the total export outcomes across the three columns—columns (2), (4) and (6). All
things equal, the impact at the 95th quantile implies that, the AGOA countries have 104%, 120.7%
and 101.8% higher exports to the USA relative to the control countries. We attribute the positive
impact at the 90th and 95th quantiles to the inclusion of oil exports in the dependent variable—total
exports. This as explained previously is driven by the oil exporting countries, namely, Angola,
Chad, Gabon and Nigeria among others. These countries are among the top ranked AGOA exporters
and hence are among the largest SSA exporters to the USA.
The impacts at the 75th quantile and below are all negative and significant with the exception of
the 75th quantile coefficients in columns (2) and (4) for total exports. At the 25th quantile, AGOA
countries have 59.8%, 53.9%, 45.2%, 45.2% 46.4% and 45.4% lower exports compared to the
control countries all things equal in columns (1)–(6) respectively. At the median the impacts are
53.4%, 51%, 54.7%, 29.7%, 54.5% and 40.1% in all six columns respectively. Indicating that in
some columns the median impact is only marginally larger (or smaller) in magnitude in the table.
The lower impact implies that countries finding themselves at the 75th quantile and below have
not been able to increase their exports above that of the control countries. This follows from our
argument that very few AGOA countries actually find an appreciable increase in their exports over
the period.
One explanation we can provide here for the results is that the countries at these points of the
export distribution are unable to sustain the increased exports they enjoyed initially after taking
part in the programme. Another explanation could be the increased capacity and competitiveness
of the control countries. The majority of the control countries accessing the USA market do not
enjoy the tariff preferences that the AGOA countries enjoy, thus, they put in a lot more effort at
reducing costs and raising capacity to export more to the USA market. As explained earlier, at the
top of the distribution the AGOA countries have large oil exporting capacities and their oil sectors
are largely owned and managed by foreign multinational companies thereby providing them an
advantage over the control countries—both in terms of capacity, managerial know-how and foreign
direct investments. A probable distinction that can also be made and that may explain the impact
of AGOA given our quantile regression is the pricing of exports. Oil products are generally sold
at world prices that is largely affected by the actions of the organization of petroleum exporting
countries (OPEC) in restricting output while the majority of the non-oil exports of the AGOA
countries depend to a great extent on prices determined in the world market with no recourse to
change those prices by restricting output.
In the next section, we provide a general discussion of the results and tie-in the results to the
five questions posed in the introduction to this chapter.
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Table 5.19: Robustness: Quantile regression estimates–Non-Oil vs. Total exports, 1975 – 2012
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Non-Oil1 Total1 Non-Oil2 Total2 Non-Oil3 Total3
q25
AGOA Treatment -0.910∗∗∗ -0.775∗∗∗ -0.602∗∗∗ -0.601∗∗∗ -0.623∗∗∗ -0.605∗∗∗
(0.146) (0.154) (0.166) (0.172) (0.144) (0.162)
GDP (logs) 0.995∗∗∗ 0.823∗∗∗ 0.360 -0.0227 0.518∗∗∗ 0.599∗∗
(0.123) (0.156) (0.348) (0.309) (0.143) (0.194)
Constant -47.86∗∗∗ -36.55∗∗∗ -49.82∗∗∗ -38.45∗∗∗ -50.14∗∗∗ -37.03∗∗∗
(3.207) (2.510) (4.018) (4.348) (3.466) (3.504)
q50
AGOA Treatment -0.764∗∗∗ -0.713∗∗∗ -0.791∗∗∗ -0.353∗ -0.787∗∗∗ -0.513∗∗∗
(0.152) (0.129) (0.136) (0.141) (0.133) (0.132)
GDP (logs) 0.968∗∗∗ 1.095∗∗∗ -0.0353 0.644 0.611∗∗ 0.727∗∗
(0.135) (0.157) (0.363) (0.364) (0.188) (0.236)
Constant -38.06∗∗∗ -27.42∗∗∗ -37.72∗∗∗ -25.35∗∗∗ -39.20∗∗∗ -26.03∗∗∗
(2.899) (2.199) (4.590) (4.263) (3.280) (2.889)
q75
AGOA Treatment -1.306∗∗∗ -0.517 -1.192∗∗∗ 0.171 -0.954∗∗∗ -0.264
(0.114) (0.274) (0.185) (0.357) (0.142) (0.316)
GDP (logs) 0.854∗∗∗ 1.080∗∗∗ 0.0928 1.279 0.357 1.361∗∗
(0.184) (0.208) (0.366) (0.826) (0.211) (0.475)
Constant -26.34∗∗∗ -7.315∗∗ -27.07∗∗∗ -9.882 -25.56∗∗∗ -9.699∗
(1.908) (2.660) (2.874) (5.427) (2.199) (4.551)
q90
AGOA Treatment -1.632∗∗∗ 0.872∗∗∗ -1.635∗∗∗ 0.684∗∗ -1.352∗∗∗ 0.772∗∗∗
(0.166) (0.184) (0.160) (0.215) (0.123) (0.187)
GDP (logs) 0.622∗∗ 0.780∗∗∗ 0.0910 0.501 -0.0423 0.570∗
(0.193) (0.158) (0.399) (0.497) (0.236) (0.254)
Constant -23.51∗∗∗ -1.178 -21.81∗∗∗ 5.068 -21.71∗∗∗ -0.202
(2.877) (2.665) (3.855) (5.090) (3.733) (3.621)
q95
AGOA Treatment -1.850∗∗∗ 0.713∗∗ -1.757∗∗∗ 0.792∗∗∗ -1.543∗∗∗ 1.011∗∗∗
(0.156) (0.240) (0.198) (0.220) (0.190) (0.235)
GDP (logs) 0.517∗∗∗ 0.601∗∗∗ -0.364 0.694 -0.273 0.257
(0.153) (0.139) (0.372) (0.392) (0.203) (0.195)
Constant -19.31∗∗∗ -4.336 -17.19∗∗∗ 6.384 -15.46∗∗∗ 5.452
(3.103) (3.508) (3.042) (5.538) (3.341) (4.688)
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mundlak Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2295 2295 820 820 1443 1443
Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications in parenthesis. Dependent variables is imports by USA. Quantiles selected are 0.25, 0.50
0.75 0.90 & 0.95. Other Controls not shown include: log of weighted distance, log of area, English, Spanish & landlocked dummies. AGOA
dummy = 1 in year of provision and zero otherwise. Countries provided AGOA in December of the year of provision are coded as having
AGOA the following year. 1 : Data is for the period 1975 - 2012. 2 : Data is for the period 2000 - 2012. 3 : Data is for the period 1990 - 2012.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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5.4.7 General discussion
In returning to our initial questions at the beginning of this chapter, we note that the results have
answered majority of the questions we had in mind when we designed the empirical analysis in
this chapter. Textile, apparel, leather and footwear products have not shown any positive impact
so far. This finding is supported in recent work by McKay (2012); Rotunno et al. (2012) among
others. This points to the fact that, AGOA beneficiaries are not as competitive in the apparel and
textile market as has been shown in the past. Essentially, the initial gains of the apparel and textile
preferences have not been sustained throughout the period. An indication that China is not their
only competition but also, other Asian and Caribbean Basin countries do export more of the TALF
products. It must be noted that, their position in this sector has been due to a number of factors
including but not limited to, the removal of the multifibre arrangement (MFA), the inclusion of
similar apparel and textile preferences in programmes offered to the Caribbean Basin countries and
the new competition that has arisen as a result. Nonetheless, China is able to export directly to the
USA given the removal of the MFA19. We summarise the evidence for each question below.
• Have the exports of AGOA recipients suffered to other destinations as a result of the
AGOA preference? Our results do not indicate that the exports to the EU has suffered due to
the AGOA preference. However, from the results based on the ratio of USA to ROW exports,
the positive coefficients indicate that relatively more exporting to the USA has occurred
compared to ROW. This might be an indication that, the AGOA recipients are sacrificing
exports to other destinations (excluding EU) to increase their exports to the USA given that
they receive limited preferential tariffs in destinations other than the USA and EU. The
competitive preferences provided by the EU has helped AGOA countries maintain if not
increase their current exports to the EU.
• Are there any differences in the impact across the various quantiles of the export dis-
tribution? The results show that there are significant differences across the distribution of
total exports to the USA. We do also find some of these differences in particular products
such as the extractive industry; agricultural, meat, dairy and seafod; food, beverages, tobacco,
wood and paper; chemicals, plastics and rubber; textiles, apparel, leather and footwear; iron,
steel, and other metals; and machinery, electronics and transportation equipment products.
The heterogeneous nature of AGOA can therefore be seen in the scale shifts present in the
plots of the quantile coefficients shown in the results section. Although in some parts of the
plots we find location shifts which indicate that the estimated coefficients remain the same
across the quantiles estimated. The evidence supports larger magnitudes of the impact at the
top half of the distribution of exports.
• What factors explain the “raw” gap between exports of AGOA and non-AGOA recip-
ients? Much of the difference in the treated and control countries can be explained by
covariate and coefficient differences between the two groups. While the coefficient differ-
ences exert a positive effect on the difference between the two, the covariate difference
more than offsets the positive effect to send the total effect below zero and thus the negative
19McKay (2012); Rotunno et al. (2012) provide more details on issues related to the apparel and textile preferences.
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impacts observed in the tables presented earlier in the chapter. Arguably, more could be done
to further decompose these effects. However, that is beyond the current analysis and would
be explored in future work
• Is the quantile impact affected by the choice of countries used as the counter-factual?
Additional results in the appendix point to the robustness of our estimates. The heterogeneous
effects as well as the significance and signs of the coefficients are for the most part maintained
when additional countries are included in the analysis. Furthermore, excluding the top
products, although removes the positive impact still shows that there is an unequal effect
across the distribution. Moreover, the robustness section provides results for a longer time
period based on 27 treated and 38 control countries. These changes in the composition of
the treated and control countries did not eliminate the differences observed in the estimated
coefficients across the various quantiles estimated.
• Is the AGOA impact only present for apparel & textiles and crude oil exporting coun-
tries? The results of the product analysis finds no positive impacts for apparel and textile
producers. On the contrary, oil exporters experience the largest gains of AGOA. The crude
oil producers together with other extractive industry exporters do experience gains at the 75th
and 95th quantiles of the export distribution of the product. They are thus, more competitive
in the American market compared to their counterparts that are not AGOA beneficiaries.
We find that the extractive industry is the main driver of the export gains found at the 95th
percentile when the exports to the USA of AGOA countries is compared to the counter-factual
(or control) countries in the sample. Nonetheless, another product that tends to show some
promise and for which gains are observed at the median (and 25th quantile) is the food,
beverages, tobacco, wood and paper products sector. Furthermore, gains to agriculture, meat,
dairy and seafood products are at the 25th and 50th quantiles in one case. As the recent
literature shows, the possible explanation for the poor performance of apparel and textiles, is
the removal of the multi-fibre arrangement (MFA) and the fact that China no longer faces
quotas in the American market for apparel and textile products. Again, the robustness section
lends support to the fact that oil exports are driving the gains in AGOA. Excluding oil exports
eliminate any gains observed at the top of the distribution. Despite observing the gains in
the two clusters, FBWTP and AMDS earlier in the product results—these products found
within the non-oil exports are unable to drive up the gains for the AGOA exporters in table
(5.19). In this case, the gains in these clusters are probably not high enough to offset the
comparatively lower exports in the other clusters compared to the control countries.
The insights we obtain from the analysis in this chapter are that (a) the distribution of benefits
to recipients of AGOA is unequal with larger exporters and crude oil exporting countries reaping
majority of these benefits; (b) the composition of AGOA (in terms of whether these countries
consistently maintain the preference throughout the sample or are removed from the preference a
number of times) countries does not change the impact of AGOA in major ways. In other words,
excluding countries that do not enjoy the AGOA preference consistently or maintaining them in
the analysis does not change the impact of AGOA neither does it remove the unequal distribution
of the impact towards oil exporting countries. The differences in the impact are marginal at best—
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indicating that compositional effects of the choice of AGOA countries does not affect the quantile
results; (c) the comparator countries (in this case the counter-factual countries) do not change the
result that the impact is heterogeneous; (d) the choice of products included in the analysis are
key to the gains observed for the AGOA countries. The gains are concentrated in a few products.
Inclusion of crude oil products widen the unequal benefits—thereby leading to large inequalities in
exports of the AGOA recipients. Generally, countries exporting the products offering the gains are
the exporters that tend to enjoy the most benefits of their AGOA status.
The lessons therefore in analysing AGOA is that, the choice of countries is not a major deciding
factor in the impact of AGOA. It may lead to a reduction of the AGOA impact but does not entirely
eliminate it when the comparison is with other developing countries. In terms of methodology, OLS
estimates are likely to be riddled with heteroscedastic standard errors leading to wrong test statistics.
This combined with the outlying exporting countries is likely to overstate the average impact and
statistical significance of any least squares estimation performed. The quantile regression which
tends to be more robust to heteroscedasticity and outliers compared to OLS would be a more
appropriate approach in estimating the impact. A caveat to the quantile regression is that, there have
not been applications of this to gravity models and the presence of incidental parameters makes
it difficult to incorporate country-year fixed effects in the estimated gravity model. The median
estimates in our results above were in almost all cases lower in magnitude compared to the OLS
estimate as shown in the graphs presented. We therefore suggest that in studying the impact of
trade preferences in general (not only AGOA preferences) the median regression results should
be reported together with the least squares or alternative non-linear approaches to provide a more
accurate picture of the impact of the preference. This is mainly because some developing countries
are more able to take advantage of the preferences and thus find themselves among exporting
nations at the upper tails of the export distribution. This is however, more relevant with aggregated
data than with highly disaggregated data (as in chapter 3 for example). One reason is because highly
disaggregated exports have numerous zeros and low values for developing countries, hence other
robust methods such as the Heckman selection or poisson pseudo maximum likelihood models are
required.
5.5 Conclusion
To conclude we have found that the largest exporters to the USA tend to benefit the most from
AGOA. Almost all these exporters (particularly the top five countries) are also crude oil producers
hence cementing their gains through the exports of crude oil and products. Not surprisingly, due to
the recent literature on apparel and textile exports we do not find any significant impact compared
to the counter-factual countries of an upsurge in apparel/textile products relative to the control
countries. More interestingly, the food, beverages, tobacco, wood and paper product sector has
been a more competitive sector for other members of AGOA and these countries find themselves at
the bottom 25th to median quantiles of the distribution of that product. These results generally find
support for the title of this chapter. That is, is there a heterogeneous impact on exports to the USA?
Yes, we find that the impact is unequal and the gains we find for total exports to the USA is at the
top half of the distribution of total exports to the USA.
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There are a few caveats to the current chapter. First, the increase/decrease in impact shown in
the estimations are in comparison to the control countries and do not imply an increase/decrease in
absolute exports by each AGOA country. Rather, they imply that in comparison to a set of countries
similar to the AGOA countries they exported more or less comparatively. Secondly, this is arguably
an initial attempt to explore the unequal distribution of AGOA gains for the recipients. And thus,
our framework requires more work to strengthen our conclusions as well as improve upon our
causal framework. Particularly, we do need to explore other ways of obtaining robust estimates
for our quantile coefficients based on the panel of countries. Last but not the least, it would be
useful to revisit the decomposition exercise to control for additional covariates as well as identify
whether the decomposition has been influenced by unobserved factors. In this regard, researchers
can again draw upon existing studies in the labour field employing selection methods to control for
unobserved factors and endogeneity. These are areas of interest that would be explored in future
work.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
6.1 Summary
In this thesis, we have provided an analysis of the impact of the African Growth and Opportunity Act
(AGOA) and Caribbean Basin Trade Protection Act (CBTPA) trade preferences for the beneficiary
countries. We provided a different approach to analysing the impact of trade preferences. A
quantitative summary of the literature is provided in chapter 2 where we undertake a meta-analysis
of the literature supported by a meta-regression. The meta-analysis shows that the pooled effect of
AGOA on exports is positive and approximately 12.8%. A subsequent meta-regression analysing
the variation in reported study effects shows that, the large differences in reported coefficients is
due to differences across study designs. For instance, the econometric techniques, sample size,
number of years of data, number of countries, the presence of country effects, robust standard errors,
level of product disaggregation, and whether the dependent variable is in logs all contribute to the
differences in reported coefficients and t-statistics. In sum, these factors either contribute to larger
reported t-statistics or the reduction of the reported t-statistics leading to insignificant estimates. We
do not find conclusive evidence on publication bias. Despite having funnel plots showing graphical
evidence of publication bias—formal tests of publication bias is inconclusive in this study. In
addition, evidence on a true empirical effect beyond publication bias is also inconclusive. The
results on publication bias and the empirical effects are attributed to the small number of studies
included in the analysis. It would be useful to acquire more studies to allow for a more conclusive
analysis of publication bias and the true empirical effects of AGOA.
The CBTPA preferences were analysed together with the AGOA preferences in chapter 3. The
focus of the chapter was to investigate whether the preferences led to higher exports to the USA
compared to exports of the beneficiaries to the rest of the world. Drawing upon and extending
the empirical approach by Collier and Venables (2007) we determine whether the preferences led
to higher exports. The results indicate that, the preferences had a positive impact on exports to
the USA. We also find that, the HS-6 and HS-2 levels of disaggregation provide more consistent
estimates compared to the HS-4 estimates that tend to switch signs across the models estimated.
The results indicate that at higher levels of aggregation the regressors were correlated thereby
reducing the number of significant estimates in the regression. A related finding shows that the
random effects model yields inconsistent parameter estimates which were twice the estimates of the
fixed effects, Mundlak corrected random effects and Heckman selection models. Meanwhile the
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Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood was the most efficient—thus, providing the lowest standard
errors. The second (chapter 4) and third (chapter 5) empirical chapters focus on the impact of
AGOA on the beneficiaries.
In chapter 4 we adopted the propensity score matching and exact matching approaches found
in the evaluation literature. These methods provide a convenient approach to constructing a set of
counter-factual countries that the AGOA beneficiaries can be compared with. The results based
on these two approaches indicate lower exports by the AGOA countries compared to the counter-
factual. We did not find evidence of an increase in exports to the USA due to AGOA. In terms
of the various product clusters we do not find a positive impact. For instance, two clusters—the
extractive industry and textiles, apparel, leather and footwear clusters did not show any increase
in exports due to AGOA. This was contrary to our expectations. While the extractive industry
cluster was never significant, the significant estimated treatment effects for the textile cluster was
always negative. We attribute the non-significance and negative impact to the crowding-out effects
occurring—due to averages calculated by combining the treated countries and the products within
the clusters. One issue in terms of the product clusters, is that, the extractive industry included
other extractive type products such as minerals and ore among others. The textile cluster included
footwear and leather products which we believe led to the lower mean values for the cluster.
Essentially, the additional products included within these clusters for our analysis led to the
mean for these product clusters to be lower due to the additional products that were not key exports
of the AGOA beneficiaries. As a result, we proposed an alternative approach to investigate the
impact of AGOA. The synthetic control method due to Abadie et al. (2010); Abadie and Gardeazabal
(2003) was adopted. The approach allowed us to focus on each treated country and follow the
evolution of its exports over the sample period. Using this approach we found a positive impact
of AGOA for some of the top five AGOA exporters to the USA. Oil products were the key to the
benefits—and the major oil exporters such as Angola, Nigeria and Congo showed a positive impact
of the preference. Kenya was the only non-oil exporting country to have seen an increase in their
non-oil exports relative to the counter-factual.
Finally, chapter 5 investigating the same issue using a quantile regression shows that, the
benefits have been unequal among the recipients. As observed in the latter part of chapter 4, very
few countries and mainly oil exporting countries are the largest AGOA exporters. The majority of
AGOA countries have relatively lower exports to the USA—and these countries in mean regressions
tend to underestimate the overall impact of AGOA. The quantile analysis reveals that the benefits
of the preference can be found at the upper tail of the export distribution. This indicates that, the
countries benefiting from their AGOA status are mainly the large exporters to the USA. Furthermore,
the countries benefiting are the countries exporting crude oil products—with a few exceptions such
as South Africa. The large disparity between the countries leads to our conclusion that, the benefits
from AGOA are heterogeneous and concentrated among a few countries rather than all countries
provided the preference. Additional results explaining the difference we find between the AGOA
and non-AGOA countries shows that, differences in the characteristics of the countries and the
differences in the coefficients explain the total difference in the export distribution between the
AGOA and non-AGOA countries.
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6.2 Lessons and contribution of the thesis
The major contribution of the thesis is the new approach of analysing the impact of AGOA and
adjusting for the heterogeneity in the uptake of AGOA. We summarise the insights as follows: (a)
the distribution of benefits to recipients of AGOA is unequal with larger exporters and crude oil
exporting countries reaping the majority of these benefits; (b) the composition of AGOA countries
(in terms of whether these countries consistently maintain the preference throughout the sample or
are removed from the preference a number of times) does not change the impact of AGOA in major
ways. In other words, excluding countries that do not enjoy the AGOA preference consistently or
maintaining them in the analysis does not change the impact of AGOA neither does it remove the
unequal distribution of the impact towards oil exporting countries. The differences in the impact are
marginal at best—indicating that compositional effects of the choice of AGOA countries does not
affect the quantile results; (c) the comparator countries (in this case the counter-factual countries)
do not change the result that the impact is heterogeneous; (d) the choice of products included in the
analysis are key to the gains observed for the AGOA countries. The gains are concentrated in a
few products. Inclusion of crude oil products widen the unequal benefits—thereby leading to large
inequalities in exports of the AGOA recipients. Generally, countries exporting the products offering
the gains are the exporters that tend to enjoy the most benefits of their AGOA status.
The analysis shows that the level of disaggregation is important in identifying the impact of
the preference. Given that preferences are provided at the tariff level requires the use of data with
high levels of disaggregation. The analysis in chapter 3 shows that using aggregated levels of data
can cloud the impact and potentially make the impact seem larger than they are. Nonetheless, the
highly disaggregated data can fail to show an impact due to the small number of exports observed
at that level. Thus, to identify the impact it is useful to think about whether the effect being studied
is hypothesised at the tariff level or at a more aggregated level.
Moreover, the results also show that AGOA countries are more competitive in the European
market than the CBTPA countries. The same cannot be said of the American market. The CBTPA
countries on average, are more competitive with higher exports compared to the AGOA countries
in the American market. Again, this might be due to the close proximity of the CBTPA countries to
the American market as well as the additional preferences America has provided them.
Last but not the least, much of the positive impact on exports is due to temporary switching of
exports between preference programmes offered by the USA as well as switching between countries
offering preferences. Thus for example the USA offers AGOA and CBTPA beneficiaries access
to the GSP preference. Haiti for example, has access to the HOPE initiative and least developed
countries have access to special GSP preferences providing them further tariff preferences over
and above that of the GSP. Such competing preferences by the same country leads to recipients
switching between preference programmes they can access1. The same applies in the case of the EU
whereby some GSP recipients can additionally receive EBA and GSP+ preferences. The competing
preferences can also be across countries. Some SSA countries receiving the EBA preferences, for
example, can find the AGOA preferences to have competitive tariff rates comparable to the EBA
1Aside from the competing preferences, also the MFN tariff rates can be quite close to the preferential rates. In cases
where they are as attractive as the preferential rates countries avoid using them due to their excessive rules of origin and
other bureaucratic obstacles.
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and in some cases and for some products actually offer much more appealing rules of origin and
tariff rates. In such cases, countries are more likely to switch exports from the EU to the USA in
those products.
Finally, a key contribution to the literature is in terms of methodology. We have looked at the
impact of AGOA by adopting tools from the evaluation literature that is yet to be introduced in
studying the impact of trade preferences. These tools include the propensity score matching, exact
matching and synthetic control methods from the evaluation literature. Also, our use of the quantile
regression framework in the previous chapter provides new insights on the impact of AGOA that
have been summarised above. We believe these tools can be extended and improved upon to analyse
trade preferences in general.
6.3 Policy implications
In designing trade preferences developed countries should take into account that, the impact varies
across the export distribution. Much of the initial impact of the trade preference is not sustained
throughout the initial years after the provision of the preference. For developing countries, in
signing up for trade preferences, they should bear in mind what the impact is on their exports to
other destinations. In the short run exports are mainly switched from other destinations to the
destination offering the most attractive preferences. In order to maintain the level of exports in the
longer run, developing countries need to provide supporting policy that creates an environment
favourable for increased production and industrial activity. This way, the short run increases in
exports to the preference giving country is sustained and not lost due to a return to the status
quo. The preference recipients can scale-up exports and maintain the higher level of exports in the
long-run.
However, it is the view of the author that, trade policy should not focus on solely taking
advantage of these preferences. Trade policy should additionally look at developing relationships
with countries that might be in close proximity and thus be less costly to export in terms of distance
and transportation costs. Some of these countries are neighbours of the AGOA countries as well
as nearby countries in North Africa and the Middle East. It would be useful for AGOA recipients
(not only AGOA recipients but other African and Caribbean Basin countries in general) to develop
these relationships that have been forgotten and left to the occasional historical trade relations
with neighbours. Developing these trading relationships would go a long way in maintaining
long run established trade and the South’s share in world trade. Nonetheless, in carrying this out,
each of these countries would have to make a concerted effort to determine their comparative
advantage and provide forward and backward linkages with industry in their respective countries.
Taking advantage of these linkages would also put them in a better position to take advantage
of the preferences offered in the EU and USA markets as well as meet some of their current
capacity constraints. For SSA countries, this should not be difficult since the various regions on
the continent (East, West, Central, Southern) already either have existing common markets or free
trade agreements. This is one way to take advantage of these common market arrangements. It is
time for the SSA countries to go beyond having an agreement on paper to actually implementing it
in practice.
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6.3.1 Implications for the USA
A useful question is, what is the EU doing that is enabling SSA countries to be more competitive
in their markets compared to the American market as provided in the literature (for example, Di
Rubbo and Canali, 2008; Nilsson, 2005)? There are several trade policy initiatives, trading and
political relationships fostered a number of decades ago between SSA countries and countries in
Europe. One advantage the EU has over the USA is its past relationship with its former colonies in
Africa. This has been found to be one of the strong predictors of trade in gravity models. Secondly,
language also shows up as increasing trade among countries. English speaking countries should
therefore not have a disadvantage in the American market given that English is the lingua franca of
the USA. Nonetheless, the distance to the USA compared to the EU market could be one of the
obstacles reducing the competitiveness of SSA countries in the American market. For instance, the
Caribbean Basin and South American countries are in close proximity to the American market than
the SSA countries. Thus, the USA need not only focus on tariffs but look at other ways to reduce
the export costs of the SSA countries. As discussed in the rules of origin literature, this can be one
avenue for reducing the costs of the SSA countries.
Another means of reducing these costs is to allow greater cumulation of production among
not only the SSA countries but also allow them to access inputs from cheaper sources even if
they are from countries the USA does not provide preferences. This way production costs for
the SSA countries would be reduced compared to sourcing inputs from higher cost countries.
The advantages gained by the SSA countries might be much higher than any gains by the source
countries outside the cumulation arrangements. A final option would be to tailor preferences to
the key products exported by developing countries—especially for the small exporters. This way
they can be provided specific tariff preferences that would be more relevant to the products they
export rather than the generic preferences that are currently in vogue. This would arguably not find
favour with preference providers and would involve an increase in the administrative costs of the
preferences. However, it is most likely that, the benefits to the small exporters would outweigh
these costs.
6.3.2 Implication for preference beneficiaries
There is the need to diversify exports to the USA and find ways of reducing the costs of exporting to
the USA—as well as maintain information to provide to exporters, to take advantage of new market
opportunities. This calls for increased investments in production for exports which can be pursued
by providing incentives to investors. Most SSA countries have free zone areas that provide some
support and incentives to exporters. However, these free zones must be made incentive compatible
to provide exporters the necessary impetus to export to other markets. There are also a number of
small family owned business. It is useful to keep these businesses unique and for them to maintain
their identity. One way they can scale up their exports to the European and American markets is by
forming joint co-operatives with other small/family businesses in neighbouring countries (as well
as within their own countries) to export or meet the demand for American imports. These informal
amalgamations would definitely provide more advantages than having a single family business
trying to export African prints to Walmart, for example. The informal group of small businesses
would together be able to meet the demand and produce consistently their individual shares of the
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collective exports. The guaranteed share of exports can actually facilitate their expansion as they
would be in a better position to attract financing from the banks. Moreover, by joining forces they
can enhance their chances of winning supply contracts with some of the large retail chains in the
American and European markets.
6.4 Concluding comments
The analysis carried out in the thesis is not without its limitation. We note that readers might
be worried about issues of endogeneity in chapter 3. In the empirical trade literature it is rather
challenging to find appropriate instruments for endogenous trade-related variables. Having said
this, we tried to solve issues of endogeneity by using lags of the suspect regressors. There were also
hardware issues that limited the number of products we could include in the analysis of chapter 3.
Hopefully, with more computing resources and adequate computer memory it would be possible to
extend the analysis of the chapter to all HS-6 digit products. In chapter 4, we find that in a number
of cases, hidden biases lead to unsatisfactory estimates of the treatment effect. This is a challenge
in the evaluation literature and one faced in the chapter. We provide all the necessary information
to give an accurate idea of the extent of the problem—several matching estimators are shown as
well as a simulation of the extent of selection and output effects that can affect our conclusion in
the chapter.
In chapter 5, the main limitation is that, the quantile regression provides inconsistent estimates
in the presence of several regressors. This problem known in the literature as the incidental
parameters problem leads to significant biases that can be made worse by having country-year fixed
effects in the model. Yet, the gravity literature suggests that the country-fixed effects provides an
adequate proxy for the multilateral price resistance terms of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003).
We adopt ad hoc methods to resolve this issue. One such method, is the use of export ratios as the
dependent variable (this is an attempt at approximating the Tetrads approach of Head et al. (2010))
while another, is the Mundlak/Chamberlain type random effect quantile regressions estimated. At
the minimum, we ensure that year dummies are included in all the panel quantile regressions in the
chapter.
The limitations of the thesis discussed above provides opportunity for further research to
address these issues. Particularly, quantile regressions have not been incorporated in the gravity
literature. This is an opportunity to return to the drawing board and link the quantile regression
to the theoretical gravity specification to account for the multilateral resistance terms. Moreover,
the HS-6 digit analysis can be extended to all products to determine whether the selection of the
products have played any role in the estimates provided. Other areas of future work could include
improving upon the quantile decomposition of the impact of AGOA to carefully delineate the
mechanisms identifying the differences between the AGOA and non-AGOA countries. Furthermore,
the decomposition exercises could be extended to panel data as these approaches are developed and
introduced into the mainstream econometric literature. These methods can thus, be extended and
applied to other trade preferences provided to developing countries.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter Two
Table A.1: Summary Statistics
count mean min max
cofficient of agoa reported 179 16.404 -11.92 769.500
standard error of agoa reported 179 19.817 0.000360 1097.127
T-stats for coefficient 179 3.873 -7.579 307.500
T-stats for coefficient (imputed from pvalues) 25 -0.523 -1.656 2.333
number of countries 179 67.212 1 207.000
number of years 179 12.179 1 21.000
number of covariates 179 11.168 2 37.000
N: sample size of analysis 179 3.20e+05 92 9.54e+06
annual==yes 179 0.844 0 1.000
select==yes 179 0.034 0 1.000
published==yes 179 0.486 0 1.000
ctryeffects==yes 179 0.693 0 1.000
timeeffects==yes 179 0.620 0 1.000
csect==yes 179 0.028 0 1.000
otherptas==yes 179 0.425 0 1.000
gravity==yes 179 0.525 0 1.000
preferencedummy==yes 179 0.978 0 1.000
robustse==yes 179 0.425 0 1.000
productfe==yes 179 0.173 0 1.000
indctry==yes 179 0.056 0 1.000
logdepvar==yes 179 0.872 0 1.000
prodgroup==Agriculture 179 0.190 0 1.000
prodgroup==All/Total 179 0.285 0 1.000
Apparel/Textiles/Leather 179 0.140 0 1.000
Energy/Electricity/Chemicals 179 0.095 0 1.000
region==AGOA countries 179 0.547 0 1.000
y==Exports 179 0.475 0 1.000
y==Imports 179 0.492 0 1.000
time freq==Annual 179 0.844 0 1.000
Method==GMM/IV 179 0.207 0 1.000
Method==OLS/Time series 179 0.503 0 1.000
disaggregation==6 digits and above 179 0.279 0 1.000
disaggregation==below 6 digits 179 0.240 0 1.000
disaggregation==Sector totals 179 0.207 0 1.000
start year 179 1994.4 1990 2001
end year 179 2005.6 2001 2010
Observations 179
Base categories are: Other–manufacturing wood, etc for product groups; Heckman/Poisson/Tobit for econometric method; Total
exports/total trade for disaggregation; AGOA plus other countries for region; Total trade and Import dummy for dependent variable
definition; Monthly and quarterly frequency for time frequency. For the dummy variables the ”No” category is the base category.
213
Table A.2: Studies included in the meta-analysis
authors
Collier and Venables (2007) 9
Cooke (2009) 20
Cooke (2014) 20
Frazer and Van Biesebroeck (2010) 4
Giovannetti and Sanfilippo (2009) 22
Lederman and O¨zden (2007) 5
McKay (2012) 4
Mueller (2008) 1
Nouve (2005) 16
Nouve and Staatz (2003) 18
Seyoum (2007) 14
Tadesse and Fayissa (2008) 32
Tadesse et al. (2008) 13
Zappile (2011) 1
N 179
Table A.3: Multilevel meta analysis results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat
precision 0.00522 -1.177∗∗∗ -0.356∗ -1.070 0.662
(0.009) (0.106) (0.159) (1.068) (4.270)
no. of covariates 0.0267∗∗∗ 0.0422∗∗∗ 0.0423∗∗∗ 0.0423∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
product effects = 1 0.808∗∗∗ 0.411∗∗∗ 0.546∗ 0.461+
(0.060) (0.090) (0.230) (0.266)
logged dep. var. = 1 0.765∗∗∗ 0.352∗∗∗ 0.348 0.550
(0.105) (0.081) (0.374) (0.468)
country effects = 1 0.0434 -0.240∗∗ 0.0445 0.109
(0.058) (0.084) (0.376) (0.404)
published = 1 0.102+ 0.0118 -0.0237 -0.0238
(0.057) (0.013) (0.021) (0.021)
N (in logs) -0.00595 0.00225 0.00144
(0.008) (0.019) (0.020)
no. of years (logs) -0.376∗∗∗ -0.376 -0.493
(0.092) (0.437) (0.463)
no. of countries (logs) -0.00673 -0.0208 -0.0206
(0.020) (0.025) (0.025)
annual = 1 1.088∗∗∗ 0.596 -0.352
(0.149) (0.751) (2.206)
time effects = 1 0.00471 -0.00520 -0.00398
(0.066) (0.066) (0.066)
cross section = 1 -3.174∗∗∗ -2.110 -5.394
(0.270) (1.571) (6.317)
other preferences included = 1 0.0534 -0.188 0.877
(0.071) (0.560) (2.179)
gravity regression = 1 -0.371∗∗∗ -0.532 0.538
(0.092) (0.352) (2.077)
robust s.e. = 1 0.0393 0.00844 0.00898
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
single country analysis 1.195∗∗∗ 0.491 -0.416
(0.147) (0.719) (2.205)
Agriculture -0.00833 -0.00803
(0.012) (0.012)
All/Total 0.398 0.668
(0.402) (0.554)
Apparel/Textiles/Leather 0.0379 0.0387
(0.089) (0.089)
Energy/Electricity/Chemicals 0.0364∗ 0.0360∗
(0.017) (0.017)
region==AGOA countries -0.383 -0.378
(0.245) (0.247)
y==Exports 0.354 -1.702
(0.895) (4.089)
y==Imports 1.002 0.119
(0.640) (2.073)
method==GMM/IV 1.005∗∗ 0.994∗∗
(0.345) (0.348)
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method==OLS/Time series 0.410∗∗∗ 0.419∗∗∗
(0.113) (0.114)
disaggregation==6 digit and above 0.00468 -0.825
(0.539) (2.215)
disaggregation==below 6 digits 0.473 -0.441
(0.506) (2.079)
disaggregation==Sector totals 0.345 0.620
(0.392) (0.551)
Constant 2.228 0.642 -0.214 -0.435 -0.363
(2.822) (1.068) (0.822) (1.216) (1.232)
lnσu: Random
Constant 1.870∗∗∗ 1.135∗∗∗ 1.083∗∗∗ 1.395∗∗∗ 1.400∗∗∗
(0.414) (0.277) (0.214) (0.231) (0.236)
lnσe: Residual
Constant 3.249∗∗∗ 1.916∗∗∗ 0.375∗∗∗ 0.301∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.057) (0.059) (0.062) (0.062)
Observations 173 173 173 173 171
LR test vs. linear regression 3.582 17.00 136.5 65.22 61.47
variance partition component (%) 6 17.3 80.5 17.3 17.3
Standard errors in parentheses. All variables divided by the standard error of the study’s coefficient. Columns (1) – (4) exclude coefficients
larger than 50 while Column (5) excludes studies with a single coefficient in addition to those with coefficients above 50.
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter Three
In providing further evidence on the various preferences of the USA, figures (B.1 – B.5) in this
appendix provide more information. The main evidence presented shows that much of the CBTPA
exports have been driven by the six CAFTA-DR countries that were initially members of the CBTPA.
The exclusion of the six countries shows that the exports of the remaining CBTPA and AGOA
countries are roughly similar. In figure B.1), total imports of the USA from AGOA beneficiaries
increases while that of the CBTPA countries fall. However, the earlier graph (figure 3.1) showed
that in terms of preferential exports AGOA is much higher. It is important to note that unlike AGOA
countries, CBTPA countries have the CBI programme in addition to the CBERA programme. Haiti
also has the HOPE preference programme in addition. Thus, summing up all the exports of these
countries under the multiple preferential programmes and MFN exports does increase the level
of their exports beyond that of the AGOA countries. This makes figure (B.1) less surprising—
as the total exports of the CBTPA countries are much higher than the AGOA countries. One
implication alluded to earlier in the discussion above becomes much clearer in the figure. The
exclusion of the CAFTA-DR countries shows a much closer level of exports between the AGOA and
CBTPA countries. The second panel which includes CAFTA-DR countries for the period they were
CBTPA members shows that they contributed a big chunk in the CBTPA exports. It is these subtle
differences that the author intends to address before arriving at a conclusive impact of AGOA on its
beneficiaries. The key here is that, one should not only be interested in AGOA preferential exports
but also what is happening to total exports to the USA as well as other destinations. Secondly,
competing preferences offered by the same country to its partners can affect the competitiveness of
other preferential exports.
Figure (B.2) shows the shares of the various preferences in total imports from each beneficiary.
There is a marked increase in preferential shares and this is above 40% for the three groups. Also
noticeable is the relatively small GSP share which is less than 10% and close to zero for CAFTA-
DR1. Figure (B.5) indicates that AGOA exports is dominated by the extractive industry and their
exports of this industry far exceeds those of the CBTPA countries. On the other hand, the CBTPA
countries have textile, apparel, leather and footwear products dominating their exports. However,
AGOA countries do tend to export visible levels of some of the other products. Last but not the
least, table (B.1) shows the shares of the top AGOA and CBTPA exporters to the USA and EU.
Chad has experienced a large increase in its shares to the USA and seen a corresponding decline
in its EU export share. The CBI countries have exports to the USA dominating their export share
to the EU. Finally, table (B.2) provides the shares of each preference in total American imports.
Imports that claimed no preference account for 75% – 82% of American imports.
We now briefly discuss the results presented in Appendix II. The results presented here include
1Given that a free trade agreement (FTA) is in effect they do not export under the GSP and previous preferences. The
preferential share actually represents exports under the FTA. Products not covered by the FTA are what did not claim any
preferences.
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HS-2 and HS-4 digit results. What is striking in Table (B.4) is the sign reversal for the HS-4
digit estimates of AGOA as well as similar sign reversals for CBTPA for HS-2 and HS-4 digit
estimations. In terms of the AGOA coefficient this is insignificant in the HS-4 digit column. A
possible explanation might be the difficulty in accurately determining the fraction of exports in
that category exported under the preference. Nevertheless, we notice that the correlation among
the regressors increase at more disaggregated levels and is more severe in the non apparel and
textile regressions. Much of this correlation is due to the preference-time interactions and the
CBTPA preference included in the regressions. The HS-6 results are repeated in the tables for
comparative purposes. In Table (B.4), the impact of a country’s previous competitiveness has a
larger effect at the 6-digit level compared to the more aggregated 2- and 4-digit levels. Market size
of the USA relative to the world becomes negative at the other levels of disaggregation and also
becomes insignificant (except at the 2-digit level where it is marginally significant at 10%). the
positive sign recorded for the 6-digit level of disaggregation is significant at the 0.1% but the effect
is small. The negative coefficient for the 2- and 4-digit levels probably indicates that at higher
levels of aggregation the rest of the world tends to provide a larger market relative to the USA.
The AGOA preferences are negative and insignificant in the 4-digit columns. They are however,
significant in the 2-digit regressions in columns (2) and (5). The coefficients are larger accounting
for the aggregated nature of the data. The GSP dummy is insignificant in both the 2-digit and
4-digit regressions—this might be due to the fact that countries are graduated or de-graduated in
products at the 10–12 digit level and not at higher levels of aggregation. This makes it plausible
to pick up a number of the tariff effects at the 6 digit level rather than at the 2–4 digit and more
aggregated levels. On the contrary, the CBTPA dummy is negative and significant in the 4-digit
regressions but insignificant in the 2-digit regressions.
The next two tables present results of the non apparel and textile and apparel and textile products
separately. Table (B.5) reports the fixed effects estimates while Table (B.6) reports the Mundlak
corrected random effects estimates. The two tables report similar estimates for our variables of
interest. The AGOA coefficient is significant and positive in both tables at the 6-digit level for non
apparel products. However, in Table (B.5) significance is at the 10% level and the coefficients of
0.017 and 0.036 (in Table (B.6) yield relatively small impacts of 1.71% and 3.71% respectively.
This significance was obtained after including the time-preference interactions. The inclusion of
the time-preference interactions also led to the exclusion of the CBTPA coefficients. The exclusion
of the time-preference dummies leads to a negative coefficient for AGOA in the 6-digit level
regressions. This compared to the apparel impact is relatively small in size. The inability to
estimate a coefficient for the CBTPA preference prevents us from making any comments about
the impact of the preference. The 2- and 4-digit results are insignificant for the GSP and AGOA
preferences. The evidence thus far points to AGOA being more favourable to apparel and textile
products. In Table (B.6) all three regressions for the apparel and textile products yield coefficients
for all three preferences. At the 6-digit level AGOA, CBTPA and GSP product dummies do lead
to higher exports to the USA relative to the rest of the world and are significant. At the 2-digit
level the signs became negative for the GSP and CBTPA preferences but remain positive and
larger for AGOA. The 4-digit level estimates of AGOA are no longer significant. The estimates for
CBTPA and GSP are significant and negative. These results so far show that care must be taken
in choosing a level of disaggregation when analysing trade data. The 2-digit and 6-digit levels
of disaggregation tend to provide coefficients with the same sign compared to the 4-digit level
coefficients. In addition, the apparel and textile products seem to be the driving force behind the
performance of the AGOA and CBTPA preferences in our regressions.
Tables (B.7) and (B.8) carry out the Heckman selection and Poisson PMLE regressions respect-
ively. The results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table (B.4). Table (B.9) summarises
the impact of the preferences across all five tables. The large impact of AGOA at the 2-digit level
is the most noticeable feature of the table. This large impact might be due to problems present
in the regressions as result of the aggregation of the six-digit trade data. However, the remaining
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preferences do not present such outliers in the impact of the preferences.
Table B.1: Share of exports to EU and USA in total exports
Top 5 AGOA countries Top 4 CBI countries
isocode country year EU (%) USA(%) isocode country year EU (%) USA (%)
AGO Angola 2000 14.7 39.2 BHS Bahamas, The 2000 38.3 18.9
AGO Angola 2001 21.1 38.3 BHS Bahamas, The 2001 33.7 18.5
AGO Angola 2002 21.2 32.5 BHS Bahamas, The 2002 30.0 24.2
AGO Angola 2003 12.1 42.5 BHS Bahamas, The 2003 29.5 22.0
AGO Angola 2004 8.7 34.3 BHS Bahamas, The 2004 30.7 25.8
AGO Angola 2005 12.9 34.9 BHS Bahamas, The 2005 34.4 18.4
AGO Angola 2006 7.8 35.0 BHS Bahamas, The 2006 35.8 12.9
AGO Angola 2007 12.1 27.3 BHS Bahamas, The 2007 28.2 16.3
AGO Angola 2008 14.4 24.7 BHS Bahamas, The 2008 23.2 16.7
AGO Angola 2009 14.6 20.8 BHS Bahamas, The 2009 18.7 28.3
AGO Angola 2010 8.7 21.0 BHS Bahamas, The 2010 18.7 21.4
AGO Angola 2011 13.9 20.7 BHS Bahamas, The 2011 13.4 24.4
COG Congo, Rep. 2000 9.7 15.6 HTI Haiti 2000 5.5 85.5
COG Congo, Rep. 2001 13.0 18.6 HTI Haiti 2001 5.2 83.1
COG Congo, Rep. 2002 17.6 7.8 HTI Haiti 2002 4.5 86.0
COG Congo, Rep. 2003 12.0 14.8 HTI Haiti 2003 4.0 86.1
COG Congo, Rep. 2004 7.1 19.6 HTI Haiti 2004 3.6 81.6
COG Congo, Rep. 2005 5.5 25.4 HTI Haiti 2005 3.6 80.7
COG Congo, Rep. 2006 4.9 31.9 HTI Haiti 2006 4.2 76.1
COG Congo, Rep. 2007 4.9 36.6 HTI Haiti 2007 5.7 71.1
COG Congo, Rep. 2008 7.5 37.8 HTI Haiti 2008 6.0 66.4
COG Congo, Rep. 2009 11.5 37.7 HTI Haiti 2009 3.8 82.3
COG Congo, Rep. 2010 15.3 26.3 HTI Haiti 2010 4.7 77.5
COG Congo, Rep. 2011 21.0 18.6 HTI Haiti 2011 2.9 84.3
NGA Nigeria 2000 20.2 37.9 JAM Jamaica 2000 23.2 32.0
NGA Nigeria 2001 22.0 34.8 JAM Jamaica 2001 24.1 23.4
NGA Nigeria 2002 21.7 28.5 JAM Jamaica 2002 24.9 21.7
NGA Nigeria 2003 21.8 34.1 JAM Jamaica 2003 28.1 23.0
NGA Nigeria 2004 15.7 41.3 JAM Jamaica 2004 30.8 13.5
NGA Nigeria 2005 18.2 43.9 JAM Jamaica 2005 33.3 14.7
NGA Nigeria 2006 18.1 38.6 JAM Jamaica 2006 20.4 19.4
NGA Nigeria 2007 16.6 40.0 JAM Jamaica 2007 22.7 25.7
NGA Nigeria 2008 19.8 34.3 JAM Jamaica 2008 24.6 22.6
NGA Nigeria 2009 21.0 28.5 JAM Jamaica 2009 17.9 30.6
NGA Nigeria 2010 19.3 31.1 JAM Jamaica 2010 13.8 29.4
NGA Nigeria 2011 29.4 30.0 JAM Jamaica 2011 19.4 36.7
TCD Chad 2000 40.8 3.2 TTO Trinidad and Tobago 2000 10.0 51.2
TCD Chad 2001 42.3 4.2 TTO Trinidad and Tobago 2001 9.2 55.0
TCD Chad 2002 40.5 5.5 TTO Trinidad and Tobago 2002 9.6 53.6
TCD Chad 2003 34.7 16.4 TTO Trinidad and Tobago 2003 6.9 62.6
TCD Chad 2004 17.1 49.4 TTO Trinidad and Tobago 2004 6.5 67.9
TCD Chad 2005 10.1 65.4 TTO Trinidad and Tobago 2005 5.0 65.7
TCD Chad 2006 1.7 79.0 TTO Trinidad and Tobago 2006 10.8 56.7
TCD Chad 2007 1.6 87.6 TTO Trinidad and Tobago 2007 8.7 56.0
TCD Chad 2008 2.5 86.3 TTO Trinidad and Tobago 2008 16.4 39.5
TCD Chad 2009 6.7 83.8 TTO Trinidad and Tobago 2009 17.6 37.2
TCD Chad 2010 8.5 62.4 TTO Trinidad and Tobago 2010 13.2 41.6
TCD Chad 2011 7.2 78.5 TTO Trinidad and Tobago 2011 13.2 43.9
ZAF South Africa 2000 27.3 8.8
ZAF South Africa 2001 28.0 8.8
ZAF South Africa 2002 26.7 7.9
ZAF South Africa 2003 27.5 7.7
ZAF South Africa 2004 25.4 8.0
ZAF South Africa 2005 25.2 7.3
ZAF South Africa 2006 24.8 8.3
ZAF South Africa 2007 24.6 8.0
ZAF South Africa 2008 23.6 7.3
ZAF South Africa 2009 22.0 6.4
ZAF South Africa 2010 19.8 7.1
ZAF South Africa 2011 19.3 7.7
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Figure B.1: USA imports from AGOA and CBTPA countries
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Figure B.2: USA import shares from AGOA and CBTPA countries
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Figure B.3: Differences in import shares for AGOA and CBTPA countries
220
Ta
bl
e
B
.2
:S
ha
re
s
of
M
aj
or
U
SA
pr
ef
er
en
ce
s
fo
rd
ev
el
op
in
g
co
un
tr
ie
s
ye
ar
A
T
PD
E
A
C
B
T
PA
A
G
O
A
A
N
D
E
A
N
C
B
I
C
A
FT
A
-D
R
C
A
FT
A
-D
R
+
G
SP
G
SP
L
D
C
N
PC
19
97
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
0.
00
15
54
8
0.
00
37
04
4
N
/A
N
/A
0.
01
69
58
4
0.
00
04
52
0.
76
02
99
9
19
98
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
0.
00
18
04
7
0.
00
34
92
4
N
/A
N
/A
0.
01
59
03
4
0.
00
12
65
8
0.
75
38
61
5
19
99
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
0.
00
17
07
3
0.
00
25
40
6
N
/A
N
/A
0.
01
11
96
5
0.
00
09
59
2
0.
78
55
81
3
20
00
N
/A
0.
00
01
30
6
N
/A
0.
00
16
28
6
0.
00
21
44
8
N
/A
N
/A
0.
01
08
66
7
0.
00
13
96
4
0.
80
03
23
3
20
01
N
/A
0.
00
48
03
8
0.
00
44
01
7
0.
00
14
5
0.
00
23
56
3
N
/A
N
/A
0.
01
12
77
3
0.
00
26
17
8
0.
78
44
83
6
20
02
0.
00
01
52
7
0.
00
60
46
3
0.
00
42
28
4
0.
00
06
53
2
0.
00
25
06
3
N
/A
N
/A
0.
01
21
78
7
0.
00
28
11
4
0.
78
03
38
3
20
03
0.
00
32
39
3
0.
00
59
01
8
0.
00
57
93
3
0.
00
12
49
1
0.
00
23
39
8
N
/A
N
/A
0.
01
30
56
4
0.
00
36
88
8
0.
78
22
54
8
20
04
0.
00
34
37
6
0.
00
53
36
6
0.
01
26
30
1
0.
00
21
08
6
0.
00
19
52
9
N
/A
N
/A
0.
01
25
43
6
0.
00
25
90
5
0.
78
73
37
5
20
05
0.
00
38
63
0.
00
49
99
0.
01
53
79
2
0.
00
25
43
1
0.
00
20
32
8
N
/A
N
/A
0.
01
24
48
9
0.
00
33
53
6
0.
78
69
93
4
20
06
0.
00
36
20
9
0.
00
28
78
9
0.
01
14
35
7
0.
00
23
67
8
0.
00
21
02
5
0.
00
21
13
1
4.
70
e-
06
0.
01
27
55
9
0.
00
43
00
1
0.
78
91
74
9
20
07
0.
00
33
94
2
0.
00
12
23
9
0.
01
21
27
7
0.
00
20
50
2
0.
00
14
46
3
0.
00
41
28
9
0.
00
00
23
0.
01
11
28
7
0.
00
42
51
5
0.
79
86
36
3
20
08
0.
00
47
78
3
0.
00
05
64
1
0.
01
33
32
8
0.
00
14
17
7
0.
00
14
38
7
0.
00
44
16
3
0.
00
00
24
3
0.
00
97
86
8
0.
00
18
92
6
0.
81
21
33
5
20
09
0.
00
27
36
0.
00
06
05
9
0.
00
81
75
8
0.
00
10
56
3
0.
00
06
91
7
0.
00
56
87
4
0.
00
00
40
1
0.
00
87
49
2
0.
00
08
49
0.
81
72
08
8
20
10
0.
00
26
95
4
0.
00
07
78
4
0.
00
80
40
5
0.
00
07
55
3
0.
00
06
37
4
0.
00
53
8
0.
00
00
51
4
0.
00
88
80
6
0.
00
07
93
1
0.
81
44
60
9
20
11
0.
00
06
38
2
0.
00
06
79
8
0.
00
78
80
4
0.
00
01
89
6
0.
00
07
88
1
0.
00
53
02
5
0.
00
00
46
9
0.
00
81
20
6
0.
00
00
54
1
0.
82
30
36
8
N
/A
im
pl
ie
s
th
at
th
e
pr
ef
er
en
ce
w
as
no
ti
n
ef
fe
ct
in
th
at
ye
ar
.
N
PC
:N
o
pr
og
ra
m
m
e
cl
ai
m
ed
i.e
.
ex
is
tin
g
ex
po
rt
er
s
di
d
no
tu
se
an
y
of
th
e
U
SA
pr
og
ra
m
m
es
av
ai
la
bl
e.
A
pa
rt
fr
om
C
A
FT
A
-D
R
an
d
C
A
FT
A
-D
R
+,
al
lt
he
ot
he
r
pr
og
ra
m
m
es
lis
te
d
in
th
e
ta
bl
e
ar
e
no
n-
re
ci
pr
oc
al
pr
ef
er
en
ce
s.
C
A
FT
A
-D
R
an
d
C
A
FT
A
-D
R
+
ar
e
fr
ee
tr
ad
e
ag
re
em
en
ts
si
gn
ed
in
20
06
w
ith
C
en
tr
al
A
m
er
ic
an
co
un
tr
ie
s
an
d
th
e
D
om
in
ic
an
R
ep
ub
lic
.T
he
se
ar
e
in
cl
ud
ed
fo
rc
om
pa
ra
tiv
e
pu
rp
os
es
si
nc
e
th
ei
rm
em
be
rs
w
er
e
ke
y
m
em
be
rs
of
th
e
C
B
I
an
d
C
B
T
PA
pr
ef
er
en
ce
pr
og
ra
m
m
es
.
T
he
re
ar
e
ot
he
r
fr
ee
tr
ad
e
pr
og
ra
m
m
es
an
d
ag
re
em
en
ts
su
ch
as
th
e
A
us
tr
al
ia
,B
ah
ra
in
,C
hi
le
,I
sr
ae
l,
Jo
rd
an
,K
or
ea
,M
ar
sh
al
lI
sl
an
ds
,M
or
oc
co
,O
m
an
,P
er
u,
Pu
er
to
-R
ic
o,
Si
ng
ap
or
e
in
di
vi
du
al
fr
ee
tr
ad
e
ag
re
em
en
ts
,N
or
th
A
m
er
ic
an
Fr
ee
Tr
ad
e
A
gr
ee
m
en
t,
A
ut
o
pa
ct
,D
ye
s,
an
d
Ph
ar
m
ac
eu
tic
al
s
pr
og
ra
m
m
es
.A
ll
th
es
e
ex
cl
ud
ed
pr
og
ra
m
m
es
ac
co
un
tf
or
le
ss
th
an
23
%
of
U
SA
im
po
rt
s
fr
om
th
e
W
or
ld
.S
ou
rc
e:
C
al
cu
la
tio
ns
ba
se
d
on
U
SI
T
C
da
ta
221
Product groups included here are the eight groups defined in figure (B.5) below. The count should be eight products however, CAFTA-DR also exports UN special code
HS 98 products while NPC exports UN special codes HS 98–99. NPC–No programme claimed, i.e. imports did not arrive under any of the preferential programmes
provided by the USA. Source: Calculations based on USITC data
Figure B.4: Count of products imported under various preferential programmes
AMDS–Agriculture, meat and dairy, & seafood (HS 1–10, 12–14); FBTWP–Food, beverages, tobacco, wood, & paper(HS 11, 15–24, 44–48); EI–Extractive industries
(HS 25–27, 68–71); CPR–Chemicals, plastics, & rubber (HS 28–36, 38–40); TALF–Textiles, apparel, leather, & footwear (HS41–42, 50–65); ISOM–Iron, steel, and
other metals (HS 26, 72–83); METE–Machinery, electronics, & transportation equipment (HS 84–89); & OI–Other industries (HS 37, 43, 49, 66–67, 90–97). Source:
Calculations based on USITC data
Figure B.5: Imports from CBTPA & AGOA countries by product group
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Table B.3: List of Countries
Afghanistan Denmark Lesotho Russian Federation
Albania Dominica Liberia San Marino
Antigua and Barbuda Dominican Republic Lithuania Saudi Arabia
Argentina Ecuador Luxembourg Senegal
Armenia Egypt, Arab Rep. Macao Sierra Leone
Aruba El Salvador Macedonia, FYR Singapore
Australia Estonia Madagascar Slovak Republic
Austria Ethiopia(excludes Eritrea) Malawi Slovenia
Azerbaijan Fiji Malaysia South Africa
Bahamas, The Finland Maldives Spain
Bahrain France Mali Sri Lanka
Bangladesh French Polynesia Malta St. Kitts and Nevis
Barbados Gambia, The Mauritania St. Lucia
Belarus Georgia Mauritius St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Belgium Germany Mexico Suriname
Belize Ghana Micronesia, Fed. Sts. Swaziland
Benin Greece Moldova Sweden
Bermuda Guatemala Mongolia Switzerland
Bhutan Guinea Morocco Syrian Arab Republic
Bolivia Guyana Mozambique Taiwan, China
Bosnia and Herzegovina Haiti Myanmar Tajikistan
Botswana Honduras Namibia Tanzania
Brazil Hong Kong, China Nepal Thailand
British Virgin Islands Hungary Netherlands Togo
Brunei Iceland Netherlands Antilles Tokelau
Bulgaria India New Caledonia Trinidad and Tobago
Burkina Faso Indonesia New Zealand Tunisia
Cambodia Iran, Islamic Rep. Nicaragua Turkey
Cameroon Ireland Niger Turkmenistan
Canada Israel Nigeria Uganda
Cape Verde Italy Norway Ukraine
Cayman Islands Jamaica Oman United Arab Emirates
Chile Japan Pakistan United Kingdom
China Jordan Palau Uruguay
Colombia Kazakhstan Panama Uzbekistan
Congo, Dem. Rep. Kenya Paraguay Venezuela
Cook Islands Korea, Rep. Peru Vietnam
Costa Rica Kuwait Philippines Yemen
Cote d’Ivoire Kyrgyz Republic Poland Zambia
Croatia Lao PDR Portugal Zimbabwe
Cyprus Latvia Qatar
Czech Republic Lebanon Romania
Table B.4: Fixed/Random effects regression without selection correction
All Mundlack corrected RE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FE-HS6 FE-HS2 FE-HS4 RE-HS6 RE-HS2 RE-HS4
AGOA product dummy 0.384∗∗ 3.224∗ -0.105 0.416∗∗ 3.400∗ -0.015
(0.135) (1.440) (0.242) (0.136) (1.443) (0.238)
agoa×gsp product dummy 0.429 -145.135∗ 0.730 0.022 -157.399∗∗ 0.571
(0.477) (56.855) (0.632) (0.564) (57.505) (0.607)
CBTPA product dummy 0.367∗∗ -0.446 -1.048∗∗∗ 0.395∗∗∗ -0.364 -1.027∗∗∗
(0.113) (0.411) (0.193) (0.113) (0.403) (0.192)
cbtpa×gsp product dummy -1.115 -5.249 -0.436 -1.561∗ -16.603 -0.934
(0.914) (39.091) (1.447) (0.617) (38.142) (1.404)
GSP product dummy 0.113∗∗ 0.219 -0.122 0.126∗∗ 0.228 -0.098
(0.040) (0.470) (0.143) (0.040) (0.470) (0.143)
CAFTA-DR -0.242∗∗∗ -0.233∗∗ -0.620∗∗∗ -0.222∗∗∗ -0.231∗∗ -0.602∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.077) (0.075) (0.037) (0.077) (0.075)
Country’s RCA, lagged (log) 0.100∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.020) (0.010) (0.005) (0.020) (0.010)
Market size, USA.World (logs) 0.008∗∗∗ -0.040+ -0.004 0.010∗∗∗ -0.039+ -0.003
(0.001) (0.021) (0.010) (0.001) (0.021) (0.010)
landlocked ‡ ‡ ‡ 0.076∗∗∗ † 0.621∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.056)
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Area (log) ‡ ‡ ‡ -0.015∗∗∗ † -0.127∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.011)
Number of cities ‡ ‡ ‡ -0.005∗∗∗ † -0.017∗∗
(0.001) (0.006)
latitude ‡ ‡ ‡ -0.002∗∗∗ † -0.006∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001)
English Speaking ‡ ‡ ‡ -0.029∗∗∗ † 0.025
(0.009) (0.052)
Spanish speaking ‡ ‡ ‡ -0.156∗∗∗ † -0.890∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.084)
Africa ‡ ‡ ‡ -0.041∗∗∗ † 0.825∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.069)
Latin America & Caribbean ‡ ‡ ‡ 0.282∗∗∗ † 1.591∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.097)
NAFTA ‡ ‡ ‡ 1.713∗∗∗ † 0.859∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.119)
Constant 0.196∗∗∗ 0.450∗∗∗ 0.739∗∗∗ 0.406∗∗∗ 0.928∗∗∗ 2.363∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.035) (0.024) (0.024) (0.182) (0.135)
agoa×yeari Yes † Yes Yes † Yes
cbtpa×yearj Yes † Yes Yes † Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mundlak terms (averages) No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1047124 20163 113997 1047124 20163 113997
Adjusted R2 0.015 0.020 0.022
Clusters 1.22e+05 1872 14029 1.22e+05 1872 14029
F-Test 72.853 5.004 18.316
R-squared overall 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.155 0.201 0.179
Robust Standard errors in parentheses, + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Dependent variable is the log of (imports into the
US/into rest of world) Estimation is done at 6 digits, 4 digits and 2 digits on positive flows F test of fixed effects for columns 1, 2, and 3 respectively: F-
test(121776,925309) = 6.89 , F-test(1871,18270) = 23.55, F-test(14028,99930) = 17.12. † indicates variable dropped in estimation ‡ indicates not applicable.
i = 2002, ... , 2009; j = 2001, ... , 2009
Table B.5: Fixed effects regression without selection correction-Non apparel and Apparel & Textiles
Non Apparel Apparel
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HS6 HS2 HS4 HS6 HS2 HS4
AGOA product dummy 0.017∗ -0.079 -0.281 0.380∗∗ 3.287∗ -0.128
(0.008) (1.042) (0.266) (0.136) (1.456) (0.242)
agoa×gsp product dummy -0.118+ † † 0.510 -150.157∗ 1.897
(0.068) (0.507) (60.564) (1.282)
CBTPA product dummy † † † † † †
cbtpa×gsp product dummy † † † † † †
GSP product dummy 0.209+ 0.430 0.391 0.102∗ 0.202 -0.247+
(0.117) (0.912) (0.447) (0.042) (0.496) (0.135)
CAFTA-DR -0.139+ -0.294∗ -0.442 -0.258∗∗∗ -0.219∗ -0.637∗∗∗
(0.078) (0.145) (0.410) (0.042) (0.086) (0.074)
Country’s RCA, lagged (log) 0.001 -0.026 -0.059 0.116∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.064) (0.039) (0.006) (0.021) (0.010)
Market size, USA.World (logs) 0.010∗∗∗ 0.148 0.109∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ -0.057∗∗ -0.021∗
(0.002) (0.098) (0.039) (0.001) (0.018) (0.009)
cbtpa×year interactions † † † † † †
Constant 0.139∗∗∗ 0.304∗∗ 0.657∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗ 0.485∗∗∗ 0.783∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.093) (0.060) (0.005) (0.032) (0.022)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 139290 2685 12335 907834 17478 101662
R2 0.002 0.013 0.010 0.016 0.029 0.027
Adjusted R2 0.002 0.007 0.009 0.016 0.028 0.027
Clusters 18551 225 1844 1.03e+05 1647 12185
F-Test . . . 71.793 4.983 19.082
Robust standard errors in parentheses, + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Dependent variable is the log of (imports
into the US/into rest of world). Estimation is done at 6 digits, 4 digits and 2 digits on positive flows Non apparel: HS 01, 02, 25 & 26 Apparel and
Textiles: HS50 - 63 F test of fixed effects for columns 1-6 respectively: F-test(18550,120718) = 8.6 , F-test(224,2442) = 29.83, F-test(1843,10472)
= 16.93, F-test(103225,804570) = 6.78 , F-test(1646,15810) = 22.32, F-test(12184,89439) = 16.84. † indicates variable dropped in estimation, ‡
indicates not applicable
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Table B.6: Random effects regression with Mundlak’s correction-Non apparel and Apparel &
Textiles
Non Apparel Apparel
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HS6 HS2 HS4 HS6 HS2 HS4
AGOA product dummy 0.036+ -0.035 -0.288 0.409∗∗ 3.444∗ -0.036
(0.020) (1.062) (0.268) (0.136) (1.458) (0.239)
agoa×gsp product dummy -0.163∗ † † 0.090 -161.322∗∗ 1.587
(0.076) (0.597) (61.106) (1.253)
CBTPA product dummy † † † 0.383∗∗∗ -0.352 -1.008∗∗∗
(0.113) (0.405) (0.191)
cbtpa×gsp product dummy † † † -1.529∗ -17.059 -0.896
(0.618) (38.388) (1.391)
GSP product dummy 0.201+ 0.430 0.383 0.118∗∗ 0.211 -0.223+
(0.119) (0.915) (0.450) (0.042) (0.496) (0.134)
CAFTA-DR -0.105 -0.291∗ -0.353 -0.240∗∗∗ -0.218∗ -0.622∗∗∗
(0.077) (0.144) (0.404) (0.041) (0.086) (0.074)
Country’s RCA, lagged (log) 0.002 -0.029 -0.049 0.126∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.065) (0.037) (0.006) (0.021) (0.010)
Market size, USA.World (logs) 0.011∗∗∗ 0.149 0.111∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗ -0.021∗
(0.001) (0.099) (0.038) (0.001) (0.018) (0.009)
landlocked -0.031∗∗∗ † -0.040 0.094∗∗∗ † 0.682∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.226) (0.008) (0.058)
Area (log) 0.002 † -0.162∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ † -0.128∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.039) (0.002) (0.011)
Number of cities 0.005∗∗ † 0.040+ -0.006∗∗∗ † -0.021∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.022) (0.001) (0.006)
latitude 0.001∗ † 0.001 -0.003∗∗∗ † -0.007∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001)
English Speaking 0.070∗∗∗ † 0.461∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗ † -0.022
(0.017) (0.162) (0.010) (0.055)
Spanish speaking -0.003 † -0.149 -0.182∗∗∗ † -1.059∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.243) (0.018) (0.087)
Africa -0.036∗∗ † 0.326 -0.042∗∗∗ † 0.868∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.199) (0.008) (0.072)
Latin America & Caribbean 0.262∗∗∗ † 2.256∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗ † 1.522∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.326) (0.018) (0.099)
NAFTA 1.658∗∗∗ † -0.433 1.714∗∗∗ † 1.083∗∗∗
(0.147) (0.352) (0.043) (0.121)
Constant -0.134∗∗ 0.637 1.154∗ 0.452∗∗∗ 0.963∗∗∗ 2.505∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.544) (0.526) (0.026) (0.189) (0.138)
agoa×year 2002 † † † Yes † Yes
cbtpa×year 2009 † † † Yes † Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mundlak terms (averages) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 139290 2685 12335 907834 17478 101662
Clusters 18551 225 1844 1.03e+05 1647 12185
rho 0.407 0.671 0.773 0.408 0.795 0.773
R-squared overall 0.111 0.153 0.175 0.159 0.232 0.193
Robust Standard errors in parentheses, + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Dependent variable is the log of (imports
into the US/into rest of world). Estimation is done at 6 digits, 4 digits and 2 digits on positive flows Non apparel: HS 01, 02, 25 & 26 Apparel and
Textiles: HS50 - 63. † indicates variable dropped in estimation, ‡ indicates not applicable. i = 2002, ... , 2009; j = 2001, ... , 2009
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Table B.8: Poisson FE Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1-HS6 2-HS6 3-HS6 3-HS2 1-HS4
US/World Import ratio
AGOA product dummy -0.263 0.972∗∗∗ 1.230∗∗∗ 28.248∗∗ -0.163
(9132.504) (0.008) (0.008) (8.629) (105.378)
agoa×gsp product dummy 0.448 2.889∗∗∗ 2.139∗∗∗ -422.761 †
(9132.032) (0.142) (0.142) (993.389)
GSP product dummy 1.176∗∗∗ -1.601∗∗∗ -0.873∗∗∗ -81.923∗∗∗ 1.549∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.015) (0.011) (8.359) (0.025)
CAFTA-DR -0.362∗∗∗ -0.853∗∗∗ -1.147∗∗∗ 4.190∗∗∗ -0.127∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.048) (0.008)
Country’s RCA, lagged (log) -0.379∗∗∗ 0.411∗∗∗ 0.298∗∗∗ -0.270∗∗∗ -0.498∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.001)
Market size, USA.World (logs) 0.256∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.260∗∗∗ -1.374∗∗∗ 0.583∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.021) (0.001)
agoa×year 2002 -0.500 0.320∗∗∗ 0.290∗∗∗ † -0.050
(167.738) (0.010) (0.010) (167.738)
agoa×year 2003 -2.085 1.047∗∗∗ 0.985∗∗∗ † †
(24768.914) (0.008) (0.008)
agoa×year 2008 -5.911 -0.108∗∗∗ -1.455∗∗∗ † †
(2.03e+05) (0.011) (0.010)
agoa×year 2009 -3.930 -0.778∗∗∗ -0.968∗∗∗ † †
(2.03e+05) (0.012) (0.012)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 259714 1445164 1704878 26208 25830
log likelihood -6.77e+06 -8.77e+06 -1.67e+07 -7.18e+04 -1.56e+06
Chi-squared 3.88e+06 1.68e+06 3.54e+06 1.35e+05 1.82e+06
Standard errors in parentheses, + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Estimation is done at 6 digits and 2 digits
- 1=Non apparel: HS 01, 02, 25 & 26; 2=Apparel and Textiles: HS50 - 63 3=Full: combines all 6 (2) digit products for both apparel and non
apparel in our sample. † indicates variable dropped in estimation, ‡ indicates not applicable. CBTPA product dummy, cbtpa×gsp product
dummy and cbtpa×yearj got dropped from the model.
Table B.9: Summary impact of preferences estimated in Tables B.4 – B.7 in percent
GSP AGOA CBTPA CAFTA-DR
Table B.4
2 digit (FE) 24.49 2411.77 -36.00 -20.78
4 digit (FE) -11.44 -9.92 -64.94 -46.18
6 digit (FE) 12.00 46.84 44.38 -21.52
2 digit (Mundlak) 25.56 2895.24 -30.51 -20.60
4 digit (Mundlak) -9.36 -1.50 -64.18 -45.21
6 digit (Mundlak) 13.39 51.57 48.37 -19.88
Table B.5
2 digit (Non Apparel) 53.76 -7.56 † -25.51
4 digit (Non Apparel) 47.89 -24.53 † -35.72
6 digit (Non Apparel) 23.29 1.71 † -12.98
2 digit (Apparel) 22.40 2575.05 -34.99 -19.66
4 digit (Apparel) -21.92 -12.04 -64.38 -47.11
6 digit (Apparel) 10.69 46.20 42.86 -22.72
Table B.6
2 digit (Non Apparel) 53.76 -3.48 † -25.27
4 digit (Non Apparel) 46.66 -25.01 † -29.73
6 digit (Non Apparel) 22.23 3.71 † -9.95
2 digit (Apparel) 23.47 3030.98 -29.67 -19.55
4 digit (Apparel) -20.00 -3.55 -63.50 -46.31
6 digit (Apparel) 12.49 50.58 46.62 -21.36
Table B.7
2 digit (Column 4) 26.59 3670.83 -27.75 -18.56
4 digit (Column 6) -12.22 -6.66 -63.82 -50.34
6 digit (Column 2) 11.69 50.25 42.32 -23.30
2 digit (Column 10: Mundlak) 24.91 3424.60 -28.82 -19.02
4 digit (Column 12: Mundlak) -10.87 -5.87 -64.95 -45.66
6 digit (Column 8: Mundlak) 11.55 49.94 43.17 -23.32
Calculated as (expβ −1)× 100. † implies coefficient was dropped by the software.
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter Four
Summary statistics
Table C.1: Summary Statistics - panel data
count p25 p50 p75 p95 mean max
Treated Countries under common support
Exports to USA 350 8564796 84170659 321903577 8.26e+09 1.35e+09 3.92e+10
Control Countries under common support
Exports to USA 397 4044833 143788228 2.73e+09 2.21e+10 3.28e+09 3.69e+10
All Countries including countries not under common support
Exports to USA 1096 6247868 131920578 1.94e+09 1.47e+10 2.46e+09 5.25e+10
Table C.2: Summary Statistics - Other variables
count mean min max
Mirror Exports Share-USA 1539 0.169 0.000000809 0.959
Area 1570 4.08e+05 10 8.51e+06
Real GDP 1278 5757.740 145.0 42188.809
Weighted distance 1570 9845.144 2387.8 16764.666
Landlocked 1580 0.139 0 1.000
Voice & Accountability 1370 42.241 0 97.000
Political Stability 1290 41.012 1.500 96.000
Government Effectiveness 1330 42.466 1.500 98.000
Regulatory Quality 1340 42.306 0 100.000
Rule of Law 1340 40.646 0 92.000
Corruption 1330 43.342 0 96.500
Adj. Saving per GNI 975 8.765 -167.5 89.299
GDP per capita 1256 3026.931 62.95 27169.707
AGOA Treatment 1650 0.212 0 1.000
Preference Type 490 1.286 1 2.000
Regions (acc. to World Bank) 1400 3.064 1 5.000
High Income (NonOECD) (HI) 1400 0.157 0 1.000
Low Income (LI) 1400 0.236 0 1.000
Lower Middle Income (LMI) 1400 0.343 0 1.000
Upper Middle Income (UMI) 1400 0.264 0 1.000
Majority Christian 1282 0.495 0 1.000
Majority Muslim 1282 0.303 0 1.000
Other Religion 1282 0.203 0 1.000
Observations 1650
Export share and preferential import data is for 2001-2010 Data for controls based on data from
1985-1999 in most cases Data from WGI are based on averages for 1996 & 1998
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Table C.4: Logit estimates for propensity score
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Landlocked 0.359 0.521 0.479 1.168
(0.638) (0.729) (0.735) (0.935)
Low Income (LI) 97.90 179.4+ 178.1+ 213.8+
(60.352) (94.268) (95.470) (119.411)
Lower Middle Income (LMI) 79.85∗ 110.4+ 109.8+ 133.8+
(37.811) (56.525) (57.244) (69.293)
Majority Christian 0.786 -17.82∗ -17.79∗ -29.62∗
(0.754) (8.875) (8.867) (11.851)
Majority Muslim 0.403
(0.744)
Weighted distance (log) 37.66 55.13 45.07 32.22
(42.504) (57.855) (59.116) (70.694)
Distance Squared (log) -1.973 -2.892 -2.337 -1.543
(2.329) (3.153) (3.225) (3.861)
LI× Real GDP 37.82+ 72.04∗ 72.56∗ 89.78∗
(20.905) (35.524) (36.084) (45.638)
LMI× Real GDP 40.56+ 82.39∗ 82.80∗ 101.8+
(24.418) (41.427) (42.048) (53.338)
UMI× Real GDP 50.69+ 96.37∗ 96.70∗ 119.1+
(28.703) (47.885) (48.594) (61.404)
Real GDP Squared -2.949+ -5.838∗ -5.872∗ -7.186∗
(1.650) (2.835) (2.878) (3.656)
Agric land % of land area 2.247 2.433 2.206
(1.543) (1.571) (2.025)
Other Religion -17.19∗ -17.23∗ -28.63∗
(8.679) (8.667) (11.533)
Corruption -1.500 -5.203 -7.301
(2.740) (4.774) (5.799)
Voice & Accountability -2.520 -2.779 -4.786+
(2.162) (2.223) (2.854)
Regulatory Quality 1.113 1.075 0.742
(2.312) (2.349) (2.815)
LMI× Corruption -3.962 -0.295 3.770
(3.859) (4.856) (6.262)
UMI× Corruption -3.599
(4.580)
Political Stability 1.285 1.899 2.802
(1.805) (2.093) (2.302)
Muslim× Real GDP -2.473∗ -2.468∗ -4.022∗
(1.229) (1.227) (1.626)
GDP per capita (log) 2.916∗ 3.043∗ 2.896+
(1.317) (1.357) (1.677)
Area (log) 0.113 0.0521
(0.186) (0.225)
LI× Corruption 3.478 5.872
(4.636) (5.748)
Adj. Saving per GNI -5.849
(4.915)
Constant -398.6+ -662.0+ -619.5+ -647.5
(230.638) (347.487) (352.896) (423.772)
Observations 110 103 103 90
Chi-square 40.41 53.64 54.02 55.94
Log likelihood -48.60 -39.19 -39.00 -31.17
Pseudo-R square 0.294 0.406 0.409 0.473
Standard errors in parentheses. Estimation results for the propensity score regressions. Dependent
variable is the AGOA treatment. Results in the text are based on Models 1 and 2; results in the
appendix are based on model 3. + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table C.5: Number of Controls and Treated under common support, Model 1
Non-agoa agoa Total
1 2 1 3
2 14 3 17
3 9 5 14
4 5 11 16
5 7 8 15
6 3 7 10
Total 40 35 75
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Table C.6: Covariate Balancing Tests
Variable Sample Control (Mean) Treated (Mean) % bias % bias reduction T-test (P-Value)
landlocked Matched .371 .343 -6.839 86.364 -.219 (.586 )
landlocked UnMatched .133 .343 50.154 -2.614 (.01)
Lower Middle Income (LMI) Matched .514 .486 -6.303 90.446 -.21 (.583 )
Lower Middle Income (LMI) UnMatched .187 .486 65.967 -3.384 (.001)
Upper Middle Income (LMI) Matched .343 .371 5.783 48.276 .219 (.414 )
Upper Middle Income (LMI) UnMatched .427 .371 -11.18 .545 (.587)
High Income (HI) Matched .143 .143 0 100 0 (.5 )
High Income (HI) UnMatched .387 .143 -56.962 2.635 (.01)
Majority Christian Matched .314 .4 17.198 46.429 .66 (.256 )
Majority Christian UnMatched .56 .4 -32.103 1.567 (.12)
Majority Muslim Matched .371 .371 0 100 0 (.5 )
Majority Muslim UnMatched .267 .371 22.373 -1.113 (.268)
Other Religion Matched .314 .229 -21.206 -55.172 -.712 (.76 )
Other Religion UnMatched .173 .229 13.666 -.682 (.497)
Weighted Distance (logs) Matched 9.373 9.334 -9.307 88.132 -.672 (.748 )
Weighted Distance (logs) UnMatched 9.008 9.334 78.416 -3.424 (.001)
Real GDP (logs) Matched 7.115 7.083 -3.604 96.513 -.149 (.559 )
Real GDP (logs) UnMatched 8.003 7.083 -103.35 4.933 (0)
Distance Squared (logs) Matched 87.892 87.186 -9.548 87.727 -.662 (.745 )
Distance Squared (logs) UnMatched 81.436 87.186 77.796 -3.413 (.001)
LI × Real GDP Matched 3.367 3.142 -7.614 88.32 -.253 (.6 )
LI × Real GDP UnMatched 1.218 3.142 65.191 -3.337 (.001)
LMI × Real GDP Matched 2.522 2.7 4.707 73.958 .186 (.427 )
LMI × Real GDP UnMatched 3.381 2.7 -18.075 .867 (.388)
UMI × Real GDP Matched 1.226 1.241 .401 99.303 .018 (.493 )
UMI × Real GDP UnMatched 3.404 1.241 -57.577 2.657 (.009)
Real GDP Squared Matched 51.2 50.835 -2.681 97.417 -.114 (.545 )
Real GDP Squared UnMatched 64.936 50.835 -103.789 4.926 (0)
The t-tests are based on the test that there is no difference in the means of the treated and control covariates. The outcomes prior to
estimating the propensity score and after are shown as the unmatched and matched rows respectively.
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Table C.11: Sensitivity Analysis: All AGOA
Outcome ATT Output Effect Selection Effect
Exports -918 813 824.00 0.33 9.46
Export Share 0.01 0.75 9.83
Exports (2002 - 1997) -428 744 736.00 0.82 9.61
Exports (2005 - 1997) -342 771 680.00 0.88 9.52
Exports (2007 - 1997) -418 388 448.00 1.38 9.55
Exports (2010 - 1997) -741 396 416.00 1.50 9.80
Exports: AMDS -124 871 808.00 0.74 10.03
Exports: FBTWP -66 321 348.00 0.39 10.11
Exports: EI 539 518 400.00 0.41 10.09
Exports: CPR -83 352 768.00 9.60
Exports: TALF -742 025 152.00 1.79 10.01
Exports: ISOM -65 693 728.00 10.19
Exports: METE -325 135 456.00 9.83
Exports: OI -102 425 184.00 9.73
Based on Income being the confounder. The methods here are described in Ichino et al. (2006) and Nannicini (2007). 1000 replic-
ations are conducted. The binary transformation is based on the mean value of each outcome (Y). The output effect is the average
odds ratio of U based on a logit model of Pr(I(Y > Y¯ ) = 1|T = 0, U,W ). The selection effect is the average odds ra-
tio of U based on Pr(T = 1|U,W ). T is the treatment, W is the observable vector of covariates and U is the unobserved
(or confounding) factors. Output effect = Pr(I(Y>Y¯ )=1|T=0,U=1,W )
Pr(I(Y>Y¯ )=0|T=0,U=1,W ) /
Pr(I(Y>Y¯ )=1|T=0,U=0,W )
Pr(I(Y>Y¯ )=0|T=0,U=0,W ) . Selection effect
=
Pr(T=1|U=1,W )
Pr(T=0|U=1,W ) /
Pr(T=1|U=0,W )
Pr(T=0|U=0,W ) . AMDS–Agriculture, meat and dairy, & seafood (HS 1–10, 12–14); FBTWP–Food, bever-
ages, tobacco, wood, & paper(HS 11, 15–24, 44–48); EI–Extractive industries (HS 25–27, 68–71); CPR–Chemicals, plastics, & rubber (HS
28–36, 38–40); TALF–Textiles, apparel, leather, & footwear (HS41–42, 50–65); ISOM–Iron, steel, and other metals (HS 26, 72–83); METE–
Machinery, electronics, & transportation equipment (HS 84–89); & OI–Other industries (HS 37, 43, 49, 66–67, 90–97).
Table C.12: Sensitivity Analysis: All AGOA
Outcome ATT Output Effect Selection Effect
Exports -918 813 824.00 0.94 0.70
Export Share 0.01 1.85 0.71
Exports (2002 - 1997) -428 744 736.00 0.60 0.70
Exports (2005 - 1997) -342 771 680.00 0.52 0.72
Exports (2007 - 1997) -418 388 448.00 0.41 0.71
Exports (2010 - 1997) -741 396 416.00 0.41 0.73
Exports: AMDS -124 871 808.00 2.06 0.69
Exports: FBTWP -66 321 348.00 1.81 0.68
Exports: EI 539518400.00 1.20 0.71
Exports: CPR -83 352 768.00 0.82 0.71
Exports: TALF -742 025 152.00 0.73 0.70
Exports: ISOM -65 693 728.00 0.71 0.74
Exports: METE -325 135 456.00 0.62 0.71
Exports: OI -102 425 184.00 0.79 0.71
Based on Religion being the confounder. The methods here are described in Ichino et al. (2006) and Nannicini (2007). 1000 replic-
ations are conducted. The binary transformation is based on the mean value of each outcome (Y). The output effect is the average
odds ratio of U based on a logit model of Pr(I(Y > Y¯ ) = 1|T = 0, U,W ). The selection effect is the average odds ra-
tio of U based on Pr(T = 1|U,W ). T is the treatment, W is the observable vector of covariates and U is the unobserved
(or confounding) factors. Output effect = Pr(I(Y>Y¯ )=1|T=0,U=1,W )
Pr(I(Y>Y¯ )=0|T=0,U=1,W ) /
Pr(I(Y>Y¯ )=1|T=0,U=0,W )
Pr(I(Y>Y¯ )=0|T=0,U=0,W ) . Selection effect
=
Pr(T=1|U=1,W )
Pr(T=0|U=1,W ) /
Pr(T=1|U=0,W )
Pr(T=0|U=0,W ) . AMDS–Agriculture, meat and dairy, & seafood (HS 1–10, 12–14); FBTWP–Food, bever-
ages, tobacco, wood, & paper(HS 11, 15–24, 44–48); EI–Extractive industries (HS 25–27, 68–71); CPR–Chemicals, plastics, & rubber (HS
28–36, 38–40); TALF–Textiles, apparel, leather, & footwear (HS41–42, 50–65); ISOM–Iron, steel, and other metals (HS 26, 72–83); METE–
Machinery, electronics, & transportation equipment (HS 84–89); & OI–Other industries (HS 37, 43, 49, 66–67, 90–97).
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Table C.13: Sensitivity Analysis: Always in AGOA
Outcome ATT Output Effect Selection Effect
Exports -748 016 192.00 0.33 5.14
Export Share 0.04 0.84 5.42
Exports (2002 - 1997) -457 082 944.00 0.76 5.34
Exports (2005 - 1997) -29 936 260.00 0.92 5.50
Exports (2007 - 1997) 184 289 568.00 1.02 5.42
Exports (2010 - 1997) -86 024 848.00 1.59 5.35
Exports: AMDS -130 864 808.00 0.76 5.55
Exports: FBTWP -100 010 288.00 0.36 5.69
Exports: EI 813 692 928.00 0.41 5.48
Exports: CPR -106 409 104.00 5.43
Exports: TALF -680 370 304.00 1.76 5.55
Exports: ISOM -86 093 176.00 5.81
Exports: METE -435 430 368.00 5.60
Exports: OI -97 720 536.00 5.58
Based on Income being the confounder. The methods here are described in Ichino et al. (2006) and Nannicini (2007). 1000 replic-
ations are conducted. The binary transformation is based on the mean value of each outcome (Y). The output effect is the average
odds ratio of U based on a logit model of Pr(I(Y > Y¯ ) = 1|T = 0, U,W ). The selection effect is the average odds ra-
tio of U based on Pr(T = 1|U,W ). T is the treatment, W is the observable vector of covariates and U is the unobserved
(or confounding) factors. Output effect = Pr(I(Y>Y¯ )=1|T=0,U=1,W )
Pr(I(Y>Y¯ )=0|T=0,U=1,W ) /
Pr(I(Y>Y¯ )=1|T=0,U=0,W )
Pr(I(Y>Y¯ )=0|T=0,U=0,W ) . Selection effect
=
Pr(T=1|U=1,W )
Pr(T=0|U=1,W ) /
Pr(T=1|U=0,W )
Pr(T=0|U=0,W ) . AMDS–Agriculture, meat and dairy, & seafood (HS 1–10, 12–14); FBTWP–Food, bever-
ages, tobacco, wood, & paper(HS 11, 15–24, 44–48); EI–Extractive industries (HS 25–27, 68–71); CPR–Chemicals, plastics, & rubber (HS
28–36, 38–40); TALF–Textiles, apparel, leather, & footwear (HS41–42, 50–65); ISOM–Iron, steel, and other metals (HS 26, 72–83); METE–
Machinery, electronics, & transportation equipment (HS 84–89); & OI–Other industries (HS 37, 43, 49, 66–67, 90–97).
Table C.14: Sensitivity Analysis: Always AGOA
Outcome ATT Output Effect Selection Effect
Exports -748 016 192.00 0.92 1.04
Export Share 0.04 1.53 1.07
Exports (2002 - 1997) -457 082 944.00 0.59 1.04
Exports (2005 - 1997) -29 936 260.00 0.47 1.08
Exports (2007 - 1997) 184 289 568.00 0.45 1.09
Exports (2010 - 1997) -86 024 848.00 0.47 1.05
Exports: AMDS -130 864 808.00 2.07 1.04
Exports: FBTWP -100 010 288.00 1.79 1.01
Exports: EI 813 692 928.00 1.24 1.04
Exports: CPR -106 409 104.00 0.72 1.06
Exports: TALF -680 370 304.00 0.74 1.05
Exports: ISOM -86 093 176.00 0.95 1.08
Exports: METE -435 430 368.00 0.64 1.07
Exports: OI -97 720 536.00 0.84 1.06
Based on Religion being the confounder. The methods here are described in Ichino et al. (2006) and Nannicini (2007). 1000 replic-
ations are conducted. The binary transformation is based on the mean value of each outcome (Y). The output effect is the average
odds ratio of U based on a logit model of Pr(I(Y > Y¯ ) = 1|T = 0, U,W ). The selection effect is the average odds ra-
tio of U based on Pr(T = 1|U,W ). T is the treatment, W is the observable vector of covariates and U is the unobserved
(or confounding) factors. Output effect = Pr(I(Y>Y¯ )=1|T=0,U=1,W )
Pr(I(Y>Y¯ )=0|T=0,U=1,W ) /
Pr(I(Y>Y¯ )=1|T=0,U=0,W )
Pr(I(Y>Y¯ )=0|T=0,U=0,W ) . Selection effect
=
Pr(T=1|U=1,W )
Pr(T=0|U=1,W ) /
Pr(T=1|U=0,W )
Pr(T=0|U=0,W ) . AMDS–Agriculture, meat and dairy, & seafood (HS 1–10, 12–14); FBTWP–Food, bever-
ages, tobacco, wood, & paper(HS 11, 15–24, 44–48); EI–Extractive industries (HS 25–27, 68–71); CPR–Chemicals, plastics, & rubber (HS
28–36, 38–40); TALF–Textiles, apparel, leather, & footwear (HS41–42, 50–65); ISOM–Iron, steel, and other metals (HS 26, 72–83); METE–
Machinery, electronics, & transportation equipment (HS 84–89); & OI–Other industries (HS 37, 43, 49, 66–67, 90–97).
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Table C.15: All AGOA: Caliper = 0.05
Outcome Caliper (δ) Γ Sign Rank plus Sign Rank minus Prob. Value plus Prob. Value minus
Exports .05 1 -3.1002 -3.1002 .999 .999
Exports .05 1.4 -4.0406 -2.2479 1 .9877
Exports .05 1.5 -4.2466 -2.0817 1 .9813
Exports .05 1.6 -4.4439 -1.9286 1 .9731
Exports .05 2 -5.1631 -1.4135 1 .9212
Exports .05 3 -6.6414 -.5182 1 .6979
Exports .05 4 -7.8524 .1018 1 .4594
Exports .05 5 -8.9024 .5836 1 .2797
Exports .05 6 -9.842 .9824 1 .163
Exports .05 7 -10.7 1.3257 1 .0925
Exports .05 8 -11.4944 1.6295 1 .0516
Exports (2002 - 1997) .05 1 -4.3943 -4.3943 1 1
Exports (2002 - 1997) .05 1.4 -5.291 -3.6222 1 .9999
Exports (2002 - 1997) .05 1.5 -5.4925 -3.4772 1 .9997
Exports (2002 - 1997) .05 1.6 -5.6869 -3.3454 1 .9996
Exports (2002 - 1997) .05 2 -6.4061 -2.9155 1 .9982
Exports (2002 - 1997) .05 3 -7.9241 -2.2239 1 .9869
Exports (2002 - 1997) .05 4 -9.1952 -1.7904 1 .9633
Exports (2002 - 1997) .05 5 -10.3109 -1.4801 1 .9306
Exports (2002 - 1997) .05 6 -11.3171 -1.2405 1 .8926
Exports (2002 - 1997) .05 7 -12.241 -1.046 1 .8522
Exports (2002 - 1997) .05 8 -13.0998 -.8826 1 .8113
The calculations in the table are based on Rosenbaum (1987, 1991a,b) The log odds of being in the treatment group is given by the logit model log[Pr(T = 1|X =
x, U = u)/Pr(T = 0|X = x, U = x)] = κx + γu, where γ = log(Γ), for each x, κx is an unknown parameter, X is the matching covariates, u
is the unobserved variable. The Γ indicates the odds of a person likely to receive treatment. If Γ = 1 this is the case for a randomized experiment since the odds
of receiving treatment is random and each individual is just as likely as receiving treatment. Γ values larger than one indicate that we are no longer in a randomized
experiment design. The likelihood of receiving treatment becomes larger than 1. Thus a value of 3 implies an individual is three times more likely to receive treatment
because of any hidden differences in their characteristics. The simulation thus tells at how sensitive our results would be given our simulation of the parameter—thus
measuring the departure from a randomized experiment in Rosenbaum’s words. The level of Γ tolerable is based on the p-values. As long as the p-values are at 0.05
and below we can significantly conclude that hidden biases would not change the conclusion of our analysis. If one or both of the p-values are greater than the rejection
level for a particular choice of Γ then we might be worried about the potential of hidden bias affecting our conclusions. The sensitivity analysis for the caliper values
of 0.1 and 0.2 are not presented to conserve space. They are however, available upon request.
Table C.16: Always AGOA: Caliper = 0.05
Outcome Caliper (δ) Γ Sign Rank plus Sign Rank minus Prob. Value plus Prob. Value minus
Exports .05 1 -1.9583 -1.9583 .9749 .9749
Exports .05 1.4 -2.7675 -1.2048 .9972 .8859
Exports .05 1.5 -2.9423 -1.0551 .9984 .8543
Exports .05 1.6 -3.109 -.9163 .9991 .8203
Exports .05 2 -3.7115 -.4428 .9999 .671
Exports .05 3 -4.9302 .4076 1 .3418
Exports .05 4 -5.9149 1.019 1 .1541
Exports .05 5 -6.762 1.5072 1 .0659
Exports .05 6 -7.5161 1.9197 1 .0274
Exports .05 7 -8.2023 2.2808 1 .0113
Exports .05 8 -8.8359 2.6045 1 .0046
Exports (2002 - 1997) .05 1 -3.5281 -3.5281 .9998 .9998
Exports (2002 - 1997) .05 1.4 -4.2876 -2.8687 1 .9979
Exports (2002 - 1997) .05 1.5 -4.4577 -2.7441 1 .997
Exports (2002 - 1997) .05 1.6 -4.6215 -2.6305 1 .9957
Exports (2002 - 1997) .05 2 -5.2261 -2.2582 1 .988
Exports (2002 - 1997) .05 3 -6.4972 -1.6506 1 .9506
Exports (2002 - 1997) .05 4 -7.5581 -1.2622 1 .8966
Exports (2002 - 1997) .05 5 -8.4876 -.9793 1 .8363
Exports (2002 - 1997) .05 6 -9.3251 -.7574 1 .7756
Exports (2002 - 1997) .05 7 -10.0933 -.5748 1 .7173
Exports (2002 - 1997) .05 8 -10.8071 -.4194 1 .6625
The calculations in the table are based on Rosenbaum (1987, 1991a,b) The log odds of being in the treatment group is given by the logit model log[Pr(T = 1|X =
x, U = u)/Pr(T = 0|X = x, U = x)] = κx + γu, where γ = log(Γ), for each x, κx is an unknown parameter, X is the matching covariates, u
is the unobserved variable. The Γ indicates the odds of a person likely to receive treatment. If Γ = 1 this is the case for a randomized experiment since the odds
of receiving treatment is random and each individual is just as likely as receiving treatment. Γ values larger than one indicate that we are no longer in a randomized
experiment design. The likelihood of receiving treatment becomes larger than 1. Thus a value of 3 implies an individual is three times more likely to receive treatment
because of any hidden differences in their characteristics. The simulation thus tells at how sensitive our results would be given our simulation of the parameter—thus
measuring the departure from a randomized experiment in Rosenbaum’s words. The level of Γ tolerable is based on the p-values. As long as the p-values are at 0.05
and below we can significantly conclude that hidden biases would not change the conclusion of our analysis. If one or both of the p-values are greater than the rejection
level for a particular choice of Γ then we might be worried about the potential of hidden bias affecting our conclusions. The sensitivity analysis for the caliper values
of 0.1 and 0.2 are not presented to conserve space. They are however, available upon request.
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Figure C.2: Propensity score and region of common support
Table C.17: Simple Average tariffs: Apparel & Textile and Fuel products, 2002–2011
Apparel textile Fuel Total
Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
MFN 8.8 0.0 28.6 0.5 0.0 7.0 8.4 0.0 28.6
AGOA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.7
CBTPA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 7.0 0.2 0.0 7.0
Author’s calculation based on the relevant HS-6 digit products downloaded from the WITS database. ‘.’ indicates missing tariff
information. Apparel and textile is based on six digit products within HS 50–63; Fuel is based on six digit products within HS 27.
The tariff information for the AGOA and CBTPA preferences are missing for most years. The zero tariffs reported for the CBTPA
and AGOA preferences are based on years of non-missing tariff data.
Table C.18: Simple average MFN tariffs: Apparel and Textile products, 2002–2011
Mean Min Max
Apparel 10.4 0.0 28.6
Textile 8.0 0.0 20.8
Total 8.8 0.0 28.6
Author’s calculation based on the relevant HS-6 digit
products downloaded from the WITS database. ‘.’ indic-
ates missing tariff information. Textile is based on six digit
products within HS 50–60; Apparel is based on six digit
products within HS 61–63. The tariff information for the
AGOA and CBTPA preferences are missing for most years.
However, in 2009 and 2010 several HS 61 & 62 six digit
categories have a zero tariff reported for the special textile
preferences.
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Table C.19: Simple average tariffs by Hanson’s classification, 2002–2011
Mean Min Max
MFN 3.6 0.0 163.8
AMDS AGOA 1.2 0.0 81.9
CBTPA . . .
MFN 2.9 0.0 9.2
CPR AGOA 1.4 0.0 4.6
CBTPA . . .
MFN 2.1 0.0 16.5
EI AGOA 1.3 0.0 8.1
CBTPA 0.9 0.0 7.0
MFN 5.6 0.0 350.0
FBTWP AGOA 4.4 0.0 175.0
CBTPA 3.2 2.3 5.2
MFN 1.6 0.0 15.0
ISOM AGOA 0.5 0.0 4.4
CBTPA . . .
MFN 1.6 0.0 25.0
METE AGOA 0.5 0.0 5.0
CBTPA . . .
MFN 2.2 0.0 14.4
OI AGOA 0.5 0.0 7.2
CBTPA 0.2 0.0 2.1
MFN 8.5 0.0 37.5
TALF AGOA 0.8 0.0 10.1
CBTPA 1.4 0.0 30.7
MFN 3.7 0.0 350.0
Total AGOA 1.6 0.0 175.0
CBTPA 1.1 0.0 30.7
Author’s calculation based on the relevant HS-6 digit products down-
loaded from the WITS database. ‘.’ indicates missing tariff informa-
tion. AMDS–Agriculture, meat and dairy, & seafood (HS 1–10, 12–
14); FBTWP–Food, beverages, tobacco, wood, & paper(HS 11, 15–24,
44–48); EI–Extractive industries (HS 25–27, 68–71); CPR–Chemicals,
plastics, & rubber (HS 28–36, 38–40); TALF–Textiles, apparel, leather,
& footwear (HS41–42, 50–65); ISOM–Iron, steel, and other metals (HS
26, 72–83); METE–Machinery, electronics, & transportation equipment
(HS 84–89); & OI–Other industries (HS 37, 43, 49, 66–67, 90–97) (all
computations are done at the HS six digit level for all products within
each HS two digit category specified above).
Table C.20: RMSPE values for treated countries
country Non-Oil Total Exports
Angola 1.0521 0.2345
Benin 1.6131 1.7569
Burkina Faso 2.2862 2.1140
Burundi 1.1122 1.0537
Cameroon 0.3562 1.0401
Chad 3.1161 2.8877
Congo, Rep. 0.6702 0.6192
Gabon 0.4763 0.3997
Gambia, The 1.9314 1.8653
Ghana 0.4602 0.4102
Kenya 0.3106 0.2025
Malawi 0.3646 0.3757
Mauritius 0.3254 0.4856
Mozambique 0.4661 0.3822
Nigeria 0.4633 0.1893
Rwanda 1.0882 0.8992
Senegal 0.7270 0.9141
Seychelles 1.3505 1.4074
Sierra Leone 0.7327 0.7567
South Africa 0.6453 0.3743
Tanzania 0.3841 0.3746
Togo 1.4889 1.1303
Uganda 0.8723 0.5403
Zambia 1.1064 1.0523
RMSPE is the root mean squared prediction error
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Table C.21: RMSPE values for control countries used in placebo runs
country Non-Oil Total Exports
Afghanistan 0.3420 0.4751
Algeria 1.0376 0.4148
Argentina 0.3099 0.1733
Bahrain 0.5199 0.5623
Bangladesh - 0.2114
Brunei 0.8930 0.8820
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.2649 0.3787
Fiji 0.7063 0.9409
India 0.1057 0.1736
Indonesia 0.0891 0.2286
Iran, Islamic Rep. 4.0099 5.2300
Jordan 0.5153 0.6275
Kuwait 0.7293 0.9420
Lao PDR 0.9615 1.0231
Lebanon 0.4839 0.5399
Macao 0.3080 0.3052
Malaysia 0.2951 0.7033
Mongolia 0.6046 0.6365
Morocco 0.2359 0.3471
Nepal 0.3809 0.7206
New Caledonia 0.5587 0.5476
Oman 0.9152 0.4622
Pakistan 0.2062 0.2063
Papua New Guinea 0.3628 0.3654
Paraguay 0.3861 0.4482
Philippines 0.2199 0.1470
Qatar 1.0932 1.3909
Saudi Arabia 0.3798 0.5469
Singapore 0.3997 0.5149
Solomon Islands 2.0101 2.0099
Sri Lanka 0.1035 0.1235
Syrian Arab Republic 0.5124 0.9405
Thailand 0.3797 0.4557
Tunisia 0.3201 0.7668
United Arab Emirates - 0.7831
Uruguay 0.3451 0.3465
Venezuela 0.2882 0.2844
RMSPE is the root mean squared prediction error. A ‘-’ implies that no value for
the RMSPE was returned as discontinuities were encountered in the estimation and
thus a more straightforward and flexible algorithm had to be used instead.
Table C.22: Weights for synthetic countries: non-oil exports
Treated Country Synthetic country Synthetic Weights
Angola Lao PDR 0.255
Angola New Caledonia 0.560
Angola Syrian Arab Republic 0.184
Burkina Faso Lao PDR 0.778
Burkina Faso Qatar 0.222
Congo, Rep. Macao 0.756
Congo, Rep. Solomon Islands 0.113
Congo, Rep. Venezuela 0.131
Gabon Algeria 0.002
Gabon Bahrain 0.181
Gabon Indonesia 0.109
Gabon Malaysia 0.042
Gabon New Caledonia 0.087
Gabon Solomon Islands 0.001
Gabon Sri Lanka 0.391
Gabon Venezuela 0.183
Gambia Lao PDR 0.991
Gambia Solomon Islands 0.009
Ghana Brunei 0.059
Ghana New Caledonia 0.348
Ghana Papua New Guinea 0.251
Ghana Philippines 0.053
Ghana Solomon Islands 0.047
Ghana Venezuela 0.242
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Kenya Bahrain 0.040
Kenya India 0.234
Kenya Iran Islamic Rep 0.071
Kenya Jordan 0.239
Kenya Papua New Guinea 0.400
Kenya Solomon Islands 0.016
Mauritius Fiji 0.547
Mauritius Jordan 0.019
Mauritius Macao 0.309
Mauritius Singapore 0.064
Mauritius Solomon Islands 0.061
Nigeria Algeria 0.332
Nigeria Saudi Arabia 0.634
Nigeria Venezuela 0.034
Sierra Leone New Caledonia 0.643
Sierra Leone Paraguay 0.322
Sierra Leone Solomon Islands 0.036
South Africa Algeria 0.195
South Africa Egypt Arab Rep 0.152
South Africa India 0.040
South Africa Indonesia 0.560
South Africa Singapore 0.053
Table C.23: Weights for synthetic countries: total exports
Treated Country Synthetic country Synthetic Weights
Angola Algeria 0.004
Angola Bahrain 0.183
Angola Bangladesh 0.001
Angola Brunei 0.001
Angola Fiji 0.001
Angola Indonesia 0.047
Angola Iran Islamic Rep 0.001
Angola Kuwait 0.001
Angola Lebanon 0.001
Angola Macao 0.246
Angola Malaysia 0.174
Angola New Caledonia 0.005
Angola Oman 0.001
Angola Papua New Guinea 0.001
Angola Philippines 0.002
Angola Qatar 0.001
Angola Saudi Arabia 0.001
Angola Singapore 0.056
Angola Solomon Islands 0.006
Angola Sri Lanka 0.002
Angola Thailand 0.001
Angola United Arab Emirates 0.002
Angola Uruguay 0.001
Angola Venezuela 0.260
Burkina Faso Bahrain 0.010
Burkina Faso Lao PDR 0.836
Burkina Faso Mongolia 0.154
Congo, Rep. Macao 0.756
Congo, Rep. Solomon Islands 0.113
Congo, Rep. Venezuela 0.131
Gabon Algeria 0.002
Gabon Bahrain 0.181
Gabon Indonesia 0.109
Gabon Malaysia 0.042
Gabon New Caledonia 0.087
Gabon Solomon Islands 0.001
Gabon Sri Lanka 0.391
Gabon Venezuela 0.183
Gambia Lao PDR 0.952
Gambia Solomon Islands 0.048
Ghana Brunei 0.059
Ghana New Caledonia 0.348
Ghana Papua New Guinea 0.251
Ghana Philippines 0.053
Ghana Solomon Islands 0.047
242
Ghana Venezuela 0.242
Kenya Bahrain 0.040
Kenya India 0.234
Kenya Iran Islamic Rep 0.071
Kenya Jordan 0.239
Kenya Papua New Guinea 0.400
Kenya Solomon Islands 0.016
Mauritius Fiji 0.547
Mauritius Jordan 0.019
Mauritius Macao 0.309
Mauritius Singapore 0.064
Mauritius Solomon Islands 0.061
Nigeria Algeria 0.332
Nigeria Saudi Arabia 0.634
Nigeria Venezuela 0.034
Sierra Leone New Caledonia 0.712
Sierra Leone Papua New Guinea 0.222
Sierra Leone Solomon Islands 0.066
South Africa Algeria 0.195
South Africa Egypt Arab Rep 0.152
South Africa India 0.040
South Africa Indonesia 0.560
South Africa Singapore 0.053
Table C.24: Treated vs. Synthetic predictors for Non-Oil exports
Predictor Treated Synthetic
Angola
Area (in logs) 14.03601 10.90519
Weighted distance (in logs) 9.405381 9.403334
English speaking dummy 0 0
GDP (in logs) 8.79734 7.707983
landlocked 0 .255
Non-Oil Exports (in logs)(1975) 18.26675 16.17728
Non-Oil Exports (in logs)(1980) 17.13557 16.37263
Non-Oil Exports (in logs)(1985) 13.71443 15.55716
Burkina Faso
Area (in logs) 12.52161 11.70223
Weighted distance (in logs) 9.13324 9.479883
English speaking dummy 0 0
GDP (in logs) 7.691059 7.548587
landlocked 1 .778
Non-Oil Exports (in logs)(1975) 13.9029 13.37099
Non-Oil Exports (in logs)(1980) 12.73048 13.64804
Non-Oil Exports (in logs)(1985) 13.61841 13.83259
Burundi
Area (in logs) 10.23401 10.56922
Weighted distance (in logs) 9.47576 9.45382
English speaking dummy 0 .087
GDP (in logs) 6.744436 7.164733
landlocked 1 .264
Non-Oil Exports (in logs)(1975) 16.67131 16.27663
Non-Oil Exports (in logs)(1980) 17.55539 16.72552
Non-Oil Exports (in logs)(1985) 13.99697 15.90799
Congo, Rep.
Area (in logs) 12.74257 10.98369
Weighted distance (in logs) 9.375017 9.375891
English speaking dummy 0 .243
GDP (in logs) 7.508524 7.508613
landlocked 0 .003
Non-Oil Exports (in logs)(1975) 15.31461 15.00563
Non-Oil Exports (in logs)(1980) 15.91673 15.91593
Non-Oil Exports (in logs)(1985) 16.46276 16.47168
Gabon
Area (in logs) 12.4975 11.94598
Weighted distance (in logs) 9.319605 9.319297
English speaking dummy 0 .349
GDP (in logs) 8.268391 8.648416
landlocked 0 0
Non-Oil Exports (in logs)(1975) 17.11628 16.77364
Non-Oil Exports (in logs)(1980) 16.62189 16.62224
Non-Oil Exports (in logs)(1985) 15.88529 16.51188
Gambia
Area (in logs) 9.332115 12.35631
Weighted distance (in logs) 8.981077 9.503884
English speaking dummy 1 .009
GDP (in logs) 5.575891 7.065357
landlocked 0 .991
Non-Oil Exports (in logs)(1975) 11.68043 12.93458
Non-Oil Exports (in logs)(1980) 11.69505 13.96498
Non-Oil Exports (in logs)(1985) 12.76827 13.06086
Ghana
Area (in logs) 12.38228 11.73372
Weighted distance (in logs) 9.188511 9.461557
English speaking dummy 1 .634
GDP (in logs) 8.510709 8.633171
landlocked 0 0
243
Non-Oil Exports (in logs)(1975) 18.67589 18.56961
Non-Oil Exports (in logs)(1980) 18.94961 18.99878
Non-Oil Exports (in logs)(1985) 18.18993 18.62224
Kenya
Area (in logs) 13.27534 13.16928
Weighted distance (in logs) 9.50872 9.467534
English speaking dummy 1 .911
GDP (in logs) 8.885896 8.912188
landlocked 0 0
Non-Oil Exports (in logs)(1975) 17.40041 17.40064
Non-Oil Exports (in logs)(1980) 17.88505 18.15704
Non-Oil Exports (in logs)(1985) 18.41648 18.21862
Mauritius
Area (in logs) 7.623153 7.614988
Weighted distance (in logs) 9.709031 9.529411
English speaking dummy 1 .522
GDP (in logs) 7.494572 8.137017
landlocked 0 0
Non-Oil Exports (in logs)(1975) 16.62627 16.6088
Non-Oil Exports (in logs)(1980) 17.81976 17.76795
Non-Oil Exports (in logs)(1985) 18.1665 18.42038
Nigeria
Area (in logs) 13.73622 13.08063
Weighted distance (in logs) 9.231462 9.209185
English speaking dummy 1 .44
GDP (in logs) 10.37557 8.488635
landlocked 0 .56
Non-Oil Exports (in logs)(1975) 17.36125 17.20326
Non-Oil Exports (in logs)(1980) 18.48723 18.08047
Non-Oil Exports (in logs)(1985) 17.36996 17.42308
Sierra Leone
Area (in logs) 11.20267 10.86679
Weighted distance (in logs) 9.06034 9.295624
English speaking dummy 1 .036
GDP (in logs) 6.716387 7.677599
landlocked 0 .322
Non-Oil Exports (in logs)(1975) 17.5279 17.39392
Non-Oil Exports (in logs)(1980) 18.19774 17.83781
Non-Oil Exports (in logs)(1985) 16.5965 16.99254
South Africa
Area (in logs) 14.01429 13.8634
Weighted distance (in logs) 9.576275 9.47398
English speaking dummy 1 .999
GDP (in logs) 11.41033 11.40907
landlocked 0 0
Non-Oil Exports (in logs)(1975) 20.61711 20.15076
Non-Oil Exports (in logs)(1980) 21.97994 20.97831
Non-Oil Exports (in logs)(1985) 21.49369 21.30116
Table C.25: Treated vs. Synthetic predictors for Non-Oil exports
Predictor Treated Synthetic
Angola
Area (in logs) 14.03601 9.184533
Weighted distance (in logs) 9.405381 9.189354
English speaking dummy 0 .066
GDP (in logs) 8.79734 9.64536
Landlocked 0 0
Total exports (in logs)(1975) 19.86865 19.47133
Total exports (in logs)(1980) 20.14122 20.12551
Total exports (in logs)(1985) 20.81353 20.75433
Burkina Faso
Area (in logs) 12.52161 12.60728
Weighted distance (in logs) 9.13324 9.462064
English speaking dummy 0 0
GDP (in logs) 7.691059 7.191892
Landlocked 1 .99
Total exports (in logs)(1975) 13.9029 13.15612
Total exports (in logs)(1980) 12.73051 14.06393
Total exports (in logs)(1985) 13.61841 13.40664
Burundi
Area (in logs) 10.23401 10.62992
Weighted distance (in logs) 9.47576 9.457086
English speaking dummy 0 .191
GDP (in logs) 6.744436 7.12449
Landlocked 1 .315
Total exports (in logs)(1975) 16.85745 15.99562
Total exports (in logs)(1980) 17.5554 16.85498
Total exports (in logs)(1985) 13.99697 15.51064
Congo, Rep.
Area (in logs) 12.74257 5.395324
Weighted distance (in logs) 9.375017 9.315714
English speaking dummy 0 .113
GDP (in logs) 7.508524 8.053666
Landlocked 0 0
Total exports (in logs)(1975) 16.75668 17.08317
Total exports (in logs)(1980) 18.37171 18.9414
Total exports (in logs)(1985) 20.28569 19.75685
Gabon
Area (in logs) 12.4975 11.03661
Weighted distance (in logs) 9.319605 9.28046
English speaking dummy 0 .001
GDP (in logs) 8.268391 9.302008
Landlocked 0 0
Total exports (in logs)(1975) 19.09818 19.02217
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Total exports (in logs)(1980) 19.49569 19.41719
Total exports (in logs)(1985) 20.07365 19.98155
Gambia
Area (in logs) 9.332115 12.27546
Weighted distance (in logs) 8.981077 9.499963
English speaking dummy 1 .048
GDP (in logs) 5.575891 6.991293
Landlocked 0 .952
Total exports (in logs)(1975) 11.68043 13.00374
Total exports (in logs)(1980) 11.70245 14.08566
Total exports (in logs)(1985) 12.76827 13.2007
Ghana
Area (in logs) 12.38228 11.68854
Weighted distance (in logs) 9.188511 9.188091
English speaking dummy 1 .351
GDP (in logs) 8.510709 8.517252
Landlocked 0 0
Total exports (in logs)(1975) 18.82976 18.74643
Total exports (in logs)(1980) 19.18319 19.18503
Total exports (in logs)(1985) 18.3704 18.53771
Kenya
Area (in logs) 13.27534 12.90265
Weighted distance (in logs) 9.50872 9.413002
English speaking dummy 1 .65
GDP (in logs) 8.885896 9.335034
Landlocked 0 0
Total exports (in logs)(1975) 17.40041 17.39955
Total exports (in logs)(1980) 17.8851 17.89919
Total exports (in logs)(1985) 18.41648 18.41522
Mauritius
Area (in logs) 7.623153 7.623906
Weighted distance (in logs) 9.709031 9.388441
English speaking dummy 1 .672
GDP (in logs) 7.494572 7.496196
Landlocked 0 0
Total exports (in logs)(1975) 16.62627 16.75979
Total exports (in logs)(1980) 17.81979 18.17813
Total exports (in logs)(1985) 18.1665 18.00514
Nigeria
Area (in logs) 13.73622 14.58674
Weighted distance (in logs) 9.231462 9.212382
English speaking dummy 1 0
GDP (in logs) 10.37557 11.2981
Landlocked 0 0
Total exports (in logs)(1975) 21.91141 21.48024
Total exports (in logs)(1980) 23.14949 23.06361
Total exports (in logs)(1985) 21.85711 21.53019
Sierra Leone
Area (in logs) 11.20267 10.59294
Weighted distance (in logs) 9.06034 9.43608
English speaking dummy 1 .288
GDP (in logs) 6.716387 7.395782
Landlocked 0 0
Total exports (in logs)(1975) 17.5279 17.52749
Total exports (in logs)(1980) 18.19775 17.75518
Total exports (in logs)(1985) 16.66466 17.03452
South Africa
Area (in logs) 14.01429 14.01257
Weighted distance (in logs) 9.576275 9.456192
English speaking dummy 1 .093
GDP (in logs) 11.41033 11.11992
Landlocked 0 0
Total exports (in logs)(1975) 20.62823 20.62665
Total exports (in logs)(1980) 21.98991 21.98892
Total exports (in logs)(1985) 21.53061 21.52894
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All 38 control countries are shown in the graph in addition to the series of the treated country.
Figure C.3: Export gaps between treated and placebo gaps in all 38 control countries (Top 5 based
on total exports)
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Showing graphs for countries not shown or discussed in the main text. Continuous solid line is treated and dash-line is the synthetic country
Figure C.6: Trends in exports, treated versus synthetic—remaining AGOA countries: total exports
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Figure C.7: Trends in exports: treated versus synthetic, remaining AGOA countries: non-oil exports
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Appendix D
Appendix to Chapter Five
In this appendix we provide further results. However, due to space considerations we provide what
we consider to be the key additional results. We are happy to provide further information and
additional tables and figures if requested.
Cross-Section Analysis
Summary information
Table D.1: AGOA (All) Countries under common support
Angola Cote d’Ivoire Madagascar Senegal
Benin Djibouti Malawi Seychelles
Botswana Ethiopia(excludes Eritrea) Mali Sierra Leone
Burkina Faso Gabon Mauritania South Africa
Burundi Gambia, The Mauritius Swaziland
Cameroon Ghana Mozambique Tanzania
Cape Verde Guinea Namibia Togo
Chad Guinea Bissau Niger Uganda
Comoro Is. Kenya Nigeria Zambia
Congo (DROC) Lesotho Rwanda
Congo (ROC) Liberia Sao Tome Principe
Table D.2: AGOA (In & Out) Countries under common support
Cent. Af. Rep. Guinea Bissau
Congo (DROC) Madagascar
Cote d’Ivoire Mali
Eritrea Mauritania
Guinea Niger
Table D.3: AGOA (also EBA) Countries under common support
Angola Mozambique
Benin Rwanda
Cape Verde Sao Tome Principe
Chad Senegal
Djibouti Sierra Leone
Ethiopia(excludes Eritrea) Tanzania
Gambia, The Uganda
Lesotho Zambia
Malawi
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Table D.4: AGOA (Always) Countries under common support
Angola Ethiopia(excludes Eritrea) Mauritius Seychelles
Benin Gabon Mozambique Sierra Leone
Botswana Gambia, The Namibia South Africa
Cameroon Ghana Nigeria Swaziland
Cape Verde Kenya Rwanda Tanzania
Chad Lesotho Sao Tome & Principe Uganda
Congo (ROC) Malawi Senegal Zambia
Djibouti
Table D.5: Non–AGOA Countries under common support
Afghanistan Cent. Af. Rep. Laos P. N. Guinea Sri Lanka
Algeria Chile Lebanon Pakistan Tunisia
Argentina Eritrea Libya Palau Uruguay
Bangladesh India Malaysia Peru Vietnam
Bhutan Iran, Islamic Rep. Maldives Philippines Yemen
Brazil Jordan Mongolia Solomon Is. Zimbabwe
Cambodia Kiribati Nepal Somalia
Table D.6: Non–AGOA Countries outside common support
Anguila Colombia Fr S & Ant land Malta Paraguay Syrian Arab Republic
Antigua and Barbuda Cook Islands French Guiana Marshall Is Pitcairn Is Taiwan, China
Aruba Costa Rica French Polynesia Martinique Qatar Tokelau Is
Bahamas, The Cuba Grenada Mayotte Reunion Tonga
Bahrain Curacao Guatemala Montserrat Samoa Trinidad and Tobago
Barbados Dominica Guyana Morocco Saudi Arabia Turks and Caicos Isl.
Belize Dominican Republic Haiti Nauru Singapore Tuvalu
Bolivia East Timor Heard & McDn Is Netherlands Antilles Sint Maarten United Arab Emirates
Br Virgin Is Ecuador Honduras New Caledonia St Helena Vanuatu
Br Indian O Ter Egypt, Arab Rep. Hong Kong Nicaragua St Pierre & Miq Vatican City
Brunei El Salvador Indonesia Niue St. Kitts and Nevis Venezuela
Burma (Myanmar) Eq Guinea Iraq Norfolk Is St. Lucia Wallis & Futuna
Cayman Is F St Micronesia Jamaica North Korea St. Vincent and the Grenadines West Bank
Christmas Is Falkland Is Kuwait Oman Suriname Western Sahara
Cocos Is Fiji Macao Panama
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Table D.11: Summary Statistics–All countries
count p25 p50 p95 mean
Exports to USA 115 8.86e+06 1.51e+08 1.33e+10 2.27e+09
USA/ROW 115 0.0661 0.2208 3.6207 0.7369
USA/EU, AMDS 115 0.0520 0.2081 3.7236 1.6190
USA/EU, FBTWP 115 0.0516 0.1911 3.0447 0.7258
USA/EU, EI 115 0.2004 0.6450 63.3549 10.2491
USA/EU, TALF 115 0.0714 0.3116 6.8481 1.4037
USA/EU, TALF 115 0.0696 0.3591 57.0529 7.8856
USA/EU, ISOM 115 0.0412 0.3234 6.2287 1.8384
USA/EU, METE 115 0.0395 0.1390 5.4197 0.9686
USA/EU, OI 115 0.1973 0.5995 5.9917 1.6319
USA/EU 115 0.0959 0.4689 6.6094 1.3702
AMDS Exports to USA 115 2.70e+05 2.84e+06 1.07e+09 1.18e+08
FBTWP Exports to USA 115 1.95e+05 1.61e+06 6.71e+08 1.12e+08
EI Exports to USA 115 4.69e+05 1.29e+07 5.94e+09 1.05e+09
CPR Exports to USA 115 8.18e+04 9.40e+05 6.02e+08 1.15e+08
TALF Exports to USA 115 5.61e+04 1.42e+06 1.94e+09 3.30e+08
ISOM Exports to USA 115 4.80e+04 5.77e+05 7.98e+08 1.13e+08
METE Exports to USA 115 2.04e+05 8.00e+05 1.51e+09 3.76e+08
OI Exports to USA 115 1.44e+05 1.15e+06 5.86e+08 6.07e+07
AMDS–Agriculture, meat and dairy, seafood; FBTWP–Food, beverages, tobacco, wood, paper; EI–Extractive indus-
tries; CPR–Chemicals, plastics, rubber; TALF–Textiles, apparel, leather, footwear; ISOM–Iron, steel, and other metals;
METE–Machinery, electronics, transportation equipment; OI–Other industries.
Table D.12: Summary Statistics - Other variables
count mean min max
Area 1570 4.08e+05 10 8.51e+06
Real GDP 1278 5757.740 145.0 42188.809
Weighted distance 1570 9845.144 2387.8 16764.666
Landlocked 1580 0.139 0 1.000
Voice & Accountability 1370 42.241 0 97.000
Political Stability 1290 41.012 1.500 96.000
Government Effectiveness 1330 42.466 1.500 98.000
Regulatory Quality 1340 42.306 0 100.000
Rule of Law 1340 40.646 0 92.000
Corruption 1330 43.342 0 96.500
Adj. Saving per GNI 975 8.765 -167.5 89.299
GDP per capita 1256 3026.931 62.95 27169.707
AGOA Treatment 1650 0.212 0 1.000
Preference Type 490 1.286 1 2.000
Regions (acc. to World Bank) 1400 3.064 1 5.000
High Income (NonOECD) (HI) 1400 0.157 0 1.000
Low Income (LI) 1400 0.236 0 1.000
Lower Middle Income (LMI) 1400 0.343 0 1.000
Upper Middle Income (UMI) 1400 0.264 0 1.000
Majority Christian 1282 0.495 0 1.000
Majority Muslim 1282 0.303 0 1.000
Other Religion 1282 0.203 0 1.000
Observations 1650
Preferential imports and shares (GSP, Non-GSP and No programme imports) data is for the period 2001–2010. Mirror
export data on the other hand, is for the period 2001–2011. Data for controls based on data from 1985-1999 in most
cases Data from WGI are based on averages for 1996 & 1998
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Structural quantile regression estimates (cross-section)
Full set of charts for tables 5.1, 5.2 & 5.6
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Figure D.1: Estimated quantiles with confidence intervals: (cross-section) based on Table 5.1
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Further robustness checks: excluding selected products and top AGOA countries, compar-
ison to CBTPA beneficiaries
Table D.15: Quantile regression: Excluding key products
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Exports Exports Exports Exports Exports Exports Exports Exports
q25
All AGOA -0.470 -1.893∗∗
(0.754) (0.581)
In & Out AGOA 0.219 -1.707
(1.889) (2.156)
Always in AGOA -0.903 -1.987∗
(0.647) (0.816)
EBA & AGOA -0.797 -2.151∗∗
(0.640) (0.789)
Constant -43.08∗ -65.73 -31.80 -31.75 -41.01 -84.83∗∗ -50.52∗ -50.60
(17.554) (35.803) (19.081) (24.034) (30.843) (29.504) (24.965) (35.891)
q50
All AGOA -1.228 -1.562∗
(0.677) (0.659)
In & Out AGOA 1.268 -1.414
(2.023) (1.521)
Always in AGOA -1.389∗ -1.653∗∗
(0.655) (0.553)
EBA & AGOA -1.200 -1.922∗
(0.628) (0.816)
Constant -27.93∗ -42.91 -32.88∗ -36.24∗∗ -60.33∗∗ -51.15∗∗∗ -52.62∗ -39.94
(12.534) (24.793) (12.390) (12.154) (21.577) (13.204) (19.931) (24.323)
q75
All AGOA -0.897 -1.606
(0.822) (1.136)
In & Out AGOA -0.459 -3.160
(1.643) (1.905)
Always in AGOA -0.951 -1.598
(0.854) (1.048)
EBA & AGOA -0.425 -1.228
(1.035) (1.794)
Constant -35.93∗ -19.86 -36.28∗∗ -43.63∗∗∗ -47.65∗∗ -41.83∗ -47.50∗ -46.52
(14.194) (18.713) (11.949) (11.976) (16.069) (20.285) (19.660) (34.285)
q95
All AGOA -0.251 -0.877
(0.744) (0.903)
In & Out AGOA -0.786 -3.245
(0.906) (1.682)
Always in AGOA -2.871∗ -2.296∗
(1.078) (1.045)
EBA & AGOA -0.915 -0.862
(1.479) (1.734)
Constant -39.20∗ -31.16 -30.69 -60.45∗∗ -40.46∗ -36.13 -41.49 -75.18∗
(16.353) (16.746) (17.941) (18.878) (18.270) (24.743) (20.772) (28.985)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 71 38 60 48 68 37 58 46
Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications in parenthesis. Dependent variables is exports less extractive industry exports. Quantiles selected
are .25, .50 .75 & .95. Controls include: English, Spanish & landlocked dummies, logs of distance (weighted), area & GDP. ’All’ indicates that all
AGOA beneficiaries are included irrespective of whether they are removed from the programme. ’In & Out’ are countries that are removed from the
programme at least once. ’Always’ are countries that have consistently been recipients from the beginning of the programme (i.e. from 2001/2003).
’EBA & AGOA’ are countries that are both members of AGOA and EBA and have continuously been beneficiaries. First four columns are for No
programme exports, second four are for GSP and last four are for NonGSP exports ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table D.16: Quantile regression estimates for exports to the USA (excluding top five AGOA
exporters)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exports Exports Exports Exports
q25
All AGOA -0.746
(0.686)
In & Out AGOA 1.092
(1.372)
Always in AGOA -0.874
(0.679)
EBA & AGOA -1.623∗
(0.779)
Constant -32.88∗ -41.69∗∗ -32.33∗ -20.45
(15.050) (13.433) (15.316) (14.476)
q50
All AGOA -0.412
(0.615)
In & Out AGOA 0.804
(1.200)
Always in AGOA -0.898
(0.701)
EBA & AGOA -1.647∗
(0.690)
Constant -38.63∗∗ -36.98∗∗∗ -32.86∗∗∗ -22.87∗
(12.244) (10.435) (8.792) (9.879)
q75
All AGOA -0.259
(0.733)
In & Out AGOA -0.126
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(1.010)
Always in AGOA -0.298
(0.866)
EBA & AGOA -2.406∗
(1.189)
Constant -16.73 -18.99 -16.03 -17.52
(16.566) (12.490) (11.464) (9.543)
q95
All AGOA 0.675
(0.960)
In & Out AGOA -1.421
(0.927)
Always in AGOA 0.644
(1.310)
EBA & AGOA 2.947
(2.519)
Constant -52.48∗∗ 0.910 -50.03∗∗ -27.74
(15.900) (16.662) (16.042) (28.438)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 70 63 66 65
Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications in parenthesis. Dependent variables is exports excluding
top five AGOA exporters. Quantiles selected are .25, .50 .75 & .95. Controls include: English, Spanish &
landlocked dummies, logs of distance (weighted), area & GDP. ’All’ indicates that all AGOA beneficiaries
are included irrespective of whether they are removed from the programme. ’In & Out’ are countries that are
removed from the programme at least once. ’Always’ are countries that have consistently been recipients
from the beginning of the programme (i.e. from 2001/2003). ’EBA & AGOA’ are countries that are both
members of AGOA and EBA and have continuously been beneficiaries. First four columns are for exports
to the USA, second four columns are for USA/EU and last four columns are USA/ROW export ratios ∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table D.17: Quantile regression estimates for excluding top five AGOA and key products
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Exports Exports Exports Exports Exports Exports Exports Exports
q25
All AGOA -0.294 -1.247
(0.386) (0.711)
In & Out AGOA 0.302 -0.191
(1.643) (1.046)
Always in AGOA -0.509 -1.327∗
(0.451) (0.650)
EBA & AGOA -0.563 -1.898∗
(0.905) (0.712)
Constant -37.64∗ -36.44∗ -37.13∗∗ -32.99 -45.67 -65.11∗∗ -53.39∗ -53.55∗∗
(14.939) (14.350) (11.751) (20.729) (23.684) (20.675) (20.902) (18.949)
q50
All AGOA -0.896 -1.410
(0.547) (0.820)
In & Out AGOA 1.984 -0.266
(1.472) (1.447)
Always in AGOA -1.005∗ -1.254
(0.445) (0.896)
EBA & AGOA -1.144 -1.643
(0.651) (1.245)
Constant -34.95∗∗ -52.00∗∗∗ -38.89∗∗∗ -44.70∗∗∗ -63.85∗∗∗ -61.78∗∗∗ -63.30∗∗∗ -61.08∗∗
(11.492) (13.121) (9.064) (12.639) (14.511) (12.257) (15.270) (20.461)
q75
All AGOA -0.794 -1.527
(0.945) (1.412)
In & Out AGOA 1.354 -0.670
(1.540) (1.275)
Always in AGOA -1.150∗ -0.847
(0.499) (1.201)
EBA & AGOA -1.915 -0.544
(1.064) (1.738)
Constant -36.11∗ -33.89 -32.63∗∗ -27.54 -48.18∗ -65.37∗∗∗ -59.43∗∗∗ -55.89∗
(14.615) (17.684) (10.367) (17.590) (18.130) (16.748) (15.765) (20.968)
q95
All AGOA -0.182 -0.718
(0.955) (1.836)
In & Out AGOA 0.105 -2.278
(1.614) (1.319)
Always in AGOA -2.131 -0.862
(1.145) (1.301)
EBA & AGOA 1.368 0.362
(1.926) (2.713)
Constant -42.21∗∗ -48.29∗∗ -36.44∗∗ -46.41∗∗ -41.06 -75.18∗∗ -75.18∗∗ -75.18∗
(14.192) (17.066) (13.089) (16.563) (26.985) (25.486) (25.937) (29.452)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 67 60 63 62 64 58 61 60
Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications in parenthesis. Dependent variables is exports. Quantiles selected are .25, .50 .75 & .95. Controls
include: English, Spanish & landlocked dummies, logs of distance (weighted), area & GDP. ’All’ indicates that all AGOA beneficiaries are included
irrespective of whether they are removed from the programme. ’In & Out’ are countries that are removed from the programme at least once. ’Always’
are countries that have consistently been recipients from the beginning of the programme (i.e. from 2001/2003). ’EBA & AGOA’ are countries that are
both members of AGOA and EBA and have continuously been beneficiaries. First four columns are for exports to the USA, second four columns are for
USA/EU and last four columns are USA/ROW export ratios ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Panel data based structural quantile regression estimates
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Table D.18: AGOA (All) Countries under common support
Angola Cote d’Ivoire Madagascar Senegal
Benin Djibouti Malawi Seychelles
Botswana Ethiopia(excludes Eritrea) Mali Sierra Leone
Burkina Faso Gabon Mauritania South Africa
Burundi Gambia, The Mauritius Swaziland
Cameroon Ghana Mozambique Tanzania
Cape Verde Guinea Namibia Togo
Chad Guinea Bissau Niger Uganda
Comoro Is. Kenya Nigeria Zambia
Congo (DROC) Lesotho Rwanda
Congo (ROC) Liberia Sao Tome & Principe
Table D.19: AGOA (In & Out) Countries under common support
Cent. Af. Rep. Guinea Bissau
Congo (DROC) Madagascar
Cote d’Ivoire Mali
Eritrea Mauritania
Guinea Niger
Table D.20: AGOA (also EBA) Countries under common support
COUNTRY
Angola Gambia, The Senegal
Benin Lesotho Sierra Leone
Cape Verde Malawi Tanzania
Chad Mozambique Uganda
Djibouti Rwanda Zambia
Ethiopia(excludes Eritrea) Sao Tome & Principe
Table D.21: AGOA (Always) Countries under common support
Angola Congo (ROC) Kenya Nigeria South Africa
Benin Djibouti Lesotho Rwanda Swaziland
Botswana Ethiopia(excludes Eritrea) Malawi Sao Tome Principe Tanzania
Cameroon Gabon Mauritius Senegal Uganda
Cape Verde Gambia, The Mozambique Seychelles Zambia
Chad Ghana Namibia Sierra Leone
Table D.22: Non–AGOA Countries under common support
Afghanistan Cent. Af. Rep. Laos P. N. Guinea Sri Lanka
Algeria Chile Lebanon Pakistan Tunisia
Argentina Eritrea Libya Palau Uruguay
Bangladesh India Malaysia Peru Vietnam
Bhutan Iran, Islamic Rep. Maldives Philippines Yemen
Brazil Jordan Mongolia Solomon Is. Zimbabwe
Cambodia Kiribati Nepal Somalia
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table D.23: Non–AGOA Countries outside common support
Belize Ecuador Guyana Morocco St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Bolivia Egypt, Arab Rep. Haiti Nicaragua Suriname
Colombia El Salvador Honduras Panama Syrian Arab Republic
Costa Rica F St Micronesia Indonesia Paraguay Tonga
Cuba Fiji Iraq Samoa Vanuatu
Dominica Grenada Jamaica St. Kitts and Nevis Venezuela
Dominican Republic Guatemala Marshall Is St. Lucia
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Table D.28: Summary Statistics–All countries
count p25 p50 p95 mean
Exports to USA 631 9.27e+07 3.42e+08 2.21e+10 3.63e+09
USA/ROW 631 0.1335 0.3032 3.2379 0.8872
USA/EU, AMDS 631 0.0365 0.1743 2.6040 0.8599
USA/EU, FBTWP 631 0.0664 0.2513 4.1283 1.2157
USA/EU, EI 631 0.2038 1.0374 308.6175 91.1470
USA/EU, CPR 631 0.0643 0.4035 8.3000 4.0408
USA/EU, TALF 631 0.0688 0.5234 95.0349 14.5985
USA/EU, ISOM 631 0.0312 0.2819 14.8643 4.8194
USA/EU, METE 631 0.0380 0.2099 7.9344 2.4683
USA/EU, OI 631 0.2141 0.7326 10.6230 3.1005
USA/EU 631 0.1600 0.5489 8.4121 1.7049
TALF Exports to USA 631 6.25e+05 2.06e+07 2.84e+09 5.71e+08
AMDS Exports to USA 631 1.25e+06 1.99e+07 1.22e+09 2.12e+08
FBTWP Exports to USA 631 1.15e+06 1.82e+07 1.13e+09 2.00e+08
EI Exports to USA 631 2.61e+06 4.61e+07 7.69e+09 1.49e+09
CPR Exports to USA 631 2.76e+05 5.15e+06 1.05e+09 1.71e+08
ISOM Exports to USA 631 1.43e+05 2.90e+06 1.34e+09 1.99e+08
METE Exports to USA 631 3.44e+05 2.81e+06 3.61e+09 6.80e+08
OI Exports to USA 631 5.69e+05 4.08e+06 7.24e+08 1.10e+08
AMDS–Agriculture, meat and dairy, seafood; FBTWP–Food, beverages, tobacco, wood, paper; EI–Extractive industries; CPR–
Chemicals, plastics, rubber; TALF–Textiles, apparel, leather, footwear; ISOM–Iron, steel, and other metals; METE–Machinery,
electronics, transportation equipment; OI–Other industries.
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Figure D.4: Estimated quantiles with confidence intervals: (Panel) based on Table 5.10
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Table D.31: Quantile regression estimates for exports to the USA: All countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TALF AMDS FBTWP EI CPR ISOM METE OI
q25
In & Out AGOA -1.716∗∗∗ -2.163∗∗∗ -0.882∗ 1.570∗∗ -0.770 -1.629∗∗∗ -0.222 -0.232
(0.324) (0.382) (0.394) (0.569) (0.398) (0.476) (0.257) (0.308)
Constant -24.07∗∗∗ -8.466∗∗∗ -12.97∗∗∗ -28.59∗∗∗ -23.60∗∗∗ -16.98∗∗∗ -9.430∗∗∗ -16.29∗∗∗
(1.288) (1.849) (0.981) (1.253) (1.928) (3.104) (1.821) (1.366)
q50
In & Out AGOA -2.970∗∗∗ -2.626∗∗∗ -0.899∗∗∗ 1.656∗∗∗ -1.484∗∗∗ -2.311∗∗∗ -0.929∗∗ -0.267
(0.295) (0.239) (0.226) (0.335) (0.265) (0.599) (0.289) (0.182)
Constant -18.95∗∗∗ -5.174∗∗∗ -14.23∗∗∗ -24.16∗∗∗ -19.01∗∗∗ -18.58∗∗∗ -14.15∗∗∗ -14.38∗∗∗
(1.455) (0.838) (0.863) (1.373) (0.970) (1.429) (1.388) (0.744)
q75
In & Out AGOA -4.796∗∗∗ -2.635∗∗∗ -1.554∗∗∗ 0.906∗∗ -1.123∗∗∗ -1.166 -1.565∗∗∗ -0.763∗∗∗
(0.528) (0.417) (0.388) (0.303) (0.316) (1.183) (0.218) (0.203)
Constant -11.52∗∗∗ -0.868 -10.64∗∗∗ -18.30∗∗∗ -15.56∗∗∗ -14.38∗∗∗ -13.51∗∗∗ -11.79∗∗∗
(2.081) (0.925) (1.661) (2.491) (0.961) (1.237) (1.011) (0.929)
q95
In & Out AGOA -1.223 -1.688∗ 0.850 -1.313∗∗ -2.630∗∗∗ 0.832∗ -3.716∗∗∗ -2.222∗∗∗
(0.777) (0.679) (0.488) (0.441) (0.526) (0.391) (0.393) (0.315)
Constant 5.180∗ -0.813 -0.474 -9.349∗∗ -2.073 -2.856 -12.64∗∗∗ -11.84∗∗∗
(2.408) (0.720) (0.684) (3.074) (3.652) (2.428) (2.657) (1.574)
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mundlak Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 989 1005 947 903 912 803 1021 1026
Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications in parenthesis. Dependent variables is exports. Quantiles selected are .25, .50 .75 & .95. Controls include: English,
Spanish & landlocked dummies, logs of distance (weighted), area & GDP. ’All’ indicates that all AGOA beneficiaries are included irrespective of whether they are
removed from the programme. ’In & Out’ are countries that are removed from the programme at least once. ’Always’ are countries that have consistently been
recipients from the beginning of the programme (i.e. from 2001/2003). ’EBA & AGOA’ are countries that are both members of AGOA and EBA and have continuously
been beneficiaries. AMDS–Agriculture, meat and dairy, seafood; FBTWP–Food, beverages, tobacco, wood, paper; EI–Extractive industries; CPR–Chemicals, plastics,
rubber; TALF–Textiles, apparel, leather, footwear; ISOM–Iron, steel, and other metals; METE–Machinery, electronics, transportation equipment; OI–Other industries.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table D.32: Quantile regression estimates for exports to the USA: All countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TALF AMDS FBTWP EI CPR ISOM METE OI
q25
All AGOA -2.535∗∗∗ -1.549∗∗∗ -1.369∗∗∗ -1.172∗∗ -2.282∗∗∗ -2.106∗∗∗ -1.736∗∗∗ -1.666∗∗∗
(0.272) (0.236) (0.199) (0.411) (0.354) (0.352) (0.213) (0.177)
Constant -20.47∗∗∗ -6.932∗∗∗ -11.42∗∗∗ -26.04∗∗∗ -21.73∗∗∗ -14.46∗∗∗ -10.79∗∗∗ -14.82∗∗∗
(1.354) (1.546) (0.932) (1.310) (1.564) (2.620) (1.526) (1.066)
q50
All AGOA -2.828∗∗∗ -2.080∗∗∗ -1.289∗∗∗ 0.366 -1.729∗∗∗ -1.904∗∗∗ -2.037∗∗∗ -0.831∗∗∗
(0.291) (0.219) (0.158) (0.311) (0.225) (0.362) (0.188) (0.150)
Constant -17.74∗∗∗ -4.338∗∗∗ -13.47∗∗∗ -23.17∗∗∗ -16.26∗∗∗ -16.38∗∗∗ -11.75∗∗∗ -13.68∗∗∗
(1.775) (0.774) (0.725) (1.590) (1.101) (1.242) (1.186) (0.665)
q75
All AGOA -3.410∗∗∗ -1.586∗∗∗ -1.643∗∗∗ 0.874∗∗ -1.311∗∗∗ -0.0446 -1.676∗∗∗ -1.130∗∗∗
(0.393) (0.176) (0.257) (0.302) (0.253) (0.424) (0.238) (0.151)
Constant -9.194∗∗∗ 0.170 -7.439∗∗∗ -19.29∗∗∗ -13.24∗∗∗ -14.61∗∗∗ -10.92∗∗∗ -10.27∗∗∗
(1.927) (1.079) (1.991) (2.247) (1.431) (1.321) (1.321) (1.037)
q95
All AGOA -1.775∗∗∗ -2.240∗∗∗ -0.642∗ 1.509∗∗∗ -0.882∗ 0.0513 -2.903∗∗∗ -1.703∗∗∗
(0.250) (0.173) (0.326) (0.251) (0.383) (0.382) (0.319) (0.330)
Constant 12.41∗∗∗ 0.999 -0.292 -12.30∗∗∗ -1.928 -1.208 -9.675∗∗∗ -10.31∗∗∗
(3.117) (0.992) (1.019) (1.477) (3.408) (2.978) (2.140) (1.736)
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mundlak Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 989 1005 947 903 912 803 1021 1026
Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications in parenthesis. Dependent variables is exports. Quantiles selected are .25, .50 .75 & .95. Controls include: English,
Spanish & landlocked dummies, logs of distance (weighted), area & GDP. ’All’ indicates that all AGOA beneficiaries are included irrespective of whether they are
removed from the programme. ’In & Out’ are countries that are removed from the programme at least once. ’Always’ are countries that have consistently been
recipients from the beginning of the programme (i.e. from 2001/2003). ’EBA & AGOA’ are countries that are both members of AGOA and EBA and have continuously
been beneficiaries. AMDS–Agriculture, meat and dairy, seafood; FBTWP–Food, beverages, tobacco, wood, paper; EI–Extractive industries; CPR–Chemicals, plastics,
rubber; TALF–Textiles, apparel, leather, footwear; ISOM–Iron, steel, and other metals; METE–Machinery, electronics, transportation equipment; OI–Other industries.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table D.33: Quantile regression estimates for exports to the USA: All countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TALF AMDS FBTWP EI CPR ISOM METE OI
q25
EBA & AGOA -1.661∗∗∗ -0.104 -1.644∗∗∗ -3.234∗∗∗ -2.993∗∗∗ -1.530∗∗ -1.914∗∗∗ -2.144∗∗∗
(0.431) (0.276) (0.247) (0.529) (0.311) (0.572) (0.277) (0.174)
Constant -25.78∗∗∗ -10.09∗∗∗ -11.43∗∗∗ -25.15∗∗∗ -23.08∗∗∗ -16.78∗∗∗ -10.43∗∗∗ -15.10∗∗∗
(1.240) (2.137) (0.883) (1.317) (1.684) (3.684) (1.679) (0.989)
q50
EBA & AGOA -1.617∗∗∗ -0.312 -1.806∗∗∗ -1.847∗∗ -3.128∗∗∗ -0.128 -2.262∗∗∗ -2.116∗∗∗
(0.356) (0.390) (0.226) (0.571) (0.373) (0.561) (0.248) (0.260)
Constant -20.43∗∗∗ -5.928∗∗∗ -12.95∗∗∗ -21.86∗∗∗ -17.05∗∗∗ -19.45∗∗∗ -13.00∗∗∗ -13.29∗∗∗
(1.628) (1.121) (0.942) (1.909) (1.013) (1.415) (1.320) (0.617)
q75
EBA & AGOA -3.140∗∗∗ -0.832∗∗∗ -2.332∗∗∗ -0.331 -1.940∗∗∗ -0.0802 -1.953∗∗∗ -1.550∗∗∗
(0.419) (0.171) (0.325) (0.939) (0.324) (0.478) (0.455) (0.262)
Constant -10.24∗∗∗ -0.848 -8.581∗∗∗ -16.23∗∗∗ -13.51∗∗∗ -14.18∗∗∗ -11.66∗∗∗ -9.715∗∗∗
(1.970) (0.956) (1.597) (2.507) (1.143) (1.189) (1.189) (1.105)
q95
EBA & AGOA 0.660 -2.096∗∗∗ -0.642 1.277∗∗∗ -3.801∗∗∗ -0.986∗ -2.716∗∗∗ -2.406∗∗∗
(1.340) (0.143) (0.610) (0.296) (0.658) (0.418) (0.561) (0.364)
Constant -0.00700 -0.828 -0.292 -11.56∗∗∗ -0.619 2.134 -8.873∗ -9.899∗∗∗
(2.077) (0.651) (0.966) (1.779) (3.793) (2.142) (3.649) (1.572)
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mundlak Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 989 1005 947 903 912 803 1021 1026
Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications in parenthesis. Dependent variables is exports. Quantiles selected are .25, .50 .75 & .95. Controls include: English,
Spanish & landlocked dummies, logs of distance (weighted), area & GDP. ’All’ indicates that all AGOA beneficiaries are included irrespective of whether they are
removed from the programme. ’In & Out’ are countries that are removed from the programme at least once. ’Always’ are countries that have consistently been
recipients from the beginning of the programme (i.e. from 2001/2003). ’EBA & AGOA’ are countries that are both members of AGOA and EBA and have continuously
been beneficiaries. AMDS–Agriculture, meat and dairy, seafood; FBTWP–Food, beverages, tobacco, wood, paper; EI–Extractive industries; CPR–Chemicals, plastics,
rubber; TALF–Textiles, apparel, leather, footwear; ISOM–Iron, steel, and other metals; METE–Machinery, electronics, transportation equipment; OI–Other industries.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table D.34: Quantile regression estimates for exports to the USA: All countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TALF AMDS FBTWP EI CPR ISOM METE OI
q25
Always in AGOA -1.623∗∗∗ -0.872∗∗∗ -1.174∗∗∗ -1.243∗∗ -2.567∗∗∗ -1.024∗ -1.575∗∗∗ -1.872∗∗∗
(0.407) (0.263) (0.268) (0.391) (0.359) (0.428) (0.243) (0.140)
Constant -24.48∗∗∗ -9.380∗∗∗ -11.75∗∗∗ -26.44∗∗∗ -23.82∗∗∗ -18.12∗∗∗ -12.08∗∗∗ -15.88∗∗∗
(1.316) (1.746) (1.002) (1.271) (1.648) (3.303) (1.438) (0.788)
q50
Always in AGOA -1.674∗∗∗ -1.502∗∗∗ -1.000∗∗∗ 0.237 -1.602∗∗∗ -0.826 -1.793∗∗∗ -0.963∗∗∗
(0.289) (0.319) (0.186) (0.433) (0.285) (0.463) (0.205) (0.242)
Constant -19.28∗∗∗ -5.181∗∗∗ -14.15∗∗∗ -22.69∗∗∗ -17.59∗∗∗ -18.48∗∗∗ -13.76∗∗∗ -14.04∗∗∗
(1.377) (1.089) (0.675) (1.757) (1.170) (1.400) (1.217) (0.756)
q75
Always in AGOA -2.225∗∗∗ -1.278∗∗∗ -1.127∗∗∗ 0.592 -1.236∗∗∗ 0.680 -1.081∗∗∗ -0.902∗∗∗
(0.555) (0.163) (0.258) (0.444) (0.241) (0.376) (0.252) (0.147)
Constant -11.79∗∗∗ -1.057 -9.849∗∗∗ -17.41∗∗∗ -14.80∗∗∗ -14.33∗∗∗ -12.21∗∗∗ -11.46∗∗∗
(1.881) (1.037) (1.856) (2.398) (1.288) (1.081) (1.195) (1.026)
q95
Always in AGOA -1.245∗∗ -2.268∗∗∗ -0.864∗∗∗ 2.045∗∗∗ -1.251∗ -0.378 -2.622∗∗∗ -0.666
(0.397) (0.137) (0.212) (0.245) (0.521) (0.252) (0.270) (0.549)
Constant 7.170∗ -0.715 0.591 -12.70∗∗∗ -4.123 -0.0549 -11.18∗∗∗ -11.12∗∗∗
(3.408) (0.675) (1.140) (1.239) (3.691) (2.141) (1.917) (1.917)
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mundlak Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 989 1005 947 903 912 803 1021 1026
Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications in parenthesis. Dependent variables is exports. Quantiles selected are .25, .50 .75 & .95. Controls include: English,
Spanish & landlocked dummies, logs of distance (weighted), area & GDP. ’All’ indicates that all AGOA beneficiaries are included irrespective of whether they are
removed from the programme. ’In & Out’ are countries that are removed from the programme at least once. ’Always’ are countries that have consistently been
recipients from the beginning of the programme (i.e. from 2001/2003). ’EBA & AGOA’ are countries that are both members of AGOA and EBA and have continuously
been beneficiaries. AMDS–Agriculture, meat and dairy, seafood; FBTWP–Food, beverages, tobacco, wood, paper; EI–Extractive industries; CPR–Chemicals, plastics,
rubber; TALF–Textiles, apparel, leather, footwear; ISOM–Iron, steel, and other metals; METE–Machinery, electronics, transportation equipment; OI–Other industries.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Further Robustness Checks (Panel Data): excluding selected products and top 5 AGOA coun-
tries and comparison with CBTPA countries
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Table D.35: Quantile regression: Excluding key products
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Exports Exports Exports Exports Exports Exports Exports Exports
q25
All AGOA -0.0284 -0.506∗
(0.229) (0.236)
In & Out AGOA 0.499 0.388
(0.585) (0.438)
Always in AGOA -0.0238 -0.698
(0.342) (0.377)
EBA & AGOA -0.475 -1.673∗∗∗
(0.267) (0.406)
Constant -42.62∗∗∗ -54.65∗∗ -35.24∗∗∗ -28.42∗∗ -23.89∗∗∗ -56.66∗∗∗ -30.42∗∗ -9.040
(5.767) (17.306) (9.614) (9.055) (5.999) (12.398) (11.263) (10.693)
q50
All AGOA -0.901∗∗∗ -1.004∗∗∗
(0.223) (0.292)
In & Out AGOA -0.249 -0.302
(0.477) (0.387)
Always in AGOA -0.963∗∗∗ -1.149∗∗∗
(0.200) (0.241)
EBA & AGOA -0.922∗∗∗ -1.692∗∗∗
(0.243) (0.271)
Constant -39.97∗∗∗ -55.65∗∗∗ -40.02∗∗∗ -45.56∗∗∗ -39.53∗∗∗ -67.22∗∗∗ -44.08∗∗∗ -32.92∗∗∗
(4.124) (7.878) (6.420) (6.873) (6.998) (6.788) (4.254) (6.141)
q75
All AGOA -0.840∗∗ -1.596∗∗
(0.263) (0.546)
In & Out AGOA -0.219 -1.545∗
(0.669) (0.763)
Always in AGOA -0.848∗∗∗ -1.389∗∗∗
(0.230) (0.341)
EBA & AGOA -0.789 -1.329∗
(0.472) (0.565)
Constant -37.09∗∗∗ -39.99∗∗∗ -37.85∗∗∗ -37.32∗∗∗ -43.42∗∗∗ -56.62∗∗∗ -39.22∗∗∗ -34.55∗∗∗
(3.820) (6.491) (3.898) (5.580) (7.352) (9.390) (4.864) (5.185)
q95
All AGOA -0.551∗∗∗ -2.082∗∗∗
(0.144) (0.194)
In & Out AGOA -1.429∗∗∗ -2.806∗∗∗
(0.327) (0.269)
Always in AGOA -2.513∗∗∗ -2.735∗∗∗
(0.425) (0.519)
EBA & AGOA -0.881 -1.048
(0.520) (0.864)
Constant -36.63∗∗∗ -21.92∗∗∗ -29.15∗∗∗ -47.28∗∗∗ -33.92∗∗∗ -40.70∗∗∗ -37.37∗∗∗ -54.62∗∗∗
(3.516) (6.035) (5.397) (4.200) (3.720) (7.808) (5.079) (9.530)
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mundlak Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 744 405 614 494 738 402 614 494
Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications in parenthesis. Dependent variables is exports less extractive industry exports. Quantiles selected are
.25, .50 .75 & .95. Controls include: English, Spanish & landlocked dummies, logs of distance (weighted), area & GDP. ’All’ indicates that all AGOA
beneficiaries are included irrespective of whether they are removed from the programme. ’In & Out’ are countries that are removed from the programme at
least once. ’Always’ are countries that have consistently been recipients from the beginning of the programme (i.e. from 2001/2003). ’EBA & AGOA’ are
countries that are both members of AGOA and EBA and have continuously been beneficiaries. First four columns are for No programme exports, second
four are for GSP and last four are for NonGSP exports ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table D.36: Quantile regression estimates for exports to the USA (excluding top five AGOA
exporters)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exports Exports Exports Exports
q25
All AGOA -0.121
(0.226)
In & Out AGOA 0.0482
(0.502)
Always in AGOA -0.256
(0.279)
EBA & AGOA -0.995∗∗∗
(0.221)
Constant -40.06∗∗∗ -43.41∗∗∗ -45.83∗∗∗ -40.26∗∗∗
(6.021) (6.724) (5.803) (5.587)
q50
All AGOA -0.431∗∗
(0.148)
In & Out AGOA 0.581
(0.312)
Always in AGOA -0.593∗∗∗
(0.152)
EBA & AGOA -1.390∗∗∗
(0.212)
Constant -37.77∗∗∗ -39.50∗∗∗ -42.08∗∗∗ -34.46∗∗∗
(3.755) (4.653) (5.174) (6.087)
q75
All AGOA -0.155
(0.178)
In & Out AGOA -0.159
(0.244)
Always in AGOA -0.370
(0.348)
EBA & AGOA -1.603∗∗∗
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(0.154)
Constant -22.73∗∗∗ -23.80∗∗∗ -25.18∗∗∗ -20.70∗∗∗
(3.373) (5.010) (3.153) (3.428)
q95
All AGOA 0.108
(0.311)
In & Out AGOA -1.273∗∗∗
(0.232)
Always in AGOA 0.683
(0.355)
EBA & AGOA 1.087
(1.070)
Constant -24.68∗∗∗ -11.06 -28.73∗∗∗ -23.87∗∗∗
(5.154) (6.147) (4.639) (6.462)
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mundlak Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 694 624 654 644
Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications in parenthesis. Dependent variables is exports excluding
top five AGOA exporters. Quantiles selected are .25, .50 .75 & .95. Controls include: English, Spanish &
landlocked dummies, logs of distance (weighted), area & GDP. ’All’ indicates that all AGOA beneficiaries
are included irrespective of whether they are removed from the programme. ’In & Out’ are countries that
are removed from the programme at least once. ’Always’ are countries that have consistently been recipients
from the beginning of the programme (i.e. from 2001/2003). ’EBA & AGOA’ are countries that are both
members of AGOA and EBA and have continuously been beneficiaries. First four columns are for exports
to the USA, second four columns are for USA/EU and last four columns are USA/ROW export ratios ∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table D.37: Quantile regression estimates for excluding top five AGOA and key products
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Exports Exports Exports Exports Exports Exports Exports Exports
q25
All AGOA 0.186 -0.419∗
(0.228) (0.212)
In & Out AGOA 0.332 0.860∗∗∗
(0.300) (0.211)
Always in AGOA 0.121 -0.673∗∗
(0.191) (0.214)
EBA & AGOA -0.318 -1.870∗∗∗
(0.237) (0.285)
Constant -45.87∗∗∗ -46.66∗∗∗ -45.72∗∗∗ -46.64∗∗∗ -26.98∗∗∗ -37.46∗∗∗ -33.42∗∗∗ -49.57∗∗∗
(6.589) (4.070) (7.046) (4.892) (6.162) (8.563) (9.842) (9.444)
q50
All AGOA -0.557∗∗∗ -0.724∗
(0.162) (0.325)
In & Out AGOA 0.422 0.706∗
(0.333) (0.288)
Always in AGOA -0.550∗∗∗ -1.113∗∗∗
(0.117) (0.184)
EBA & AGOA -0.934∗∗∗ -1.356∗∗∗
(0.217) (0.206)
Constant -42.94∗∗∗ -52.86∗∗∗ -47.94∗∗∗ -48.78∗∗∗ -45.00∗∗∗ -58.21∗∗∗ -50.41∗∗∗ -46.58∗∗∗
(5.506) (4.044) (3.982) (3.848) (6.338) (4.894) (5.674) (6.243)
q75
All AGOA -0.596∗ -1.126∗∗∗
(0.296) (0.339)
In & Out AGOA 0.974 -0.739
(0.653) (0.402)
Always in AGOA -0.766∗∗ -0.532
(0.243) (0.358)
EBA & AGOA -0.760∗ -0.780∗∗
(0.321) (0.301)
Constant -41.67∗∗∗ -46.17∗∗∗ -41.38∗∗∗ -42.70∗∗∗ -49.51∗∗∗ -55.16∗∗∗ -55.37∗∗∗ -52.81∗∗∗
(4.121) (4.125) (4.671) (4.447) (3.925) (2.353) (3.756) (5.545)
q95
All AGOA -0.430∗ -1.831∗∗∗
(0.167) (0.304)
In & Out AGOA -0.0968 -2.488∗∗∗
(0.195) (0.380)
Always in AGOA -1.512∗∗ -1.141∗∗
(0.509) (0.376)
EBA & AGOA -0.134 -0.728
(0.497) (0.558)
Constant -36.90∗∗∗ -40.07∗∗∗ -39.34∗∗∗ -41.58∗∗∗ -34.57∗∗∗ -68.68∗∗∗ -59.82∗∗∗ -59.38∗∗∗
(3.777) (5.274) (3.792) (5.626) (3.677) (4.739) (6.435) (7.567)
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mundlak Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 694 624 654 644 688 621 651 641
Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications in parenthesis. Dependent variables is exports. Quantiles selected are .25, .50 .75 & .95. Controls
include: English, Spanish & landlocked dummies, logs of distance (weighted), area & GDP. ’All’ indicates that all AGOA beneficiaries are included
irrespective of whether they are removed from the programme. ’In & Out’ are countries that are removed from the programme at least once. ’Always’
are countries that have consistently been recipients from the beginning of the programme (i.e. from 2001/2003). ’EBA & AGOA’ are countries that
are both members of AGOA and EBA and have continuously been beneficiaries. First four columns are for exports to the USA, second four columns
are for USA/EU and last four columns are USA/ROW export ratios ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table D.38: Robustness: Quantile regression estimates–fuel and apparel & textile exports, 1975 -
2012
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fuel1 Textile1 Fuel2 Textile2 Fuel3 Textile3
AGOA Treatment 0.0908 -2.031∗∗∗ -0.440 -2.830∗∗∗ 0.536 -1.885∗∗∗
(1.497) (0.463) (1.026) (0.709) (1.307) (0.451)
Constant -90.30∗∗∗ -69.68∗∗∗ -29.40 -73.97∗∗∗ -36.79 -58.94∗∗∗
(16.821) (5.815) (27.736) (10.117) (23.983) (7.737)
q50
AGOA Treatment 0.764 -2.692∗∗∗ 3.443∗∗∗ -3.765∗∗∗ 1.592 -2.887∗∗∗
(0.805) (0.303) (0.952) (0.481) (0.930) (0.301)
Constant -39.03∗∗∗ -58.88∗∗∗ -41.54∗∗∗ -48.42∗∗∗ -31.98∗∗ -51.88∗∗∗
(7.348) (3.527) (9.032) (6.360) (11.184) (4.518)
q75
AGOA Treatment 1.949∗∗ -2.909∗∗∗ 7.605∗∗∗ -4.031∗∗∗ 2.994∗∗∗ -2.768∗∗∗
(0.595) (0.384) (1.005) (0.412) (0.877) (0.336)
Constant 4.251 -55.39∗∗∗ -11.76 -45.26∗∗∗ 2.172 -43.88∗∗∗
(6.051) (2.826) (20.380) (4.836) (9.697) (3.674)
q90
AGOA Treatment 2.340∗∗∗ -2.519∗∗∗ 5.538∗∗∗ -3.998∗∗∗ 2.414∗∗∗ -2.785∗∗∗
(0.484) (0.334) (1.629) (0.548) (0.680) (0.355)
Constant 0.574 -59.44∗∗∗ -30.16 -53.29∗∗∗ -26.10 -47.27∗∗∗
(14.480) (3.249) (20.126) (6.524) (20.115) (3.273)
q95
AGOA Treatment 1.477∗∗ -2.811∗∗∗ 4.142∗∗ -3.814∗∗∗ 1.904∗∗ -2.598∗∗∗
(0.547) (0.321) (1.266) (0.548) (0.601) (0.320)
Constant 29.25 -53.73∗∗∗ -23.45 -42.09∗∗∗ 8.143 -40.40∗∗∗
(15.808) (2.065) (20.590) (9.413) (24.520) (3.243)
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mundlak Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1920 2000 820 768 1314 1313
Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications in parenthesis. Dependent variables is imports by USA. Quantiles selected are 0.25, 0.50
0.75 0.90 & 0.95. Other Controls not shown include: log of weighted distance, log of area, English, Spanish & landlocked dummies. AGOA
dummy = 1 in year of provision and zero otherwise. Countries provided AGOA in December of the year of provision are coded as having
AGOA the following year. 1 : Data is for the period 1975 - 2012. 2 : Data is for the period 2000 - 2012. 3 : Data is for the period 1990 - 2012.
Apparel & Textile products are based on SITC 26–clothing, 65–textile, yarn, fabrics, made up articles, etc. & 84–textile fibres, not manufacture
& waste; Fuel products based on SITC 3–Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials (SITC Rev. 1). ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗
p < 0.001
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Table D.41: A comparison of estimates: Quantile Regression, Penalized Fixed Effects (PFE),
Mundlak and ordinary Fixed Effect (OFE) regressions
Penalized Fixed effects Mundlak Mundlak Fixed Effects Fixed Effects
Coeff. Std. Error t value Pr(> |t|)
USA (common support), λ = 5
(Intercept)[0.25] -46.180 6.636 -6.959 0.000 -39.33*** -39.12*** -29.67*** -31.41***
All AGOA[0.25] -0.183 0.322 -0.568 0.570 -0.163 -0.288 0.278 0.177
(Intercept)[0.5] -38.785 5.784 -6.706 0.000 -39.17*** -38.70*** -28.35** -22.78*
All AGOA[0.5] -0.288 0.315 -0.914 0.361 -0.118 -0.0759 0.342 -0.240
(Intercept)[0.75] -35.249 5.545 -6.357 0.000 -22.96*** -23.87*** -37.59*** -33.58***
All AGOA[0.75] -0.357 0.332 -1.075 0.283 0.189 0.150 -0.351 -0.881*
(Intercept)[0.95] -29.785 8.827 -3.374 0.001 -23.53*** -24.19*** -33.40*** -27.82***
All AGOA[0.95] -0.623 0.499 -1.249 0.212 0.688*** 0.699*** -0.545 -1.107***
USA (common support), λ = 3
(Intercept)[0.25] -41.539 5.836 -7.117 0.000 -39.33*** -39.12*** -29.67*** -31.41***
All AGOA[0.25] -0.447 0.277 -1.616 0.107 -0.163 -0.288 0.278 0.177
(Intercept)[0.5] -38.568 5.044 -7.646 0.000 -39.17*** -38.70*** -28.35** -22.78*
All AGOA[0.5] -0.616 0.260 -2.366 0.018 -0.118 -0.0759 0.342 -0.240
(Intercept)[0.75] -33.693 4.832 -6.972 0.000 -22.96*** -23.87*** -37.59*** -33.58***
All AGOA[0.75] -0.589 0.263 -2.245 0.025 0.189 0.150 -0.351 -0.881*
(Intercept)[0.95] -27.779 6.247 -4.447 0.000 -23.53*** -24.19*** -33.40*** -27.82***
All AGOA[0.95] -0.874 0.334 -2.621 0.009 0.688*** 0.699*** -0.545 -1.107***
USA (All countries), λ = 5
(Intercept)[0.25] -4.591 3.728 -1.232 0.218 -14.02*** -13.68*** -0.836 40.38***
All AGOA[0.25] -0.508 0.300 -1.690 0.091 -0.455** -0.470** 1.945** 0.730
(Intercept)[0.5] -0.745 3.038 -0.245 0.806 -1.869 -2.065 -1.011 39.17***
All AGOA[0.5] -0.530 0.274 -1.935 0.053 -0.346* -0.355* 1.622* 0.559
(Intercept)[0.75] -1.057 2.736 -0.386 0.699 -0.964 -0.532 3.660 38.13***
All AGOA[0.75] -0.548 0.273 -2.008 0.045 -0.196 -0.132 1.513* 1.988**
(Intercept)[0.95] -1.419 2.556 -0.555 0.579 -3.561** -2.478** 1.557 34.12***
All AGOA[0.95] -0.634 0.361 -1.754 0.080 0.224 0.319** 0.712 1.178*
USA (All countries), λ = 3
(Intercept)[0.25] 2.876 2.870 1.002 0.317 -14.02*** -13.68*** -0.836 40.38***
All AGOA[0.25] -0.515 0.252 -2.045 0.041 -0.455** -0.470** 1.945** 0.730
(Intercept)[0.5] 4.230 2.378 1.779 0.076 -1.869 -2.065 -1.011 39.17***
All AGOA[0.5] -0.580 0.228 -2.541 0.011 -0.346* -0.355* 1.622* 0.559
(Intercept)[0.75] 5.031 2.154 2.336 0.020 -0.964 -0.532 3.660 38.13***
All AGOA[0.75] -0.565 0.228 -2.475 0.014 -0.196 -0.132 1.513* 1.988**
(Intercept)[0.95] 4.863 2.360 2.060 0.040 -3.561** -2.478** 1.557 34.12***
All AGOA[0.95] -0.544 0.280 -1.941 0.053 0.224 0.319** 0.712 1.178*
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies No Yes No Yes No
Fixed Effects Yes No No Yes Yes
Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications (also for Mundlak & fixed effects estimates but are not shown). Quantile is
indicated in square brackets in the first column. Dependent variable is exports to the USA. Koenker’s Penalized Fixed Effect
(PFE) estimates are obtained from the package ”rqpd” in R, all remaining estimates are obtained using the Stata statistical
software. We were unable to obtain estimates with time dummies based on the penalized fixed effects estimator, hence, these
are not reported. Those of the two other estimators are reported. The control variables are the same as in the text: English,
Spanish & landlocked dummies, logs of weighted distance, area. Estimates are based on the minimized Gaussian l1 penalty
min(α,β)
∑q
k=1
∑n
j=1
∑m
i=1 wkρτk (yij −αi−xTijβ(τk)) +λ
∑n
i=1 |αi|. The λ choices used are λ = 3 & λ = 5. As
λ → ∞ the fixed effects αˆi → 0, for all i’s. The difference across the coefficients in the last two columns for the ordinary
fixed effects estimation is larger compared to the difference across the Mundlak estimates. On the contrary, for the Mundlak
estimates, there are a few cases where the estimates are similar and only marginally different. This indicates that for the
ordinary fixed effects the inclusion of additional variables can lead to wide swings in the estimates. Unfortunately, we are
unable to show this for the PFE, but then we expect adding additional sets of variables to affect the coefficient estimates. This
makes the estimates of the Mundlak random effects more stable across different parameterizations of our model. Additionally,
the Mundlak estimates in several cases are closer to the PFE estimates than the ordinary fixed effects estimator. This indicates
that there is some parameterization of λ that would yield estimates similar to those of the Mundlak estimator. For now, the
ordinary fixed effects estimates can be taken as the upper bound while our PFE estimates provide the lower bound of the
impact.
